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THE
NEW ENGLANDER.

EDITED BY

GEORGE P. FISHER, TIMOTHY DWIGHT, WILLIAM L. KINGSLEY,

WITH THE COÖPERATION OF

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ARTICLE I.—THE ROMAN ELEMENT IN MODERN
CIVILIZATION.

Histoire de la Civilisation en Europe depuis la Chute de l'Empire Romain, jusqu'à la Révolution Française. Par M. GUIZOT. Huitième Edition. Paris, 1864.

THE lectures upon European Civilization which M. Guizot gave at the Sorbonne during the three stormy years that precluded the Revolution of July, are justly held to have marked an epoch in the study of Mediæval history. In the prime of life, with an established reputation, with the enthusiastic sympathy of an impressible and brilliant auditory, the lecturer lacked no stimulus for the exercise of his finest powers. The exceptional position in which he stood added zest to his instructions. When, in the autumn of 1812, he commenced his academical career, he was young and unknown, and his hearers were few in number. His own tastes and associations at this time were almost exclusively connected with a literary calling. The Restoration opened before him a new path, and brought him into contact with new questions; yet when in 1825,

after enlarged experience, he discussed the political development of Europe, with the twofold purpose of combating revolutionary theories and reconciling liberty with social order, he found his hearers little disposed to follow and still less to accept his views, and just at the moment when their prejudices began to melt, his lectures were interdicted by the Villèle ministry. This ill-timed interference with the liberty of teaching only served, however, to kindle a more lively curiosity when, three years later, M. Guizot was permitted to resume his chair. No University professor in modern times had been greeted with such a hearing. Young and old, Frenchman and foreigner, the secluded scholar and the busy politician, listened with the same delight, as the lecturer, luminously expounding the complex elements of modern civilization, and tracing the indissoluble alliance of the present with the past, constantly enforced the impressive truth that those who reject historical traditions and sever the ties which unite successive ages, are at war with one of the distinctive and sovereign instincts of human nature. Thus discussing the grandest themes, and addressed to most cultivated minds, the enthusiasm awakened by these lectures, and the lectures of MM. Villemaine and Cousin at the same time, recalled the palmy days when Abelard and Peter Lombard were followed by admiring throngs, and *Nos fuimus in Galandia* was a password among scholars all over Europe. After thirty years, years of such triumph and disappointment as are the lot of few, M. Guizot, in his Memoirs, vividly recalls the impressions of this period. That he should prefer to leave untouched the paragraphs which were greeted with so much applause, and which have been assigned a rank in French historical literature beside the pages of Bossuet and Montesquieu, can occasion no surprise. It would be doing the illustrious author gross injustice to attribute this reluctance to modify his work to any disposition to undervalue the result of later researches, or to the pardonable complacency in which an old man might be permitted to indulge. In the preface to the sixth edition of his lectures, of which the one before us is simply a re-issue, he uses the following language: "I have changed nothing in the work. I have not even modified certain ideas which at the present day I might present in a form more symmetrical

or more complete. I have made it a duty to leave these lectures as they appeared, and as the public has been accustomed to receive them for thirty years. I might add much to such a rapid sketch of the character and progress of European civilization; I have found nothing that I ought to retract; and I dare believe to-day, as thirty years ago, that in all its essential features this sketch is true."

While we have no disposition to find fault with this natural preference of the author for presenting the lectures in their original form, it must always remain a matter of profound regret that he did not take pains to indicate, in the form of notes, some of the more important, at least, of those modifications which his mature reflections had suggested. By this course the lectures would have lost none of their interesting associations, while their value to the student might have been considerably increased. We cannot help thinking that had M. Guizot devoted to this useful labor the time which he has consumed in discussing theological truths, he would have rendered a far more signal service to society. In his Preface he takes notice only of those criticisms upon his lectures which have been made by members of the Church of Rome, of which the well known work of Balmez is perhaps deserving of most consideration; but with regard to some other subjects than those connected with radical differences of religious thought, the conclusions of M. Guizot are open to revision, and the very general approbation given to his lectures as a text-book for historical instruction imposes upon others the task which he has not seen fit himself to undertake. It does not in the least detract from the recognized merit of these lectures, to say that the researches of an entire generation of historical scholars have added something to our knowledge. Nor can the most searching criticism ignore the debt that historical study owes to M. Guizot's labors and example. At a time when historical inquiry hesitated between wild hypothesis and juiceless compilation, he achieved a graceful union of philosophy with fact. And if others have traced relations which he overlooked, it has often been from following the path which he first pointed out with such distinctness.

For the execution of the great task which, on the whole, he accomplished with such brilliant success, M. Guizot possessed

qualifications such as seldom can meet in a single person. It would be easy to give the names of more acute thinkers, of more profound scholars, of more successful statesmen. France alone might supply us with illustrations. But it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find one in whom these three characteristics were so happily combined. It is this rare union of qualities that constitutes M. Guizot's distinctive superiority. It forms the basis of that just discernment and that excellent balance so conspicuous in all his writings. He is never misled by fine-spun or pedantic theories. His insight into the past is not the blurred vision of the antiquary, but the discriminating glance of one versed in affairs. His reasonings are not the reasonings of a recluse, but of a man of the world. He is an ardent politician as well as a University professor, and in studying the twelfth century never forgets the nineteenth. His lessons are for the statesman as well as for the scholar, and have a charm for readers who seldom meddle with mere abstract speculations. Mr. Gibbon used to think that his history had been the gainer even for the short time that he sat as a silent spectator on the Treasury bench; but M. Guizot's experience of political life, at the time when these lectures were delivered, was already various and intimate.

While, however, all this has unquestionably added to the interest and practical value of M. Guizot's observations, it may be questioned whether the gain has not been accompanied with corresponding loss. There is doubtless an advantage in thus surveying the past through the windows of the present, but it must be remembered that these windows are made up of "many-colored glass." There is great danger that immediate issues may tint the landscape, and distort that accurate historical perspective which alone reveals events in their right relation. Those outlines are made prominent which illustrate the problems of the day, rather than those which in each successive period were really most conspicuous. A truly scientific history must be conceived in strict accordance with the actual course of things. Such a history will doubtless prove far more dry to the general reader; its practical lessons may be far less obvious; but it will be far more symmetrical in structure, and will embrace all phenomena with far more fairness and completeness. Such an ideal of historical composition could never,

perhaps, be fully reached, but it furnishes the standard by which the value of every philosophical investigation of history must be measured.

Despite his studied reserve, it is impossible to read M. Guizot's lectures without being reminded of his relation to contemporary politics. He is not only a Frenchman, but a Frenchman of the Restoration, of the Charter, and of the Chamber of Deputies. Commencing public life in 1814, when the Bourbons first returned, sent the following year to Ghent as representative of the Constitutional Royalist Committee, holding office under two successive ministries of Louis XVIII, a vigorous pamphleteer, silenced as professor for his pronounced opposition to the Royalist reaction under Charles X, it would have been difficult for M. Guizot to dis sever his speculations from problems in which his interest was so lively. Always carefully eschewing any direct allusion to questions of the day, there yet lurks a tacit application which the dullest reader cannot mistake. Thus, in the course of 1825, while determined, as he declares, "to restrain himself within the sphere of general ideas and by-gone facts," he chose a theme, the origin of representative government, which made it hardly possible for him not to trench upon issues then agitating French society to its very foundations. In discussing the political problems of the Plantagenets, he could not avoid sifting the maxims of the Bourbons. And when he resumed his instructions in 1828, his overmastering predilections would not allow him to follow any other course. His aim, as he candidly avows, was not simply to satisfy "a scientific or literary curiosity." In all his speculations he keeps steadily in view a practical end. But is this a safe course for an historian of civilization to follow? Do not M. Guizot's own lectures reveal the limitation of such a method? Is not his survey too much confined to a special class of facts, and are not these facts considered too much with reference to a single theory? Not only is monarchy held up as the consummate flower of political development, but the particular type of monarchy which M. Guizot and his friends were just at that juncture seeking to establish. The Lectures on Civilization are in fact a vindication from history of the pet notions of the Doctrinaires. The Sorbonne professor seems seated on the famous

sofa of Count Beugnot. This must have added a most delightful flavor to the author's views when they were first expounded, and still gives them a heightened interest for any reader familiar with French history since the Restoration. Yet it just as much detracts from the scientific value of M. Guizot's discussions. Preoccupied with a political theory, he has been betrayed into giving undue prominence to certain phenomena and neglecting others, and has presented an outline of the development of European society which, however masterly in some respects, is in others inaccurate and incomplete. We shall indicate briefly the grounds on which this criticism is based.

The distinctive excellence of M. Guizot as an historical lecturer consists in the clearness and vigor of his outline. Before his time the long stretch of years so contemptuously designated the Dark Ages, was hardly better understood than Central Africa before the discoveries of Livingstone and Baker. The origin of European institutions was involved in as much obscurity as the sources of the Nile. By the ordinary reader the whole period was consigned to the limbo of forgetfulness, as an age of hopeless confusion, without aims, without progress, and without results. The ludicrous amount of misconception that prevailed was shown in the popular belief that the wondrous architectural creations of the thirteenth century were the work of the roving warriors who wrested the sceptre of the West from the feeble successor of Augustus. A learned English bishop even proposed the theory that the pointed arch was first suggested to them by the intertwining branches of their native forests. And, absurd as all this was, it was no more so than some of Sir William Blackstone's explanations of the origin of certain English laws. Of course the vast change of sentiment between this century and the last with respect to the Middle Age, is not due to these lectures of M. Guizot. Many causes combined to bring this change about, and the tide had already turned before his name was known to the world of letters. M. Guizot's conspicuous service was in rendering this movement popular. He first unrolled before the eyes of the European public the map whose dust only the most enterprising student had disturbed. His political opinions combined with his rare qualifications to direct unusual attention to his views. No

academic lectures have exerted a more wide-spread influence. To the vast majority of readers he was the first to bring order out of chaos. He traced in luminous lines the grand profile of European progress, and sketched the essential relations of its seemingly discordant and discontinuous elements. Nothing can be finer than the manner in which he condenses into a few pregnant paragraphs the salient features of successive centuries. Let him, for example, be compared with a writer to whom has been assigned, on the roll of English historians, a leading rank, the late Mr. Hallam. Leaving out of account the contrast that would naturally be expected between a course of lectures delivered before an audience and a work designed for perusal in the study, yet how different the conceptions which the two have formed of the Middle Age. To the low estate of historical learning in England must be attributed some part of the general applause that greeted Mr. Hallam's work, a work which, with all its diligent research, is destitute of unity and of those general views which distinguish the philosophical inquirer from the mere compiler. A history less in sympathy with the subject it expounds than Mr. Hallam's "Middle Ages," it would be difficult to name. An English Whig, imbued with the traditions of the Georgian era, has the same appreciation of the political theories of the thirteenth century that a utilitarian philosopher like Mr. Grote has of the metaphysical theories of Plato. M. Guizot is never confused or dry. A pervading instinct of historic unity runs through his pages, and felicitous applications of general principles constantly invest his facts with the charm of an enlarged philosophy. He is always seeking for relations, always confident of tracing in the ceaseless transformations of society some pervading and abiding principle. The service he has rendered in this direction can hardly be too highly estimated. He has surveyed and marked out the vast and untraveled expanse stretching from the fall of the Western Empire, making a fruitful field of what before could only be likened to a "vast Serbonian bog." It would be strange indeed if, in achieving this bold excursion, M. Guizot did not sometimes go astray. It can hardly be regarded as a reproach to his well-earned fame, if we venture the observation that precisely in this, which constitutes his distinctive excellence, may be found his most notable defects.

A criticism that must suggest itself to every reader is that M. Guizot, keenly alive at all times to the political problems of the Restoration, not only assigns to limited monarchy an exaggerated function, but is inclined to attach to administrative forms in general too great a weight. We do not forget that he carefully discriminates between the two different points of view from which the history of civilization may be considered, and that he only professes to discuss social and political phenomena, but even in tracing the connection of external facts the body cannot be separated from the spirit, and we shall seek in vain to comprehend institutions even, if we do not at the same time appreciate the invisible forces that have given them shape. The true relations of successive ages and institutions are seldom the external ones, and like the fabled fount, the stream of influences sometimes wholly disappears only to bubble up in a new form and in an unexpected quarter. It is a defect in M. Guizot that he is too prone to seek for unity in external facts, and that he sometimes misses the more essential relations of historical phenomena. Thus in his analysis of the original elements of European civilization, after making the obvious division into the Roman, Christian, and Germanic influences, and laying down the principle that the abounding and diversified development of modern Europe is due to the co-existence of these various systems, he fails to define with accuracy the way in which this mutual modification was effected. In M. Guizot's opinion the principal legacy of Rome to the civilization that followed was the Municipal system, while to Christianity we are indebted for the Mediæval Church, and to the Germans for the Feudal tenure. But surely this is stopping very far short of a complete analysis. The decaying city corporations of Italy and Gaul, which had been almost crushed beneath the tremendous burden of imperial taxation, and were kept alive at last mainly through the new vigor which the Church supplied, by no means embodied the most energetic impulse that Rome gave to the new social order. Christianity, even keeping in mind the distinction on which M. Guizot insists between Christianity as a simple belief and Christianity as a corporate body, fails wholly to account for the Church—we will not say of Hildebrand—but of Leo and Gregory the 1st. So Feudalism, looked at as a developed system, can be only

very partially explained from the primitive customs of the tribes that followed Theodoric and Clovis. The course of European civilization from the 5th to the 12th century must remain in many essential aspects an inexplicable enigma, if we do not trace with more precision the mode in which these elements exerted their mutual influence. For they did not exist apart, but were strangely woven together, and it was from this blending that the two prime phenomena of the Middle Age, its peculiar social and its peculiar ecclesiastical arrangements, sprung. It seems unaccountable that while M. Guizot so correctly discriminated these elements at the outset, he should have failed so wholly to note their subsequent relations. While he subjects both Feudalism and the Church to a searching study, and explains in detail some of their subordinate features, we look in vain for any explanation of the influences that shaped these unique and sovereign facts.

During the early Middle Age, that is, from the fifth to the tenth centuries, the influence of Rome was felt not so much in political as in social and religious institutions. In saying this we do not forget the grand experiment of Charlemagne; but the more carefully that experiment is studied, the more thoroughly shall we be convinced that Charlemagne was influenced to a very slight extent by ideas derived from Rome. It may be true, as M. Guizot claims in his *Lectures on Civilization in France*, that it was "towards Roman civilization that Charlemagne's ambition tended;"* but nothing can be more inaccurate than Sir James Stephen's sweeping statement that "the great aim and glory of the life of Charlemagne had been the revival of the Empire of Rome in an intimate alliance with the Church of Rome." This may have been the motive of the Pope when he placed the crown of the West on the brow of the Frankish king; but there is no evidence that it had any weight with Charlemagne himself. How little he was swayed by the idea of imperial unity was shown in his subsequent division of the Empire, in his choice of a capital, his love of the old Germanic lays, his zeal for preserving the laws and customs of the different nations subject to his sway, his substitution of German for Latin names

* Waits, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, B. iii, s. 205, will not concede even this.

of the months and winds, and his purpose, unfortunately never carried out, of compiling a grammar of the Teutonic tongues. In his will, as preserved by Eginhard, he makes no discrimination between Rome and his other cities, and in his capitularies his regal is usually coupled with his imperial title—*Rex Francorum invictissimus et romani rector imperii*. The great Karl remained till his death a thorough Teuton. After his death poets writing in Latin, and nursed in the traditions of Latin literature, sung of his restoring the throne of Romulus precisely as the English poets of the last century used to borrow the conventional imagery of Greek mythology; but the scholar who in our own time has subjected this period to the most elaborate study, a scholar whose early death, and by his own hand, was an irreparable loss to French historical literature, has shown most conclusively that political conceptions borrowed from Byzantium or Rome played a subordinate part in the policy of Charlemagne.* Mr. Bryce, who in his valuable monograph on the Holy Roman Empire seems somewhat inclined to the common view, still makes the important admission that the bond by which the Empire was held together was not so much civil as ecclesiastical. With regard to Charlemagne's motive in accepting the title of Emperor of Rome, there seems much weight in Mr. Maine's suggestion, that in the absence of any conception of territorial sovereignty, the imperial title was the only one that conveyed the notion of universal rule.† For the true sway of the imperial idea, we must look to a later period. It was not with the Frankish, but with the Swabian and Hohenstaufen princes that the mighty influence of Rome made itself felt in politics, embodied in that marvellous creation of fact and theory, the Holy Roman Empire, for which Barbarossa fought and Dante suffered and wrote. But centuries before this formal revival of the Empire the influence of Rome had been silently shaping mediæval society.

The history of Europe after the fifth century may be broadly distributed into two dominant facts, one ecclesiastical and the other social, the warp and woof of the Middle Age. The first of these was Latin Christianity, and the second the Feudal

* Lehuërou, *Hist. des Inst. Carolingiennes*, 363, cf. Waitz, i, 183.

† *Ancient Law*, 99-102.

system. Neither of these could have been what they were but for the impulse of Roman civilization. If carefully examined, they show unmistakable traces of their Roman origin. The real unity of European development cannot, indeed, be conceived without connecting them with Roman institutions. The sway exerted by the municipalities, even if it be admitted that the municipalities survived the storm of successive invasions, was feeble and partial when compared with this. Yet M. Guizot nowhere notices this connection, nor is there anything that indicates that he recognized what must certainly be regarded as the most remarkable influence, when we consider it in both its aspects, that Rome exerted upon modern civilization. A brief examination will show how serious is this omission.

With regard to the first of these, the influence of Roman ideas in moulding Christianity, we need be less explicit, as the subject has been abundantly explored and is now well understood. M. Guizot claims that to estimate the influence of Christianity upon modern civilization, we must look at it not as a belief but as an institution. We must do more than this; we must look at it as a Roman institution. The Greek Church was an institution, but it never developed any such tendencies or exerted any such influence as the Church of Rome. Greek Christianity was always inquisitive and speculative; aided by the copiousness and precision of an unrivalled language, it did not shrink from investigating the mystery of the Divine nature, and defining with exquisite precision the relation of the Persons in the Godhead. In its polity it closely adhered to the analogy of Greek political life, and remained a federation of ecclesiastical republics, where the whole episcopal hierarchy held the same rank. No central city usurped supremacy; no instinct of centralization ever enthroned a single visible head. The tendency of Latin Christianity was precisely the reverse. Its aims were direct and practical. Its theology dealt with the earnest problems of sin and salvation. Soon as its distinctive character appeared, it showed the old Roman regard for legal form, and the old Roman subordination to recognized authority. In its widest expansion it looked steadily to one center; in its most enthusiastic efforts it acknow-

ledged one rule. Love of unity was its leading feature ; by an irresistible instinct it raised the throne of St. Peter to a supremacy over the whole of Christendom.

No reader of Milman needs to be reminded that the solid ecclesiastical organization which received its shape under the hands of Gregory the Great, was in the main a revival of Roman ideas in a religious garb, just as the statues of the Cæsars were baptised with the names of the Apostles. The pontiffs were mitred consuls. The contrast between the Church to which the Epistle to the Romans was written, and the Church for which the Isidorian Decretals were forged, can only be explained by keeping in mind this fact. It may be doubted whether the verse of Scripture which the Church of Rome puts in the fore front of her claims would ever have been dragged into the arena of controversy, had not the growing power of the Roman bishop suggested the need of some Biblical support. It was Rome and Roman ideas that remodeled the religion of the West, and the universal empire which fell from the feeble grasp of the successors of Trajan and Diocletian was once more arrogantly wielded by Hildebrand and Innocent. Even the renovation of the monastic rule, the great religious revolution of the sixth century, was only another illustration of the same fact. The striking contrast between Eastern and Western monachism was due simply to the sway of Roman ideas. It was the subjection of Oriental fervor to Roman love of order. M. Guizot alludes to the Rule of St. Benedict, but he fails to remark that the Rule of St. Benedict was hardly less Roman in its spirit than if it had been directly borrowed from the Theodosian code. And the rapid diffusion of the Rule throughout the West, due in great measure to Gregory the Great, was but another triumph of Roman love of unity.*

M. Guizot, in the extended examination which he devotes to this part of his inquiry, is only willing to admit that the Church cherished an affectionate attachment for the Empire, and that, when she succeeded in converting the Germanic nations, she called upon them to re-establish it ; in other words, that Leo gave the imperial crown to Charlemagne. But the

* Montalembert, *Monks of the West*, ii, 149.

Church did far more than this; she not only sought to re-establish the Empire, but she sought to make herself its perfect counterpart. The first was the suggestion of circumstances, the second was the aim she kept steadily in view for generations. The confused state of Italy, after the overthrow of the Lombards, the increasing anarchy throughout the West, the dread felt by the Popes for the Saracens on the one hand and the Byzantine Court on the other, all conspired to bring about the memorable alliance between the Church and the Franks. It was not so much an affectionate remembrance of the fallen Empire, as the imperious necessity of some strong right arm on which to lean; the spiritual Head of Christendom found that he could not dispense with the temporal.* On the other hand the influence of Rome exerted on the internal development of the Church was organic and continuous. It was already a great fact before Pepin the Short had shut up the last long-haired king in the convent of St. Omer. The Church which in her days of weakness had made it no part of her mission to regenerate Roman society, had now become transformed into a Roman institution. She had become conterminous with the Roman Empire; she eagerly embraced and perpetuated the imperial idea.† Her sees were Roman cities; her dioceses for the most part corresponded with the political divisions. In her growing demand for more rigid uniformity in faith and order, in the increased emphasis which she gave to the notion of a visible unity, she was Rome ruling the souls as she once had ruled the bodies of men. Hobbes, with more insight than M. Guizot, once termed the Church the ghost of the Empire rising from its ruins; but this comparison fails if meant to convey the impression that the successors of St. Peter wielded a shadowy or unsubstantial scepter.

If now we turn to consider the second great characteristic fact of the Middle Age, we shall see that here, too, the influence of Rome, though at first sight less apparent, was in fact no less real. No question connected with this period has been the occasion of more controversy, or has been enveloped in so many misconceptions. From the close of the tenth to the beginning of the fourteenth century, Europe was under the sway

* Lehuërou, 352.

† Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, 12.

of a unique system, a system not so much political as social in its nature,* but coming at last to dominate over State and Church alike. Essentially military in its spirit, ecclesiastical, judicial, and legislative junctions were equally affected by it. Springing from a great public need, it afforded, at a time of universal disintegration, such manifest securities that almost every class sought either power or protection in it. It is the key to the transition from ancient to modern States. The great drama of the Middle Age, the Quarrel of Investitures, was its immediate result; the great heroic achievements of the Middle Age, the Norman conquests of England, of Sicily, of Palestine, were its distinctive work. Its complex code was enforced, with the same rigor, by the banks of the Severn and the Jordan; its judgments were affirmed beneath the oaks of Vincennes and beside the Holy Sepulchre. An accurate comprehension of its nature and effects must lie at the basis of any correct understanding of mediæval or even of modern Europe. Some of our common legal forms carry us back directly to it. The simple deed by which the title to an American farm is conveyed, reminds us of the time when the Feudal institutions were flourishing in full vigor.† The marked distinction between personal and real property that so tenaciously holds its place, a distinction unknown to Roman law, dates from this epoch. From the Feudal compact issued some of the most potent political institutions of modern times. The English constitution, "rising like the proud keep of Windsor with its kindred and coeval towers," bears in every feature of its irregular but massive outline the ineffaceable traces of its Feudal origin. Strangely enough, though English law is thus leavened with Feudal maxims, the great English lawyers seem to have known far less about the Feudal system than those of Germany or France. Mr. Hallam says that Lord Coke, for want of familiarity with it, was unable to explain the Statute of Treasons; and Blackstone writes as if he supposed that it was brought by Clovis into Gaul in the same developed state in which it existed under the successors of Hugh Capet.

* The social basis of Feudalism is most fully investigated by Secretan, *Essai sur la Féodalité*. Lausanne, 1858.

† Pomeroy, *Municipal Law*, 242.

The broad discrepancy of view which has prevailed respecting the origin of the Feudal system, no doubt may be traced in part to the extreme prejudice which for so long a time refused to see anything but anarchy and barbarism in the earlier period of the Middle Age, and in part to national vanity, that insisted on finding all the germs of the social development of Europe in primitive Germanic customs. But all parties agreed in recognizing the importance of the question. Especially by the great historical inquirers of France, has it been regarded as a fundamental problem.* No one can complain of M. Guizot because in a course of a dozen lectures he does not enter at length into this intricate subject. The whole time at his disposal would hardly have sufficed to do it justice. Nor was it any part of his plan to argue questions of mere antiquarian interest. But when he makes the unqualified assertion that the bequests of Rome to modern Europe were the municipal system and the idea of imperial majesty, we cannot but feel regret that his rare power of condensed and lucid statement had not been devoted to a brief exposition of his opinion respecting so important a question as the origin of benefices. From neglecting to do this, he has failed to supply one of the most essential links in the development of modern society, and the student who has no further explanation than these lectures furnish, must miss one of the most striking illustrations of that feature of European civilization of which M. Guizot so strongly and so justly insists, the continuous development that may be traced beneath its diversified shapes.

For M. Guizot's opinions on this important question, we must turn to his *Lectures on Civilization in France*. Here with greater fullness, and on the whole with much fairness, he investigates the nature and influence of the Feudal system. With his usual discrimination, he carefully draws the line between Feudalism in its progressive formation from the fifth to the tenth centuries, and Feudalism in a completely developed system, as it existed during the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries. The neglect of this obvious distinction has been a prime source of the great diversity of opinion that has prevailed. Many of the fierce disputes that were waged from the

* Lehuërou, *Ina. Merovingiennes*, 352.

time of the Feudal publicists of the seventeenth century to the time of Mably and Montlosier, might have been settled at once had this simple fact been kept in mind, that the Feudal system as it existed under the Capetian kings had been five centuries in forming. M. Guizot also analyzes, with sufficient exactness, the constituent elements of Feudalism. These were the unique tenure of territorial property, the amalgamation of property with sovereignty, and the hierarchy of military, legislative, and judicial ties which united the various fief-holders, and established what might be termed a general society. That with this penetrating insight into the nature of Feudal society when it was fully developed, M. Guizot should not have recognized its relation to earlier institutions, that he should still insist on regarding it as an outgrowth of Germanic tribal customs, modified by the alteration in personal relations brought about by the invasions, seems doubly surprising in one usually so quick to trace analogies. It is also singular that one so fond of surveying his subject in its broad aspects should not have had his attention arrested by two patent facts,—that Feudalism prevailed only where the Germanic tribes came into contact with the Empire, having no existence in Sweden, Denmark, and Hungary, and thriving only as a feeble plant in Castile and Portugal; and again, that where the Latin and Germanic elements were most completely fused, as among the Franks, it reached its most vigorous growth, while in countries where the Roman element predominated, as in Italy and Arragon, it prevailed only to a limited extent.*

Yet while M. Guizot thus carefully discriminates the Feudal system into its essential constituent elements, he wholly fails to recognize the common principle on which the whole structure is built, a principle which, had he clearly apprehended it, must have suggested a correct solution of the problem. The circumstance that fiefs were usually held on tenure of military service has naturally led to the conclusion that Feudalism was a military rather than a social system, and thus tended to hide from sight its essential nature. But Feudalism, considered in its legal aspect, was simply a modification of the Law of Contract. It is not going too far to say that the whole Feudal

* Secretan, *Es-sai sur la Féodalité*, 82.

hierarchy reposed on this single idea.* The lord is bound to his man as well as the man to his lord. Sovereignty belonged not to the lord alone, but to the lord and vassal. In this light the mediæval vassal was in some respects the superior of the ancient citizen. The contract thus established implied mutual consent and reciprocal obligation. In it even the king as supreme suzerain was included. According to the strict Feudal theory, he was simply first among his barons. Hugh Capet, haughty as he was, could lay claim to no higher distinction. When he put the question to a rebellious noble, "Who made thee count?" he received the instant retort, "Who made thee king?" According to that remarkable monument of Feudal law, "The Assizes of Jerusalem," a code introduced into Palestine by the conquering Normans, as the Mosaic code had been introduced there by the conquering Israelites twenty-five centuries before, the principle is distinctly laid down that the king as simple seigneur suzerain is bound to his vassals by reciprocal engagements.† Legislative and judicial powers were originally shared by the meanest of his immediate tenants. Mr. Freeman, in his "History of the Norman Conquest," describes the extraordinary pains that William took to secure the full assent of his vassals to his adventurous enterprise. Nor did the influence of the idea of contract stop with this. In time even the serf came to be held responsible only for certain clearly defined duties, and to profit by the guarantees which the Feudal system afforded.

Now how shall we account for this wide-spread application of the idea of Contract? The idea belongs to a developed, not to a crude and unformed society. The extent to which it is applied furnishes an unerring test of the civilization of a people. It was a theory especially elaborated in the Roman code. And bearing this fact in mind, and the other fact just before alluded to, that only when Roman and Germanic institutions are found combined has the feudal principle developed, how can we resist the inference that this singular application of contract law is due to the influence of Rome. Much has

* Laurent, *La Féodalité et l'Eglise*, 60.

† This principle is also clearly recognized by Fortescue, *De Laudibus Legum Angliæ*, cap. xiv.

been written respecting the influence of Roman law during the Middle Age, but the earliest traces of that influence must be sought not at the epoch of the revival of the study of the Justinian legislation by the great jurists of Bologna, nor even in the wrecks of the Theodosian code perpetuated by the municipalities of Italy and Gaul. The earliest and most singular influence of the Roman law was in shaping the Beneficiary Tenure. The sway which vanquished Rome thus exercised over the conquerors, though silent, is unmistakable. No one who carefully compares the social state of the Empire just before its fall with the social state of the new kingdoms reared upon its ruins, can fail to note it. When Rome's military prestige had departed, when the frontiers once guarded by ancient valor had been effaced, when successive hordes of strange invaders had encamped on the Seven Hills, when her territory had been carved into new states, ruled by kings cradled beyond the Danube and the Rhine, the legal conceptions which she had developed with so much precision still held the scepter of civilization over barbarism, and insinuated themselves into the new society that rose from her ruins. The traditions of her legislation thus strangely preserved, were not it is true the majestic and beneficent maxims destined at a later date to regenerate society. They were not the generalized principles which, in modern times, have proved the potent germs of such mighty revolutions. They were rather the exceptions and anomalies of her legislation, the modifications which had been introduced more by the needs of the Lower Empire than by the growth of legal science. But they were not on that account any the less Roman.

A certain class of writers have been only struck with the anarchic character of the early Middle Age. Such writers have dwelt especially on the diversity which it presents in contrast with the order and uniformity of Roman civilization. M. Guizot, it will be remembered, makes this diversity the distinctive characteristic of the mediæval period. And great stress has been laid, in explanation of such a state of things, upon the individualism and love of independence that marked the northern races. Even the peculiar personal legislation, which Savigny has shown had its origin, not in any national pro-

clivity, but simply in the altered circumstances in which the Germanic nations found themselves when settled on Roman soil,* used to be alleged in proof of these characteristics. But the truth is, if we attentively study the social institutions of the new kingdoms established within the Empire, we shall be most impressed, not with their diversity, but with their uniformity. Especially when we consider a fundamental characteristic of society, the distribution of land, shall we find this to be the case. We are liable to misconceive the matter when we describe the settlement of the northern nations within the Empire as a conquest or invasion; with the single exception of the Lombards, every one of those nations was first admitted as an ally. The two Gothic kingdoms, and that of the Burgundians, were established with the express sanction of the imperial government, and remained for some time under its jurisdiction. The kingdom of the Franks seems to have owed its foundation partly to consent and partly to conquest. In all these kingdoms, as is well known, we find the same social phenomena repeated. We find a similar division of landed property, and under different names recognize essentially the same personal distinctions. From these similar conditions it was inevitable that similar tendencies should spring. While, however, in the other kingdoms, these tendencies were modified, or impeded, by a variety of circumstances, with the Franks they were vigorously developed. For an analysis of the results that followed we need only turn to the admirable account of M. Guizot himself.†

If we examine the social state of the Franks after the fifth century, we shall find the lands of the kingdom distributed according to a threefold tenure. The allodial, or freehold proprietors were those whose estates were held in free and absolute possession, the *dominium directum* and the *dominium utile* being united in the same person. These proprietors were the original freemen of the nation, to whom lands in the first instance were

* *Gesch. des Röm. Recht im Mittelalter*, B. i, s. 111. Laurent is still inclined to the view of Montesquieu, *Les Barbares et le Catholicisme*, 169. On the other hand, Waitz agrees with Savigny. *Deutsche Verfassungsgesch.*, B. ii, s. 78, Zweite auflage.

† *Essais sur l'Histoire de France. Quatrième Essai.*

allotted.* Another class were the tributary holders, or those who rented lands of a proprietor, where, in consequence of the great diversity of origin, the diversity of condition was also very marked. A third class were the beneficiary holders, or those who held lands of another, not on condition of paying rent, but of rendering certain services. These services were military, judicial, and domestic. From the operation of various causes, the beneficiary came in time to be the prevailing tenure, and the political institutions were based upon it.

That the Feud of the tenth century was simply a development of the Beneficium of the fifth, is a fact that no longer admits of doubt, so that the inquiry into the origin of Feudalism resolves itself simply into the question—What was the source of the beneficiary tenure? This is found in existence, as we have seen, at the very origin of the Frankish kingdom, and M. Guizot himself correctly describes it as the “cradle of the Feudal system.” The attempt was made by Montesquieu and Mably to show that, at the outset, benefices were held at the pleasure of the grantor, and that benefices for life and hereditary benefices were but successive modifications of this original principle.† But a more careful examination shows that the three forms co-existed from the very beginning and that, as a rule, benefices could be retained so long as the stipulated services were faithfully rendered. At all times we find hereditary benefices the form towards which all benefices naturally tended. The principle that ran through them all was that of holding an estate on condition of rendering a service.

Where now shall we seek for the origin of such a universal practice? M. Guizot deduces it entirely from the modification which the possession of landed property necessarily introduced into the old Germanic relation existing between a chief and his personal followers.‡ This military patronage, he says, was

* M. Guizot, *Essais*, 62, with whom Lahuërou agrees, *Ins. Merov.*, 353, derives allodial from *loos*, *lot*. On the other hand, Grimm derives it from *al* (integer) and *ôd* (*bonum*). *Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer*, 493.

† *Esprit des Loix*, Liv. xxx, c. 16. *Observations sur l'Histoire de France*, Liv. i, c. 4.

‡ *Essais*, 86.

the origin of that aristocratical organization which, at a late period, grew into the Feudal system.* When the Franks were established in Gaul, exchanging a wandering and warlike for a more fixed and peaceful mode of life, the former military tie, now in danger of dissolution, was cemented afresh by these gifts of lands. The institutions which grew out of this were to be attributed to the difference between landed property and any other gifts. The gift of a horse would not tend to separate a warrior from his chief; but the gift of an estate, removing him from the immediate society of his chief, and establishing new and independent interests, must in the end essentially modify the old relationship. By the antagonism of interests thus created, the history of the beneficiary tenures, in M. Guizot's opinion, is to be explained.

Now no one can deny that in the spirit of the Feudal system may be clearly traced the influence of this original Germanic institution of *gasindi*, which Tacitus describes under the name of *comitatus*. From this, unquestionably, the strong personal element in Feudalism must be explained. This remained even after the Feudal system had been reduced to a most complex and rigorous code, and was the source of those peculiar moral features to which its nobleness was due. The relation between the chief of the *gasindi* and his followers was perpetuated in the *antrustion* of the earliest epoch, and survived in the fidelity owed by the vassal to his lord.† But when all this is granted, we still fall very far short of explaining the peculiar nature of the beneficiary tenure, from which the feud, as all admit, must be deduced. There is a fundamental difference between the free, voluntary spirit of the Germanic military band, and the formal, artificial ties created by the benefice. The latter was wholly based upon the possession and use of landed property, creating relations at once personal and real, while the relations existing in the *gasindi* were personal alone. Feudalism was, in its essence, a legal relation based upon ownership of land; of all this in the Germanic *gasindi* we find not the slightest trace.‡ There are other marked distinctions between the Frankish vassalage and the German *comitatus*. Among vassals were found

* *Civ. en Europe*, 62.† *Secretan*, 25.‡ *Secretan*, 26.

every class; it was a relation between persons of every rank; in the great majority of cases it could establish no close personal relationship; only rarely was it connected with domestic life. The tie was by no means the same in every case. A vassal might in some circumstances be strictly dependent on his lord; or he might be an almost independent prince. In short, between the two there was not only an essential difference in nature, but they were established in a different way and led to widely different results. The vassal, too, was originally found with the Franks alone.*

We are forced, therefore, to look in another direction for an explanation of the beneficiary tenure. If not of Germanic, was it of Roman origin? To answer this question, we need to call to mind the social condition of the Lower Empire. When the frontiers of the Empire had ceased to be guarded by ancient valor, the politic successors of Augustus sought in a wholly new policy a support for their failing power. Precisely as at a former period the provincials had eagerly coveted the distinction of Roman citizenship, so now the Germanic nations, already modified by the proximity of Roman culture, aspired to the advantage of becoming subjects of the Empire. The privilege was freely granted, but on conditions which, it was believed, would add to the security of the State. Whole tribes were allowed to enter the Empire and settle on the vast tracts which the imperial taxation, more ruinous in its effects than the worst tyranny, had converted into deserts, on condition of rendering military service. Thus, it was hoped, that at the same time the armies would be recruited and the decline in production be checked. The name *Laeti* was applied to them. Since the *Laeti* were voluntary settlers, their condition was superior to that of the *Coloni*, who for the most part were captives taken in war. Yet like the *Coloni* they were restricted to the land which they cultivated, and not being incorporated into the general body of citizens, formed separate communities, preserving to a considerable extent their own customs. They were all bound by the obligation of military service, forming in fact military colonies. They existed only in the West, the attempt

* Waitz, ii, 262; i, 372

to establish them within the limits of the Eastern Empire having resulted always in disaster.*

With this was connected another practice. The imperial government sought to bind the legionary troops to the defence of the Empire, by giving to veterans lands along the frontier. These lands, known as *agri limitanei* or *terre limitaneæ*, were also assigned on condition of military service. They could be alienated, but in that case the one receiving them renewed the original contract by taking an oath of fidelity. They could only descend to male heirs, and on condition of rendering the same service. So manifest seemed the utility of the device, that not only Roman veterans, but great multitudes of Germans, were settled in this way. All the north and east frontier of Gaul and both banks of the Rhine were covered with these estates.† Thus for a long period before the final disruption of the Empire, we find great numbers of Germans planted on its deserted lands, and along its borders, on this peculiar condition, not of paying annual rent, but of rendering military service. For at least two centuries they must have been familiar with the practice before the overthrow of the Empire caused it to cease. Nothing has a more tenacious hold, as all experience shows, than systems of land tenure. They survive political changes, and linger on through revolutions and conquests. The laws that regulate landed property have almost the permanence of the land itself. Who can believe that this system, to which the Germans were already so accustomed, was at once swept away?

The term *beneficium* is familiar in Roman law. In its earliest use it signified some special privilege granted as a reward for service. In the period of the Republic, public offices and honors were termed the *beneficia* of the Roman people. Subsequently the grants of land made to soldiers, such as have just been described, were termed *beneficia*, and the public register in which they were recorded was known as the *liber beneficiorum*. Among the four *bureaux* which formed the department of the *comes rerum privatarum* we find a *scrinium beneficiorum*, or bureau of benefices.* So far as benefices simply conferred

* Giraud, *Droit Français au Moyen Age*, i, 185.

† Giraud i, 197.

‡ Lehuérou, *Ina. Merovin*, 357, 358.

exemptions and immunities, they were bestowed on civilians as well as soldiers, and the same term was used to denote the estate, or the privileges connected with it. From almost the foundation of the new kingdoms we find precisely the same term used to denote the same relation. It is now well understood that in the earliest period of the Frankish monarchy the obligation of military service was by no means the universal or essential characteristic of the benefice. The pronounced military character of the benefice belongs to the Carolingian epoch. The benefice always imposed certain obligations, but the obligation of military service already existed in the constitution of the Germanic nations. The tie which the benefice established was at first more purely personal. As, however, the original Germanic institutions became enfeebled, the military spirit tended more and more to mould the beneficiary relation, till at length from out the benefice emerged the fief. Hence we need to guard carefully against confounding the fief of the tenth century with the benefice of the fifth. Between the benefice of the Franks and that of the Romans there existed also certain differences; yet still the resemblance is so close, and the transmission seems so natural, that it is hard to believe that both the name and form of the one was not derived from the other. The legal obligations of the two were similar; but with the Germanic benefice was connected, from the outset, an element of personal fidelity, which connects it with the *gasindi*.* Our insufficient knowledge of the actual manner in which Germanic society was thus gradually leavened by Roman legal principles, does not enable us to trace the precise mode in which the modification of the Roman benefice was brought about. In explanation of this transmission much stress has been laid on the peculiar Roman contract known as the *Emphyteusis*. Sir Francis Palgrave even goes so far as to derive from the term the word feud.† “No better etymology,” he says, “can be found for *Feudum* than by supposing that it is a colloquial abbreviation of *Emphyteusis*.”† And Mr. Maine, whose treatment of this subject is marked by the insight and acuteness that render his work one of the most important contributions

* Lehuërou, *Ins. Merov.*, 362.

† *English Commonwealth*, ii, 206.

that English literature has yet made to the Philosophy of Law, is disposed to adopt the same opinion. "The truth is," he says, "that the Emphyteusis marks one stage in a current of ideas that led ultimately to feudalism."* This view undoubtedly derives considerable support from the circumstance that we have in the Emphyteusis a very striking example of the double ownership which characterized the beneficiary tie, and also from the explanation that it affords of the tendency which the benefices so early showed to become hereditary, since it was the peculiarity of the Emphyteusis that it conveyed a perpetual right. There was also another striking analogy between the two, to which Mr. Maine does not allude, that on the death of the emphyteuta without heirs, the land reverted to the owner precisely as under similar circumstances a fief escheated to the lord. The fiftieth paid the owner on transfer of the estate, also suggests the feudal fine. The Roman Law, however, allowed the emphyteuta a right of disposition by will not enjoyed by the feudal tenant. But, notwithstanding these striking analogies, we still doubt whether the *beneficium* of the Franks was borrowed from the Emphyteusis. The notion of double ownership, on which Mr. Maine lays so much stress, would have been just as naturally suggested by the tenure of the *agri limitrophi*, which he is not quite correct in saying were held on the terms of an Emphyteusis. The obligation of military service made an essential difference. The name, as we have before stated, applied to this form of grant was *beneficium*. The Emphyteusis, where the service imposed was simply a quitrent, became under the Empire a favorite and universal tenure, and there is abundant evidence that it was perpetuated in the new Germanic kingdoms, but it retained its name and character, and was not confounded with the benefice. It was adopted in the leasing of Church lands, and in those portions of Italy subject to the Byzantine sway. Thus in the sixth, seventh and eighth centuries it was so frequently resorted to by the Church of Ravenna that Pope Adrian in one of his letters to Charlemagne denounces it as an abuse.† And when Feudalism was fully established, we find the Emphyteusis misconceived as merely a bastard fief‡

* Ancient Law, 289.

† Giraud i, 202.

‡ Ibid, 208.

The truth then seems to be that the Feudal system was neither exclusively Roman nor exclusively Germanic in its origin. It can only be explained from a combination of the two. Writers on the one hand like Comte, who claim that an analogous system would have developed had there been no dismemberment of the Roman Empire,* or like Eichhorn and other German writers, who recognize in the relation of the feudal vassal only the traces of an old Germanic institution,† are equally in the wrong. On the first theory we should be wholly unable to explain the sentiment of personal allegiance, so unlike the dry, juridical relation of the Roman tenant; on the other, we should be equally at a loss to explain the appearance of a refined theory of contract so unlike the genial, personal relation of the Germanic followers. "Feudalism," to quote the words of Mr. Maine, "was a compound of archaic barbarian usage with Roman law; no other explanation of it is tenable, or even intelligible,"‡

The entire omission, in these lectures of M. Guizot, of any recognition of this signal influence of Rome in shaping the social institutions of the Middle Age, the extreme emphasis laid upon her municipal traditions, cannot but be regarded as a serious defect. In a philosophic survey of the general course of modern civilization, one of the most striking links has been omitted. As a consequence of this omission, the most singular phenomenon that mediæval society presents remains, in some of its essential features, an inexplicable problem. Had M. Guizot sought for the results of Roman civilization, not simply in the direct and limited sphere of her positive institutions, but in the indirect and far wider scope of her legal maxims, he would not have termed the municipal system her main bequest to modern times.

But not only has the author of these lectures failed to note one of the essential conditions out of which the Feudal system sprung; he has failed not less to remark one of its most memorable results. We refer to its influence on the great communal revolution of the twelfth century. In his general treatment of the Free towns, M. Guizot is extremely fair. A

* Phil. Positive, v, 274.

† Deutsche Staats u. Rechtsgeschichte, i, 78.

‡ Ancient Law, 352.

native of Roman France, he does not fall into the error, which some of his countrymen have committed, of laying an undue stress upon the connection of these towns with the ancient municipalities. When Savigny wrote his great work, he made the perpetuity of Roman law during the Middle Age dependent on the perpetuity of the municipal system. The amazing erudition with which this thesis was maintained caused it for a time to be received without dispute. In France it was welcomed with especial favor, from its bearing on a vital question raised by the Restoration. In the charter of 1814, the startling proposition was laid down that the commons owed their political enfranchisement wholly to royal favor, all rights originally residing in the person of the sovereign. While this was simply the reiteration of an old error, to which even such a writer as Mably had given his countenance,* yet the circumstances under which it was now revived gave it an altogether new significance. What had been a mere harmless blunder of antiquaries now became a political dogma, and in seeking to overthrow such a dangerous assumption the opponents of royal prerogative eagerly fell back on the view which Savigny had diffused. The well known work of Raynouard proceeded from this impulse,† and was an attempt to show that the communal liberties of the twelfth century were not of royal but of Roman origin, and that in nearly all the towns of central and southern France the ancient municipal system had never wholly ceased. Although both birth and political proclivities would have seemed to dispose M. Guizot to such a view, he was not misled by it. Recognizing fully the fact that some of the French towns had continued in the uninterrupted exercise of municipal functions after the fall of the Empire, and that in these towns many traces of the Roman municipal system might be detected, he still insists that to many of the towns this description cannot be applied. These towns either peacefully acquired their rights by successive royal charters or wrested them from the Feudal lords by open insurrection. Especially is M. Guizot's accurate discrimination, in dealing with this question, shown in the distinctness with which he

* Madox makes a similar claim for the English king. Firma Burgi, dedication.

† *Histoire du Droit Municipal en France.*

traced the line between the ancient and the mediæval system. While granting that the ancient municipal idea played an important part in the formation of the new commune, he at the same time insisted that it underwent essential transformation. The Roman curia was marked by an extreme predominance of the aristocratic spirit; the commune, on the other hand, was democratic. In the former, power was concentrated in the hands of a few families, and in these families was made hereditary; in the latter, a large class, and of various ranks, directly or indirectly participated in municipal rights. Hence M. Guizot does not hesitate to designate the communal movement as a "veritable revolution," since even towns of undisputed Roman origin underwent such modifications as to give rise to a system based upon different principles, animated by another spirit, and destined to play in modern society a part wholly unlike that played, under the Empire, by the cities of Italy and Gaul.

But whence proceeded this new spirit, destined to work such mighty transformations? This question M. Guizot does not answer. He regards the communal movement as an insurrection against the Feudal system, but he fails to remark, what is not less true, that in the bosom of the Feudal system the communal movement had its birth. He allows, indeed, that the Feudal system held up a potent example of resistance, that even those who were most oppressed by it had before their eyes a continual lesson of insurrection; still he persists in regarding the communal revolution as a wholly distinct and independent movement. He presents it in his lectures as a separate chapter in the development of European civilization. But the commune of the twelfth century, if we look at its essential character, was simply a new application of that theory of Contract on which, as we have seen, the whole Feudal system rested. The charters that became so common after the reign of Louis VI were merely mutual stipulations. *Magna Charta* itself was nothing more than this. A new class, enriched by industry and trade, emboldened by habits of common action, claimed to participate in the system from which they saw others deriving such manifest advantages.* Such is the true inter-

* Capéfigue, *Hist. de Philippe Augustus*, ii, 561.

pretation of this memorable movement. We need seek no other explanation. The communal revolution was the inauguration of modern nations and of modern liberty, yet it was the direct offshoot of the Feudal system.*

The organisation of the different communes differed greatly, their privileges were acquired in very different ways, but the spirit which they embodied was everywhere the same; and it was the spirit of Feudalism. Like the liberties which Feudalism reorganized, the liberties of the commune were, at first simply the liberties of classes. The democratic movement, which originated in the Trade-guilds, belongs to a second stage.† The commune was at first an urban fief. Like the Feudal lord, it enjoyed certain sovereign rights. Like the Feudal lord, it might wage lawful war, and within its own gates exercised a jurisdiction as exclusive as that which the lord enjoyed within his castle walls. The obligation of the towns to its suzerain were the ordinary obligations of a Feudal vassal. Thus it was held to military service, and in case of failure to perform this service, the town forfeited its charter precisely as the lord forfeited his fief. The burghers of the larger towns in some instances claimed to rank with the Feudal aristocracy. In Germany especially the great burgesses were on an equality with the provincial nobility, and certainly intermarried with them.‡ They bore arms, and could attain knighthood.§ The common impression, to which Sir Walter Scott so much contributed, that the mediæval citizen belonged to a despised class, is grossly incorrect. In the Italian towns there was little difference between the upper class of citizens and the noble, and in Central France both followed the same kind of life. The troubadours describe the burgher as mingling in the tourney with the knight, and the statutes of Avignon expressly conceded to well-born citizens the privileges of chivalry.¶

The Free towns have been represented as a prime cause of the subversion of the Feudal system. But the fact should

* Laurent, *Féodalité et l'Eglise*, 536.

† Brentano, *Hist. and Devel. of Guilds*, 50.

‡ Menzel, *Hist. Germany*, ii, 62.

§ Madox says this was not the case in England at first. *Firma Burgi*, 254.

¶ Laurent, 544.

also be borne in mind that they perished with it. The same growth of nationality which weakened the Feudal weakened at the same time, and for precisely the same reason, the Communal principle. If the towns, by their alliance with monarchy, undermined the Feudal aristocracy, like Samson they perished in the ruin which themselves had caused. That concentration of power in the hands of the king, to which beyond doubt they were the chief contributors, was fatal to their own existence. The sovereign rights of towns could no more be reconciled with a national monarchy than the sovereign rights of fiefs. The Communal could as little furnish the basis of a general society as the Feudal system. They rested on precisely the same conception of separate and isolated powers. The bold burgher of Amiens or Meaux was as much out of place in the new French monarchy as the mailed baron with whom he once had struggled. The Communal can then only be regarded as a modification of the Feudal system.

Great stress has been laid by Thierry on the distinction, which M. Guizot was the first to recognize, between the municipal constitutions of northern and southern France. Admitting that northern France was the cradle of the commune, properly so called, that is the Free town constituted by mutual association under the pledge of an oath, he claims that the consular constitution of the south, which from the twelfth century successively made its appearance in the cities which had the most intimate commercial relations with those of Italy, had a wholly different origin. Here the municipal movement was connected with the great revival of the Italian towns, to which the bitter feud between the Church and the Empire had given such a vigorous impulse.* But while the two movements thus differed in form, was there any difference in their spirit? Was the rise of the Italian towns due to any traditions of old Roman liberty, or was it essentially the result of Germanic influence? The question is one of the most interesting connected with the whole Middle Age. The frequent occurrence of certain names at first glance forcibly suggests the influence of Roman municipal ideas. The constant use of legal formulas, derived from Roman law, would seem

* *Tiers Etat*, chap. 1. The same view is taken by a recent writer, Zeller, *Le Moyen Age*, 387.

to show that the old municipalities never wholly disappeared. On this ground Savigny claimed that the rise of the Italian towns was simply the renewal of ancient but unintermitted rights. But a more searching scrutiny has conclusively demonstrated that the existence of the Roman municipal system cannot be traced beyond the Lombards, and that the names "consules" and "curiales" which linger later, are not used in the old Roman sense. So that the struggle for Italian liberty was due to the same general causes that gave rise to the movement in northern France, and was the expression not of a Roman, but of a Germanic sentiment.*

Yet while thus compelled to discard the notion of any distinctive Roman influence in causing the great communal revolution of the twelfth century, we must not fail to note how it became the vehicle for a majestic sway of Roman maxims. With the twelfth century came also that remarkable revival of the study of Justinian, which had its origin, not as was formerly supposed, in the antiquarian zeal awakened by the accidental discovery of a copy of the Pandects, but in real and imperious social needs. A new commercial society was springing into being, whose manifold and intricate legal wants could not be supplied by the Feudal jurisprudence. Hence the rapid and universal introduction of the more refined distinctions of Roman law. The effects of this innovation can be omitted from no survey of mediæval civilization. It served more than anything else to prepare the great transition from feudal to modern times. We trace it everywhere. In the silent undermining of the feudal judisdiction, in the bold assertion of regal rights against papal domination, in the conflict between the Church and the Empire, we catch the constant ring of the well-tempered weapons drawn from this great armory. In the daring, at times unscrupulous, lawyers, whom the great school of Bologna had scattered over Europe, we see the real subverters both of priestly and feudal domination. By their skilled and unrelenting hands, the death blow of the Middle Age was struck. But the civil lawyers could not have argued, the

* Hegel, *Geschichte der Städteverfassung von Italien*, ii, 205, a work which in clearness of delineation and thoroughness of research is not surpassed by any production of recent German scholarship. For the Lombard cities, Leo, *Ital. Gesch.*, i, 80.

maxims of the code could not have been applied, had not the Free towns prepared the way. The Crusades came in to help the work. In the prolonged absence of so many feudal lords, the communal jurisdiction received an energetic impulse. The change thus effected was one of the most remarkable that modern civilization has to show. It is true that this change was effected not in the communal but in the royal courts; still it is not less true that the towns were the starting point. But for the judicial system which they called into being, the acute civilians of which the royal courts were constituted would never have existed. No function indeed discharged by the Free towns, was so important as the service which they thus rendered as the nurseries of Roman law. Here was the secret of the influence they exerted in subverting the Feudal system. In the constitution of the Free towns, as we have already seen, there was nothing anti-feudal. Had they remained simply the communes, as originally established, they would in time have completely amalgamated with the social state from which they sprung. For they represented new interests, not a new idea. Soon, however, as they became vitalized by the maxims of the code, they began to move in a direction to which Feudalism was diametrically opposed. Swayed by a new spirit, they became impatient of feudal isolation, and entered upon the centralizing movement of which modern nationality is the conspicuous result. But the Free towns would never have developed into the third estate, had it not been for the enlargement of ideas due to the influence of Roman law. The civilians, as Thierry truly observes, were the head and soul of the *bourgeoisie*. With them the movement for political reform began.

Born in an old Roman town, a town in which are preserved the most perfect architectural remains of Roman civilization to be found out of Italy, and doubtless often as a boy playing in the shadow of that matchless *Maison-Carrée* which warmed even the philosophic soul of Jefferson with the emotions of a lover,* it might be supposed that M. Guizot would not omit to glance at the most brilliant chapter in the history of the Free Cities. He recognizes the influence of the Roman municipalities in shaping the civilization of the fifth century, but this

* See his letter to the Comtesse de Tessé, in "Domestic Life of Thomas Jefferson." Jefferson visited Nîmes the very year that Guizot was born.

in re majestic sway of Rome exerted after the twelfth century he does not even mention. When dwelling on the contrast between a burgess of the twelfth century and a citizen of the eighteenth, he does not allude to the most potent influence that brought this change about, and when carefully tracing the growth of modern monarchy, he fails to point out one of the main springs by which its roots were watered. Still more surprising is the absence of any mention of that imperial system which so strikingly illustrates, in a two-fold way, the same influence. For the Holy Roman Empire, the most refined political conception to which the Middle Age gave birth, was equally reinforced by the traditions of Roman literature and by the maxims of Roman law. The passionate longing for peace and unity which in an age of incessant strife fed itself on the ideal of a universal Empire, which fondly turned to the time when the world acknowledged but one head, and that head was Rome, "the very time wherein God deigned to be born of a Virgin and dwell upon earth," which gave the whole impulse to Dante's political career, found its most powerful ally in the persistent resolution of the civilian to invest the successors of Otto with the prerogatives of the successors of Constantine. The legists of Bologna did not hesitate to apply to the Hohenstaufen princes language which had been addressed to Justinian by the courtiers of the Lower Empire.* Surely in enumerating the various attempts at organization made by mediæval society, this deserved a passing notice. M. Guizot specifies the theocratical attempt; the Empire was its precise counterpart in the political order. The ruling maxim of the Middle Age was "One God, one Pope, one Emperor." "The two great ideas," as Mr. Bryce shows, "which expiring antiquity bequeathed to the ages that followed, were those of a world-monarchy and a world-religion."† But this imposing political conception, which though never completely embodied, yet left its impress on the state system of Europe for six centuries, M. Guizot does not deign to mention. Yet on two grounds, as a splendid illustration of the sway of Roman civilization, and as a signal political experiment, it came legitimately within the limits of his survey. Of all "remembrances of the Empire," this was surely the most remarkable.

* Laurent, *La Papauté et l'Empire*, 214.

† Holy Roman Empire, 99.

In thus serving as the earliest centers for the diffusion of Roman law, the communes powerfully contributed also to the distinctive political tendency of modern times. We make a great mistake when we limit the political influence of the Justinian code to the mere modification of Feudal monarchy. Its power was far more deeply shown than in that direct result. Years ago, in those lectures which have but just begun to attract the respect that they deserve, Mr. John Austin called attention to the degree to which the technical language of the code has "tinctured the language of international law and morality;"* and no reader of Mr. Maine will need to be reminded with what elegance, acting upon this hint, he has traced the hypothesis of a law of nature from its origin in the Pretorian Edict down to the time when the juridical axiom of Ulpian was made the preamble of American liberty. For the code was not simply a body of positive enactments; it was also a vast repository of legal principles, and the sway of abstract jural conceptions has proved in the end more wide spread and lasting than the jurisdiction of tribunals. Mr. Maine does not, however, notice the important support given by the communes to this revival of the idea of natural right. He only mentions the celebrated ordinance of Louis Hutin, enfranchising the royal serfs on the ground that by the law of nature every one must be born free. But more than a century before, an Italian town, Pistoia, had emancipated its serfs on the ground of natural right† an example followed fifty years later by Bologna, in what deserves to be considered the first grand act of emancipation of modern times. More than one Italian city entered upon the path thus opened. Thus began a movement more significant in the history of modern civilization than any modifications of administrative forms; a veritable revolution,—since an idea marched in the van.

We do not forget that M. Guizot expressly disclaims any purpose of tracing the progress of ideas, and professes to limit his study simply to external facts, the modifications of the social state. But did his plan admit of such a limitation? In the history of civilization can the outer and the inner phases of development be thus distinguished? can the external fact be

* Study of Jurisprudence. Austin's Works, iii, 359.

† Von Raumer, *Geschichte der Hohenstaufen*, v, 139.

understood, in its origin and essence, without some reference to the internal and spiritual principle, of which in almost every case it is the direct embodiment? Can, for example, the Mediæval Church be comprehended apart from the dogmas of Latin Christianity, or the Feudal system apart from the refined distinctions of Roman law? Does not modern history lack some of its essential links if we leave out of account these silent but far-reaching influences? Can we account for the rise of modern Monarchy, or for the rise of modern Democracy, without recognizing the sovereign presence of ideas? Can we fathom any of the great problems of the modern age if we fix our eyes on external facts alone? We can only conjecture what would be M. Guizot's answer to these questions; but from expressions in several of his later writings we are inclined to think that the extraordinary vicissitudes of his career have not been without influence upon his views. In the preface to a work published while the impressions of 1848 were still fresh upon his mind, he confesses to a doubt whether constitutional monarchy and representative government were the sole recipe for the ills under which society was suffering;* and in the *Memoirs* written after he had witnessed the overthrow of two dynasties, and seen a democratic republic crushed beneath the heel of a military despotism, and which may be safely taken as expressing the mature reflections of the illustrious scholar and statesman, we find a striking admission that the mighty impulses of modern life involve deeper questions than those connected with the restoration of the Bourbons.† Perhaps had M. Guizot revised his lectures, the modifications might have been more important than he seems disposed to admit.

In the observations which we have ventured to offer, we have only partially explored a field which invites far more thorough and far more extensive examination. On other points than those which the limits of this Article allow us to consider, the opinions of M. Guizot are open to objection. Much might be said respecting his treatment of the two remaining elements of European civilization, the Christian and the Germanic, but we abstain from a portion of the subject which has already been discussed with much ability by Dr. Woolsey in this Review.‡

* *Hist. du Gov. Rep.*, Pref. iv.† *Memoirs*, i, 164.‡ *New Englander*, April, 1861, October, 1861.

ARTICLE II.—THE THEOLOGICAL DEPARTMENT ESSENTIAL IN A UNIVERSITY.

THE occasion determines my subject.* I have only to utter the thought which this transaction expresses: The Theological Department is essential in a University.

Various lines of thought here solicit attention.

Since religion is vital to the welfare of society, and is the most important agency in human culture, it is essential that the best practical training be provided for its teachers, that they may be wise, earnest, and efficient in their Christian work; and that, enriched with piety and culture, they may quicken in our hard-working, care-worn people the aspirations and endeavors of the higher and immortal part, and elicit from the prosaic affairs of ordinary existence the light and beauty of spiritual life; like the bee, which, in the words of Swift, "visits all the flowers of the field and the garden . . . and by an universal search, much study, true judgment, and distinction of things, brings home honey and wax, . . . thus furnishing mankind with the two noblest things, sweetness and light."

It is important also to consider the reciprocal influence of the theological department and the university. This department is not, indeed, intended to provide direct religious influence for the other schools. Every school is responsible to provide an education healthy in its religious influence and reverential in its spirit. The theological department does not obtrude its teaching or its exhortation on the others. But as a center of religious thought and Christian faith within the university, as the recognition by the university of religion as fundamental in human character and of theology as indispensable in human thought, as the voice of the university declaring Christian faith to be in harmony with all science, and the knowledge of God

* This Article is the Inaugural Address, delivered by Prof. SAMUEL HARRIS, at his induction to the Dwight Professorship of Theology in the Theological Department of Yale College, Oct. 10, 1871.

to be essential to the completeness of the circle of knowledge, the religious influence of the department on the university itself, though silent and unobtrusive, is constant and powerful.

On the other hand, the influence of the university on the theological department is important and beneficent. The opportunities here generously afforded to the theological students to attend the lectures of the university and otherwise to be recipients of its instructions are gratefully appreciated. And the atmosphere of scientific and literary culture, in which the student lives, is constantly refining, enlarging, and liberalizing him.

Besides these, and not the least of the considerations inviting attention, is the reciprocal influence of these departments in making men engaged in various lines of investigation acquainted and capable of understanding and appreciating each other, and thus contributing to bring to an end the jealousy between the students of science and of religion which arises largely from mutual ignorance.

But time will not permit me to follow out these lines of thought. I confine myself to a single proposition: The department of theology is essential in a university, because theology is a legitimate sphere of knowledge and essential to complete the circle of intelligence.

Uneasy relations have always existed between theology and natural science. Theologians have been wont to exhibit fearful apprehensions lest discoveries in natural science should undermine religious belief; as if there were danger that the credit of the Author of Nature would not endure a close scrutiny of His works. In an ancient writing, by some attributed to Origen, such a jealousy was expressed as to the scientific researches of the astronomer Ptolemy: "Who will not be amazed at the thought and care spent on these calculations? This Ptolemy, who has so closely studied these things, is not altogether a useless person. I am only grieved that, being of recent times, he could be of no service to the giants, who, knowing nothing of these measurements, thought that the heavens were near us, and endeavored to build a tower to reach them. If Ptolemy had been there to instruct them, they would not have labored in vain. Oh, idle knowledge, that puffs up

the soul! Oh, faithless faith, that is no faith! That Ptolemy should be thought 'the wisest of men' by those who cultivate this kind of knowledge!" In the eighth century, Virgilius, Bishop of Salzburg in Bavaria, was threatened with excommunication for teaching the existence of antipodes. Zachary the Pope wrote to Bishop Boniface respecting him: "As to the perverse and wicked doctrine which against God and his own soul he has advanced, if it shall be ascertained that he declares that there is another world and other inhabitants beneath the earth, then call a council, deprive him of his sacerdotal honor, and excommunicate him from the church."

On the other hand, the students of science sometimes put themselves in sharp antagonism to theology. Comte teaches that knowledge is limited to phenomena. He further denied that man can have any scientific knowledge of his own mental operations through his own consciousness, and taught that human knowledge is limited to phenomena observed by the senses, with their classification by resemblances and coördination by their uniform sequences. The most distinguished teachers of the so-called positive science in this country and in England repudiate Comte as its exponent. But if science, misled, declares itself incompatible with theology, this sweeping conclusion of Comte is the conclusion which it must accept and defend. There can be no middle ground. It must deny that both theology and philosophy are legitimate subjects of investigation. Although the most profound thought of the ages has been expended on these subjects, it must insist these were but transitory phases of human thought, through which the mind of the race must necessarily pass in its progress to positive science; that therefore educated minds and institutions of education have no concern whatever with these subjects, not even to oppose them, since, with the inevitable progress of the human mind, they must be left behind and sink forever below the horizon of thought.

History thus far has proved that there is no good reason for the jealousy of theology and science. Science has in repeated instances seemed opposed to Christian truth; but further discovery or more correct reasoning has removed the antagonism, and gained from science in that very particular a confirmation of

religious truth. It is time this jealousy should cease, and that all believers in Christianity and all students of science unite with the father of modern philosophy in the reverential meditation: "Thy creatures have been my books, but Thy Scriptures much more. I have sought Thee in the courts, fields, and gardens, but I have found Thee in Thy temples." "Let no man upon a weak conceit of sobriety or an ill-applied moderation, think or maintain that a man can search too far or be too well studied in the book of God's word or the book of God's works, divinity or philosophy, but rather let men endeavor an endless progress or proficiency in both;—only let men beware that they apply both to charity and not to swelling; and, again, that they do not unwisely mingle or confound these learnings together."

I. In support of my proposition I say, first, that the seeming antagonism of natural science and theology disappears, if we observe Lord Bacon's caution, just cited, that we "do not unwisely mingle or confound these learnings together." This would appear if we distinguish three spheres of knowledge by its objects, nature, man, and God. But we do not go to the heart of the subject in this comparatively crude classification. What I affirm is that the knowledge of God is essential to complete our intelligence respecting any one object. We cannot complete our intelligence respecting nature without the knowledge of God; and we cannot complete the circle of intelligence respecting man without the knowledge of God. Whatever is the particular object of study, the knowledge of God is necessary to complete our intelligence respecting it.

This explanation being kept in mind, we may distinguish three "learnings," science, philosophy, and theology. We cannot complete the circle of intelligence respecting any object till we know it in the light of science, philosophy, and theology. A clear apprehension of the distinctness of these three is necessary to show their harmony. This distinct apprehension let us try to attain.

We first observe facts presented to us by the senses and our own consciousness, or learned from the well attested observations of others. These observed facts we classify according to

their resemblance and coördinate according to their uniform sequences. When a uniform sequence is established by unvarying observation, we call it a law of nature and rest on it the prevision and prediction of phenomena. This we call science, or, for the sake of precision, positive science.

But the sphere of human intelligence outreaches the sphere of science and encompasses it. Science acknowledges, in the words of Herbert Spencer, that "there must exist some principle which, as being the basis of science, cannot be explained by science." The roots of intelligence strike deep and wide into the unseen; far as the tree of knowledge spreads its branches, leafy and fruitful, in the light of day, so far must it spread its roots in the unseen. Or, to use a different illustration, that which is held in the cup cannot at the same time contain the cup. In the observations and coördinations of science itself, the observer necessarily comes in sight of a reality transcending and encompassing the phenomena of science, the existence of which science must acknowledge, but which science by its processes cannot fathom and comprehend—a sphere of intelligence encompassing science as the sea encompasses the land. Travel within the sphere of science in whatever direction you will, sooner or later you come in sight of that all-comprehending ocean.

"So in a season of calm weather,
Though inland far we be,
Our souls catch sight of the immortal sea
Which brought us hither;
Can in a moment travel thither,
And see the children sport upon the shore,
And hear the mighty waters rolling evermore."

It is inherent in rationality that the mind must push its inquiries into the sphere of intelligence beyond the observation of phenomena. The child asks: "What did that?" and when answered, asks again: "What for?"—the two great questions pertaining to the efficient and final cause. God has made the human mind thus, that by the necessity of its rationality, as the needle to the pole, it may turn to Him, the first cause and final end, of Whom and for Whom are all things. The mind finds in its own rationality principles regulating all its think-

ing, by which it knows not only what is but what must be, and is able to construct systems of necessary truth, like geometry. It finds, as constituent elements of its own rationality, principles of truth by which it distinguishes between the rational and the absurd, the law of action by which it distinguishes between the right and the wrong, and ideals of perfection by which it distinguishes the beautiful from the ugly, the perfect from the imperfect. It must bring all observed facts within its own rational intelligence, to interpret them to the reason in their rational ground, law, and end. This sphere of knowledge we call philosophy. Whewell published a work entitled, "The Philosophy of the Natural Sciences." Every science has a philosophy, by which the mind determines the *rationale* of the facts, and without which science can neither justify its own laws nor grasp the significance of its own facts. In science man is the observer, in philosophy he is the interpreter of nature. The necessity of asking the questions of philosophy is inherent in rationality.

But philosophy leads to God. That which is comprehended must always be compassed by that which is not comprehended by it. Philosophy can interpret science and give the *rationale* of its phenomena; but it cannot interpret and comprehend itself. Like science, it must rest on a principle which, as the basis of philosophy, philosophy cannot comprehend. That principle is the existence of God. Here the intellect reaches the utmost bound of thought and rests in absolute repose. We cannot comprehend God, because by the knowledge of Him we comprehend all that is; and that by which all else is comprehended must itself forever transcend comprehension. The reality of His being is assured; because without it science is meaningless, philosophy is impossible, and knowledge vanishes like a dream. His absolute rationality, power, and love are assured, because these are the positive ideas respecting God, by which we find the unity, the significance, and the reality of all that is. But while our knowledge of Him is positive, it is limited; our minds cannot grasp and compass Him, for He is that which compasses all.

Comte insists that the efficient cause must be excluded from scientific inquiry, because if once admitted, the whole of theol-

ogy must be admitted with it. We may go farther: once admit the legitimacy in any particular of that line of thought which I have designated as philosophy, and you must admit the whole of theology. And this is only saying that theology is inevitable, if it is legitimate for man to ask for the *rationale* of phenomena, to ask whence they are and for what rational end they exist, to study them in the light of the principles of truth, whereby he distinguishes the rational from the absurd, in the light of the law of right and the ideals of perfection. And this is only saying that if, in addition to his senses, man is endowed with rationality, then there must be a God.

Here then is the third kind of "learning," the knowledge of God. Rationality conducts us into the presence of him, the supreme and absolute Reason, the eternal Source of all that is, the First and the Last—the first of beings, the last object reached in thought, the resting place of the intellect not less than of the heart. Thought cannot comprehend God; but by Him it comprehends the universe—reason supreme and ultimate; almighty power obedient to the supreme reason, evermore expressing the thoughts of perfect wisdom in the acts of perfect love;—rationality ultimate, all-pervading, all-controlling, expressing itself in all created things. God is the greatest of mysteries and the solution of all other mysteries—the darkness and clouds about His throne are gathered from the face of the created universe, leaving it in light. Deny God, and the darkness and clouds about His throne spread over the face of the universe.

If we clearly apprehend these three departments of thought in their distinctness, we shall see that there is no conflict between them, and that no one of them can exclude another or be indifferent to it. It is only when one of them claims to occupy the whole field of thought and to be the whole of knowledge, that antagonism appears. Science, it is said, does not reveal God. She searches the heavens with the telescope, and determines the position, magnitude, and motions of suns and planets; but God never passes over the field of view. With the microscope she explores what the unaided senses cannot perceive, and classifies and describes the creatures of its peopled worlds; but with the searching scrutiny of the microscope

she does not find God. In the laboratory she analyzes bodies into their elements, and detects and measures the subtlest agents; but she does not find God. "The depth saith, It is not in me; and the sea saith, It is not with me." But this is only because God is not a phenomenon, to be arranged in the classifications of science and coördinated in her sequences. Rational intelligence outreaches the sphere of phenomena, and human knowledge is broader than the classifications and coördinations of science. "Canst thou *by searching* find out God? It is high as heaven; what canst thou do? deeper than hell; what canst thou know? The measure thereof is longer than the earth and broader than the sea." It is only when science denies this, and insists that the limits of her investigations are the limits of all knowledge, that it can be in antagonism to theology. When she says, "Because I do not find God with the telescope, the microscope, or the alembic, therefore there is no God," she attempts a violent suppression of human knowledge and a contraction of the possibilities of intelligence, and puts herself in revolt against rationality itself.

II. It is not sufficient, however, to say that these three departments of thought are not in conflict. They are reciprocally supplemental and necessary.

Philosophy must use the facts certified by science; otherwise its deductions are void of contents and reality; and discipline in the scientific spirit and methods is necessary to the safety and sobriety of its reasonings. Without these, in the study of philosophy, to use the words of Milton, more vigorous than elegant, we are "deluded with ragged notions and brabblements, and dragged to an asinine feast of sow-thistles and brambles."

Theology finds in every discovery of science a new illustration of the wisdom of God.

On the other hand, science cannot complete itself as science, nor verify its own laws, nor interpret its own phenomena without accepting the aid of philosophy, and accepting the principles and processes of thought which make theology inevitable and trustworthy. Without it science loses its significance and reality drops out from human knowledge.

Knowledge consists in grasping reality in intelligence. It is a translation of reality into thought. If I understand a steam-engine, I read in it the thought of its inventor. The steam-engine is the thought of its inventor expressed in iron. Precisely so the knowledge of nature is reading the thought expressed in nature. Kepler exclaimed, "Oh God, I read thy thoughts after thee!" This is what we are always doing in the study of nature; we are reading God's thoughts after Him. But whatever is the expression of thought must first have existed in thought. The steam-engine was a thought in the mind of the inventor before it was that thought expressed in iron. The very possibility of reading thought in nature implies that nature is the expression and product of thought, and existed as a thought in the mind that planned it, before it existed as the same thought expressed in worlds and systems. Intelligence, antecedent to phenomena and expressed in them, must be acknowledged as the condition of the possibility of science. The laws of science are the thoughts which facts express. We read thought in the face of physical phenomena, as a child reads thought in the face of its mother, interpreting her smiles and frowns. Knowledge being the apprehension of thought in phenomena, the three departments of science, philosophy, and theology are necessary to its completeness; and no one of them can be complete knowledge without the other.

I may illustrate by the study of a book. We would read Homer's *Iliad*. The first step must be to learn the letters and the order of their grouping in words. We accordingly proceed to examine them with scientific scrutiny; we arrange them in classes according to resemblances, and observe their uniform sequences in words. This is the science of the phenomena presented in the book. But after all this study, we know only the phenomena presented in the book in their classes and uniform sequences; that is, the letters and words. We do not understand the book till we discover the thought which these letters and words express, and apprehend the whole in its unity and design as an epic poem. This part of our study of the *Iliad* is analogous to philosophy in the study of nature and of man. But when we read the thought of this great epic, we know that it is the thought of an intelligent being who was its

author, and who has expressed his thought in these symbols. This corresponds to theology. The study of the letters is the first department of knowledge respecting the book, indispensable to any knowledge of it; without this all attempts to read its meaning would be vain. But it would be preposterous to say that this is the only sphere of knowledge respecting the book. So in the study of nature, the observation, classification, and coördination of phenomena, which we call science, is the learning of the letters and of spelling, classifying the letters by resemblances and coördinating them in words. But this gives no more a real knowledge of nature than the knowledge of the letters and of spelling gives a complete understanding of the book. So difficult is the task of learning to read, that we do not wonder that the attention of children is wholly occupied with the letters, and that their first reading is mechanical, without taking the sense. And so vast is the book of nature, and so slow and laborious the process of learning to read it, it is not wonderful that scientific observers should stick for a time in the letter, and read mechanically without taking the sense. But maturer knowledge and further mental growth will carry them beyond this childish defect and make them interpreters of nature.

I will use another illustration. Science teaches that all thinking, volition, and emotion involve molecular action of the brain. Suppose some instrument invented by which you can look through the skull and observe the molecular action of the brain. You find some Shakespeare composing *Macbeth*, some Newton writing the *Principia*, some Paul glowing with the love which counts all things but loss that he may accomplish his work of bringing men to Christ; and you make an exact chart in each case of the course or orbit of every moving molecule. You have an exact copy of the action of the brain; but it bears not the remotest resemblance to the thoughts expressed in it; not the remotest resemblance to the imaginative creation of *Macbeth*, the mathematical demonstrations of the *Principia*, the glowing, self-sacrificing love of Paul. You have the observed phenomena, but you have entirely missed their significance.

Suppose, now, an infinitesimal inhabitant of the brain, to whom the brain is the whole known universe, and to whom the

motion of its molecules is relatively as great as to us the motions of the planets. Suppose this infinitesimal being provides himself with telescope and microscope and observes all these motions of the molecules of the brain, and classifies them by resemblances and coördinates them in their uniform sequences. Now he claims that he has created a science of the universe—this brain in which he lives being to him the universe—and yet the thought, the volition, the emotion which cause these movements and express themselves therein, he entirely misses, and of the intelligent being, whose thought, volition, and emotion the action of the brain expresses, he has no knowledge. How plain that this infinitesimal being deludes himself with the mere show of knowledge, while he misses its reality. And yet it is no more a mere show of knowledge without reality than is the science of the natural universe, which confines itself to the resemblances and sequences of phenomena, with no apprehension of the thought which the phenomena express, nor of the supreme intelligence in whom the thought originates.

The truth is, science is not advanced by the mere observation of facts. A discovery which enlarges science, while it presupposes the observation of facts, is not itself the observation of a new fact, but the discovery of a principle by which facts already known are coördinated, and their law and significance declared. Such was Newton's discovery that the law of gravity pervades the solar system. Such was Kepler's determination of the orbit of Mars; not the discovery of a new fact, but the determination of the mathematical idea which brought the facts already known into unity. Facts are not science till they are brought into unity and interpreted by a principle. The facts of meteorology lie in innumerable tables of observations, mostly useless as yet. Presently some one will strike the master principle which will bring them into order and reveal their significance. Facts are but rubbish till the Orphic music of a master thought causes the stones to move from the heaps and range themselves in the beauty and massiveness of a temple.

Rational principles are void without observed facts; observed facts are meaningless without rational principles. Facts may be compared to the rounds of a ladder; principles to its sides. Facts dissociated from a principle are like the rounds lying in

a heap here, while the sides lie useless there. But when the rounds are placed in the sides, we have a ladder by which to scale the heavens.

This is the teaching of the Baconian philosophy, and is set forth by Lord Bacon in the simile of the spider, ant, and bee—"Those who have treated of the sciences have been either empirics or dogmatical. The former, like ants, only heap and use their store; the latter, like spiders, spin out of themselves their web. The bee, a mean between the two, extracts matter from the flowers of the garden and the field, but elaborates and fashions it by her own efforts. The true labor of philosophy resembles hers; for it neither relies entirely nor principally on the powers of the mind, nor yet lays up in memory the matter afforded by the experiments of natural history and mechanics in their raw state, but changes and elaborates them in the understanding. We have good reason, therefore, to derive hope from a closer and purer alliance of these faculties (the experimental and the rational) than has yet been attempted." And this interpretation of facts by philosophical principles, this rooting of the knowledge of the seen in the unseen, the most profound thinkers on science in our own day explicitly acknowledge. Mill and Lewes are examples. And, although the better to mark the distinction, I have called the observation, classification, and coördination of facts, science, and the interpretation of facts by rational principles, philosophy, yet science, as it is taught by its master-minds, is not confined within these limits. Indeed a man cannot repress the questions of philosophy, if he would; for the necessity of asking these questions and of using the principles and methods of philosophy in answering them, is inherent in the constitution of a rational being. Therefore, however carefully a student of science may aim to exclude them, they continually appear, even in science itself.

It is the boast of science that it rests on the induction of facts. But induction is not a mere heaping up of facts; it is reasoning in view of facts from a principle which carries the conclusion beyond observation and makes it universal. All induction rests on the metaphysical principle of the uniformity of nature—a principle which from the nature of the case observation is incompetent to establish. This principle, rightly inter-

puted, resolves itself into this, that reason knows itself as a law to all things, and expects to find the order and law of rationality everywhere. Positivism rejects the difference between the rational and the absurd, and undertakes to explain geometry and all necessary knowledge as the result of observations accidentally cohering through some mucilaginous principle of association. But it undermines the very process of induction by which it would establish its own destructive conclusion. It is the desperate effort of rationality to devour itself.

And because the mind cannot divest itself of its inherent rationality, we find science freely using metaphysical principles and establishing scientific doctrines on them. The doctrine of the conservation and correlation of force is purely metaphysical. It is the rational principle of the efficient cause stated in a scientific form. It declares the existence of an ether, which eludes the senses and has never been observed. It distinguishes force from matter, while repudiating, as not legitimate to science, the questions what matter is and wherein it differs from force. Finally, Herbert Spencer accepts the conclusion, inevitable if we once start on this line of thought, that there is an absolute, underived, persistent force, and that "the axiomatic truths of physical science unavoidably postulate Absolute Being as their common basis." Thus the last word of science is the first word of theology.

We also find, when men profess to confine themselves rigorously to science, that they are incapable of resting in the observation of phenomena, but are reaching beyond to grasp the thought which the phenomena express and by which they can be interpreted and harmonized. Hence the various cosmogonies of geology; hence the attempt to account for the origin of species and a theory thereon immeasurably outreaching the basis of facts; hence in the history of science marvelous examples of wide theories on the slenderest basis of fact—the inverted pyramid resting on a point and spreading upwards and outwards to any extent.

The natural sciences, therefore, are not independent of philosophy and theology, but are at once embraced and upheld by them, as ships by the ocean. The whole history of science shows that it cannot complete itself as science nor verify its

own laws without their aid. In the very process of classifying and coördinating facts, science acknowledges as certain and verifiable that every thing acts according to the law of its being. But if so, then science recognizes thought in every phenomenon; and not merely thought as of an observer who says, "this is," but thought which is a law of being, therefore antecedent to the phenomenon, imperative on it and prescribing its action. But this is admitting rationality as underlying all phenomena; it is admitting the distinction between the rational and absurd as pervading all the domain of observation; it is admitting that the ideas and principles of rationality are the matrices in which all things are cast, the archetypes of which all things are types; it is admitting that in our investigations of nature we are justified in assuming the existence of a rational order and law, and in making that assumption the basis of induction. But if the universe is thus pervaded by rationality, if all things have been cast in the mold of rational ideas and principles, and are the expression of the same, then we are brought into the presence of God, the supreme and absolute reason; for rationality cannot exist except as the rationality of a mind.

Shelley was an atheist. He used sometimes defiantly to sign his name, "Percy B. Shelley, Atheist." Yet he says that he loves to think of a fine intellectual spirit pervading the universe. It is the pathetic cry of a refined and cultivated mind, imprisoned in the negations of atheism, yet unable to repress its own rational intuitions, and yearning to commune in nature with a fine intellectual spirit like its own. It is the delicate spirit Ariel, imprisoned by a malignant witch in a cleft-pine, and writhing to escape and soar in its native empyrean.

III. Thus far I have considered the subject in its relation to pure intellect. There is an argument also from the moral and religious side of man's being.

Matthew Arnold says, "Religion is ethics heightened, enkindled, lit up by feeling. . . . Religion is not morality, but morality touched by emotion." If so, the enthusiasm of every patriotic soldier in battle is religion. Following this line of thought, he propounds and vindicates this definition of God: "For science, God is simply the stream of tendency by which all things

fulfill the law of their being." If this was intended only to define what positive science in its strictest limitation may propound respecting God, the definition would not need to be criticized. But what is strange is that he seems to teach that even the Bible presents no higher idea of God. The most which he allows that the writers of the Bible recognize in God is, "the enduring power, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness." This is positively bewildering—that Moses in the mount supposed himself in the presence of "the stream of tendency by which all things fulfill the law of their being;"—that Paul, in his agonized confessions of sin, his rapt communion with God, his enthusiastic love and heroic self-sacrifice, was thinking only of "an enduring power, not" himself, "which makes for righteousness;" and that all beyond is the imagery of poetry and the extravagance of emotion.

But religion is more than morality lit up with emotion. What is morality? Reason knows itself as a law to action. A rational being knows himself bound to act reasonably. The reason thus acknowledged by a rational being as the law of action we call conscience, or the practical reason. And this side of man's being we call moral. Over it presides the sense of duty. The law which it recognizes is the law of love—admitted now by Comte, Buckle, and the thinkers whom they represent, to be a universal law, recognized with more or less distinctness in the literature, philosophy, and religion of all civilized races. In this recognition this class of thinkers, after long controversy, have accepted the doctrine of the New Testament and the Christian Church. In religion the moral law is acknowledged as the law of God, and the sense of duty is acknowledged as his voice. Religion is morality illuminated by the knowledge of God's law, vitalized by faith in His love, glowing with answering love to Him, and alive in loving and self-sacrificing service to man. Thus quickening the moral being, it penetrates with its light and warmth the whole man, it refines the intellect to delicacy of spiritual discernment, and kindles the soul in enthusiasm for ideals.

Here God seems to come into immediate communion with the soul, to reveal Himself within the consciousness. If there is a step in the argument from the law within us to the law

above us, from the spiritual necessities of our being to the God who meets them, it is a step scarcely discernible. There seems to be philosophy, not less than religion, in the doctrine of God in us the hope of glory.

As a fact men do not believe in God because they have proved His existence, but because the moral and spiritual demands of their being cannot be met without Him. The moral nature when awakened turns inevitably to Him. In the sense of sin, we look to Him with terror or trustfully seek His pardon; in the sense of weakness, we seek His strength; in perplexity, we seek His guidance; in aspiration for a better life, we seek Him as the perfect One, and long to commune with Him. The moral ideas cannot find their significance nor the moral nature its completeness except in the recognition of God. We do not live in order to pray; we pray in order to live. Prayer is the outgrowth of our moral necessities. Volney prayed audibly and earnestly when in danger of shipwreck. This is not singular; nor is it an adequate explanation to say that he was frightened. It is simply that whatever rouses man's moral nature causes him to turn to God, in Whom alone the moral nature finds its necessities met, its significance revealed, and its rest attained.

And this is a trustworthy source of knowledge. The notion that man knows only what he logically proves from observed facts is an error. Comparatively few of men's opinions are the result of logical proof. Truth lies about us like the sunshine, and penetrates with its quickening influence through every pore. The moral nature is as really a part of man's rational constitution as the pure intellect; and what is necessary to its perfection is as completely verified truth as any conclusion from a logical process. If the moral nature is a lie, nothing can be believed; there is no difference between truth and error.

Hence theological knowledge is clearer and fuller as the moral nature is more quickened and developed. There is a spiritual discernment of what the natural man knoweth not. This is as philosophical as it is scriptural, and has its analogies in other spheres of knowledge. Our mistakes and errors are not so often corrected by argument as by growth. The rustic says the earth cannot turn on its axis, because if the mill-pond

were turned bottom up, the water would be spilled. He remaining the rustic that he is, you cannot convince him of his error by argument; he will only laugh at you as a fool. He must have intellectual development and growth. Then he will laugh at his own previous rusticity. So it is in respect to all first principles. If a man does not admit that a stone in motion was moved by some force, you can never convince him of it by argument. He needs instruction, development, mental growth, not argument. So it is in the moral and spiritual life. If the moral nature is torpid or undeveloped, moral distinctions are obscure. To such a mind moral distinctions cannot be established by argument; but the moral and spiritual capacities must be developed; the man must be instructed in new ideas, trained in new conditions, above all quickened to faith in God's redeeming love; and when he has become spiritual, he will know what is spiritually discerned.

Hence the more cultivated the soul in moral character, the greater the appreciation of theology. As society becomes more spiritual, the greater will be the capacity to understand theology, and the higher will be the appreciation and the greater the demand for theological instruction. But so far as theological knowledge springs from the moral nature and advances with its culture, it is not the less trustworthy as knowledge, not the less a legitimate sphere of investigation and entitled to a place in the university.

This argument is enhanced by the universality of religion. Positive science itself must accept it as a universal fact of humanity, to be studied. The doctrine of Comte that it is only a transitory phase of humanity, is unsupported by fact and incompatible with positivism itself, which must accept as belonging to humanity what is a universal characteristic of humanity. Positivism therefore acknowledges religion, even when denying what is essential in its idea. Hence the desperate position of Mill that there may be a religion without the belief in God.

These thoughts may relieve the apprehension, sometimes entertained, that religion may pass away from the earth. The invitation from the heavenly throne is always, "Oh taste and see that the Lord is good." It is not the keenness of analysis,

nor the iron force of logic, nor the might of intellect alone that will uphold the truth of religion, and on the other hand it is not analysis, nor logic, nor intellect that can destroy it. Piety holds its place in the face of objections that the Christian, unlettered it may be, cannot answer, and arguments that he cannot refute. Devotion is a safeguard against intellectual error; and this is a reasonable defence, accordant with the deepest laws of human intelligence.

So also that which is inherent in humanity will last as long as humanity lasts. Atheism has always been short-lived. After the greatest conflagration of unbelief, religious faith reappears. It is not argument that brings it back; it comes back because humanity cannot get on without it; society speedily comes to a position in which its necessity appears. It comes up as verdure reappears on burnt land.

Not only is religion a universal element in human history, but one of its most important factors. Theology touches all the interests of society. It underlies the theory of government; it is vitally related to marriage, the family and education; it underlies all philanthropy and reform; it determines the type of civilization; it is powerful in all human progress. Thus viewed, it is not only a legitimate sphere of investigation and entitled to a place among the departments of higher education, but it is a department which by its far-reaching and important practical relations may reasonably be expected to awaken an earnest interest in all educated minds.

IV. It remains to say that the denial of the legitimacy of one of the spheres of knowledge by the students of another evinces a lack of breadth and comprehensiveness of thought, and belittles the sphere of human intelligence.

One of the highest ends of liberal education is to enlarge and liberalize the mind, and to create in the cultivated man an appreciation of all kinds of knowledge, even of those which he does not specially cultivate. There is always a tendency in any special pursuit to narrow the mind. A man accustomed to investigation in one sphere and by one method, is in danger of coming to regard this as the only sphere and the only method; of coming to regard other spheres of thought with a certain

contempt. As if the eye, if we could suppose it conscious, should affirm that because no sound ever came within the range of its observation, therefore it is impossible to have a knowledge of sound. The charge of such narrowness and bigotry against theologians has been sufficiently frequent and bitter. I do not deny that they have shown the effects of the tendency inseparable from every special pursuit. The theologian may get lost in the musty past, and mistake the exploring of libraries for the investigation of truth; he may need the admonition of Faust to his scholar: "Is parchment the holy well, a drink from which allays thy thirst forever? Thou hast not gained the cordial, if it gushes not from thy own soul." Devotion to science subjects to the same danger and needs the same caution. Minerals and plants, chemical elements and mechanical forces may be dry as the driest parchment and as powerless for true culture.

This danger is increased by the minute division of the sciences which the progress of knowledge renders necessary. So marked is this tendency, that Sir J. F. W. Herschell has thought it necessary to argue that the natural sciences have no necessary tendency to pride, opinionativeness, and dogmatism. On this subject J. S. Mill says: "This lowering effect of the extreme division of labor tells most of all on those who are set up as the lights and teachers of the rest. A man's mind is as fatally narrowed and his feelings towards the great ends of humanity as miserably stunted by giving all his thoughts to the classification of a few insects or the resolution of a few equations, as to sharpening the points or putting on the heads of pins. The 'dispersive specialty' of the present race of scientific men, who, unlike their predecessors, have a positive aversion to enlarged views, and seldom either know or care for any of the interests of mankind beyond the narrow limits of their pursuits,* is dwelt on by Comte as one of the great and growing evils of the time, and the one which most retards moral and spiritual regeneration. To contend against it is one of the main purposes towards which he thinks the forces of society should be directed. The obvious remedy is a large and liberal

* So far as my acquaintance extends, this sweeping censure is undeserved.

general education, preparatory to all special pursuits." The prosecution side by side in a university of the studies preparatory for special pursuits, also tends powerfully to check this evil tendency, and to enlarge and liberalize the students in special professions to appreciate the knowledge and the work of students of other professions.

It must be added that if theology is excluded as not a legitimate subject of knowledge, the exclusion belittles the sphere of human knowledge. It was a great enlargement of the range of human thought when modern astronomy burst the crystal firmament and opened the depths of space crowded with suns and systems. But if science shall shut out God and spiritual reality, if it shall smother all spiritual aspirations, if it shall extinguish the grand hopes of men for the triumph on earth of the Redeemer's kingdom of righteousness, peace and love, then it contracts the sphere of thought more than it had enlarged it; then science itself comes down on us, itself a solid firmament, shutting us down to the earthly and the phenomenal, like mice beneath a glass receiver, from which the air is being rapidly exhausted.

"I'd rather be
A pagan, suckled in a creed outworn,
So might I, standing on this pleasant lea,
Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn;
Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea,
Or hear old Triton blow his wreathed horn."

A solid firmament, with God and heaven above it, His law and love and redeeming grace beneath, is a grander theater of thought, aspiration, and endeavor, in which the soul can expatiate with a larger freedom and a grander development, than the open and sun-thronged vast of space in which no supreme reason guides, no divine love rules, no aspiration to know God and to be like Him inspires the animated clods which for a little time eat, drink, and propagate, enjoy and suffer, and then sink again into dust. Then is all our knowledge what Pindar calls "a dream about a shadow;"* and we must adopt in lit-

* Ἐπάμεροι· τί δέ τις; τί δ' ὄντις;
Σκιάς ὕπαρ ἄνθρωποι.

Pindar Pyth., viii, 135.

eral verity the pathetic words of Burke, after the death of his son: "What shadows we are, and what shadows we pursue."

It is evident, therefore, that a University cannot be secularized without being brought into positive antagonism to religion. It would then exist as an institution for the highest education in every branch of knowledge and for every useful profession; but in all its schools would be no school of theology, and in all its provisions no provision for religious culture. Then the voice of the university would proclaim through every day and year of its existence, that the knowledge of God and of man's relations to God has no place in the various departments of human knowledge, that religious culture is no part of the highest education, that the neglect of religion is the becoming attitude of educated minds, and that the religious instruction of the people demands in the university no school for the professional training of religious teachers. The theological department is the voice of the university proclaiming its faith in God, acknowledging theology as a legitimate department of knowledge, and holding an important place in the higher education, and declaring the necessity of training with the highest discipline and culture the religious teachers of the people.

ARTICLE III.—A STUDY IN CHINESE HISTORY.

To the traveller the first view of China conveys an impression which grows stronger with every hour of his stay. It is the impression of civilization. The coasters that swarm about the islands and capes as he approaches do not betoken a savage state; they are the messengers of commerce and traffic; they are the carriers of wealth; they are the servants of luxury; and they are manned not by barbarians, but by men of enterprise and industry. When he reaches the land, it is to find himself on the shores of an empire more extensive than was ever the Persian or the Macedonian, more populous than the Roman in its golden age, as ancient as the Egyptian and far more enduring; an empire with cities, temples, bridges, roads, and canals; with a history and a literature, with libraries and schools, with paper mills and printing shops, with government and revenue laws, with agriculture, manufactures, and art, with minted coin, and even that last refinement of Western civilization, paper money. He discovers that all these things are centuries old, and some of them emerge from an antiquity that had passed into authentic history before the mythical times of Greece began. He is forced to admit that here is civilization. China may be heathen, but she is civilized. These people may be fossils, but they are not savages. They have environed themselves in a Central Flower Kingdom which is exclusive, opinionated, and stationary, but which is nevertheless the product of a hundred ages of philosophy and toil. This is not barbarism. It is society; and that in an advanced stage. The elements which have mingled in the result have been peculiar, and they have produced a civilization which is peculiar. But it is civilization, and withal a very remarkable example of it; produced in a country separate from others, and walled in by ocean, desert, and mountain chain almost as effectually as the Happy Valley of Rasselas; the growth of a people but twice conquered by any foreign power, and then not till ages after their national life had become mature and permanent; a civilization, in fine,

which, so far from being aided by the religion or the culture of the West, had never heard of Christianity, or of the Roman eagles, or of Grecian art, or of Phenician commerce, till its own life could be measured by twenty centuries. "Of all the peoples," says M. Pauthier, "who have existed or who still exist on the globe, the Chinese people is the only one, with the exception of the Indian, whose civilization from the time when the earth began to be peopled has accomplished its complete development of its own movement and by its own nature, without the help of any foreign civilization brought in by conquest or transmitted by literary monuments, as have been the European civilizations, and perhaps even that of ancient Egypt.*

A country which has thus wrought out its own problems apart from all others, cannot fail to exhibit some interesting phases of experience. Here we have an indigenous civilization. Its processes have not been tampered with by any meddling hand. It has expanded by its own spontaneous life. It would be surprising, therefore, if some of its methods did not prove to be unique, and stand in strong contrast with those of the civilizations more familiar to us, which have been shaped by forces more arbitrary and compulsive. It is not our purpose, however, to institute such a comparison as this within the limits of a single paper. We shall confine ourselves to tracing the two main currents of historic movement which are most distinctly visible in Chinese as in all other civilizations—namely, the course of material progress, and the history of religious knowledge.

Beginning with the present stage and tracing slowly backward, we shall find the elements of modern Chinese life sifting out one by one, until we reach a period where only the merest rudiments of the social fabric will be left; life reduced to its lowest and simplest terms. And still beyond lies an age of darkness and myth, a Black Forest which affords no clue but an occasional fragment of tradition, and whose denizens, shrouded in that primeval twilight, appear rather as unreal spectres roving among the shadows of the historic dawn, than as real beings of flesh and blood who could have had anything in common with the cultivated man of to-day.

* *Chine, ou Descrip. Historique, &c.*, p. 5. He does not allow that the introduction of Buddhism from India was a civilizing agency, since China was already in advance of any influence which that might otherwise have been able to wield.

It will be convenient for the purposes of this sketch to divide Chinese history into periods of a thousand years each.

The first period will carry us back from the nineteenth century to the ninth; and the China of to-day must be reduced to the China which was visited and so quaintly described by the two Mohammedan travellers of that earlier date.* At the outset of our backward journey, we leave behind all those modern arts and appliances which have come directly or indirectly from intercourse with Western powers, and which linger along the shores of the great Empire, without penetrating inland to any great extent, or exerting any sensible influence upon the mass of the nation. Many branches of mechanical industry have sprung up in our own times, whose products are both tokens and appliances of civilization, and whose success shows that the Chinese are not so entirely servile and imitative as they have had the credit of being. Such are the arts of glass-blowing and bronze work, the preparation of vermilion and prussian blue, the manufacture of gold leaf, pearl buttons, glass mirrors, sweet meats, &c., the use of such conveniences as the capstan and windlass, and the improvements in mathematical instruments, field artillery, copper-block printing, and the like, taught them by the Jesuit missionaries.† These recent marks of Chinese growth are the first to drop from our view. By the time we are half through our first stage, we shall also miss the racy columns of the *Pekin Gazette*, the oldest daily in the world, and some two or three hundred years farther along shall be obliged to continue our journey without the convenience of paper money, which has been in use at various times since the tenth cen-

*Their *Account* was translated from the Arabic by Renaudot.

† "As much as they are pretended to have been skilled in casting of cannon, Father Adam Schall and Martini were at the head of all the meltings in their time; and notwithstanding what is commonly said, that the severe prohibition against infringements on the ancient usages, or receiving instruction from strangers, has prevented them from improving the arts they invented; these strangers have taught them an infinite number of things, before unknown in the country."—Renaudot, *Dissertation on the Chinese Learning*, appended to *Ancient Account, &c., by Two Mohammedan Travellers*.

It was hard, however, for Renaudot, Frenchman though he was, to admit anything good in Chinese character or art, which was not traceable to some other source.

ture.* We shall very soon emerge also on the other side of the great court of Kublai Khan, the Mongol conqueror of China, and the "most civilized prince of his time." The Grand Canal, of which he was the builder, will disappear; and his whole vast power, then at its greatest extent, will melt from view "like the baseless fabric of a vision"; as indeed it did in reality, within less than a century after the death of the great Khan. Certain other peculiarities of Chinese life belonging to this modern epoch will likewise disappear; as opium, which has been known to the Chinese scarcely more than two centuries, even as a medicinal prescription; the shaven crown and braided cue, which were originally marks of subjection imposed by the Manchu Tatars so late as 1627; and even the small feet, which cannot be traced back farther than the middle of the tenth century. These are the chief differences we should observe between the Chinese of to-day and the Chinese of a thousand years ago. On completing the first stage of our journey and looking around upon the country and the times, we find the same industrious people, the same employments of rice and tea culture in the fields and trading in the towns, and the same busy commerce on the rivers and along the coast. In dress the people are precisely the same, save that, untrammelled by either fashion or Tatar, the women have the whole of the feet, and the men have the whole of the hair, which nature had provided. The period we have reached is the era of the Norman sea-kings, of Alfred the Great, of the successors of Charlemagne, of the Augustan age of the Moors in Spain, of the separation of the Greek and Latin churches, and the early growth of the temporal sovereignty. The elements which were combining to form the modern states of Europe were then in their ferment. The dark ages still brooded over the ignorant nations. Christianity was doing its utmost to regenerate society, but was itself too often borne back in the struggles of those turbulent times. In China, on the contrary, we behold a heathen civilization which had already entered upon its period of maturity. The Empire of the ninth century was already possessed of an immense population; and

* See prefatory remark to an Article on paper money, by Klaproth, *Journal Am. Oriental Soc.*, i, 136.

by the discipline of its own civil feuds, and the contests with Hun, Mongol, Corean, and Japanese, was compacted into a solid state. The Mohammedan travellers found a country in which letters were cultivated by high and low. There were schools in every town for teaching the poor to write and read, and the masters were paid at the public charge. There was a large literature of printed books. The governmental officers were selected from the literary graduates, and had been for three centuries. The emperors sent written mandates to the provincial kings and governors by relays of post-horses. The people were skilled in porcelain, in silk-weaving, in lacquered ware. There were good artists among them, and expert carvers. The women wore ivory combs. Tea had been cultivated for many centuries, and was now in general use.* The people were not addicted to wine, and the ravages of opium and *samshu* were unknown. They lived in good houses of wood or brick or even stone; and their rooms were adorned with ancestral tablets and mottoes from Confucius. They had dials to measure time, and the two travellers declare that they saw "clocks with weights." They had copper coin in great abundance, but no money of silver or gold. They were fond of gaming and all manner of diversions. They married as many wives as they pleased, worshiped idols, cultivated astronomy, but knew nothing of other sciences, and very little of that. They were a peaceable nation, though able to fight on occasion; and had an army, equipped with bows, spears, and a rude artillery in which they used gunpowder. They derived most of their subsistence from the soil then as now, and used hoes, spades, shovels, mattocks, plows, harrows, and water-wheels for irrigation; and these im-

*The earliest notice we have from any foreigner of this now universal drink is so curious that it is worthy of being transcribed: "The Emperor also reserves to himself the revenues which arise from the salt-mines, and from a certain herb which they drink with hot water, and of which great quantities are sold in all the cities, to the amount of great sums. They call it *Sa*, and it is a shrub more bushy than the pomegranate-tree and of a more taking smell, but it has a kind of bitterness with it. Their way is to boil water, which they pour upon this leaf, and this drink cures all sorts of diseases. Whatever sums are lodged in the Treasury arise from the poll-tax, and from the duties upon salt and upon this leaf."—*Ancient Accounts*. &c., Renaudot, p. 25.

plements were in much the same primitive shape in which they had been originally contrived.

These facts, combined with what we otherwise know of Chinese character and habit, will enable us to form a sufficiently correct picture of the great Empire as it appeared to Mohammedan eyes in the ninth century. It is plain that the Chinese were less civilized then than now. Various improvements in knowledge and mechanical art, which were unknown to them in that mediæval period, are now in general operation, and there has been a corresponding advance in the comforts of life.

Taking the central year of the ninth century for a new point of departure, and measuring off another thousand years for our second stage, we shall penetrate to the middle of the second century before Christ, which is still but a mediæval period for so ancient a realm. Our progress toward that more distant point will eliminate other elements; and we shall find Chinese society of two thousand years ago more rudimental and less homogeneous. The whole period is strongly marked with political convulsions. There are frequent changes of dynasty; and under each dynasty many of the monarchs succeed in reaching the throne only by a merciless use of dagger and poison. Chinese history during almost the whole of this decade of centuries, bears a close resemblance to the bloody annals of the later Roman Empire; and while such monsters as Commodus, Caracalla, and Heliogabalus were rioting in blood and lust on the throne of the Western world, unknown to them, and alike unconscious of them, such other monsters as Tung-cho, Fe-te, and Lew-yu were rivalling their unnatural crimes in the East. The physical world seemed almost as malignant as man. There were extensive droughts, followed by famine. One instance is noted of an entire population of one hundred thousand families migrating in quest of a more kindly soil. There were earthquakes, more destructive than any we hear of in the modern annals of the Empire. The rivers, neglected by the monarchs, who were too busy with their courtesans and their feuds, took the opportunity to burst their dykes, and sweep away whole communities and almost whole provinces at a time. And yet in spite of these commotions, and under the incubus of so many bad rulers,

there was a vitality in Chinese civilization which made it grow, and made its growth substantial and permanent. This was the period in which it invented paper,* improved the methods of writing and printing upon it, began to use India ink,† introduced the culture of tea‡ and the manufacture of porcelain,§ reformed its civil service by selecting only literary graduates for governmental employ,|| courageously fought off the Huns¶ and craftily bought off the Turks,** imported Buddhism from India,†† received the first overtures of foreign intercourse and trade,‡‡ and adopted many improvements in the affairs of both the local municipalities and the Empire. We find during this period at least four general epochs of reformation and revival of learning; under Woo-tee, in the second century, B. C., Ming-te in the first century, A. D., Leung-woo-te in the sixth, and Heuen-tsung in the eighth. Many less extensive movements in the same direction are noted by the Chinese historians. Schools and colleges were established, libraries were gathered, learned men were encouraged, and literary degrees became the passport to promotion.

The Chinese of ten centuries ago had then more of the arts and appliances of civilization than their ancestors of twenty centuries ago. The Han dynasty, indeed, in the early part of which our second goal is fixed, the Chinese often refer to with pride as their age of chivalry, and to this day they delight to call themselves "the men of Han"; but as we journey back to reach that age of chivalry, we must leave behind us many of those luxuries of life, conveniences of business and trade, and improved applications of mechanical powers, which were developed at a later day. We must leave behind the entire body of printed literature which had grown to such an enormous expansion by the time of the Mohammedan visitors; for though the nation already possessed a written literature more extensive than could be shown at the same period by any other nation in the world, except possibly the Hindus, it was not yet printed.

* About a century and a half B. C.

† In the seventh century A. D.

‡ Fourth century.

§ Seventh century.

|| Second century.

¶ For two or three centuries before and after the Christian era. They finally disappear from Chinese history in the second century.

** A. D. 619.

†† A. D. 65.

‡‡ At Canton, second century, from Arabia and Hindostan

The art had just been invented. Few persons had yet heard of it. Very likely it was looked upon as a black art, and those who practiced it may have been suspected of necromancy, as were Gutenberg and Faust sixteen centuries later. It was doomed to languish for hundreds of years, and at least two eras of discovery seem to have been needed to inaugurate so marvellous an art—one, the original invention—the other, centuries later, the discovery of its inestimable utility. Paper itself was only just coming into use,* and the books of the ancients, originally traced with a style on leaves or reeds or pieces of bamboo, had now for many years been engrossed in a more permanent form on cloth or silk. It was in this century that the national history began to assume its proper rank in literature, in the person of the Chinese Herodotus Sze-ma-tseên. It was this century also that gathered the first library in the Empire, and produced the first lexicon of its own language,† said to be the most ancient universal dictionary in any language.

We have in these facts the picture of a nation learning to think for itself, becoming conscious of its needs, and beginning to put forth its inventive powers to supply them. It was already a large empire. The present provinces of Canton, Fuh-kien, and Kwangsi had lately submitted to the imperial sceptre; and with these additions the national boundaries had expanded to very nearly their present limits. Within less than a century also the nomadic Huns and other Tatar tribes, after having given the frontiers infinite trouble, acknowledged fealty to the government which they despaired of overthrowing; and when our Saviour was born, the Chinese emperor—styled by a singular coincidence Ping-te, the Prince of Peace—received homage and tribute from a territory that stretched from the Pacific to the Caspian. It is impossible now to compute even approximately the population which occupied these boundless plains. We know that some portions of some of the provinces were thickly settled, but some other portions were scarcely inhabited at all. On the vast interior steppes the subject tribes wandered at will; but throughout the whole of China proper, from the Kiayu Pass to the Yellow Sea, there was nothing nomadic or

* Invented during the reign of Wan-te, 179–156 B. C.

† The *Si-wun*, by Hi-Si, 148 B. C.

predatory, except some fragmentary tribes who to this day linger among the mountains of the southwest. The Chinese were already in some good sense a nation. They had a central government, cities, laws, literature, and trade. They cultivated rice, made silk, coined money, and had foundries for casting tripods and bells. But the mass of the people were of menial occupation and were poor and ignorant. Very few could read or write. Books were scarce and costly, as in the Saxon times under King Alfred, and for the same reason. The arts were rude. The simple contrivances which sufficed for executing the more difficult parts of the various handicrafts which had come down to them from the fathers could hardly be dignified with the name of machinery. The villages in which they lived were made of tolerable houses; and yet Canton, then as now the queen city of southern China, was walled around with a stockade of bamboo and mud.

An outlook toward the West will show us the familiar names and events which synchronize with the period we have reached. It is the military era of Rome. The great empire of the West is unconsciously emulating the great empire of the East. The god Terminus is pushing the Roman boundaries outward in all directions. The well-known legions have broken the power of Carthage, and have reduced Syria, Macedonia, and Greece to Roman provinces. Alexandria is the center of commerce and learning. The great men of Athens and Sparta are in their graves, and the Augustan age has not yet dawned on the banks of the Tiber. The last prophet of the Old Testament has uttered his warnings to the degenerate times, and the Macabees are vainly striving to maintain the national prestige. Somewhat later in the century occurs the first great forward movement of the Teutonic tribes; and the bloody struggle begins which is to end only with the subjugation of Germany, Gaul, and Britain by Julius Cæsar. The homes of our Saxon ancestors were still among the Schleswig forests, and the British Celts were ignorant of the inevitable Roman. The world was witnessing the progress of two types of heathen civilization—the military and the esthetic—the Latin and the Greek; while unknown to both, a third type—the mechanical—was slowly working out its problems in China, and has outlived them both.

Starting again at 150 B. C., another thousand years of retrogression will bring us up to 1150 B. C.—not far from the time of Eli and Samson in Israel, and nearly back to the Trojan war. This was the period which produced Confucius, the most famous name in Chinese history. It was the period also of Lao-tse, a contemporary of Confucius, and founder of the rationalistic system of Taoism. It was the period which settled the form of the Chinese letters, and produced the first dictionary of them; * which preserved the first notices of silk raising; † which witnessed the building of the Great Wall by Che-hwang-te, ‡ and the frantic attempt of the same man to immortalize himself as the first emperor by destroying all the literature of the ages that preceded him. § Almost the entire

* About 800 B. C.

† B. C. 780; though "in referring its invention to Si-ling, or Yuen-fl, wife of the Emperor Hwang-ti, B. C. 2602, the Chinese have shown their belief of its still higher antiquity." Williams' *Middle Kingdom*, ii, 122.

‡ About 220 B. C.

§ About 210 B. C. The story of the manner in which the early literature was recovered after this act of barbarian arrogance, is thus told by Barrow, and will show us how far that which has come down to us professing to be the surviving fragments may be depended upon as genuine:—"The Emperor Che-hwang-tee, of the dynasty of Tsin, after reducing the refractory provinces, conceived the mad scheme of destroying all the writings of the empire, under the idea of commencing a new set of annals with his own reign, in order that posterity might consider him as the founder of the empire. Some sixty years after this barbarous decree had been carried into execution, his successor, desirous as far as might be possible to repair the injury, held out great rewards to those who could produce any part of the annals of the empire, more especially the hundred chapters of the Shoo-king. After some time, a copy of the Shoo-king was procured, in this manner. All ancient writings, and those of Confucius in particular, were comprised in short sentences, forming a kind of poetry, not unlike the Proverbs of Solomon; and they were in the memory of most persons then, as they are now, who had any pretensions to literature; but sixty years having been suffered to elapse before any encouragement was held forth for the revival of letters, most of those who had known the Shoo-king were either dead or so old as to have lost the recollection of it. At length, however, a man named Foo-seng, of the age of ninety and upwards, was discovered, who in earlier life could repeat the whole of the Shoo-king by heart. To this man the historiographers of the empire were sent; but he was unable to write, and his articulation was so imperfect that the parts of it which he recollected could only be obtained through the medium of his daughter, who having received the words from her father repeated them to the historians. In this way they proceeded until twenty-nine of the books or sections of the Shoo king had been committed to writing, which Foo-seng had comprehended in twenty-five; but here they were compelled to stop, the infirmities of Foo-seng not allowing him to pro-

period was covered by the Chow dynasty. Thirty-five emperors kept possession of the imperial sceptre two centuries longer than it was held by any other reigning family. Under this dynasty the evils of the ancient feudal system culminated; and we naturally find the next reigning house attempting to consolidate the Empire by destroying the power of the petty princes and reducing by force the provinces which would not yield to reason or gold. This was accomplished by a subsequent dynasty, the Han, at just about the close of the period we are considering. It was, therefore, an important crisis in the early life of the nation; and affords us a most interesting spectacle of a great people emerging from the feudal condition into the higher and more homogeneous monarchical state. The Chinese then of the second century B. C., were politically superior to their progenitors of a thousand years before. Of their superiority in most other respects, evidences are not wanting. The great sage of Chinese philosophy belongs to the latter part of this epoch; * and his influence, though not at all comparable then to the universal homage he has now for many centuries received, was already strongly moulding the beliefs and manners of his countrymen. The speculations of Lao-tse,† whose followers have since developed his system into such a debasing code, must originally have given an impulse to the thinking minds of his time. The Chinese had copper coin throughout nearly the whole of this period. They raised silk very early

ced. A document thus obtained did not pass for genuine among the learned; yet all were eager to procure copies of it, in order to compare such passages as each might recollect to have heard their fathers repeat. The early annals of China, however, do not rest solely on this record. Half a century after this, a prince of Loo, in pulling down an old building (some say the house in which Confucius lived), to erect on its site a temple in honor of that philosopher, discovered in one of the walls an imperfect copy of the Shoo-king, with two other works of Confucius. They were much devoured by the worms, and written in a character which had gone out of use. The learned men were assembled to collate this newly-discovered copy with that taken from Foo-seng's recollection, and it is said that they did not materially differ, except in the division into chapters. They, therefore, proceeded in deciphering the remaining part of the characters, and after much time and labor obtained twenty-nine complete articles in addition to the twenty-nine recollected by Foo-seng, making the fifty-eight chapters of which the Shoo-king at the present day is composed." Barrow's Article on "China" in the *Encyc. Brit.*, vol. vi, p. 560.

* Born 551 B. C.

† Born 604 B. C.

in it, and probably even before. They knew the properties of the arch long before the Romans or the Greeks. They were the first of all people to use iron in their bridges.* The load-stone was known to them from a remote antiquity, and its power of affecting iron is noted in a Chinese dictionary so early as A. D. 121. Père Gaubil says he found the use of the compass distinctly recorded in a work written a hundred years later. But the story that Ching-wang, eleven centuries before the Christian era, presented certain ambassadors with chariots fitted with box-compasses to direct their homeward way, is, in all probability, a fable. The artisans of the Empire made pottery, bells, tripods, vases of gold and silver, swords and bows for the troops, and the simple tools used by the farmer and the fisherman. They were mainly an agricultural people, and the two great river deltas and the vast swampy plains of the interior fed the increasing millions with the already national diet of rice.

If now we can set these characteristics of the period plainly before us, and compare the Chinese who began it with those who lived through its closing years into the next period, we shall discover a very sensible increase in the power and activity of the civilized agencies. We have seen what the people were under the Han. To picture them as they were a thousand years before, we must divest them of much that helped to make the times of Han their Age of Chivalry. First of all we must conceive of the Chinese without Confucius; a difficult thing to do, since the name and fame and teachings of the sage are so interwoven with the entire history of the nation for more than two thousand years, that for every historical period we instinctively call up the image of Confucius as the prototypical Chinaman. Let us conceive of the nation, if we can, as without Confucius; without his writings, without his pupils and commentators, without his influence, without a single tablet to his memory or temple for his worship. Conceive of China without Taouism or Buddhism; without printing or even paper; without porcelain, or lacquer ware, or tea; without compass or gunpowder or coin, and possibly without silk; without her Great Wall and her Grand Canal. It is difficult to imagine China so stripped; and the question instinctively

* Du Halde.

riser. What can there be left? There was left a people not nomadic, but nationalized and settled; a people of some millions—how many it is impossible to conjecture; a people divided into provinces and ruled by hereditary princes who had some sort of feudal relation with each other and with the central court; a people who lived in houses, and decorated them with mottoes from the ancient sages and with vases of metal which are still in existence and are greatly admired; a people who knew something of the common businesses of life, carpentry, metallurgy, and husbandry; who, having no coin, traded by weight or barter; whose soldiers fought with bows and swords; whose men of letters recorded their learning on strips of bamboo, and kept account of eclipses and other formidable movements of nature; whose poets still live in the grave sonnets afterwards embalmed by Confucius in the *Shi-king*, and whose chroniclers left their histories to be gathered into the *Shu-king* by the same hand.

These were the beginnings of civilization. But we have not reached the source of the nation itself. A thousand years more will carry us back to 2150 B. C., a period many centuries beyond the founding of Tyre, or of Thebes, or of Troy, or of Athens, and (according to Dr. Hales) seventy-two years before the call of Abraham. It is in the early part of the *Hea* dynasty. The Five Emperors have all passed away. The successor of the last of the five, the Great Yu, has finished his brief reign of seven years,* which however, was long enough for him to earn a fame that has been celebrated by Chinese historians and poets for four thousand years. The exact limit of the period under review falls about in the middle of the reign of Chung-kang, a usurper, but a wise and paternal ruler, who did much to confirm and develop the young empire, then lately redeemed from swamp and flood by the labors of Yu. His subjects were not so numerous as we have found them in the later periods already examined; but there was a wonderful vitality and productiveness about them, and in spite of war and famine and flood, according to their oldest maps they had spread enough to occupy, or at least hold, a territory stretching seventeen degrees from north to south, and twenty-five from east to west.

* Died B. C. 2198.

Their employments and their possessions were of the simplest kind.* They were still engaged, as they had been for some centuries, in clearing away the jungle, draining the marshes, and reducing the land to cultivation. They made pottery, and soon acquired (if they had not at the beginning of this period) some practical knowledge of metallurgy, as is shown by the specimens which have survived to our own times.† They already possessed a rude alphabet; E Yin presented to his sovereign a written memorial B. C. 1765, and solar eclipses were noticed and recorded as early as B. C. 2159.‡

These figures do not take us back to the origin of the Chinese. The accounts seem to be tolerably credible as far up as the accession of Fuh-hi, the first of the Five Emperors, and probably the founder of the empire. His reign commenced B. C. 2852 (that is, 504 years before the Flood, according to Usher, 808 years after it, according to Hales). Setting aside the extravagant claims of the Chinese for the glory and greatness of this monarch, and making allowance for their very natural desire to show a high antiquity for their institutions, it must be admitted that there are some grounds for believing in Fuh-hi. There is an air of reality and verisimilitude about these ancient accounts which, if attached to the traditions of Arthur or of Odin or of Numa, would give those personages more of credibility than they now enjoy.§ The mythical period of China

* According to the Chinese historians, the property of Shun when he succeeded the emperor Yaou, B. C. 2238, consisted of cattle, bow, shield, spear, some household furnishings, and musical instruments. To these we may doubtless add some clay ware for the kitchen, as he was himself a potter, as well as a farmer and a fisherman.

† There is an ancient Chinese work entitled *Po-ko-ko*, in sixteen large volumes, descriptive of sacred vases, jugs, bottles, mirrors, &c., of the Shang, Chow, and Han dynasties, comprehending nearly eighteen centuries, and coming down to the time of Christ. It contains several hundred plates of them. Many of the vases described are still preserved, and are over thirty-five hundred years old. They are of gold, silver, and copper. Several figures of them are given in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (volumes 1 and 2) and show a very good degree of art and skill. Their forms improve, however, with the progress of time, and so do the forms of the letters in the inscriptions on them.

‡ Williams, *Middle Kingdom*, ii, 149.

§ The Chinese claim a direct and well known line of transmission for more than two thousand years before Christ; and a line somewhat less perfect for many centuries beyond. "Mencius said, From Yaou and Shun down to T'ang were five

stretches back into a darkness which we have no means of exploring. But the era of Fuh-hi appears to emerge into tolerably well-defined history; and we cannot well refuse to believe that by that time, and possibly some centuries before, the progenitors of the Chinese had arrived on the banks of the Yellow river, and were actual settlers. The first provinces occupied were not upon the coast, but in the interior. The capital of Fuh-hi was in Shen-si, a province on the western bank of the Yellow river and more than seven hundred miles from the sea. The migrating tribes had entered China from the west; and the legends of that earliest reign exhibit them in their transition state from the nomadic to the provincial. Ignorant of the vast extent of the territory into which they had emerged through the passes of the Tien-shan, they spread gradually down along the banks of the Hoang-ho, possessing themselves of the most favorable spots for building their booths and grazing their herds. They found themselves in a country battlemented around on three sides with a rampart of mountains, and on the fourth defended by the sea. It was a country of immense alluvial plains, crossed by ridges of limestone and granite, and channeled by numberless rivers. The inundations of these untamed floods reduced vast regions of soil to swamp. It is not impossible that the immense "fault" in the volcanic plateau of Mongolia which, according to Prof. Pumpelly,* produced the ancient lake system of Northern China, may have been at the time of the Chinese immigration a recent event; and the tremendous deluge which Chinese tradition locates at a period as early as thirty-one centuries

hundred years and more. As to Yu and Kaou Yaou they saw those earliest sages and so knew their doctrines, while T'ang heard their doctrines as transmitted and so knew them. From T'ang to King Wan were five hundred years and more. As to E Yin and Iae Choo, they saw T'ang and knew his doctrine, while King Wan heard them as transmitted and so knew them. From King Wan to Confucius were five hundred years and more. As to T'ae-Kung Wang and San E-sang, they saw Wan and so knew his doctrines, while Confucius heard them as transmitted and so knew them. From Confucius downward until now, there are only one hundred years and somewhat more. The distance in time from the sage is so far from being remote, and so very near at hand was the sage's residence." Works of Mencius, quoted by Loomis, *Confucius and the Chinese Classics*, p. 263.

* Described and mapped in his *Geological Researches in China, Mongolia, and Japan*, pp. 43-45.

before Christ, may have been the first rough experience the tribes encountered on their arrival. The tradition so nearly synchronizes with the account of the Noachian deluge (according to Hales), that many have referred it to that event; and it may possibly be the surviving reminiscence of that catastrophe brought away from the patriarchal home by the original colonists. But there are many indications that the Chinese were already on the banks of the Hoang-ho when the Deluge occurred. Be this as it may, the possession of her magnificent rivers has entailed upon China more frequent, more extensive, and more destructive inundations than are known in any other country. The earliest traditions are full of tokens that the first settlers found large tracts of Northern China overflowed, and were obliged to resort to "lake-dwellings" raised on piles above the floods, or to "cave-dwellings" tunnelled into the cliffs of clay or limestone that skirted the ravines. In the remote parts of the Northwestern provinces and in Mongolia such caves are occupied to this day.

In point of civilization, the early tribes who migrated to Eastern Asia, and became the progenitors of the great Cathayan empire, were scarcely more like their descendants of the present age than the cannibal Celt was like the modern Highlander and Welshman, or the barbarous Saxon was like the modern Englishman. What we know of them is gathered from the traditions preserved by the Chinese historians themselves. Du Halde, quoting from native authorities, draws a picture sufficiently savage:—Men differed but little from brutes; they knew their mother, but not their father; the sexes lived in common; they fed mainly upon animals taken in the snare or the chase; they devoured every part, and drank the blood, and wore the skin; they had no letters, and kept their records with knotted cords. The Jesuit missionary Mailla* gives us an

* Barrow, in his article upon "China" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, gives us an account of Père Mailla's History, from which we can form some opinion of its value: "We may take it for granted that when the Emperor Kaung-hee summoned to Peking the most learned men of the empire for the purpose of translating into the Mantchoo language an abridged history of China from the earliest times, those annals only were consulted which were considered as most authentic, namely, those which are compiled and published by the college of Han-lin. Père Mailla was one of those missionaries who viewed the Chinese less through the eye of pre-

outline equally vivid and somewhat more full :—" Les premieres peuples qui habitèrent la Chine, n'en occupèrent d'abord que la partie septentrionale, qui consiste dans ce que renferme aujourd'hui la province de Chen-si ; ils étoient si grossieres et si barbares qu'ils tenoient beaucoup plus de la bête que de l'homme : sans maisons ni chaumières, les bois et les campagnes étoient leurs demeures ordinaires ; ils ne vivoient que des fruits que leur fournissoit la terre, ou de la chair crue des animaux qu'ils tuoient, dont ils n'avoient pas horreur de boire le sang, et ils se garantissoient de la froidure en se revêtant de leur peau, sans d'autre apprêt que celui de la nature. Nulle loi pour leur conduite, nulle règle, nulle discipline ; chacun suivoit les mouvemens que sa passion lui inspiroit, et na paroissoit penser qu'à la vie purement animale ; enfin, ils ne différoient de la brute, qu'en ce qu'ils avoient une ame capable de leur inspirer de l'aversion pour une telle vie."

It appears then that the Chinese themselves place the beginnings of their nation at the lowest point of barbarism. They admit a savage origin more distinctly than did the Romans or the Greeks. They affirm it. In these reminiscences of the earliest age that have survived there is not a trace of civilization ; and the only hope for any such development as has actually followed is contained in the fact so briefly noted by the Jesuit—"the mind capable of feeling disgust for such a condition," and capable, therefore, of attempting to rise above it. And yet Chinese civilization seems to have been born of circumstances rather than from any upward tendencies in the Chinese mind. There is little satisfaction to be got from trying to conjecture the motives which may have brought the original wanderers to their future home ; but whether they were pushed on

judice than most of the Jesuits. He was employed by the emperor in making a survey of the empire which cost him and his colleagues the labor of ten years ; he passed forty-five years of his life in the country, and generally about the court, during which time he made himself perfectly acquainted with the Mantchoo and the Chinese languages. When, therefore, Kaung-hee undertook the laudable design of giving to his Mantchoo subjects an authenticated history of China in their own language, Père Mailla conceived the idea of proceeding *pari passu* with a translation of the same work into French ; and having lived to complete this Herculean labor, it was published at Paris after many difficulties and delays by the Abbé Grozier, in fourteen large quarto volumes, under the title of *Histoire Generale de la Chine*." The quotation in the text is taken from the first chapter of this work.

by the pressure of populations in the rear, or were led forward in quest of more abundant food, or were inspired by mere love of adventure—whatever the driving force, it is plain that they came. Perhaps there was no necessity of their staying; but if they did stay, there was a necessity of clearing the jungle and draining the floods. They accordingly set themselves to the task, and in that labor the Central Flowery Kingdom was begun. Their civilization was born of their work. The clearing of the land diminished the supply of wild beasts for food, and agriculture became a necessity. Agriculture needed some sort of a tool, if no more than a pointed stick. The pointed stick could only be fashioned by fire or with an edge of flint. The flint-knife required a stone hammer and a skilled workman. This indeed was a degree of proficiency they may have reached already in their nomadic state, since the stone hammer and flint knife must have been needed to shape the bows and arrows and spears with which they fought their battles and slaughtered their game. And the greater civilizing influence which would come from the cultivation of the soil would arise from the double fact that it was a new employment and, therefore, a new application of handicraft, and that agriculture, unlike hunting, was itself a thing of growth, which would require more implements and harder labor and quicker processes to satisfy the wants of an increasing population. We can easily imagine, therefore, how the pointed stick would in course of time be improved into a rude shovel or pick or hoe; and how some inventive genius, more brilliant or more lazy than his fellows, would finally contrive to attach cattle to it and transform it into a plow. All these improvements would be the work of time, and of long periods of time. And though we have some reason for believing that the ancient Chinese were furnished with these first rude implements of husbandry and mechanical art at a proportionally earlier period in their national life than any other nation of antiquity, yet when after long and slow centuries they wheeled out from the shadows into the dawn of history and stood forth in a light sufficiently clear for us to distinguish them, they had hardly yet attained to all these appliances of an improved condition. At the earliest date in the Chinese annals which we have assumed to be in any degree

trustworthy—the chieftainship of Fuh-hi, 2852 B. C.—they had made but little advance toward the arts of civilized life. But that advance, though little, was genuine and substantial. They had learned to produce fire by friction, to make clothing of skins, to build huts and dig caves; they had contrived a method of notation by means of knotted cords, and had done something toward clearing and draining the territory they occupied. From this point forward the advance appears to have been much more rapid. The reign of Fuh-hi was itself prolific; better clothing, better homes, better food were among the fruits of his sagacity. The knotted cord disappeared and a sort of hieroglyphic took its place. Marriage was enjoined, and the people were taught to labor. Within two centuries was invented the famous Cycle of Sixty Years, which has governed all Chinese chronology from that time to this, and has been in use, therefore, for more than forty-five hundred years—the longest chronological era known. Five centuries more, and we find them observing the celestial phenomena and recording eclipses. By about the same period also the first crude hieroglyphs devised by Fuh-hi had grown into more orderly characters somewhat resembling the modern, and the people had learned to use them in writing.

This was certainly a rapid advance. And if now we compare the development of the first five or ten centuries after Fuh-hi with the condition of things before him, it will appear that a period of, at least, several centuries must be allowed in order to cover all that had transpired. The movements of tribes are ordinarily slow. The Persian caravans could cross the whole breadth of Asia in two hundred and forty-three days;* but the progress of a nomadic people across the same space might consume as many years. Hunting tribes do not move straightforward over desert and river and mountain range, as toward a goal that must definitely and soon be reached. They drift to and fro, wherever led by caprice or allured by prey. It is not likely that the Chinese marched across the continent like a well-ordered colony. They drifted, like other nomads. The interval between the Deluge and Fuh-hi, three hundred and three years,† might possibly be sufficient for the slow migration,

* Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, iv, 68.

† Hales' Chronology.

the arrival, the selection of territory, and the change from nomadic to agricultural. But the evidence suggests a longer period; and it is possible that the original tribes separated from the parent stock before the Deluge, and were already located in eastern Asia, or were on their way, when that event took place. In either case it is plain that the original immigrants were barbarians, and brought no civilization with them; and equally plain from their subsequent history that they were not civilized by any force from without. Niebuhr charges his opponents with having overlooked the fact "that no single example can be brought forward of an actually savage people having independently become civilized." But China appears to be such an example. If Rome brought her light from Greece, and Greece took hers from Egypt, and Egypt kindled hers at the primitive hearthstone of the race in Western Asia, here was an empire that borrowed from no other, but lighted her own torch, on her own soil.

In this outline we have traced Chinese history backward, for the sake of showing more vividly the contrast between the present enlightenment and the primitive barbarism. With a remarkable regularity, the increase of the Empire has been accompanied by a parallel increase in the apparatus of civilization. From the earliest times until now, sometimes checked, but never entirely interrupted, the progress of the national life has made each century broader and richer than the last in the appliances of oriental comfort and art. It is a history which might be diagrammed in the form of a triangle, from whose apex, lost in the obscurity of primitive myth, the sides would slowly diverge to a substantial base resting upon the visible life of to-day.

If now we turn to the other branch of our subject, the religious element in Chinese history, we shall be struck with the fact that the triangle stands reversed; and with its apex resting on the modern surface, the base retreats into the past, and lies somewhere in that mythical antiquity from which the Central Flowery nation emerges—that primeval Enchanted Ground which lies between the first man Adam and the first Chinaman Fuh-hi. If, looking back from our own times along the periods

which stretch into that dim past, the appliances of civilization appear less numerous and more rude until they cease altogether, on the contrary the knowledge of the true God seems to come out more clear and distinct. And we have the remarkable phenomenon of barbarous nomads possessing a higher and truer comprehension of the Supreme Being than remains to their polished and enlightened descendants.

The first immigrants must have brought with them a knowledge of God derived immediately from their forefathers in Western Asia. But this knowledge was not retained in its completeness, and began slowly to fade from the national consciousness. Judging from the native records themselves, it was not till fifteen centuries after the settlement of the country that the Chinese began to worship images. The original conception of the Supreme Being, which is reflected from the pages of the *Shu-king*, must have suffered a considerable change before any such materialistic representation of the Deity could have been thought of. Especially is this moral deterioration apparent from the time of Confucius. His immense influence has moulded the nation into conformity with maxims of political philosophy, and the sense of religion has been proportionally enfeebled. He professed to be a statesman, and distinctly declined the honor of being a religious reformer, or even a religious teacher. He would keep on good terms with the gods, but not meddle with them. Living himself an upright life, he impressed upon his disciples rules of behavior that resemble those of Chesterfield, axioms of common sense that remind us of Franklin, and principles of morals that would have been worthy of Seneca or Cato, or even of Paul; and yet on the subject of the soul and its higher spiritual relations and its destiny he preserved an impenetrable silence, and to this day no man can affirm what were his innermost beliefs. "The subjects on which the Master did not talk," say the *Analects*,* "were prodigious things, feats of strength, disorder, and *spiritual beings*." The Emperor Woo-te† rejected Confucianism because it did not instruct him about the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. The whole vast authority of this wonderful man, whose memory has for twenty centuries wielded an immensely

* Book vii, 20.

† Sixth century, A.D.

greater power than did his living self, has gone into the scale of state-craft, and the national conscience has slackened its hold of that which appeared of so little importance to the Master. It is a striking spectacle—the hopefulness of Confucius—standing there as he did among the oppressions, the cruelties, the misgovernment and anarchy of those quarrelling provinces, and vainly expecting to stem the tide by teaching the *native force of virtue*. He had a royal faith in human nature which he never lost, though he never found the human virtue whose effects were to be so magical and potent. It is a melancholy comment upon the moral decay of the nation, that even such a mind as his could not or would not appreciate the divine power of reform which could be found in the knowledge and worship of the true God; and did not seem to comprehend what an instrument of civilizing force he could have wielded over the hearts and lives of his age by insisting on the preservation of that knowledge.*

* "I will mention two important subjects" says Dr. Legge, the learned editor of the Chinese Classics, "in regard to which there is a growing conviction in my mind that he [Confucius] came short of the faith of the older sages. The first is the doctrine of God. This name is common in the *She-king* and *Shoo-king*. *Ti* or *Shang-ti* appears there as a personal being, ruling in heaven and on earth, the author of man's moral nature, the governor among the nations, by whom kings reign and princes decree justice, the rewarder of the good and the punisher of the bad. Confucius preferred to speak of Heaven. Instances have already been given of this. Two others may be cited;—"He who offends against Heaven has none to whom he can pray." * * * "I do not murmur against Heaven. I do not grumble against men. My studies lie low and my penetration rises high. But there is Heaven; that knows me!" Not once throughout the *Analects* does he use the personal name. I would say that he is unreligious rather than irreligious; yet by the coldness of his temperament and intellect in this matter, his influence is unfavorable to the development of true religious feeling among the Chinese people generally, and he prepared the way for the speculations of the literati of mediæval and modern times which have exposed them to the charge of atheism. Secondly, along with the worship of God there existed from the earliest historical times the worship of other spiritual beings—especially, and to every individual, the worship of departed ancestors. Confucius recognised this as an institution to be devoutly observed. * * * The custom must have originated from a belief of the continued existence of the dead. * * * But Confucius never spoke explicitly on this subject. He tried to evade it. * * * I incline to think that he doubted more than he believed. If the case were not so, it would be difficult to account for the answer which he returned to a question as to what constituted wisdom. "To give one's self earnestly," said he, "to the duties due to man, and, while respecting spiritual beings, to keep aloof from them, may be called

During the life of Confucius his contemporary Lao-tse was dreaming out the system which has since grown into such a farrago of jugglery, necromancy, and devil-worship commingled. And within five or six centuries more the introduction of Buddhism from India completed the triad of religions; and these have gone on ever since demoralizing the Empire and reducing the theistic beliefs of the people more and more hopelessly to the ordinary pagan level of materialism. At about the time of the Norman Conquest of England there occurred one of those minor eras of the revival of letters and learning, so many of which are chronicled in Chinese history; but the majority of the writers were commentators who explained away most of the few allusions to the Supreme God that had survived from the ancient classics. So often as this process was repeated, the nation settled deeper and deeper into ignorance of the true God. It may be doubted whether any other people in the world have ever so generally lapsed into atheism as have the modern Chinese. In all that vast empire there is but one temple consecrated to the worship of the Supreme Deity, and but one worshiper, the Emperor, who celebrates the pageant once a year. But before Confucius, and for some centuries after him, this higher form of worship was common among the people. The name of God is frequent in both the Shi-king and the Shu-king. "Te, or Shang-te, appears there as a personal being, ruling in heaven and on earth, the author of man's moral nature, the governor among the nations, by whom kings reign and princes decree justice, the rewarder of the good and the punisher of the bad."* These appear to have been the earliest conceptions of God among the Chinese. And they are so inwrought into the very texture of the ancient odes and chronicles, that Confucius himself, who "preferred to speak of Heaven" rather than of God, did not expunge them from his

wisdom." At any rate, as by his frequent references to Heaven, instead of following the phraseology of the older sages, he gave occasion to many of his professed followers to identify God with a principle of reason and the course of nature; so in the point now in hand, he has led them to deny, like the Sadducees of old, the existence of any spirit at all, and to tell us that their sacrifices to the dead are but an outward form, the mode of expression which the principle of filial piety requires them to adopt when its objects have departed this life.—*Life and Teachings of Confucius*, pp. 100-102.

* The whole passage is quoted in the preceding note.

compilations, but left them just as they stand, to reflect the earlier and purer beliefs. The Chinese do indeed to this day reverence their classics with an almost superstitious homage; but the great Name which they contain has lost its power. "Whoever wishes to know," says Dr. Gutzlaff, "what the Chinese retained of the patriarchal creed, has only to read the passages in the Yih-She * which refer to Shang-te, the Supreme Emperor. * * * The nation would not be in that degraded condition in which we find it now if these notions had been retained."† The mass of the people can rise no higher now in their vague remembrance of their ancestors' God than to worship heaven and earth; and the highest conception of Him now recoverable by their acutest philosophers is that of an invisible universal Soul to the visible universal Body.‡ From this conception downward to the grosser forms of materialism is a *descensus facilis*; and here is where the Chinese are to-day. Their knowledge of God is but an infinitesimal fragment of that which they possessed when they first entered the country. By sheer neglect of it, and sometimes doubtless by wilful abuse, that divine knowledge has slowly melted away. They "did not like to retain God in their knowledge." The result has been a process of demoralization similar to that which Mr. Layard brought to view when he dug out the secrets of Nineveh. "It is found," he says, "contrary to the general impression, that idolatry was introduced when men had a better knowledge

* A Chinese historical work in fifty volumes, published 1670.

† Remarks on the Yih-She, *Journal Royal Asiatic Soc.*, III, 274.

‡ See e. g., an Article on Chinese Theology by Rev. T. M'Clatchie, an English missionary in China, *Journal Royal Asiatic Soc.*, XVI, 380. The conclusions at which he arrives are as follows: "From the above statements we perceive that the Chinese, in common with all other pagan nations, hold—

1. That there is one Eternal, Ungenerated First Cause of all things.
2. That this First Cause is Fate, Providence, Nature, The Infinite, Heaven, Reason, Incorporeal Reason; an indivisible Unity, an immoveable Mover, Hidden, Incomprehensible, Omnipresent, the Root and Author of all things, &c.
3. That he is the supreme Soul of the whole universe, which is by his presence constituted a living animal, endowed with intellect and the power of motion. And,
4. That matter is eternally associated with him. This First Cause the other pagans respectively designate *Geor*, *Deus*, &c., &c., and the Chinese designate him *Shin*."

These positions he maintains by very full quotations from standard Chinese authors.

of the true God than afterwards prevailed ; that it did not grow up as a religion of nature, by the ineffectual attempts of men to find the true God. But it was introduced as an expedient of men, in order to obscure what knowledge of God they possessed, because they did not like to retain God in their knowledge. This is shown in the fact that the earliest representations of God found in these sculptures are the best, and immeasurably exceed everything of the kind existing in after ages ; especially in their approach to the true idea of God."

The causes of this decay of the primeval religious knowledge are not hard to find. To say nothing of the bias toward evil, which was as disastrous a factor in human history then as now, there was much in the circumstances and surroundings of nomadic life to draw the attention away from such momentous subjects and concentrate it upon the immediate struggle for life. The thought of God, too, is a subject so vast, so incomprehensible, so baffling, that we can readily conceive the pagan mind of those early times easily tiring of the lofty pursuit, and "half in sorrow, half in anger" giving over its attempts to hold a knowledge which was so difficult to manage and sometimes so painful in the possession. The apparatus of thought was meagre. The language was as rude as the symbols by which men sought to express it were imperfect. And with such inadequate means for retaining knowledge, it is not wonderful that a primitive tribe, quite willing to be relieved of moral restraint, should gradually slacken its hold of the knowledge of God. Whether this was the actual process by which the early Chinese forgot the Jehovah of their fathers, history may never be able to tell us ; but it does tell us that they forgot Him. Their ancient literature bears abundant traces of the fact that they "once knew God ;" their modern literature is still more profusely burdened with sad testimony that they know Him no longer. We will not delay to confirm the latter part of this statement by quotations : and for the former, a few of the examples we had selected will suffice. The use of *Shang-te* and *Shin* in the ancient books can leave little doubt in any mind that they were used to describe a supreme personal God. Listen to such a prayer as this :—T'ang said : "I, the child Le, presume to use a dark-colored victim, and presume to announce to Thee, O most

great and sovereign God, that the sinner I dare not pardon, and thy ministers, O God, I do not keep in obscurity. The examination of them is by thy mind, O God."* Of the same person the Chinese historians have recorded that "in his days the seven years' drought occurred; the principal scribe observed that prayer should be offered up. Ching-tang said, 'I only wish for rain on account of the people. If prayer will avail, I will offer it myself.' He then fasted and cut off his hair and nails, riding in a mourning chariot; and binding white reeds around him, that he might represent a sacrificial animal, he went forth to the wilderness of mulberry bushes and invoked, saying, 'Let not the lives of the people be forfeited on account of the neglect of one individual.' He then acknowledged his six faults, saying, 'Is it that my government is extravagant?—or that my people are not properly attended to?—or that my palaces are too lofty?—or that my ministers are too numerous?—or that presents are too frequently sent?—or that sycophants abound?' He had scarcely ceased when the rain fell, to the distance of several thousand furlongs."† He evidently prayed to an invisible God, and believed him to be a personal God. Yu the Great, founder of the Hea dynasty, 2205 B. C., "sought for able men to honor God."‡ The House of Chow showed its fitness to assume the reins of empire by seeking men "who should reverently serve God, and appointing them as presidents and chiefs of the people."§ Shun, 2238 B. C., offered sacrifices to the Supreme Ruler.|| Shin-nong, the successor of Fuh-hi, about 2737 B. C., "sacrificed, say the Chinese historians, to the Supreme Lord in the temple of light."¶ Such tokens of monotheistic beliefs are common in the earliest chronicles and the primitive ballads of the Chinese. Along with them are traces of other ideas, which sound strangely familiar to minds that are accustomed to ponder over the Scripture account of redemption. "Without recognizing the ordinances of heaven," said

* *Confucian Analects*, Book xx: i, 3. T'ang was the founder of the Shang dynasty, 1766 B. C. The "sinner" is the tyrant K'ee, the last emperor of the preceding line.

† Quoted from Chinese writers by Dr. Medhurst, *China, its State and Prospects*, p. 9.

‡ From Chinese authors, Loomis, *Confucius and the Chinese Classics*, p. 33.

§ From Chinese authors, Do., p. 34.

|| Gutzlaff, *History of China*, i, 84.

¶ Pauthier, *Hist. de la Chine*, p. 26.

Confucius, "it is impossible to be a superior man."* "He who offends against heaven has none to whom he can pray."† "Though a man may be wicked," said Mencius, "yet if he adjust his thoughts, fast, and bathe, he may sacrifice to God." And here is the Golden Rule, in one of the many negative forms in which it appears in the teachings of the Master. Tsze-kung said, "What I do not wish men to do to me, I also wish not to do to men." The Master said, "Tsze, you have not attained to that."‡ In his description of the Shi-king, Mr. Hardwick says: "It comprises three hundred and eleven odes and other lyrics, for the most part moral in their tone, and sometimes breathing, in the midst of tender sentiments and deep regrets, a freshness and simplicity entirely characteristic of the earliest ages of mankind. The ancient bard appears more conscious than the modern Chinaman of some corruption cleaving to the human family as a whole; and here and there we trace an ardent aspiration after some more lofty stage of being, which, as time went over, was completely stifled by the growing love of pelf and the incurable self-sufficiency engendered in the heart of the Chinese."§ As to the origin of this corruption, however, the Chinese writings give no sign. M. Pauthier has remarked this contrast with the Mosaic account of the fall of the race: "So far from admitting the perfection of the first men and their fall, the human race according to these traditions has arrived at its present state only slowly and by degrees, by losing some of its primitive forms. Not only here is there no fall, but there is progress and development, of nature as well as of civilization."||

These citations will sufficiently exhibit the spirit which pervades the surviving fragments of early Chinese tradition. It is manifest that the first immigrants upon Chinese soil brought with them a clearer and better knowledge of God than was retained by their descendants. We cannot otherwise explain these frequent allusions in their writings to the Supreme Being. To the modern Confucian-Buddhistic-ancestor-worshiping Chinaman, these traces of a better worship must be unintelligible. A more painful spectacle could hardly be presented to the

* *Analects*, Book xx: iii, 1. † *Ibid*, Book iii: xiii, 2.

‡ *Ibid*, Book v: 11.

§ *Christ and Other Masters*, Part iii: 17, 18.

|| *Chine*, p. 26.

Christian philanthropist than this, of an infant people, destined to grow into the most populous of empires, starting on its long career equipped with the knowledge of God, and through all the forty and perhaps fifty centuries of its history thus far steadily improving its material condition with arts, inventions, and education, but as steadily letting go of those great moral forces by which alone it could successfully grapple with the spiritual emergencies which must arise in all human life. Thus century by century the great Empire has risen materially, and sunk morally. The result is civilization on the one hand and paganism on the other; a life, chained to a body of death; an artificial glow which illumines the physical side of this life, but throws no gleam of hope into the future world; a society whose thrift is godless, and whose conscience is dead.

The suggestions which rise from the study of Chinese civilization, and which remain to be stated, should be regarded rather as topics to be investigated, than as conclusions reached.

1. The possibility of an indigenous civilization.

2. The peculiar character of a civilization which, however it may germinate, grows up independently of the primitive religion of the race, and even while the religious sense is going through a parallel process of decay. This appears to have been the history of the great heathen civilizations, Egypt, Greece, Rome, Assyria, &c., as well as of China. In China the knowledge of God appears to have lasted long enough to stimulate the first desires of the colonists to better their condition; and this may be the true germ of that wonderful and yet somewhat unnatural growth.

3. The study of Chinese antiquities confirms the statements of Max Müller; "If in this spirit we search through the sacred ruins of the ancient world, we shall be surprised to find how much more of true religion there is in what is called Heathen Mythology than we expected." "The more we go back, the more we examine the earliest germs of every religion, the purer I believe we shall find the conceptions of the Deity, the nobler the purposes of each founder of a new worship."*

4. The western origin of the Chinese is made probable by the historical traditions pointing to a time when they were

* *Lectures on the Science of Language*, second series, pp. 442, 443.

wanderers in Central Asia, by their early monotheistic beliefs, which connect directly with the Scriptural revelations of God, and must have come from the family of Adam or of Noah—by various statements in the institutes of Menu—and by certain indications in their language.

5. The time at which the original colonists of China separated from the parent stock is left in doubt. The dates of Chinese history cannot be made to harmonize with the common chronology of our Bibles. Hales' chronology puts the Deluge in the year 3155 B. C. Between that epoch and the date of Fuh-hi, the interval of three centuries may possibly be a sufficient allowance of time for the Chinese family to cross the deserts and rivers and mountain chains of Central Asia, and reach the eastern slope of the continent. It is also conceivable that this migration may have taken place before the Deluge, during the period between Adam and Noah, when the populous race must have pushed off its marginal tribes in some directions to great distances from the over-burdened center. This supposition would be favored by the character of the language, which is so unique that it cannot be classified as a member of any of the great families of speech. It is neither Semitic, nor Aryan, nor yet Turanian.* It is an outsider, and always has been. In the absence of proof, this would certainly look as if the Chinese were not present at the building of Babel, and had no part in the confusion of tongues. The language bears no resemblance whatever to any of the languages which trace their lineage to that event. It seems to be older and more primitive, as if it branched off from the original speech of the race, and then petrified, so to speak, before it had time to develop by the inflectional process, as all other cultivated languages have done.

6. A complete investigation of Chinese archæology would contribute valuable data toward some of the questions involved in modern speculation upon Prehistoric Man. It is a field which invites labor, and may yet help to decide some of the perplexing problems which are continually recurring in the study of the primitive life of the race.

* Whitney, *Language and the Study of Language*, chap. ix. Max Müller, *Science of Language*, first series, p. 288, 289.

ARTICLE IV.—HERBERT SPENCER'S LAWS OF THE UNKNOWABLE.

First Principles. On the Unknowable. By HERBERT SPENCER.
New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1870.

THIS treatise forms the first part of Mr. Spencer's "First Principles"—a kind of second book of Genesis—written on the *a priori* plan, and one which to us seems to be no improvement on the first. We have placed the title of this book at the head of our Article, because it is one of the best known expositions of the nescient philosophy—Mr. Spencer being the great prophet of nescience, both in science and in religion.

When this work first appeared, some seven years ago, it was received with considerable applause, even by religious thinkers. Mr. Spencer admitted the reality of religion, and insisted upon the existence of God. In this respect, the work was an agreeable change upon the open war, and undisguised atheism, of such men as Comte. It had, too, an aspect of humility. It set a limit to many extravagant speculations, by declaring the limited nature of our faculties. These things moved many theologians to look upon the work as a flag of truce, sent out from a hitherto hostile camp, and they failed to see that the concessions to religion amounted to absolutely nothing, while the demands from it were such as to render true piety impossible. Not that Mr. Spencer, when he introduced this Trojan horse, intended this result; but such is nevertheless the outcome of the doctrine. For we consider this theory of nescience, which so many of our scientific men and young thinkers hold, as pernicious as any in all speculation; more so than the hardy old-fashioned atheism, because it is more decorous in appearance, and more specious in argument, while it is identical in the final result. The first is a precipice, bold and naked, over which one may plunge, if he chooses, but not unconsciously; the second is the same precipice covered over with snow, not strong enough to save one from the abysses, but powerful, by its seeming safety, to lure him to destruction.

This Know-Nothing doctrine is as old as philosophy; but the philosophy of the doctrine has changed with time. Formerly the difficulty was external, now it is internal. "We cannot know anything," the old sceptics used to say, "because as much and as good evidence can be brought against any proposition as for it; and hence the mind must remain in eternal balance between two opinions." But the fault was in the evidence, not in the mind. The contradictions of the testimony embarrassed the judge.

Now, all this has changed. The difficulty is no longer external, but internal. The criticism of fact has been exchanged for the criticism of faculty. The nescientist no longer inquires whether reality exists, but contents himself with the humbler question whether we have any faculties for knowing it, supposing it to exist. As a result of this intellectual inventory, mental limits have been discovered, and all knowledge of the real is said to lie beyond them. By the constitution of the mind itself, we are forever prohibited from reaching reality. Phenomena are all we know, and these when analyzed to the bottom, can never give us things as they are, or "things in themselves." Between appearances or things as we know them, and the hidden reality behind them, an impassable gulf is fixed.

This form of nescience began with Kant. He taught that there are forms of thought and sensibility in the mind, which determine the form of our knowledge, something as a mould gives shape to a cast. The matter of anything, as an iron ball, is one thing; the form is quite another. So the content, or matter, of our knowledge, is given by the things known; but the form, which is entirely different, is given by the mind itself. Hence all our knowledge is a composite, of which the two factors are the external thing, and the internal form. What the thing is, apart from this form, or what it is "in itself," is, and must be—to use the established phrase—"unknown and unknowable." Moreover, as it is conceivable that other orders of intelligence should differ from the human, we can never be certain that our knowledge has universal validity. We think things in the relation of cause and effect, of substance and attribute, &c.; but these relations are only forms of our thought, and correspond to no reality in the thing. Hence all our

knowledge is true only for us ; at least we can never be sure that it is true for other orders of being.

This doctrine, in its essential features, is identical with that of relativity, upon which Mr. Spencer relies for the support of his theory. A criticism of the one is a criticism of the other. Indeed this relativity is derived directly from the teachings of Kant, and just here we have a word to say. This later form of the doctrine, as it appears in the works of Hamilton, Mansel, and Spencer, has far less logical and metaphysical value than the earlier form as taught by Kant. In his works one commonly finds good sense, and good logic. The arguments are not merely logical, but real. We may not admit their validity, but at the same time we feel that they have a genuine momentum, and are not a logical play on words. In passing to the relativity philosophy, one is sensible of a change in this respect. There seems to be a kind of intellectual shuffling going on, a playing fast and loose with words as with the "absolute," "infinite," "conditioned," "unconditioned," &c. This makes one regard many of the conclusions as he does the celebrated one that the minute hand of a watch can never pass the hour hand ; to overturn them is difficult, but to believe them is impossible. We certainly see the ghost according to programme, but cannot rid ourselves of the conviction that concave mirrors and magic lanterns are at the bottom of the show. Kant shows us real existences fighting ; the relativist shows us shadows. These indulge in most dazzling fence, and seem to cleave each other through and through ; but no blood is drawn, and nobody is hurt.

Armed with a knowledge of our mental limits, Mr. Spencer, following in the wake of Hamilton and Mansel, proceeds to charge all our familiar conceptions with involving contradictions, and intellectual *hari-kari*. A further analysis of our faculties reveals to his searching gaze a pack of mental impostors, who, by some hocus-pocus have contrived to shuffle themselves into such universal acceptance that most men regard them as necessary truths. But these villains are usurpers nevertheless ; and having the bad taste to contradict our philosopher, they very naturally excite his wrath. He at once brands them as "pseudo-ideas," keeps them just long enough to give

evidence against themselves—which is assumed to be the only true evidence they can give—and then, turns them out of doors. We notice that they are occasionally smuggled in to help the prosecution, but are forbidden to say a word for the defence. This is the last feather. After being convicted of harboring “pseudo-ideas,” the mind feels the propriety of being humble. For the present, our only hope is that as these necessary truths, *alias* pseudo-ideas, are such liars, they may have lied when they spoke against themselves.

The authority for this summary ejection seems to be that these truths cannot be pictured by the imagination, and so are “unthinkable,” and “inconceivable.” Horsed upon this test of knowledge, Mr. Spencer gallops gaily out of the *a priori* country, but like the famous John Gilpin is carried farther than he cares to go, before he dismounts. Can anything be more mocking to an exact thinker than this claim, that nothing shall be admitted to the rank of knowledge which cannot come before the representative faculty? What is the image of motion? or emotion? or relation? or force? or cause? or law? or existence? Yet these, and a multitude of other ideas, all absolutely without the imagination, do constantly enter into the exactest reasonings, each one keeping its place, without any danger, nay without any possibility, of being confounded with another. Now are we to claim that all knowledge into which these “unthinkable ideas” enter, is only illusion? Either that, or we must allow that we can have certain knowledge which is yet “inconceivable.” In fact it is the attempt to apply this test to ideas to which it has no application, which is at the bottom of Kant’s antinomies, Hamilton’s contradictions, and the general assortment of inconceivabilities which Mr. Spencer tries to saddle upon our reason.

A good illustration of the value of this test is given in his criticism of the atheistic, pantheistic, and theistic theories, of the origin of the universe.

Mr. Spencer believes that there is a soul of truth even in the falsest view, and that every creed, if analyzed, would be found to agree in something, even with its seeming contradictions. “To doubt this would discredit too profoundly the average human intelligence.” Hence, if we should lay aside

from the various creeds all that is peculiar to each, and find that in which they all agree, this common article of faith would possess the very highest claim to our acceptance. Accordingly he summons the atheist, pantheist, and theist, in turn, to appear for cross-examination.

Between atheist and theist, it would seem a hopeless task to look for common ground, something like harmonizing yes and no; but great is logic, and Mr. Spencer is equal to the task. The result of the examination is the proof that "not only is no current hypothesis tenable, but also that no tenable hypothesis can be framed." The "soul of truth" existing in these diverse statements, is that none of the parties know anything about the matter. This is what they have always been trying to say, but were never able clearly to enunciate it until Mr. Spencer helped them. An omnipresent mystery behind the universe, unexplained and unexplainable, is the ultimate religious truth, the one in which all conflicting creeds agree.

We believe that a comparison of religions would show more than a common belief in mystery, even a belief in power, and will, as well. It is not a mystery, but a good being of some kind, that men have revered; it is not a mystery, but a demon, that they have feared. Superstition has not stored the universe with mysteries, but with persons. Will-power behind phenomena, is the ultimate idea of all religions whether false or true.

But leaving this question, what is the reason for involving atheist, pantheist, and theist in a common condemnation? Because they all postulate the inconceivable idea of self-existence. Each assumes either the creation or the creator to be self-existent; and hence each view is equally untenable. "Differing so widely as they seem to do, the atheistic, pantheistic, and theistic hypotheses contain the same ultimate element. It is impossible to avoid making the assumption of self-existence somewhere: and whether that assumption be made nakedly, or under complicated disguises, it is equally vicious, equally unthinkable" (p. 36).

We suspect that neither atheist, pantheist, nor theist would be very much frightened by such argument as this. For whether it be unthinkable or not, it is one of the strongest

affirmations of the mind that there is self-existence somewhere; the question between the theist and his opponents being, where that self-existence is to be found. It is in the material universe, say the atheist and the pantheist. That cannot be, says the theist. The visible universe bears every mark of dependence. There must be some being, apart from these phenomena, uncaused and independent. Stop, says Mr. Spencer. "If we admit that there can be something uncaused, there is no reason to assume a cause for anything" (p. 87). That is to say, if one should teach that space and time, which bear no marks of origination or dependence, are uncaused, he must also believe that plants and animals, which bear the plainest marks of dependence, are equally uncaused existences, and need no explanation. "Those who cannot conceive a self-existent universe, and who therefore assume a creator as the source of the universe, take for granted that they can conceive a self-existent creator" (p. 85). Is it possible that this is Mr. Spencer's reading of the law of causation? Does that law commit us to any such absurdity as an infinite series of causes? Plainly not. The application of that law, is well marked and defined. It is not existence, as such, that demands a cause, but a changing existence. Could the universe be brought to a complete stand-still, so that there should be no change whatever, then the demand for a cause would never arise. It is entrance and exit only, that give rise to this demand. Whatever manifests them, must have its cause; whatever does not, can dispense with a cause. If not, why does Mr. Spencer place an "absolute reality" behind the universe at all, as the cause of its phenomena? and why does he look upon that "absolute reality" as uncaused? "If we admit there can be something uncaused, there is no reason to assume a cause for anything." Either the "absolute reality," or the dictum, must leave. And now, as the universe is but a vast aggregation of events, of entrances into, and exits from, existence, let the reader judge, whether Mr. Spencer is justified in dismissing the atheistic, pantheistic, and theistic hypotheses as equally untenable; or whether the theist is not right in passing behind this vast aggregation of events, called the universe, to a supreme and unchangeable author? Surely a test

of knowledge, which overlooks this most patent distinction between the wave, and the abiding deep below it, is not a trustworthy one; especially since, as we have intimated, it bites off its own nose. For Mr. Spencer apparently believes that his "absolute reality" is self-existent; which assumption, by his own reasoning, makes the "absolute reality" an "untenable hypothesis," involving "symbolic conclusions of the illegitimate order."

As a result of his criticism of scientific and religious ideas, he concludes that a "fundamental reality" underlies the universe; and that this is "unknown and unknowable." Religion ends in mystery; science ends in mystery; and our highest wisdom is to recognize that this mystery is utterly inscrutable.

Mr. Spencer is not an idealist. He insists as strongly upon the existence of a "fundamental reality," as upon our ignorance of its nature. "It is rigorously impossible to conceive that our knowledge is a knowledge of appearances only, without at the same time conceiving a reality of which they are appearances; for appearance without reality is unthinkable" (p. 88). Now it seems to us that this Know-Nothing position is the most untenable possible; that Mr. Spencer has been so flushed with his victory over the "pseudo-ideas," as to push the rout too far; and, in attempting to drive them into the abysses, has tumbled in along with them. Our purpose then is to show that he must either go farther, or not so far; that he must either adopt absolute idealism or admit the objective validity of our knowledge of things. To deny a thing to thought, and save it to existence, is impossible; for—to risk a logical paradox—nothing, which is said to exist, can be declared unknown, until something is known about it. In his present position this modern Samson parallels the ancient by pulling the temple on his own head.

Mr. Spencer further supports his theory by an appeal to the doctrine of relativity. But, before proceeding to examine this doctrine, we must guard the reader against confounding the incomprehensible, that is, the unexplainable, with the unknowable. This is a confusion, which, though appearing elsewhere, is especially manifest in pages 68–78. The explanations of science are only classifications of particular facts, un-

der one more general. So we explain the sinking of a stone, or the rise of a cork in water, the fall of a body, or the rise of a balloon, the flow of the rivers, the swell of the tides, and the motions of the planets, all by referring them to the general fact of gravitation. This is the nature of all scientific explanations. But clearly such a process must come down to an ultimate fact at last, which cannot be included in any other, and so must remain unexplainable, but not, as Mr. Spencer intimates, unknowable. For though we cannot give the rationale of that final fact, by the supposition we know it as a fact. The *that* or *what* may be known, though we are in the profoundest ignorance of the *how* or *why*. And so we can have a good deal of certain knowledge of the incomprehensible. To return to our illustration, the fact of gravity, the law of its variation, the fact that it includes all the particular facts mentioned, these are abundantly certain, but gravity itself is as incomprehensible as the Deity. A recollection of this fact, that the incomprehensible is not the unknowable, will, as we shall see, break the force of many of Mr. Spencer's weightiest arguments.

But what is this famous relativity which convicts all our beliefs of "fetishism," and turns our knowledge out of doors?

As a philosophical doctrine, it is not well-defined, but is in fact a combination of several doctrines, some of which are not only true but truisms, while the rest look marvellously like something "pseud."

Sometimes it means that we can only know things as related to ourselves, that is, that we have only such knowledge as our faculties can give us. In one sense this is axiomatic. All knowledge implies a thing to be known, and a faculty for knowing it. Clearly then, we can only know those things, or properties of things, which are adjusted or related to our faculties. An eye could not see sound, an ear could not hear vision. It is said that there are sounds of so high a pitch as to be above the limits of our hearing, and others of so low a pitch as to be below them. Our knowledge of sound then is relative, for we hear only those notes which are properly related to the ear. It is very conceivable that there should be organisms

which should perceive sounds that range far above the limits of our hearing, and perhaps none of those which we hear. Now in each case, the knowledge of sound is relative; but are we to say then that neither party knows anything about sound? Two men stand on the shore, and look seaward. One has stronger vision than the other, and so the range of sight is relative, but real. Certainly it would not be claimed that because one sees farther than the other, both see nothing. Plainly, nescience finds no support in this interpretation of the doctrine of relativity. Let there be other beings than men, whose faculties far outrun ours, the fact does not cast discredit on what knowledge our faculties do give us.

But, under this statement of the doctrine, lurks another, which, though seldom put in plain statement, means this; our faculties, both the perceptive and the thinking, do not give us the objective reality of things.

In this statement we recognize at once the mental forms of Kant. Let us see the logical result of such teaching.

Matter is said to have form: has it really form? It has for us, says the Know-Nothing, but it has no form in itself. Some higher intelligence might see it as formless. Then the form which I attribute to it is a phantom of my own creation.

Matter is said to resist: has it really any such power? Again the answer is that matter "in itself," has no such power. We must conclude then that the resistance of matter is a fiction of the mind that affirms it, as ghosts exist only in the eye that sees them.

The line of argument is evident. We have but to call up in turn the various attributes of matter and win from the Know-Nothing the confession that all we think we find in matter is but the shadow of the mind itself. But how then do we know that there is any "fundamental reality," or "thing in itself." If all that we do know is imaginary, there seems to be no good reason for supposing that what we don't know is real. If mental limits or forms can create so much, it is very credible that they can create the thing outright.

But it is urged, the same thing produces diverse effects upon different organisms; and as the reality can't be like all the reports given of it, it is most reasonable to suppose it like none

of them. White light, falling on different objects, has no tendency to make them all of the same color, but rather makes the particular color of each more vivid; the blue becomes bluer and the green greener, &c. If we suppose persons to have eyes that see only blue or green, the judgment would undoubtedly be, everything is blue or green. Now here we have an illustration of the unknown reality (white light) producing effects altogether diverse from itself, and from each other (blue light, green light).

There are a few stock objections of this kind, which are of as much value to the Know-Nothing as the "small child" is to the associational psychologist, or the charges of "fetishism," "anthropomorphism," and "bibliolatry," are to the theological iconoclast. But what do they amount to? Supposing such a queer lot of eyes to exist, where is the contradiction? If light is said to be blue, green, &c., it is only the truth; light is blue, and green. The error would be in affirming it to be only blue or green. If this error be avoided, there is no contradiction, and no ground for nescience. It is only saying that one eye is adopted to the blue ray, and the other to the green.

The same reasoning applies to all the other objections, which the Know-Nothing is in the habit of urging against the truth of the senses. As a result of these considerations, we hold that he must either advance, or retreat. Between absolute idealism, and the admission that our knowledge of things is real, there is no middle ground. No mental form, and no relativity of thought, can bridge the bottomless pit between.

But do you mean to say that you have an "absolute" knowledge of things? That you know the thing "in itself"? What an "absolute" knowledge, &c., may be, we are not certain. We only mean to say that what we seem to find in a thing is really there. We suspect though that this "absolute," "thing in itself," "fundamental reality," &c., in the way in which the terms are used, are really the very pseudest of pseudo-ideas. We are writing upon a table which has legs, leaves, top, cover, &c. This, we know. If there be any ghostly, absolute, fundamental-reality-thing-in-itself, table, lurking around the real one, we are happy to admit that we know nothing about it. Our claim is that what we see in things is in them; and that a

denial of this leads inevitably to what Mr. Spencer calls the "insanities of idealism." His claim that "it is impossible to get rid of the consciousness of an actuality lying behind appearances," and that "from this impossibility results our indestructible belief in that actuality" (p. 97), will in no wise save him from the abysses. We have an irrepressible belief that we see things as they are; and if we could get rid of one belief we could get rid of the other. His fundamental reality must either come into knowledge, or go out of existence.

But in insisting upon the validity of our knowledge of matter, we do not mean to say that we know all about it. As we have said, all knowledge implies both a thing to be known, and a faculty for knowing it. For sight, or sound, there must be the external vibration, and the adapted organ. It is very credible that new senses would reveal to us properties now unknown. Matter may have a million aspects of which we can now form no idea; it may even have a thought or thinking side; of this we say nothing. But whatever sides it may, or may not, have, it certainly has those which we see. To be sure, we know only phenomena or appearances—two words which are saturated with illusion—but then things appear as they are, and not as they are not. Indeed, why shouldn't they? Why not perceive the very thing, instead of some phantom which has no likeness to the thing whatever?

The same general observation is to be made with reference to the laws of pure thought, to which this same form of relativity has been applied. We always think things in certain relations, as one or many, as substance or attribute, as cause or effect, as necessary or contingent. These are the categories, the necessary affirmations, of the human mind. But the Know-Nothing says that these, while true for us, may not be true for other orders of being. We admit that they may be unknown, and so inapplicable, to other intelligences; who may think things in altogether different relations; but our categories cannot be false for them unless they know them. A thing of which one has no knowledge, is neither false nor true for him, but simply unknown. Philosophy would have been saved from a great deal of confusion on this point, had it been kept in mind that false and true apply only to the knowable, or the known.

But if these hypothetical beings—in whose existence we have not much faith—can understand the meaning of our categories, then it is impossible that they should perceive them to be false. There may be beings who have no idea of number, and to them the equation $3 \times 2 = 6$ would present no idea whatever, and so would be neither true nor false, but unintelligible. But for all who have the idea of number, $3 \times 2 = 6$ everywhere, and always. "What presumption!" says the Know-Nothing. "Do you mean to say that the laws of our thought are true for all intelligence?" Precisely that; and which, "we ask in return," is the greater presumption, to teach that $3 \times 2 = 6$ everywhere and always, or to teach that in some corner or cranny of the universe, and for some transcendent intelligence, $3 \times 2 = 77$? There may be beings whose thought processes compare with ours, as the speed of the lightning with the pace of the snail; but the conclusions we reach in our slow advance are as true as theirs, though grasped with the swiftness of light. We refrain from imposing our categories upon other beings, but insist that they are nevertheless true. To deny this, is to commit intellectual suicide; to identify light and darkness, cosmos and chaos, being and blank.

Sometimes relativity is interpreted to mean that we cannot know pure being—that is, being without attributes—but only the properties of being.

This we conceive is not an exact statement of our knowledge. It is not true that we know attributes alone, but rather we know being as possessing attributes. Thus we do not know redness, hardness, squareness, but a red, hard, square, thing. But let the doctrine stand as stated, still nescience derives no support from it. We cannot know pure being, for the sufficient reason that there is no such thing to know. All this talk about pure being, arises from a pernicious habit into which thinkers fall, of thinking that whatever can be separated in thought, can also be repeated in fact. A beam has an upper and lower side, either of which can be thought of separately, but no beam can exist without both sides. Being, without attribute, is as impossible as a stick without two ends; and to argue about pure being, is as absurd as to talk of pure "upper-sideness," or pure "one-endedness." But supposing such a fiction to exist, we

cheerfully admit that we can know nothing about it; nor would we be much distressed at the loss. Matter or spirit, the finite or the infinite, apart from their properties or powers, excite very little curiosity in our minds. Imagine a metaphysical engineer, who, knowing how his engine is made, how it works, what it can do, &c., should say that this is no knowledge at all, and insist upon knowing the "absolute" engine, or engine "in itself." But if any one still believes that pure being is not pure nonsense, and is grieved at his inability to know it, we could not find it in our hearts to disturb so profound a sorrow. For ourselves, however, if the relativist will allow us to know—not being in itself, but the powers, the properties of being, we are content. But care must be taken that the Know-Nothing, after he has succeeded in heaping opprobrium on a pretended knowledge of abstract being, does not slyly carry it over to concrete being also. If he does, and denies that we know even the real properties of being, then, as we have shown, he is on the highway to the "insanities of idealism."

Again, the doctrine sometimes reads, we know not things, but their relations. This is the most prominent form of the doctrine in Mr. Spencer's work.

On this position, the most obvious comment is, that it does not appear how a relation can be discerned between unknown things. If one stick is known to be twelve feet long, and another to be four, the relative lengths can be determined. But suppose nothing be known of the length of either, what relation can be deduced? Clearly, a knowledge of things must precede a knowledge of relations; and, on the other hand, all knowledge of relations must vanish with the knowledge of things. At all events, a known relation between unknown things, would be an intellectual curiosity.

Mr. Spencer proceeds to defend this position by the following fallacies. "Every complete act of consciousness, besides distinction and relation, also implies likeness. Before it can become an idea, or constitute a piece of knowledge, a mental state must not only be known as separate in kind from certain foregoing states to which it is known as related by succession; but it must further be known as of the same kind with certain other foregoing states. * * * In brief, a true cognition is pos-

sible only through an accompanying recognition. Should it be objected that if so, there cannot be a first cognition, and hence no cognition, the reply is, that cognition proper arises gradually—that during the first stage of incipient intelligence, before the feelings produced by intercourse with the world have been put in order, there are no cognitions strictly so called” (p. 79). Does this reply meet the objection? If all cognition presupposes recognition, a first cognition is a manifest impossibility. If to cognize we must recognize—that is, *cognize* over again, where do we get the material of that recognition? Again, if “cognition proper” arise gradually in childhood, why may it not arise gradually in manhood as well? The fact is Mr. Spencer means by “cognition proper” classification, which is an entirely different thing from cognition. This will appear more clearly in our next quotation. His answer to this objection, is a good specimen of a favorite method with the associational psychologists. Whenever one of their fundamental assumptions is contradicted by the experience of manhood, it is easy to say that in infancy—a period of which anything can be affirmed, since nothing is remembered—it was strictly true. This is certainly improving the early years to the utmost. The “small child” is put into the associational mill, and, after a little brisk grinding, is brought out with a complete set of mental furniture. When the critic reaches the spot he is blandly told that it is all done and the machinery put away, and that any search on his part will be useless.

Mr. Spencer continues: “Should it be still further objected that if cognition presupposes recognition, there can be no cognition, even by an adult, of an object never before seen; there is still the sufficient answer that in so far as it is not assimilated to previously-seen objects, it is not known, and that it is known in so far as it is assimilated to them. * * * An animal hitherto unknown is yet recognized as belonging to one of the larger divisions—mammals, birds, reptiles, or fishes; or, should it be so anomalous that its alliance with any of these is not determinable, it may yet be classed as vertebrate or invertebrate; or if it be one of those organisms of which it is doubtful whether the animal or vegetable characteristics predominate, it is still known as a living body; even should it be questioned

whether it is organic, it remains beyond question that it is a material object, and it is cognized by being recognized as such. Whence it is manifest that a thing is perfectly known only when it is in all respects like certain things previously observed ; that in proportion to the number of respects in which it is unlike them, is the extent to which it is unknown ; and that hence when it has absolutely no attribute in common with anything else, it must be absolutely beyond the bounds of knowledge" (p. 80).

Omitting the minor confusions in this statement, the leading one is that which we have already noticed, the confounding of the unexplainable, or unclassifiable, with the unknowable. Plainly, we can only give a rationale of classifiable facts, for explanation is only classification ; but the facts must be known as facts before they can be classified. A thing in which we detect no likeness to other things, is not an unknowable thing, but an unclassified thing. To say that this thing can only be cognized by being recognized as matter, and that if this common tie were removed then we could not know it, is only to deny it to our perceptive faculties, and delude ourselves into thinking that this is a failure of the knowing power.

Upon a full survey of Mr. Spencer's view that we cannot know things in themselves, it seems to us utterly untenable. The alternatives are reality or idealism. The law of thought which warrants our belief in the existence of a thing warrants the assertion of something about it. After eliminating the paralogsms which cluster around that "pseud" abstraction, or pure nonsense, which he calls absolute being, and after guarding against the confounding of terms, we come at last to a number of truths and truisms all of which we would gladly have admitted beforehand.

But supposing nescience to fail in science, it does not follow that it fails in religion. Mr. Spencer is peculiarly severe on the impiety of supposing that we know anything about the Deity. Owing to the peculiar nature of the problem, relativity has done some of its loftiest tumbling over the question, "Is God an object of knowledge?"

If there be a God, he must be "first cause," "infinite," and "absolute." This is the fundamental proposition. "But" says

Mr. Spencer, quoting from Mr. Mansel, "these three conceptions, the cause, the absolute, the infinite, all equally indispensable, do they not imply contradictions to each other, when viewed in conjunction, as attributes of one and the same being? A cause cannot, as such, be absolute: the absolute cannot, as such, be cause. The cause, as such, exists only in relation to its effect; the cause is a cause of the effect; the effect is an effect of the cause. On the other hand, the conception of the absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation. We attempt to escape from this apparent contradiction, by introducing the idea of succession in time. The absolute first exists by itself, and afterward becomes a cause. But here we are checked by the third conception, that of the infinite. How can the infinite become that which it was not from the first? If causation is a possible mode of existence, that which exists without causing is not infinite; that which becomes a cause has passed beyond its former limits" (p. 89).

On the next page Mr. Spencer, still quoting from Mansel, after having proved that the absolute cannot be unconscious, proves that it cannot be conscious either. For "consciousness is conceivable only as a relation. There must be a conscious subject, and an object of which he is conscious. The subject is a subject to the object; the object is an object to the subject; and neither can exist by itself as the absolute. This difficulty, again, may be for the moment evaded, by distinguishing between the absolute as related to another, and the absolute as related to itself. The absolute, it may be said, may possibly be conscious, provided it is only conscious of itself. But this alternative is, in ultimate analysis, no less self-destructive than the other. For the object of consciousness, whether a mode of the subject's existence or not, is either created in, and by, the act of consciousness, or has an existence independent of it. In the former case, the object depends upon the subject, and the subject alone is the true absolute. In the latter case, the subject depends upon the object, and the object alone is the true absolute. Or if we attempt a third hypothesis, and maintain that each exists independently of the other, we have no absolute at all, but only a pair of relatives; for coëxistence, whether in consciousness or not, is itself a relation" (p. 40).

We have often wondered whether Mr. Mansel when he wrote this, or Mr. Spencer when he quoted it, was really serious or not. For with the exception of Mr. Mill's famous conclusion that matter is known only as a modification of mind, and mind is a product of matter, this is the finest specimen of amphibious logic we have ever met with. Mr. Spencer begins by assuming that there is an absolute, and ends by telling us that there is no absolute; "for coëxistence whether in consciousness or not is itself a relation." From this the conclusion is irresistible, that now, there is no absolute in the universe, and never will be, until God has cast all created being back into nothingness. For we exist, God coëxists, and so is not absolute but relative, and hence knowable. But if this thing which can only exist alone, be the true absolute, Mr. Spencer is very right in saying, that we cannot know it. For, you see, the absolute cannot be the absolute, until we have become non-existent; and then, there would be very grave obstacles to our pursuit of knowledge.

But the absolute with which Mr. Spencer begins the paragraph is one that can coëxist, at least we must suppose so; for it is incredible, that he meant to waste all this argument on a non-existence. The conception of this absolute, he says, "implies a possible existence out of all relation." Mark! not an actual existence out of relation, but a possible one; that is, an existence dependent on nothing else. This absolute we cannot know, because of the hostility of the idea of first cause.

Now why do we affirm an absolute being at all? Only as the support of contingent or related being. What kind of an absolute do we affirm? Not one out of all relation, but out of necessary or dependent relation. Mr. Spencer recognizes this in his definition, and forgets it in his application. In the definition it is what holds no necessary relation. "Its conception implies a possible existence apart from all relation." In the reasoning, it becomes that which is apart from all relation; as in the example quoted; "coëxistence, whether in consciousness or not, is itself a relation." Now the absence of restriction, not the absence of relation, is the characteristic of the only absolute that can be rationally affirmed. The only absolute being we know, is found in causal connection with the universe. We

rise to that being by the law of causation, but, forsooth, we cannot leave it by the same law. This absolute of Mr. Spencer is the veriest ingrate. It owes its existence to the law of causation, for we should never affirm an absolute, except as the support of related being; and now, like some naughty children, it refuses to acknowledge its parentage. At the bare mention of cause, it begins to bristle up, puts on airs, and declares that, being absolute, it knows nothing of causes. Clearly such an absolute as we have mentioned, one without restriction, may unquestionably become a cause. Of course such an absolute God will be in relation to his creation, and so will be knowable, for we are allowed to know the relative.

Hamilton and Mansel taught that our conception of the absolute is purely negative. Mr. Spencer, seeing that this view must lead to a negation of the absolute, sets himself to oppose it. In so doing he comes very near what we conceive to be the true doctrine of the absolute, but in saving the doctrine mows off his own legs. He says (p. 91):

"Our conception of the relative itself disappears, if our conception of the absolute is a pure negation. * * * It is admitted, or rather contended, that the consciousness of a relation implies a consciousness of both the related members. If we are required to conceive the relation between the relative and non-relative, without being conscious of both, we are in fact required to compare that of which we are conscious with that of which we are not conscious; the act itself being an act of consciousness, and only possible through a consciousness of both its objects. What then becomes of the assertion that 'the absolute is conceived merely by a negation of conceivability,' or as 'the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible?' If the absolute is present in thought only as a mere negation, then the relation between it and the relative becomes unthinkable, because one of the terms of the relation is absent from consciousness. And if this relation is unthinkable, then is the relative itself unthinkable for want of its antithesis; whence results the disappearance of all thought whatever."

Mark! we are forever told that we can never be conscious of the absolute. "It is thus manifest that a consciousness of the

absolute is equally self-contradictory with that of the infinite.' "It is thus manifest that, even if we could be conscious of the absolute, we could not possibly know that it is the absolute: and, as we can be conscious of an object as such, only by knowing it to be what it is, this is equivalent to an admission that we cannot be conscious of the absolute at all." "As an object of consciousness everything is necessarily relative" (p. 78). In the argument just quoted, however, its necessary existence in consciousness is insisted upon. We must have a consciousness of both relative and absolute, or all thought is impossible. We are told too that the absolute cannot enter into a relation. But here we learn that unless known in relation and antithesis to the relative, there is no thinking possible. We yield the point; we believe that all our thinking goes in pairs, as absolute and relative, finite and infinite, and that these appear and disappear together. But this makes the absolute a relative, and brings it once more within the domain of thought and knowledge.

All this is the sheerest jugglery. God is related to the universe, and to us. In such relation we are not forbidden to know him. Of what use then to tell us that apart from his relation to his creation we cannot know him? If there were no other being than God, we, being non-existent, could not know him. If God were all alone in a mighty void, without any manifestation of power, wisdom, or character, no more a being than a blank, indifferently existent and non-existent—for to deny the absolute, the power of becoming non-existent, would be a limitation—then we grant that we could never know him, and would not care to know him. But what does this amount to? It is a labored attempt to prove that in eternal darkness there would be no light, and no sound in everlasting silence. This most petty, pitiful, and barren conclusion is all that is reached, while the unhappy looker-on, entangled in verbal confusions, and dazzled with a show of logic and science, is left to infer that we know nothing of God or his will concerning us. The God who has revealed himself in the universe, the author of its glorious beauty, the preserver of its eternal order, the Infinite Purity and Holiness, this God we are permitted to know, and we are content. The Living God of

the Bible is left us, the sleeping Brahma of the Know-Nothing we cheerfully resign to the worshiper of the absolute.

But finally, God is infinite, and hence we cannot know him. As in the case of the absolute we noticed a perpetual shuffling from one definition to another, so here there is a constant shifting from the metaphysical infinite, which is the all, to an infinite which can coëxist with the finite. In a passage already quoted Mr. Spencer says, "If causation is a possible mode of existence, then that which exists without causing is not infinite." This argument can only apply to the metaphysical infinite, and could be used to show that any being that does not include in itself, not only all other beings, but all evil also, however vile, cannot be infinite. Envy and malice are possible modes of existence; are we then to conclude that a God who is not envious and malicious, is not infinite? We cannot believe, however, that Mr. Spencer intends to reduce the argument to this absurdity, by reasoning about a metaphysically infinite God who does not exist at all. Whatever infinite there be, must coëxist with the finite.

Can we know such an infinite? He says (p. 76): "The very conception of consciousness, in whatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily implies distinction between one object and another. To be conscious, we must be conscious of something: and that something can only be known as that which it is, by being distinguished from that which it is not. But distinction is necessarily limitation; for if one object is to be distinguished from another, it must possess some form of existence which the other has not, or it must not possess some form which the other has. But it is obvious that the infinite cannot be distinguished from the finite, by the absence of any quality which the finite possesses; for such absence would be a limitation. * * * A consciousness of the infinite as such, thus necessarily involves a self-contradiction: for it implies the recognition, by limitation and difference, of that which can only be given as unlimited and indifferent."

We have quoted this paragraph, not because it demands any answer, for the only infinite which it implies is that miserable abstraction, the metaphysical infinite, which no more applies to God than to man; but because it contains

one of the great fallacies of this philosophy—that to know by distinction and difference, is a mental weakness. Now we do not like to be presumptuous, but, with all deference to the great philosophers who have held this view, it seems to us that the reason why we know things by difference, is because they are different. If they differed not, in attribute, nor in space, nor in time, they would be the same. This power to know things apart is a weakness, is it? Are we to suppose that there is some transcendent or absolute intellect which sees all things alike, detecting no difference between yes and no, good and evil, being and blank? Would such a thing be absolute intelligence, or absolute insanity?

So far from relativity preventing us from reaching the infinite, it is the very property of thought by which we do reach it. The conception of the finite is impossible without the antithesis of the infinite. Along with the finite extension goes the idea of the infinite space around it; together with the finite time, is seen the everlasting duration underneath it. If to this, it be objected that the ideas do indeed go together, but only the finite is real, while the infinite is a negation, we deny it. The abstract infinite is unquestionably a negative idea, but the concrete infinite, as infinite space, time, or being, is a positive idea. If not, then, as Mr. Spencer well says, "If, in such cases the negative contradictory were as alleged 'nothing else,' then the negation of the other, and therefore a mere nonentity, it would clearly follow that negative contradictories could be used interchangeably; the unlimited (or infinite) might be thought of as antithetical to the divisible; and the indivisible as antithetical to the limited (or finite). While the fact that they cannot be so used, proves that in consciousness the unlimited and indivisible are qualitatively distinct, and therefore positive or real; since distinction cannot exist between nothings" (p. 90).

With Mr. Spencer, we consider this conclusive; but if further proof be needed, we have only to turn to his argument already given for the positive conception of the absolute, and for relative and absolute, substitute finite and infinite, and we shall see that our conception of infinite being is a positive one, and is absolutely necessary to our knowledge of finite being. Making

the substitutions, the last of the argument would read: "If the infinite is present in thought only as a mere negation, then the relation between it and the finite becomes unthinkable, because one of the terms of the relations is absent from consciousness. And if this relation is unthinkable, then is the finite itself unthinkable, for want of its antithesis: whence results the disappearance of all thoughts whatever."

But suppose it granted that we cannot reach the infinite, can the infinite reach us? This is a question which Mr. Spencer entirely ignores. Intent only on casting opprobrium on the human faculties, he forgets that at the same time he is charging inabilities upon the infinite too. We have often heard Mr. Spencer praised for his "severe logic;" we have even heard him styled a "modern Aristotle" by some enthusiastic admirers; but we confess we are staggered by such passages as these. "But it is obvious that the infinite cannot be distinguished, as such, from the finite, by the absence of any quality which the finite possesses; for such absence would be a limitation" (p. 77). On p. 111 the claim that "the universe is the manifestation and abode of a free mind like our own," is given as an illustration of the "impiety of the pious." It must be everything; yet to say that it is a Living, Conscious Intelligence, is the vilest fetishism. It must possess all power and transcend all law, yet has not the power of revelation. Able to sow space with suns and systems, to scatter beauty broadcast like the light, and maintain the whole in everlasting rhythm, but utterly unable to reach the human soul. Mr. Spencer has much to say about contradictions; let the reader judge whose is the contradiction here. By his own reasoning he is involved in the most perfect dilemma possible. If God be infinite, he can reach us; if not infinite, we can reach him; in either case communion is possible.

But here as in the case of matter, while insisting upon a real knowledge of God, we do not claim a complete one. We do not pretend to say how he does this or that, but that he does this or that. We do not claim to give a rationale of the Divine nature any more than of our own. The mystery of existence is equally insoluble in both, and some facts, not some explanations, are all that is known in either case. "Who can search

out the Almighty to perfection?" has been the language of the best religious thinkers, from the time of Job until now. We have as little patience with those geographers of the Divine nature, who know all about God, as with the Know-Nothing, who leaves us in total ignorance. All we claim is, that we have a real, though finite, knowledge of the Deity; not an infinite thought, but a finite thought about the infinite; which, like the infinite series of the mathematician, is true as far as it goes, though carried to only a limited number of terms.

The final quotation we give from Mr. Spencer, is a fit companion to the confusions already noticed. There is an old satire often urged against religion, so old indeed that what little point it ever had has been lost for ages. It runs back to the time of Xenophanes, and has been repeated in various forms ever since. Mr. Theodore Parker uses a buffalo for comparison. He supposes that a buffalo, arguing as the natural theologians do, would conclude that God has horns and hoofs. We have also seen a mole used to illustrate this powerful irony. Mr. Spencer believes that "volumes might be written on the impiety of the pious," and he accordingly proceeds to lash said impiety by dressing up the old satire in this form:

"The attitude thus assumed can be fitly represented only by developing a simile long current in theological controversies—the simile of the watch. If for a moment we made the grotesque supposition that the tickings and other movements of a watch constituted a kind of consciousness; and that a watch possessed of such a consciousness insisted upon regarding the watchmaker's actions as determined like its own by springs and escapements; we should only complete a parallel of which religious teachers think much. And were we to suppose that a watch not only formulated the cause of its existence in these mechanical terms, but held that watches were bound out of reverence so to formulate this cause, and even vituperated as atheistic watches any that did not so venture to formulate it; we should merely illustrate the presumption of theologians by carrying their own arguments a step further" (p. 110).

If theologians taught that God has legs and arms, parts and passions, this satire might have some point: but since they expressly forbid such an assumption, it is difficult to tell where

the force of the "grotesque supposition" lies. For, remembering that religion does not attribute organs to God, it is so plain that the watch has the best of the argument, that we wonder that anyone could ever have been deceived by it. For, if this thinking, conscious watch should conclude that it had a thinking, conscious maker, it would be right. And let us "develop the simile." Suppose that this "grotesque" watch should turn Know-Nothing, and insist that it is "fetishism" to believe in a thinking, conscious watchmaker, and should begin to "vituperate" all watches who were stupid enough to believe in a watchmaker; it would "merely illustrate" Mr. Spencer's "presumption by carrying his argument a step further." Clearly enough this metaphysical watch has "ticked out" better logic than the "modern Aristotle."

The only interest which nescience has is a religious one. Science would go on in just the same way, collecting and coördinating facts, though the facts were proved to be phantoms. Common life would remain the same. The most thorough-going Know-Nothing would be as eager to get bread as the realist; he would be as careful to keep out of a relative fire, or relative river, as out of an absolute one. In all these cases, the practical necessity would override the speculative error.

But it is not so in religion. There we are not forced to act; there we are constantly seeking some excuse for inaction. Even the suspicion that our religious ideas are delusions, leads to a relaxation of effort, as they know too well who have at any time made nescience their theology. To declare our knowledge imperfect, and inadequate, is admissible; but to declare it utterly false, is fatal to religion. It is useless to leave us these religious ideas as regulative truths; a regulative truth will regulate until one discovers the fraud; but he must have very little knowledge of human nature who imagines that it will have any power after the trick has been found out. These gleams of good that sometimes visit us, these occasional intimations of a solemn beauty, and a perfect purity, these undying suspicions of conscience that there is a Sin-Avenger somewhere, all these, which we have thought point upward to God, are found to point nowhere, and are but magnificent will-o-the-wisps. Why pursue them? It might be safe to follow them, but it might

be dangerous; at all events the most reasonable course is to ignore them. Out from this blank abyss of total darkness, neutral alike to good and evil, no inspiration of the soul can come. Religion cannot live on nescience; and reverence is impossible toward a blank. Though to be sure we now see through a glass darkly, yet the image there discerned must not be wholly distorted. The Infinite One must ever be as a great mountain range, wrapt in a shadow, and stretching away into the unknown, yet some peaks must pierce through to the sunlight, and the clear blue. In contemplating Him we shall ever be as men watching in the darkness of early dawn, with a deep sense of awe and mystery pressing upon us, yet there must be some glow on the hill-tops, and a flush in the upper air. There must be a solemn silence that reverence may bow low and worship; and there must be a voice which we can trust, saying, "Lo it is I, be not afraid." The absence of either of these elements must lead, we believe, to the decay of all true religion. In the God who commands our reverence and our loving worship, there must be mystery, and there must be manifestation.

ARTICLE V.—RÉCIT D'UNE SŒUR:—MEMOIRS OF A
FRENCH ROMAN CATHOLIC FAMILY.

Récit d'une Sœur. Souvenirs de Famille, recueillis par MME. AUGUSTUS CRAVEN, née LA FERRONNAYS. Ouvrage couronné par l'Académie Française. Quartorzième édition, revue. Didier & Cie. 1868. 2 vol. p. 451, 433.

A Sister's Story. By MRS. AUGUSTUS CRAVEN. Translated from the French by EMILY BOWLES. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1870. 8vo, pp. 539.

PROTESTANTS believe that the Roman Catholic Church, by the additions which it has made to the pure religion of the Bible, has brought incalculable evils upon Christendom; that by the superstitious observances which it has inculcated it has put to sleep the consciences of millions; and that by its connivance with evil it has brought upon itself a heavy burden of just reproach through all the ages. Yet Protestants also believe that practically in every generation there have been within the communion of that Church a great number of persons who have so intelligently and firmly held to the vital truths which it has retained, that even the errors which they have accepted have not materially injured the beauty of their Christian character, or deprived them of the consolations and hopes of the Christian religion.

The volume whose title we have placed at the head of this Article furnishes satisfactory evidence that what has been true in the past remains true at the present time; that there are very many in our day who implicitly accept the dogmas of the Roman Catholic Church who in their lives and in their deaths give unmistakable evidence of genuine piety.

We hardly need say that, as Protestants, we rejoice in all such evidence. Believing as we do in the communion of saints, and in a Church greater and more catholic than the Roman Catholic Church, it is a matter of rejoicing to us to know that even among those who denounce us as heretics, and

look upon us with pity and horror, there are those who are our brethren—for they belong also to that Church which is gathered from among all peoples and nations, of which the only Head is Jesus Christ.

The book of which we speak presents the Memoirs of the various members of a French Roman Catholic family in our own times, of high social position. It introduces the reader to a great variety of persons, well known in church and state, not only in France, but in other European countries. The "Story" is consequently one of real life; and illustrates in an exceedingly beautiful and affecting manner what we have said with regard to the piety which exists among the adherents of the Romish faith. It is accepted by them in Europe and America as one of the most powerful and attractive works of its kind which has been published in modern times. Yet it plainly appears from these Memoirs, as we think, that this piety, wherever it is exhibited, owes its existence to, and derives its nourishment from, the great truths which those who acknowledge the authority of the Pope hold in common with Protestants; and we cannot but think that it appears also that nearly everything which is distinctive in the Church of Rome, either in doctrine or practice, is useless to those who are seeking in earnest to live in conformity to the will of God, and to those who are not is fruitful only of evil.

Such an exhibition of religious life as is here presented—whatever opinion the reader may form of it—merits consideration. There is reason to believe that many of our countrymen have derived their ideas of what Roman Catholicism is from what they have seen of it among the ignorant and semi-barbarous foreigners who are to so great an extent engaged here only in menial employments. Perhaps it is not too much to say that even well informed Protestants are to be found who firmly believe that no educated man in the Roman Catholic Church is or can be sincere in his reception of its dogmas.

Nothing surely is to be gained by undervaluing what is really good in that Church. We propose, accordingly, to give a somewhat full abstract of the "Story" which is here told. We feel, however, that we ought to premise that anything

which we can do in the way of compressing these two thick volumes within the limits at our command must prove very unsatisfactory. The book is one which requires to be read throughout, if any adequate impression is to be obtained.

The Memoirs open with an introduction to the home of the French ambassador in Rome, at a period only a few weeks before the famous Revolution in Paris of "the three days"—the 28th, 29th, and 30th, of July, 1830. The ambassador at that time to the Papal Court was M. le Comte de Ferronnays, who had already for many years represented his government at St. Petersburg. In 1828, on his return from Russia to Paris, he had accepted the position of minister of foreign affairs; but a severe illness made it soon necessary for him to resign his portfolio. In the autumn of the following year, his health being in a measure reëstablished, he received information, while traveling in Italy, that he was appointed minister to Rome. Circumstances, however, prevented his entering immediately upon the duties of this office, so that it was not till the month of May, 1830, that he was fairly established with his family at the French embassy, which was then in the Palazzo Simonetti in the Corso.

As may readily be supposed, the younger members of the household were delighted with the prospect before them. "The eternal city" with all its treasures of art, the object of their longing dreams since earliest childhood, was before them. They were to enter society under the most favorable auspices, in one of the most interesting capitals of Europe. So the first few weeks were passed in the pleasantest manner possible. All unsuspecting that these happy days were to be the last which they were to spend in that degree of position and fortune, they enjoyed them to the full. But they had hardly learned to feel at home in the spacious apartments of the Palazzo Simonetti, when tidings of the Revolution in Paris reached them. M. le Comte de Ferronnays felt it to be incumbent upon him to send in his resignation at once; and then all was confusion in their beautiful home. The rooms which had been so elegantly fitted up for them were dismantled. The house was speedily filled with packing boxes. Their carriage and

horses which had been sent on to them from Vienna reached them only in time for one single drive outside of the walls of the city, and then were sent to be sold. All was uncertainty as to what it was best to do and where it was best to go.

At first it was thought advisable to leave Italy; but influenced partly by considerations for the health of some of the party, and as it would seem partly also by motives of economy, they concluded to go to Naples. There, accordingly, they were soon established in a little villa, at Castellamare, which seemed as we are told very "ugly and desolate" after the broad staircases and spacious *salons* of the French embassy. Still they contrived to make themselves comfortable. Their house was very small, and the rooms were "dismal and shabby," but there was one large unfurnished room, the windows of which looked full upon the Bay of Naples and the heights of Castellamare, and this they made the gathering-place for the family. Here they brought every day their tables and chairs, and so spent the morning together, reading, writing, and chatting. The Count and Countess had both had an early experience of a life of exile. They had been in childhood with their parents among the *émigrés* of the first French Revolution. In fact, they had been married in Clagenfurth, in Corinthia, at the time that the army of Condé was encamped there. So their children, from the days of infancy, had been familiar with stories of the miseries and the dangers to which exiles are exposed, and with the courage and resignation which their parents and grandparents had shown in meeting the reverses of fortune. They did not know but a similar fate might be in reserve for them; so with admirable fortitude and cheerfulness they set to work to make their plans for the future. It was determined, if it should become necessary, that Eugénie should give music lessons, and Pauline should be a nursery governess.

But matters speedily changed for the better; and early in 1831 they felt able to remove to a pretty house on the Chiaia, next door to the palace of Sir Richard Acton; and the winter was passed in the most brilliant and agreeable society. Lady Acton delighted in having a circle of young people constantly around her; and with the gay throng which gathered at her house, where the young king, also, was a frequent guest, they

danced and sang, represented tableaux, and acted plays, every evening.

But though apparently living a life at this time of incessant gaiety, we are assured by the compiler of these Memoirs that her brothers and sisters were by no means carried away with it. She says that they enjoyed it exceedingly—so much that during the day they talked with child-like glee of the party of the preceding night and of the friends they hoped to meet again in the evening—still, she adds, they were never long “without exchanging thoughts of God and heaven.” Their brother Albert, too, who was about nineteen years of age, soon declared that it would not do for him to live in a place where serious life seemed impossible. He told his father that he longed to improve himself and fit himself for usefulness; that he felt that he had already lost a great deal of time, and that in Naples it was impossible for him to fill his mind as he wished “with great and noble desires.” Accordingly he gained his father’s consent to accompany M. Rio, an old friend of the family, who was at that time commencing in Tuscany those careful and laborious investigations with respect to places of religious and historical interest in that part of Italy which have since made his name famous. The studies to which he was here incited did much to restore to him the energy which Naples had weakened. He became acquainted also at this time with MM. de Lamennais, and Lacordaire, and Count Charles de Montalembert, who were in Italy for the purpose of submitting to the Holy See the opinions which they had been advocating in Paris in the “*Avenir*.” This acquaintance with Count de Montalembert in particular soon ripened into a firm and lasting friendship. Under such influences, the religious views of Albert seem to have become firmly established; and on returning to Florence he made “a kind of retreat,” at the close of which he approached the sacrament, and “fixed on a rule of life which he never ceased to observe till the day of his death.”

In 1832, Albert rejoined his family, who had meanwhile removed to Rome. They had found there an old friend whom they had known intimately when they had lived in St. Peters-

burg, the Countess d'Alopeus, the widow of the Russian minister at Berlin, who had only very recently died. The friendship which had formerly existed between the two families had been renewed. Alexandrine, the daughter of the Countess, had become the very intimate friend of the sisters of Albert. There seems to have been something peculiarly attractive in this young lady, which was felt and acknowledged in every circle in which she moved. In the most cultivated society of the great capitals of Europe she had been distinguished everywhere for the elegance of her manner. It is said that there was something about her which could only be described by the word "*suave*" which drew all hearts to her. Her character also was singularly beautiful. Her father had been by birth a Swede; her mother was a German; and those sterling virtues of the northern nations, truthfulness, sincerity, "horror of exaggeration," were marked traits which distinguished her. Her parents were professedly Lutherans, although their connection with that communion must have been merely of a nominal character, as they caused their daughter to be baptized according to the rites of the Greek Church—the Emperor Alexander standing as her godfather. She is said to have been educated also in the Protestant faith, though it is evident that her views of religious truth were far from being intelligent—especially upon the points of difference between Protestants and Roman Catholics. We are told that when she made her first communion in the Lutheran Church, at the age of fifteen, "she made a solemn offering of the happiness of her life, that she might obtain in return a clear knowledge of divine truth;"—as if under a kind of impression that God is some malignant being who is desirous of keeping his children in ignorance, and is only to be propitiated by the "solemn offering of the happiness of a life." We do not speak of this with any desire of detracting from the interest which the character of Alexandrine is calculated to awaken in the minds of our readers, but as she is represented to have been at this time a Protestant, it is but right that the real nature of the views in which she had been educated should be understood. We have already said that she seems to have been possessed of every grace of character, and we ought to add that we have no disposition to question that she manifested

also a sincere interest in a religious life. At the time that we are introduced to her in the Memoirs she certainly appears to have been living a life of habitual prayer, and to have loved to keep God constantly in her thoughts.

It was not long, of course, before Albert and Alexandrine met, and they two are henceforth the central figures in the "story"—which, it may as well be stated here, is told by Pauline, one of the sisters of Albert. With her this "story," after the death of nearly all the other members of the family, became a labor of love, and the materials which she had at command were most ample. Albert and Alexandrine had each kept a journal in which they had been in the habit from day to day of writing about themselves and their inmost feelings with a particularity and with a freedom from all reserve which can hardly be understood by Anglo-Saxons.

This journal of Alexandrine, which chronicles the progress of her acquaintance with Albert, was afterwards re-written by her, and she added to it very extended "reminiscences." The compiler of the volume before us says: "It comprises so much that is at once simple and sublime, passionate and romantic, pious and heartrending, all written in a charming, affecting, natural manner, that it seems almost a pity not to give it to the world in its fullness." Of the journal of Albert, which covers the same period, his friend, Count de Montalembert, said, after reading it: "These are things which if they were in a printed book would be admired by the whole world—so, at least, it seems to me. I know of nothing finer in any of the great writers who have described the workings of the heart. To me there seems something wonderfully satisfactory, and even, I think, honorable to the human mind, in the knowledge that such beautiful thoughts arose quite simply and spontaneously in the pure and modest mind of a young man unknown to all literary fame, without the least idea of publication, only occupied with God and his love, and never dreaming that passages were flowing from his pen which the greatest genius in the world might have coveted. Yes, I repeat it, apart from the tender interest I feel, when I reflect that it is my friend and brother Albert who wrote these things, I am thankful to God for having given such beautiful thoughts to a young man who never went beyond the

limits of his home circle and had no other teachers than religion and love. I wish you could have seen the tears running down Anna's (Madame de Montalembert) cheeks when I read these papers to her; you would not have thought it an unacceptable tribute. We were both reminded of our Abbé Gerbet's admirable words, which apply so well to Albert: 'For my part, I listen more attentively to the utterances of a holy soul, than to the voice of genius!'"

After such commendation from the highest literary authority in France, we may perhaps be excused if we devote an amount of space, somewhat out of proportion, to the part of the Memoirs which traces the history of these two young persons.

The first meeting of Albert and Alexandrine took place early in 1832 in the *salon* of her mother. She had had a great wish to see and know him because he was the brother of her friend Pauline de la Ferronnays. In her journal, where she describes the meeting, she says: "He did not strike me as handsome, though I liked the expression of his eyes, and he left me altogether with rather a pleasant impression." In after years, when she re-arranged and re-wrote her journal as we have stated above, she added: "I heard from him afterwards that he fell in love with me that first day, and told his friends how much I had captivated him; but they made a joke of it, and he never mentioned me to them again."

A few days after this first meeting she had gone with a friend to hear the nuns sing at the Trinità da Monte. There she saw M. de la Ferronnays, as she then called Albert, on his knees. "Something about him interested me in a way I could not account for, and I must have felt some confidence in him, for, finding myself near him as we went out of the church, I said I should have liked to kneel down as he had done, and that if his sisters had been there I should have done so. "Then why not have done it now?" he replied. "Why give way to human respect?" This straightforward way in a young man of twenty pleased me. No one before had made me that sort of sensible answer. As he was going down the steps of the Trinità with us, I looked more attentively at his face and countenance. I wanted him to come to us in the evening, and he did so!"

"Feb. 24th. Albert and I, with my mother and M. Rio, took a walk this day which I shall never forget. We went first to the Villa Mattei, and then to the Villa Pamphili. I was very much pleased with the conversation I had with Albert at the Villa Mattei, and when we got to the Pamphili we fell back a little to talk together without being heard. There is a great sympathy in our views and our tastes, and under those grand pines, and looking at that wonderful view, we spoke quite freely of religion, of eternity, and of the sweetness that might attend death itself amidst scenes such as those we were then gazing at. This conversation, so unlike the frivolous talk which wearied me in ordinary society, sank deeply in my heart."

We do not propose to follow the details of the growth of the affection which was now daily becoming stronger and stronger in the heart of Alexandrine. They are all to be found here, chronicled without the slightest reserve. As might be expected, there is much that is put down in her journal, and in that of Albert, which may easily be criticised by the reader who cares to do it, as weak and sentimental ; and possibly some things as absurd. But it should be borne in mind that it is not even every matter-of-fact Anglo-Saxon, the history of whose days of courtship will bear so severe a scrutiny. In the few extracts that we make, our object is rather to illustrate the religious character of this young Roman Catholic lover.

Late in March, Albert seems to have been quite ill, and Comte de Montalembert and M. Rio reported to Alexandrine that he needed a physician, but refused to see one, and they begged her to write to him to persuade him to do so. Accordingly, March 22d, she says in her journal : "With mama's consent, I wrote a few hasty lines to Albert entreating him to be prudent, and to take care of himself for his family's sake, and for ours. The next day he was worse, and M. Rio came in the evening, and gave me a little note from Albert, with an air of mystery which put me a little out of countenance. However I took it from him, and read it immediately in order that my mother might see it at once, though I would much rather have had my note and the pleasure of it to myself. It contained

these words: 'It is not a dream then? I have read your note a hundred times since yesterday, and I shall read it again every day after my morning prayers. You will find that I am obedient now, for what I refused my best friends, I have done at a word from you. How come you to have such influence over me? Can no one influence *you* on the one point which makes you now so often sad and restless? Let us at least unite in begging of God the grace which brings happiness with it.
* * * * * ALBERT.'

On re-writing her journal she added: "O my God, Thou art witness that in these his first written words to me, he spoke more of his desire for my conversion than of his own love, and revealed the intensity of that greater desire before he showed me the strength of his affection. Reward him, O my God, with thy best blessing, for this singleness of heart." Her journal continues: "I suffered much that evening; I felt confused and anxious about Albert; but so touched that he had written to me when he was so ill. And then I was a little doubtful how my mother would take that allusion to religion. I dreaded showing her the note, though delay made it only worse, and the longer I put it off the more difficult it seemed to be. I was glad that I had to go out the next day, as soon as I was up, to Cardinal Fesch's gallery. But my mother expressed some surprise that I had not yet shown her the note, and I went to my room to fetch it; but, as I again felt great misgivings as to the religious part of it, I tried to cut it out. In my hurry I ran the scissors into my finger, and some drops of blood stained the paper, which gave me a sad feeling of superstitious fear. I went out altogether upset, and could not enjoy a single picture in the gallery. When I gave the note to my mother, I remember praying that she might be more struck with its beginning than the end, which really did happen, for all she said was, that it was rather too affectionate."

Albert soon recovered, and, March 27th, she writes: "Albert came to see us quite well, and in such spirits he could hardly contain himself" She added subsequently: "I have not forgotten how he kissed my mother's hand and mine;" and she writes further: "I only found out long afterwards that about that time he went out very early in the morning, and bare-

footed, in the Roman pilgrim's garb, made the round of the Seven Churches to obtain my conversion."

April 5th there was a grand picnic at Princess Wolkonsky's, at Terra Nuova. She writes: "At dinner, Albert sat by me, and his other neighbor was Louise Vernet, who was so beautiful that I quite envied her." Afterwards they walked off together "to look at the view" of the mountain line of Albano, which stretched far along the horizon. She continues: "On one of the hills," as she was standing by him, "I do not exactly know how it came about, but he asked me to call him my brother. I did so with great pleasure, and it made him very happy." The party did not return till nearly dark, and in the carriage, she says, as Albert "was sitting opposite me, and looking up to the glorious starry sky, he said, 'Let us for a moment both thank God for the happiness you have given me to-day.' I was surprised, for until then, I had been accustomed only to the conversation of worldly people. But I liked this feeling in him, and we raised our hearts together to God."

Wednesday in Holy Week, April 18th.—I went with the M——'s to hear the *Miserere* in the Sistine Chapel. Albert was with us. Hiding behind Miss M——, I knelt down, so that her aunt—whose remarks I dreaded—could not see me, and it pleased me to think that perhaps Albert would."

April 19th she went to St. Peter's, and says: "M. de G—— gave me his arm in the church. I was vexed not to be taken care of by Albert, especially in so sacred a place. As we were coming out of the church he told me how painful it had been to him."

The next day, on the steps of St. Peter's, he said to her: "Oh, I am very happy, for I have been to Communion this morning, and I love you." * * "This startled me a little, though it was said as if he meant only that brotherly love of which he was always talking."

Directly after Holy Week, both families left for Naples, where they established themselves at once near to one another, in villas from which they had a view "which has no parallel on earth." Alexandrine was still the inseparable companion of the sisters of Albert, and it was not long before Pauline de Ferronnays, having found one day, when her brother had gone

to Amalfi, the little book in which he kept his journal, brought it out, and read it to Alexandrine, who thus describes her feelings in her journal. "There was not a passage in which, directly or indirectly, I did not find something that had reference to myself." * * * "Pauline, who was thus letting me into the secrets of her brother's heart, thought she was making up for her indiscretion by not allowing me to have the book in my hands; but I got hold of it, and found fastened to one of the pages the little nosegay, tied with a red ribbon, that I had thrown to Albert in the Corso, at Rome." * * * "Oh, what great pleasure this little book gave me! I did not disguise it from Pauline. I went away much happier than I had come; and I thought the view, and the matchless blue sea and sky, more lovely than ever. I felt a great interior delight in the sense of existence, and in being where I was. I did not yet acknowledge it to myself, but I felt as if the dawn of a glorious day was about to break upon me."

Not many days now elapsed before Albert made a formal declaration of his love; and then several weeks intervened before any decisive answer was given him, though the two were apparently as much as ever in one another's society. The revulsion in his feelings was very great, as we gather from the following entries in his journal.

"June 4th, 1832. For some time past I have lost all those delightful feelings which the love of God, and nothing but that love, used to give me. I feel that my soul requires to be strengthened. At Rome I was certainly a better man than here. I took so much pleasure in fulfilling all my duties. I used to feel such devotion when I entered a Church, and such a living faith filled my soul. Now everything in me seems weakened.

"June 5th. It is in vain to try to school myself. I cannot succeed when I speak to her, or when she shakes hands with me. I altogether forget what I am doing. I am afraid that there must be exaggeration in these feelings, and that they cannot prove lasting; and yet I do think I never saw anybody in the world to be compared with her, unless, perhaps, my sister Pauline."

"June 6th. Give me back, I beseech Thee, my God, the fervor I have lost. All the vague and impetuous feelings of

youth find something in religion which calms and satisfies the soul. Oh, my God! I have forgotten that language of the soul which those only understand who love none but Thee—that language which is only used in a Church or in solitude. It was familiar to me once, and I thought it so sweet. Grant me, my God, to speak it again, as in those happy days which now seem to me so far distant, when I was going every moment into a Church to pray for her, and felt as if I must be heard. O, my God, when I asked for her conversion, offering in exchange my own life and all my happiness, was the joy of loving Thee included in the sacrifice? Save her, O my God! save her; but save me also. Take away from me, if it be Thy will, every enjoyment which enthusiasm can give, but leave me the love of holiness; let me never lose it again.”

On the first of August we have the first intimation that Alexandrine was disposed to look with some degree of favor upon the proposals which had been made. On that day she writes: “Pauline had been sitting for a long time with me in my room, till it grew quite dark. Then she went away, and I returned to the drawing-room. I had a vague hope of finding Albert there, but he was not come. It was ten o'clock, and I would not give up hoping. Mama proposed to the Prince [the Russian Prince Lapoukhyn, who was now engaged to be married to the Comtesse d'Alopeus] to go out on the terrace. I let them go on before me, and delayed following them, for I kept thinking ‘He will perhaps arrive in a minute,’ and so he did. I was so happy to see him that I could not speak. I was the first, however, to break that long silence, which told more than I felt I could venture to say. All that evening was so full of happiness. O! God of boundless love! is not this pure bliss, this ecstatic joy, this love which sees nothing but perfection in the object of its love, a foretaste of the endless affection which we shall feel for those already so immensely dear to us on earth?”

But there seems to have been as yet no formal betrothal. Alexandrine was very distrustful of herself, and though the sequel proved that she was the most constant, tender, and devoted person in the world, she thought she had the most changeable, uncertain disposition possible. She was doubtful,

also, whether, if Albert knew her better, he might not be estranged from her. She did not want him to be deceived about her character. She wrote in her journal: "He must either be cured of his love, or, if it stands the test, I can trust him forever." She accordingly gave him, as he was going to Castellamare to be absent for a few days on an excursion with Prince Lapoukhyn, "a certain little green book," and another "blue book"—"the earliest depository of all my thoughts," as she describes them,— "having taken care to paste a sheet of paper over the last pages, in which he was mentioned, and trusting to him not to tear it off." "Alas," she says, "there were many foolish things in that book, which ought to have estranged him from me; but though I did not wish it to have that effect, I was resolved to be honest."

The same day Albert had written in his journal the following prayer: "O! my God, do not forsake me! Forgive me all my faults, and give me an energy which I have never yet possessed. Restore to me those fervent feelings of devotion which were wont to fill my soul and to be its safeguard against the enemy on the watch to destroy me. I dread the coming winter. It will be so different from the last. Oh, Mary, my Blessed Mother, pray for me! do not abandon me! Give me courage to conquer human respect, to make my enemies blush,—not to give them occasion of triumph. I am ashamed to say it, but I dread the sneers of worldly people. I should like to act nobly and independently. To be indulgent towards others, and severe towards myself. Not to allow of any jests on my own line of conduct, but on the other hand, not to set myself up as a judge. To go a good deal into society, since I can do so without committing sin. To love Alexandrine without giving way to folly, and compromising her by childish absurdities; and, above all, grant me, my God, to love virtue. Give me back that warmth of zeal I used to feel for everything good. Make my heart burn again with the fire of Divine love. Purify more and more that passion which is now the life of my soul. Give me, I beseech Thee, self-control, and never permit me, in the agitation of my feelings, to utter a single word which could wound or offend her ears. Let me hold her in the deepest reverence, and strive to become worthy of loving her without

ever aspiring to a greater happiness. O! my God, give me tenderness of heart, zeal, enthusiasm, and love."

A few evenings after, Alexandrine heard the servant announce "M. de Pietracatella" and "M. de Sass," and then "exclamations of surprise, and well known voices." It was Albert and the Prince, who had returned from Castellamare and taken them thus by surprise. In her journal, she says, during the evening, "Albert suddenly asked me what I should think if he had read in the little book what I had so carefully pasted over. I was frightened, but answered that I was quite sure he never could have done it.—'But if I *had* done it?'—'It is impossible, I can never believe it.'—'But I *have* done it.'—'No!'—My confusion was increasing, but I still absolutely refused to admit that he could have done such a thing.—'Shall I quote a sentence in it to convince you?'—'No. You cannot; you would be only inventing it.'—'*I think I love Albert*,'—he said, gazing at me as if from the depths of his eyes. I looked at him, and turned my eyes away with such an altered expression, that he was sad all the evening. Indeed, I did not feel for a little while as if I had any love for him at all, but it came back when I saw he was quite unhappy."

On the 18th of September she saw Albert again. "He was looking as sad as when we parted at the Vomero. I could not hold out, and said a few words to him, which made us again as happy as ever. Indeed, happier, for there was now no longer any disguise between us. Pauline came to see me, and said that Albert had acknowledged his fault to her, and that he had used such strong terms of self-reproach before mentioning the fact, that she had been frightened and had asked him if he had had the audacity to kiss me! Albert was *quite* horrified at this question, and at her even imagining he could have ventured to do such a thing."

The question of their marriage was now discussed by the Comte de la Ferronnays and Madame d'Alopeus, and at the instance of the Comte it was determined that the strength of Albert's attachment should be tested by a temporary absence, during which there should be no correspondence between the two young people.

During his absence, Fernand, one of his brothers, persuaded Alexandrine to write a short note to Albert, which he enclosed in one of his own letters. She wrote: "Fernand, after trying in vain to persuade me to write to you, told me at last that you wished it, and thus induced me to do so. * * * Your father told Pauline that he should not believe in the strength of our attachment until we had been two years without meeting or writing a line to one another. We must not be deceitful. This is the last time I shall ever write to you in secret. Adieu ! My best prayers are those I put up for you. I hope God will hear me, and that you will be happy. * * * I cannot seal this note, but it does not signify, Fernand will not read it."

Albert replied to Fernand: "My own dear brother. It is very wrong indeed, but I love you more than ever. You can hardly know the good you did a poor solitary fellow, far from those he cares about. That beloved note was like a drop of cold water to a wretch dying of fever. But for all that she must not write to me again. * * * I had written her a long letter, but I tore it up. She charges me not to answer her note, and it is better I should not do so. We shall one day meet again, and then she will learn all the sufferings of a heart forever devoted to her. As she says herself: 'We must not be deceitful.' Therefore, my best Fernand, great as is the sacrifice, do not extort from her any more letters for me."

At last, about a month before the time which had been fixed, Albert's parents and Madame d'Alopeus relented, and agreed that he should return, and on the 7th of January, 1838, Alexandrine writes: "I was sitting up stairs with Pauline, when all of a sudden the door opened, and Albert rushed in. Yes, there he was, kissing Pauline affectionately with all his warmth of manner, and looking so delightfully happy ! I had not seen him for two whole months ! We had no secrets from Pauline ; still we did not, before her, show more than a little bit of the joy we felt at being once more together."

A few days after, the Comtesse d'Alopeus and the parents of Albert went to dine with Count Stackelberg, and Alexandrine dined with Albert and Fernand and their four sisters. She writes in her journal that they had "great fun." After dinner Pauline and Eugénie went to their rooms to dress for a party,

and their two little sisters set themselves down to play a duet on the piano. She continues: "Fernand, finding himself *en trio* with Albert and me, declared it was very awkward, and, joking about it, pretended to go to sleep, and covered his face with his pocket handkerchief. Albert and I stood conversing near the chimney piece. After a little while I wanted to go away, for it did not seem to me quite proper to remain there alone with my friend's brother and the two little girls. While I was lingering, Albert just touched my forehead with his lips; so suddenly that I was taken by surprise. I felt very angry, and without saying a word took my shawl and left the room. When I was alone in mine, I kept thinking over what had passed, and I was really much annoyed. It seemed to me as if our pleasant existence had undergone a change and that a disagreeable one. At that moment I did not feel quite certain that I loved him as much as I did before." * * * When she saw him afterwards "he was looking very much out of spirits. As soon as he could do so, he told me that he had been deeply grieved by my reproachful glance. He seemed very penitent, and did not attempt to excuse himself, and he spoke so well and feelingly that before the evening was over my resentment had vanished.

"February 11th—I went with Albert's parents to the ball at the Academy. When we came home I went up stairs with them to have some tea. Pauline and Eugénie ran to their rooms to take off their cloaks, and I remained alone with Albert in the drawing-room, drinking my tea in haste, for I wanted to go down again. He was admiring, I think, my long curls. He took one of them in his hands and pressed it gently to his lips. I was displeased, but not so much as that other time. It did not seem to me to be quite so bad."

The days now passed swiftly by; and no cloud seemed to obscure the happiness of the two families. We find Alexandrine writing in her journal in these words: "We went to a ball in the evening. I felt full of life and spirits, and everything seemed transformed as if by magic. When I was waltzing with Albert it made me indeed a little shy to think that people were looking at us, and perhaps joking and saying with a smile: 'Ah, they are quite happy now!' But nothing could

spoil my enjoyment. I did not care the least what was said, and was too happy to give it even a thought. During the cotillion which I danced with Albert, I went up to Pauline and whispered to her, in a kind of ecstasy, 'O, Pauline, I am so happy!' She was quite touched."

And now Lent began, and Alexandrine writes: "Shrove Tuesday.—Albert talked to me a great deal about God, of the angels, and of his dear religion, for which I felt an increasing attraction. I enjoyed a happiness so complete, so unexpected, so much beyond what I had ever dreamt of, that it filled my heart with gratitude towards God, and made me more kind and indulgent to everyone."

"Holy Thursday.—My mother gave me leave to go with my friends to the *Tenebræ* in the royal Chapel. The music was beautiful. There was something in that lovely Chapel, the singing, and above all, perhaps, in the feeling that I was kneeling by my Albert's side, which made me pray with devotion. I was glad to look like a Catholic. The walk home was perfect; the moon shining brightly, and the Neapolitan spring beginning to embalm the air. We stopped at several Churches on our way, to pray before the sepulchrea. It is the custom in Naples to visit seven Churches on that day. Albert and I knelt down side by side on the pavement. There was in this something inexpressibly sweet to me. I do not know exactly what I prayed for, but I know we both raised our hearts to God with a full reliance on his goodness. We went the whole length of the Villa Reale by the light of the moon and the stars, our hearts full of adoring love for God, and affection for one another."

About this time Albert received a letter from the Abbé Martin de Noirliu [now Curé of Saint Louis D'Antin in Paris], a special friend of his, with whom he was in correspondence. The Abbé writes: "Persevere, my dear Albert, in your solicitude for that soul which is so dear to you. If you bring it to the knowledge of the truth you will have made a conquest for God, and she will be yours not for time only but for eternity. It is especially to prayer that you must have recourse in this important matter, for light comes down from above, and thence must also proceed that courage which is so necessary when we have to overcome early prejudices and impressions imbibed in

infancy. I am not surprised at what you tell me of the agitation which Mademoiselle ——— feels at the idea of a change of religion. It seems to her as if in taking this step she had to cross an abyss, and however courageous a person may be, it is natural to draw back on the brink of an unfathomable abyss. Protestants erroneously suppose that in renouncing heresy they are compelled to trample under foot and anathematise those they leave behind. God forbid that this should be the case ! We condemn error, but we feel only love and pity for those whom it enthrals. By the fact of her reception into the Church she will simply declare that she returns to the faith which her ancestors held for fifteen centuries, and renounces the error which separated from Catholic unity those among them who lived three hundred years ago. She will leave it to God to decide on individual cases, for He alone can judge who are and who are not in good faith in their heretical and schismatical position. In short, my dear friend, tell her that there is no salvation except for those who are in Catholic unity, or else for those who having been born in heresy are entirely in good faith, and would be ready to become Catholics at once if they thought that in so doing they would please God. But as to those who have doubts and will not seek instruction, or, what is still worse, who maintain that their forefathers sinned in breaking the unity of the Church, and yet persevere in remaining themselves out of its pale, they are fearfully guilty."

"That soul interests me deeply, my dear Albert. I have already prayed for her this morning at Mass. I sincerely compassionate her mental sufferings. Tell her to hope, and, above all, to pray much. Ask her what she would do if she knew that the Mother of Our Lord was on earth and living near her. I have no doubt she would go at once and ask for her prayers. Let her, then, have recourse to this good Mother in Heaven. If she invokes her with confidence, she is sure to be heard."

The spring had now come, and with it the necessity of a temporary separation of the two families. They were all to meet in Italy again in the autumn, where Madame d'Alopens expected to be married to Prince Lapoukhyn. But she wished to spend the summer with her relatives in Germany. Madame de la Ferronnays also was obliged to go to France on business,

and it was arranged that Albert and his two eldest sisters should accompany her. The Count meanwhile was to take his two youngest daughters to Rome, and place them for three months in the Convent of the Trinità da Monte, where Olga was to make her First Communion. Tuesday, April 30th, was the day for parting, and at two o'clock they all went together to the Hotel Crocelle, where the Prince had invited them to dine. Alexandrine writes: "What a sad dinner it was! I could not any longer restrain my tears and sobs. I was sitting by Eugénie, who entreated me to control myself, for she was afraid my mother would be displeased by this excessive grief. At last at a quarter to four, we had taken leave of everybody, and were seated in our travelling carriage. As we were going down stairs Albert asked me to give him full permission to hope. I looked at him quite surprised that he should still need such an assurance, and answered affirmatively. Those were our last words. Albert and Fernand followed us for a long time in an open calèche, in the pouring rain, which must have drenched them to the skin. I saw them a little longer in this way, but we could not speak to one another. At last after a great waving of hands, their carriage stopped, and we lost sight of it."

The Count de la Ferronnays left the next day by sea, with all his family. But the wetting which Albert had had on the evening of Alexandrine's departure had done him far more harm than they were aware of, and on arriving at Civita Vecchia his father decided that Madame de la Ferronnays should continue her journey in the steamer without Albert, and that he should remain at Civita Vecchia for a few days, till sufficiently recruited to follow her to France. But they had hardly reached the hotel, when Albert was seized with such a violent fever that the physician pronounced his life to be in imminent danger. For some days he lay in a kind of stupor, and it long remained a doubtful question whether the termination would not be fatal. His father watched over him with the utmost solicitude; and his daily bulletins to Madame de la Ferronnays, who had now reached Paris, and the letters which he wrote, afford such a revelation of the tenderness and love of a

father's heart under such trying circumstances as is calculated to call out the warmest sympathy. We cannot, however, delay to make quotations from them, or from the letters and journal of Alexandrine after she heard of what had befallen Albert. In a few weeks, however, he recovered sufficiently to go with his father to Rome, where they remained during the summer.

Meanwhile new causes of anxiety arose. Madame d'Alopeus, on reaching Germany, was urgently remonstrated with by her relatives for having given any countenance to this proposed alliance of her daughter with a Frenchman. They objected to Albert's age, to his state of health, to his want of fortune, to his having no profession. Now that the House of Orléans was established on the throne of France, there could be no prospect of advancement for a son of the Comte de la Ferronnays. They insisted also that as Alexandrine was one of the maids of honor of the Empress of Russia, she could not marry without applying to the Emperor for permission; and though he had a personal regard for the Comte de la Ferronnays, his dislike of the French was so great at that time that it would be very difficult to obtain his consent. They descanted also upon Albert's being a Roman Catholic; and Madame d'Alopeus, who had before thought nothing of this difference in his religious views, became quite disturbed, and began to have conscientious scruples on the subject. The result was that Alexandrine was kept during the whole summer in a constant state of annoyance. After one of these painful discussions at Stuttgart respecting her marriage, where special stress had been laid upon the fact that Albert had no profession, she wrote in her journal: "I should like very much to know whether there will be professions in heaven? and if general officers and cabinet ministers will rank higher than nameless people. After all, what does earthly glory and dignity amount to? Why do not people seek to win a higher post in heaven? They seem quite to forget that in heaven alone are to be found everlasting distinctions. A profession indeed! I hate the very sound of the word! To defend one's country in case of need, I admit to be right; but this is a remote contingency, and where is the good of wearing out

one's life in a round of mechanical duties, instead of devoting it to the service of God? It is all very well to say to a girl, 'Do not marry before you can be secure (if one can be secure of anything on earth) that you will have enough to live upon.' This is all rational, prudent, and kind, but that our respect and our contempt should turn upon the possession of a little more or a little less money is really an enormity which cries to heaven for vengeance."

Then she paraphrases a favorite passage from La Bruyère to suit her case, and writes: "The language of the world is: 'My dear young lady when you meet with any one whom you are inclined to like, do not take the trouble of ascertaining if he is good and high principled. Oh, dear no! Provided he be not a thief, or has not committed some great crime, that is enough. Do not indulge in high flown and ridiculous ideas of perfection. But be sure you inquire if he has money enough to give you and your children the means of indulging in all and more than all the superfluous luxuries of life. If you can make sure that this is the case, do not hesitate to marry him; you are sure to be happy. But if, on the contrary, he has only a competency, then, although romantic people tell you that his wife will be an enviable woman; that his character is the best safeguard for her happiness, that his religious principles are excellent, and his habits so moderate that he is never likely to run into foolish expenses, be sure you turn a deaf ear to these absurd speeches, which betray an utter want of sense and of the commonest knowledge of the world.'"

Alexandrine remained firm in spite of all the influences which were brought to bear upon her, although her health was somewhat affected by the constant annoyances to which she was subjected. At last, in September, her mother set out from Germany on her return to Italy for the winter, and on the 10th inst. they reached Milan. From Milan they went to Florence, where they were joined by Prince Lapoukhyn, and, all preliminaries having been arranged, an early day was appointed for his marriage with the Comtesse d'Alopeus. Meanwhile her opposition to Albert had reached such a point that she wrote from this place to the Comte de la Ferronnays with the intention of breaking the engagement of her daughter. The conster-

nation of Albert and of the whole family was great. Alexandrine herself was so affected, that she fell dangerously ill, and it even became necessary to postpone the wedding of her mother.

The sisters of Albert continued to write to her. They were now in Rome, where the family had just assembled to be present at the First Communion of Olga. Eugénie wrote as follows: "Guess where we went this morning at six o'clock with my mother? To the Scala Santa! which we ascended on our knees for you. We prayed very earnestly. May our prayers be granted, beloved friend. It gave us pleasure really to perform the part of pilgrims. I tried hard to imitate their humility."

Pauline wrote: "Albert was saying to me the other day that when he recapitulates the events of his life, he cannot but recognize such special mercies toward him in the dealings of Providence, that he can never be grateful enough." * * * "He spoke, also, of the calm and peace which now make him ready to bear whatever God ordains." * * She says that "he is satisfied to leave himself and you in the hands of God. * * He has improved in every respect. * * He is so amiable and unaffected that everybody esteems and likes him. * * Albert has not as much talent and information as his friend Charles de Montalembert, but he is quite as intelligent, quite as enthusiastic in his love for all that is good and beautiful, and possesses at the same time greater gentleness of character, and of language and manner. * * * You live in a state of terrible agitation, dearest Alex * * * however, God will order all things, small and great, in our lives." And in another letter: "We have a sort of confidence that all will end as we wish. For my part, I am convinced it will. My father looks to nothing worse for you than waiting. * * * God will help us, dearest sister. Leave everything in his hands, and remember that as long as the certainty of mutual affection exists, there is no real cause, or at least any great cause, for sorrow. Albert thinks so, too. Religion, poetry, and love, are sweetening your lives, and if God chooses by a few more trials to make you earn the joy of an endless union, take courage, and believe, and hope. * * Let us fix our eyes on Heaven; God will not lose sight of

us. Our struggles, and anxieties, and sorrows, nothing we can do or suffer, are lost. Do not for a moment doubt that we shall one day be sisters and pray in the same Churches."

Alexandrine recovered sufficiently for the marriage of her mother to proceed; and on the 30th of October the ceremony was performed, "first at the Greek Church, and then at the Protestant Chapel." Alexandrine wrote in her journal: "It crossed my mind during the ceremony that there would never be bridal joys and bridal flowers for me."

About the same time we find a description in the journal of Pauline of the First Communion of Olga, at which all the family were present: "It was a rare privilege for Olga to make her First Communion at Rome, but never did God's graces descend on a soul more worthy to receive them. Religion expands her mind and governs her imagination. Her most habitual thoughts are spiritual ones, yet she is young and child-like for her age. And is not this precisely what God loves? * * * * As I was Olga's god-mother, I knelt by her side all the time, which I felt to be a great privilege. Cardinal Lambruschini officiated. Nobody could have witnessed without emotion the scene in that Chapel, and I hope God will give me grace to be always faithful to the resolutions I made that day at the foot of the altar, and to bear in mind the touching words addressed to us, and the moment when with Olga we all received Communion. The complete union which existed between us, the quiet, silent thanksgiving after Mass, and the peaceful, intense joy with which our little sister embraced us as we came out of the Church, must ever live in my remembrance. * * Oh, how I blessed God that I was born in his Church. * * * When the doors of the convent closed behind us, it seemed to me as if we were plunging once more into a sad and restless world, whilst peace, joy, and everything which makes life sweet were to be found within those walls."

After the First Communion of Olga, the Comte de la Ferronnays left at once with his family for Naples, where they were soon followed by the Prince and Princess Lapoukhyn and Alexandrine, whose health was still in quite a precarious condition.

The two families having met again, it was not many days before the possibilities of the marriage of Albert and Alexan-

drine began to be canvassed once more ; and the final announcement to Alexandrine of the result we give in her own words.

"In the evening I was lying on the sofa, rather sad, when Eugénie came in. I shall never forget that moment of my life. The day was closing in, and the room getting dark. Eugénie began by pitying me because I was ill ; but she did not at first make any reply to my complaints that our happiness was still so uncertain. At last she said : 'Then you don't know ?' Oh, those words, they still seem to ring in my ears ! She told me as much as she knew of what had been settled. Pauline came in afterwards, and from her I learned that I might look upon Albert as my future husband."

All this time Albert was in constant correspondence with Count de Montalembert, making him the *confidant* of all his troubles, and counselling him with regard to the course which he ought to pursue in view of the decision of the Pope, respecting the *Avenir* and other publications of his and MM. Lamennais and Lacordaire.

December 10th, 1838, he writes to his friend to announce his happiness. He says : "Oh, I wish I could give you a share of my happiness. I am unworthy of so many blessings ; of that life of joy and gladness which began two years ago, and will never end ! This letter will be very confused, for I am in a most unsettled state of mind. * * * * I do so want to talk to you. Pray for us, dear friend, and bless God for his goodness to me. As I look back, I feel you so closely connected with my past life. You have been associated with all this happiness, and it began when I was with you. * * * * I love you more dearly than a brother. Adieu. Alexandrine sends you her kindest remembrances ; she must be included in your friendship for me. If you write to M. de Lamennais, beg him to pray for us." He also sent remembrances to M. Lacordaire.

We make an extract also from a letter written a little later, in reply to one which he had received from the same friend. It will be seen that he had entirely misconceived what Count de Montalembert had written about the course which he intended to pursue after the appearance of the Pope's encyclical letter, in which he was forbidden to write or approve of anything contrary to it. He says : "My dear unhappy friend, I

have just received your letter from Frankfort. It has thrown me into the greatest agitation. What would I not give to be with you. It is perhaps presumptuous to think I should be of any use, or could give you any comfort. I should like to answer the first part of your letter, but the end of it haunts me like a painful dream. Dearest friend, for God's sake do not go back to France at this moment. Measure the depths of the abyss into which you are about to cast yourself, and remember that if you once take that step, it may become impossible to turn back. There was but one voice in praise of the Abbé de Lamennais when he made his submission. Some evil-minded persons were wicked enough to throw doubts on the sincerity of that act, but their insinuations were treated with contempt, and the sacred authority of the Church was vindicated by its means. It may be that the words which you have scattered over the world have been inspired by God, but everything combines to show you that *enough* has been said. If they are really of Divine birth they will bear fruit, and shine out one day in all the splendor of truth. The time is not yet come, perhaps, when we can reap the blessings they promise. We must shudder at the sight of the calamities which an excess of zeal might bring about, and shrink with horror from the idea of schism. Let us gather round the Cross, the foundation stone of the Church, to cherish and defend, not to undermine her. I implore you, my dear friend, *compel* yourself not to yield to M. de Lamennais' persuasions. May God bless and save you. * * * I do not know what will become of me if I hear you are gone to Paris. In the name of our friendship and of all who love you, and in His sacred Name in Whom we are for ever united, let *duty* overcome every argument urged against it. All my belongings, who love you as one of ourselves, are alarmed at seeing such an alternative before you. My father speaks of you with a paternal solicitude. As to me, my beloved friend, I cannot tell you the anguish I felt on receiving your letter. * * * My sister and Alexandrine wish me to say everything affectionate and kind. They are terrified at the idea of your going to Paris."

December 24th Albert writes again: "Do write soon and often, and tell me M. de Lamennais' plans. * * Everybody's

eyes are fixed upon him * * why does he urge you to return to Paris? If Rome decides against you, surely you will submit. * * * You speak of the incompatibility of liberty with religion, which is, you say, dividing a soul asunder. Could this be possible? Oh, no; believe me these are groundless fears. Liberty means the Cross of Christ, and God has planted it in the world as the rallying point of the human race. Mark the gradual progress of true liberty from the hour of its first descent from heaven. * * Shall we despair of the future when it appears so much brighter than ever? * * * God's hand is visible in this check from Rome. It will give time to younger men to overtake you, and later you will resume your onward march."

Alexandrine also wrote to him begging him to submit to the encyclical letter of the Pope. "I hope I am not presumptuous in thinking that you will be a little influenced by my advice, for you had the kindness to say that you loved me because I loved Albert. I often repeat those words to myself, for that is the way in which I now like people to love me. * * I trust God will hear our prayers for you. I say *our* prayers, because I too will pray for you. You do not, I suppose, object to it, in spite of your severity towards us poor Protestants."

Count de Montalembert replied: "I am lost in amazement at the effect which my letter from Frankfort has produced on you all." He says that in speaking in his letter about "going to Paris," it was only to use his influence with M. de Lamennais to dissuade him from all idea of resistance to the Holy See. * * * "All that you say with so much affection, good sense, and heartfelt eloquence I have likewise felt; and there is not a sentence in your letter which does not perfectly agree with what I have thought and resolved since I read the decisive brief of the 5th of October." In a note to Alexandrine he speaks of Albert as "the most faithful and the most affectionate heart he had ever met with in this world."

We pass, now, over the happy winter spent in Naples. All obstacles to the marriage were smoothed away, and those months were months of unalloyed happiness. A few days before her marriage Alexandrine wrote in her journal: "Tomorrow I am going to communion, and my heart is so cold.

* * * O, God, most pitiful, whom I fear, and yet whom I love for thy infinite sweetness and mercy, my Father, who art in Heaven, forsake me not when my heart is dead and dry, but give me faith, hope, and love, and enlighten me as to all I ought to believe. I beseech thee, in the name of Jesus Christ, teach me the true faith !”

We pass over, also, the marriage. It was solemnized on the 17th of April according to the rites of the Roman Catholic Church, and afterwards in the Protestant Chapel. A full account appears in Alexandrine's journal, but we quote only the last sentences. “I came back to my mother's house, and to the room which I was to leave forever. There I took off my white gown, and put on a grey silk dress, and a straw bonnet trimmed with pink, for our journey to Castellamare. Once ready to go, I gave a sorrowful look at the people and places I was leaving behind. I felt deeply moved, and asked to go once more into all the rooms. I kissed my mother, and then everybody else. At last, getting into the calèche with Albert, we drove away. It felt to both of us like a dream.”

The Memoirs now carry us to Castellamare, and introduce us to the charming home where Albert and Alexandrine were expecting to spend the summer. “A flight of steps, over-arched by a trellis of vines, led to it from the road.” Vesuvius and the matchless bay were spread before their windows ; and the breeze came to them perfumed by the roses and the orange flowers that grew in the garden in which the house was embowered. They seem, indeed, to have reached the highest point of earthly happiness. Albert's father and mother, and his brothers and sisters, all joined them in about a week, and their days were spent together in reading aloud, and their evenings on the largest of their three balconies, where they sat for hours enjoying the glory of the Italian nights.

But almost at the very commencement of their married life, a cloud arose which threatened soon to overwhelm all their happiness. “Ten untroubled, peaceful, cloudless days” passed, and then Albert had unmistakable symptoms of a hemorrhage of the lungs. At first they had no apprehension of any very serious result, but on a recurrence of the bleeding it was de-

cided that the air of Castellamare did not suit him, and he was advised to go to Sorrento. There a month was passed without any great anxiety, although Albert was ailing the whole time. But "they were so steeped in happiness" that they did not realize his danger.

While in Sorrento, Albert wrote to his friend the Abbé de Noirlieu, to advise with him as to the course which he should adopt for bringing Alexandrine to feel the importance of deciding to become a Roman Catholic. This was ever to him a subject of the very first importance, and yet he was restrained by a feeling of delicacy from exerting any direct influence upon her. Alexandrine's mother, it will be remembered, had at first been very tolerant and indulgent on the subject of their differing faiths. Even at the time of Albert's sickness, she had gone so far as to pray for him herself in Roman Catholic Churches, and burn tapers before their shrines, kneeling with a devotion very similar to that of Roman Catholics. But she had entirely changed after her visit to Germany; and since the marriage of her daughter she had become still more sensitive on the subject. She wrote to her that if she became a Roman Catholic, "it would nail her up in her coffin." Alexandrine was exceedingly attached to her mother, and felt the strongest reluctance to be the cause of any pain to her. So she was disposed, notwithstanding the strong leaning which she felt towards the religion of her husband, to wait till "entire conviction should irresistibly impel her conscience to the final step." The letter of Albert to the Abbé gives a very pleasing glimpse of their life at Sorrento. He says: "Alexandrine is not the woman to yield merely to influence, or to be led only by her tastes, and however much she may be drawn towards our faith, her conscience requires some other warrant than the impulse of her heart. * * * I am glad to see her frequent our Churches of her own accord, and take delight in doing so. On Sunday, she seems to reckon it a duty to hear Mass. But even if she were fully convinced, there would still be the difficulty of leaving the religion professed by her mother, whom she tenderly loves, and who has hitherto strongly opposed her doing so. We must trust in God for this, and hope." He adds: "We are reading a book which came out some time ago,

and which perhaps you know, called 'Travels of an Irish Gentleman in Search of a Religion,' with notes, by Thomas Moore. It goes back to the primitive Christian times, and demonstrates by authoritative testimony, which he quotes, that Catholicism is the *constitution*, so to speak, of Christianity, and that what we believe at this day was the faith of the Apostles. It proves that Fasting, Transubstantiation, the Supremacy of the Pope, Mass, Oral Tradition, Reverence for Images, Prayers for the Dead, Purgatory, and Confession, made part of the faith and practice of primitive times. He also dwells upon the discipline of the Secret observed among the early Christians, which has, no doubt, often led to false interpretations, and furnished Protestants with arguments which it is, however, easy enough to confute." He informs him, also, of the approaching marriage of his sister Pauline to an English gentleman, Mr. Augustus Craven, who afterwards held important positions in the diplomatic service of his native country. He says: "My future brother-in-law is a Catholic in heart, and he will be received into the Church soon after his marriage. * * *

It may perhaps appear strange that such strict Catholics as we all are should be marrying Protestants, but we have good reason to be thankful if God makes use of us to bring others to the love of the one Church and the true faith. There is no vanity in saying this, for our share in these conversions is a very indirect one, and they would have taken place even without our coöperation." He gives his views also with regard to the work of M. de Lamennais—*Paroles d'un Oroyant*—which had just appeared, and which was creating intense excitement everywhere; and also of the book of Silvio Pellico which he and Alexandrine had been reading. He says: "The peace of the author's soul seems to pass into our own, while his overflowing tenderness draws from us purifying tears."

Sorrento, however, was soon declared by the physicians to be unsafe; and they were advised to go to Pisa. Accordingly, after waiting for a few days that they might be present at the marriage of Pauline with Mr. Craven they took their way to their new resting place, where they were soon joined by Count de Montalembert. Albert had written to him at Florence while on his journey: "Dear friend, before you leave

Florence, make a little pilgrimage for me to Santa Maria Novella, and say a little prayer to the Blessed Virgin in the first or second chapel, near a black marble tomb, with a statue of Our Lady, surrounded with Angels, which stands behind the altar. Three years ago I used to pray there very often, and I have always thought I owed my happiness to those prayers, for it was immediately afterwards that I met Alexandrine at Rome. I am superstitiously inclined perhaps because I am so happy. * * * Ask also health for me. Is it wrong to wish for it? With so much happiness, should I not be satisfied to suffer a little? Well, God's will be done; I hope my petition will not displease Him. So, then, pray earnestly for me."

In her journal, Alexandrine writes: "Nov. 10th, Monday. Montal (the name which the Count received among his friends) arrived at seven in the evening. Albert was so happy! We met him on the stairs. He has told me several times that the warmth of my welcome made him feel quite at his ease; he had been a little alarmed at the idea of finding himself *en tiers* between Albert and me. I could not have been otherwise than delighted to see him, for there never was a more devoted friendship than Albert's for him."

"Tuesday, Nov. 18th. I went with Montalembert to see the Campo Santo by moonlight, and thought it so beautiful, so solemn! Albert, who would be so keenly alive to this sort of enjoyment, was obliged to give it up on account of his health. We take long walks on foot, and Albert follows us in the carriage."

"Wednesday Dec. 26th. This morning my beloved Albert went to communion in the Church of St. Francis, at the altar of St. Philomena, where a Novena had been made for him. Yesterday he confessed, with touching humility, to a Franciscan. All this has been good for his soul, but a little fatiguing for him. Dr. Betti saw him yesterday, and finds him better. * * * It made me burst into tears when I saw him kneeling at the altar. Partly, I think, from sorrow that I was separated from him at such a moment, and partly because I was beginning to feel convinced of the truth which I was still struggling to resist."

"Dec. 28th. This evening Montal began to read aloud to us the manuscript of his life of St. Elizabeth of Hungary, with which we were both delighted." To this she added afterwards: "Albert took a fancy to the names of 'brother' and 'sister,' which St. Elizabeth and her husband gave each other; and since that time, when we were alone, he used often to call me 'sister,' and I remember the beautiful angelic expression of his countenance at those times."

"Tuesday, Jan. 13th, 1835. At dinner, Albert suddenly announced that he intended to go to a ball that evening where we had all been invited, but had sent an excuse. I objected, for I was so afraid it would hurt him, but he persisted, and ended by saying 'I will go.' He sent for my maid, and desired her to get everything ready. At last I submitted to the not very disagreeable command of making myself as smart as possible; I was certainly two hours about it. To make the thing perfect, we forced Montal to come with us. He required a great deal of pressing, and declared he had nothing to wear. Albert lent him almost everything, but we had to send for a shoemaker, and for a hair dresser to cut his hair. All this amused us immensely, and as we had at that time no manservant, we got the shoemaker's boy to escort us to the ball, which made us all die of laughing."

"Jan. 15th. I went up with Albert to Montal's room. He was packing up his things, having to start the next day. * * He was bewildered in the midst of his parcels, books, and papers. I looked at his books a little. They were all more or less religious. There were amongst them legends and stories. I helped him to pack up, and we talked meanwhile a little about religion. He read me in a triumphant manner a fine passage of Alphonso Liguori on the devotion to the Blessed Virgin, which I have still some difficulty in admitting, and he recommended me to burn 'Father Clement,' a book lent to me by my Protestant friends as an antidote against Catholicism, which, however, had rather had the contrary effect. Then we went down again to our sitting room and spent a merry evening. Montal made me sing a number of ballads and national airs which he had collected during his travels. There was among them a beautiful German hymn. The words were trans-

lated from St. Bernard (*Jesu, wie süß wer Dein gedenkt*), saying that there is nothing so sweet as to think of Jesus, nothing so sweet as to feel His Presence. Montal was always getting me to sing it, though at first he thought it almost a sacrilege to let me do so. He was surprised afterwards to find that I sang it with almost as much expression as the pious young girls at Ratisbon, who used to sing it at their work."

The next day Alexandrine wrote to Eugénie: "Our dear Montalembert is gone. We could not get him to stay longer. We sat up with him last night till half-past two, and then he started with tears in his eyes. He regrets so much this comfortable family life, as he calls it, which we lead, and which he has become quite accustomed to. There is one comfort, and that is that we are friends with him for life."

As the winter progressed there seemed to be no improvement in Albert's health. Yet the symptoms in his case were not positively alarming, so he and Alexandrine continued hopeful that in the spring he would regain his strength. Their journals and their letters to their friends, during this period, show how happily the days slipped by. They tell us of the books and reviews which they read, of the thoughts suggested by them, and of the conversations which they had on religious subjects. But we cannot delay to glean even a single paragraph.

In March it was thought best to try the effects of a voyage to the East and a visit at the palace of the Prince and Princess Lapoukhyn in Russia. Albert was well enough to enjoy all this to the full. They visited Malta, Smyrna, Constantinople, and were everywhere received and entertained with the greatest cordiality for the sake of Prince Lapoukhyn and of the distinguished statesman Comte de la Ferronnays. At Constantinople in particular every attention was paid to them by the French, the Prussian, and the Russian ministers, and they went everywhere and saw everything under the very best guidance. Alexandrine and Albert both write with enthusiasm about all that they see and do, but it is evident that amid all the excitements and distractions of travel religion and religious duties are never absent from their thoughts.

Albert writes to Count de Montalembert: "Tell the Abbé Lacordaire how I envy all who are present at his Conferences

[the celebrated Conferences at Notre Dame]. There is no place like Paris for satisfying those inner wants of the soul, without which it vegetates, but cannot be said to live. The strong emotions which lift us up to God can only be felt, ordinarily speaking, where love is an active principle. * * * Alexandrine ought to see one of such priests as are to be found in France. * * * Again I say it, I look to France alone for the person who will make her feel the necessity of a fixed belief." And, again, in another letter to the same friend: "Thank M. Lacordaire for his kind message. I hope his Conferences will be published; for a poor exile like me cannot forego his interest in what so powerfully excites the youth of Paris."

Early in June they left Constantinople for Odessa, receiving the kindest attentions from their friends to the last; M. de Boutineff, the Russian minister, and Prince Gagarin accompanying them to the steamer, and providing them with flowers and fruits for their voyage. At Odessa, they were met by the mother of Alexandrine and Prince Lapoukhyn, and after being detained some days in quarantine, were escorted by them to their beautiful home in Korsen.

Albert wrote on the evening of their arrival to his mother and sisters: "One hurried line to tell you that we arrived this evening at this enchanting Korsen. I am so bewildered with wonder, that I shall never be able to describe it. A beautiful situation, a magnificent house, comforts of every sort and kind. An apartment for Alex and me such as I should desire for the rest of my life. Alex's room is lovely. Our drawing-room a perfect gem. My room charming, and furnished with a huge silver toilet service. I never saw anything like my mother-in-law and the Prince's apartments. The drawing-rooms and immense ball-room are full of copies of the most famous statues in the Italian galleries. All is magnificent." Alexandrine, too, in the same letter: "Here we are, thank God! and everything surpasses our expectations. It is all so bright, so comfortable, and in such perfect taste. Only fancy, darling sisters, that my room is all pink, the bed, the curtains, the blinds, all rose-colored silk; a lovely folding screen, which surrounds the bed, is of the same silk, and the rest of the furniture of pink velvet. In our sitting room there are two beautiful statues of white

marble; the hangings, chairs, and sofas are of red silk, and from the charming table where I am writing I see from each window the most lovely views. Parterres of flowers surround the house on all sides. It is impossible to describe it all to-night."

Albert's health, too, seemed to have been improved by the journey; so with brightening prospects before them, they enjoyed for a few days with keen delight the pleasure and the repose of their residence at Korsen. But a fortnight only had passed when Albert was seized with a fresh bleeding from the lungs, of a far more alarming character than ever before. The hemorrhage was with some difficulty stopped, but for three days his life was considered in immediate danger.

After a month of nursing and medical treatment, there seemed to be a decided improvement, and the remainder of their visit was passed very happily. But now Alexandrine's eyes were opened with regard to the future. Up to this time she had had no serious misgivings about the ultimate complete recovery of her husband's health; but after this, though she did not give up hope, she never again recovered her child-like gaiety.

About the first of September they set out by land for Italy once more. It was felt to be very important that Albert should be safely established south of the Alps before the cool days of autumn should set in.

Slowly, therefore, and by careful stages, they made their way towards Vienna and Venice. Their journals are full of interesting details about the incidents of travel in all the various places through which they passed. But we quote only a single paragraph, written at the first town to which they came after entering Poland. "I was so happy to be in a Catholic Church again and to hear Mass. I have been in a sadly tepid state for some time past. What has become of that fervor I used to feel? Have I lost it by my carelessness? Has God withdrawn from me, because I no longer thought of Him, still less felt devotion in His service. Oh, how the soul loses all its light, when it no longer draws it from Him! How it creeps when it does not lift itself up to God! Oh, shame, shame upon me! But yet have mercy upon me, O my God! Return again to Thy servant, who has so often and so basely forsaken Thee!"

It was not till about the middle of October that they reached Venice. They would have preferred, if it had been possible, to have gone on to France and to have joined the other members of the family who were all then assembled at Boury—an estate near Paris which Comte de la Ferronnays had recently purchased, and which was to be their future home. But a winter in France was not to be thought of in Albert's state of health, and they were quite content to be once more in Italy. Alexandrine wrote to Pauline: "There is a charm, a perfume, and undescribable attraction about Italy. * * All other countries seem to me so cold and common place in comparison. It is only the East and Spain I fancy which possess the same kind of poetical charm." To Count Montalembert, also, she wrote, gaily reminding him that in Pisa "after the first few days of awe and reverence you inspired me with, I grew so bold as to throw *eau de Cologne* and orris powder at you, and got you to order me a bonnet." However, she writes in the same letter about herself more seriously. "There is nothing that would make me so happy as to be of the same religion as Albert; but besides the doubts I still have, I am kept back by the feeling that I should break my mother's heart; that mother to whom I owe the happiness of being Albert's wife. I should break her heart inwardly and perhaps bodily too. * * My position is a painful one, and I cannot help rejoicing that I have not yet made up my mind; and I do not wish for instruction, or to be convinced that it would be my duty to go against my mother on this point. Dear friend, if you have any charity, you will pity and not condemn me. I try as much as I can to cast this, my heavy burthen, on our blessed Lord. I also ask the Virgin and the Saints to pray for me, for I believe in their intercession in some sort of way, more than I do in some others of your doctrines. It is your Pope whom I cannot believe in. * * Well I hope God's goodness will deliver me from this torture and difficulty which embitter my life."

For a time they felt some encouragement about Albert's health. The letters written to the family at Boury, and to their friends in other places, continued to be hopeful. They even interested themselves with plans for spending the next winter in Syria; and Albert wrote to Pauline: "We have serious

thoughts of spending some part of next winter in the Holy Land. Jerusalem is my dream. I cannot imagine anything equal to the interest of following our Lord Jesus Christ's footsteps, with the Gospel as one's guide. Every Christian ought, I think, once in his life to enliven his faith by resorting to its fountain head. I feel as if mine, tepid as it is, would be forever kindled into fervor. For where are there interests comparable to those bound up with religion? How dry and cold all others seem by the side of that one which is unchangeable, inexhaustible, and Divine."

Alexandrine wrote to Count de Montalembert: "You would pity and laugh at me at the same time, my dear Montal, if you knew how I am given up body and soul to household cares. There is not a trace left of 'the poetical Alexandrine.' The present one is surrounded with stores of oil, potatoes, rice, candles, &c., and is perfectly well acquainted, as I beg you to believe, with the prices of everything, eggs included."

Albert writes, too, to the Princess Lapoukhyn: "If you could only see Alexandrine busying herself with household matters and all their wearisome details with such gaiety and such perseverance! Where did the *élégante* Mademoiselle d'Alopeus acquire this patent? How has she learnt to be a perfect house-keeper in her kitchen, and at the same time to retain all the captivation and charms which make everybody fall in love with her?"

But in all their letters religion is the one subject which is never lost sight of. Alexandrine expresses herself thus to Eugénie: "My poor mother writes me such touching letters. I cannot break my mother's heart. She has been the happiness of my life. She has allowed me to marry a Catholic, and I am all that she has. If I could, I would examine, study,—and try to become a Catholic. The Pope is my difficulty. I think I am convinced *quasi* all the rest."

But now, as the winter wore away, it became only too manifest to Alexandrine that Albert was failing; and in her journal, at this time, we find the prayers which she offered that her husband might be spared: "Almighty Father—for thou hast permitted us to ask—I ask in the name of Thy Son Jesus Christ, to whom Thou hast promised to grant all things, I ask thee

that I may live, and die, and rise again with my cherished Albert. I love him, I love him, O! my God, much in Thee. I love him much because he loves Thee. O! keep us ever together in thy love; never separate us! Pray for me, ye saints, and love me, dear Jesus. Let my voice reach Thee, as that of the poor woman reached Thee, as that of the centurion, and so many others! Like one of them, I cry, Lord, I believe, help Thou my unbelief!" Again sitting in the window, and looking out at the lovely view, she exclaimed, almost in despair: "Compared with God we are less than the clay which the potter fashions into different vessels, or the wax which the artist moulds at will. I am less before God than the grain of dust which whirls before me. May I not then be as indifferent to Him!" But the cheering words are borne to her mind: "The very hairs of your head are numbered;" and she writes: "Our troubles, then, have all a purpose. I know it is good for me to be tried. It makes me think of God. It makes me, I hope, somewhat better."

The family at Boury began now to be alarmed; and Fernand was sent to be with his brother, and to assist Alexandrine in her care of him. But she felt the need of the love and sympathy of her sisters, and she wrote to them in these sad pleading words, which cannot be read even now without a thrill: "Fernand and Putbus are both most kind; but they are not enough for me now." * * "Dearest; I want pity. I want comfort; and to be folded in the arms of some one I love, and weep and sob there without restraint. My too full heart needs the relief of tears to calm the agitation which I am perpetually concealing. I want to feel my mother's arms about my neck, and yours, beloved sisters. I am sitting writing to you, lonely and sad in my Albert's room. He is asleep. I should like to have somebody watching with me."

But before this despairing cry for help could be heard and answered from Boury, her fears were realized, and Albert had another severe attack which brought him so low, that Fernand was obliged to say: "We must get a confessor." "Have we come to that?" she cried; and then almost instantaneously, she added: "Now, I am a Catholic!" and she wrote at once to Korsen: "My own beloved mother. I must open my whole

heart to you. * * I have an irresistible desire to belong to the same Church as my poor Albert. I give you my word of honor that it is only during these last dreadful days that I have felt this wish take complete possession of my mind. But I must also add, that up to this moment it is my love and respect for you which have prevented my seeking instruction upon the Catholic faith, dreading to find out that it was the true one, and of being then obliged to embrace it. * * My love and respect for you are in no way diminished, but I now feel myself irresistibly impelled towards a decisive step, and also fully persuaded that you will forgive me. * * I assure you that I shall only act from conviction. But let me examine, learn, and then resolve. * * * Ah, my sweet mother! permit me then to be instructed in the Catholic religion; and if your poor child returns to you a widow, you will not mind, will you, if she comes to you a Catholic? You will not banish her from your heart? She will love you and cherish you more than ever. Her religion will never be a source of annoyance to you. * * O! dearest mother, if the Catholic religion had but this one advantage over ours, of prayers for the dead, I should choose it." To Count de Montalembert she wrote: "I should be happier as a widow and a Catholic, than as I am now, a Protestant."

But many days of suspense were yet to be passed before she could hear from Boury, and at twelve o'clock at night on the ninth of March we find her writing to Pauline:

"He is alive, dearest Pauline, but I can hope no more. It is very hard quite to lose it, and it is only to-night that I give it up, though I have been told innumerable times that he may die from one moment to another. * * I am here alone in his room, he sleeping and I watching him—knowing that he is dying without father, mother, sister, or brother, in whose arms I could for a while give way to my dreadful anguish—I who all through my life have felt such intense need of sympathy. I must write to relieve this intolerable burthen. This then is the end of our love. Ten days of happiness out of less than two years of married life, and this for us who love one another as much as it is possible to love. Ten days! for it was not longer that I was entirely free from anxiety about his health."

But the expected help at last arrived, and Alexandrine writes : "Through the God of goodness and of love, I have had the happiness of seeing Albert in the arms of his parents once more. I knelt down in silence behind them to thank God for this great mercy. Eugénie spent the night in my room. Oh, what sweet hours we spent in talking and weeping together. She brought me a rosary and a letter from Montal." In this letter, written in response to her own, Count de Montalembert says : "I cannot refrain from saying what comfort it gave me to hear that you had made up your mind to complete your union with Albert, by that only tie which was still wanting to make it perfect. My dear sister—for so you are indeed become by this important act, inspired by Divine grace—what a consolation there is in this, not only for you but also for him ; as it has been doubtless through his means that you have become a child of the Eternal Truth, and that your soul will be the rich prize he can present to his merciful Judge. You, too, dear Alexandrine, will now quench your thirst for consolation at that inexhaustible source ; you will be nourished with the Bread of the Strong, and God will reward you for the sacrifice you have had to make, a hundred fold in this world, and forever in the next. He will show you the immense and the unspeakable difference between suffering as a Catholic, with all the sweet and abundant riches of the Church imparted to you, and suffering with no other support than the cold and barren faith poor Protestants profess."

The love which Albert inspired in his friends was at all times something quite remarkable, but now that the family were all assembled around his sick bed, the affection for him which was displayed was very beautiful. In Eugénie's journal we find the following prayer for him : "My God, everything is possible to Thee. I do not complain of the trials Thou sendest in this world, but vouchsafe to hear this prayer which I make with the deepest faith. Accept an exchange of trials. Let Albert recover, and give me his illness. Let me suffer a long time, till I am fit to die, and then let me go to Thee. This will still be a trial for them all, for they will grieve to lose me. It is not therefore a release from suffering that I pray for. What I ask is, for one suffering to be exchanged for another. I know that trials are the only way to Thee. My

God, everything is possible with Thee. Remember the centurion. Remember Jairus's daughter. Remember all them who said to Thee with faith, 'Heal this child,' or 'Heal this man.' See, my God, with what faith I cry 'O! Lord, heal Albert.' Give me his sickness. Let it be terrible; let it be like a fire in my breast, to purify my heart. Let my throat suffer sharply to make up for the faults of vanity I have committed when my voice was admired, and I took pleasure in being listened to. Punish me, O my God, for I am full of vanity. I will bless every pain, and then when I shall have been ill a long time, Thou wilt let me die. O! everything, everything to obtain that. To obtain that I may go to Thee, my God, my only Love; there is no word impossible with Thee. Hear my prayer. The world will be surprised, and it will say that it is inexplicable! Albert so weak and so sickly recovers, and Eugénie, so strong and so healthy, dies. And I shall say to myself, 'Cannot God do what he pleases? God has so willed it—this explains all.' ”*

* We have scarcely felt it necessary to remind our readers how much such *Memoirs* as these suffer in being rendered into English. They understand how the subtle charm with which the original is enveloped must be lost in any translation. But this loss is so great in all passages which express excited feeling or strong emotion that we cannot forbear putting down this single passage in the original.—“*Mon Dieu! tout vous est possible, je ne murmure pas contre les épreuves que vous envoyez en ce monde; seulement, mon Dieu, acceptez cette prière que je vous fais avec tant de foi, d'un échange d'épreuves. Guérissez Albert, donnez-moi sa maladie, faites-m'en souffrir longtemps pour me rendre digne de mourir, puis laissez-moi aller à vous. Voyez, mon Dieu, ce sera toujours une épreuve, car moi aussi ils me regretteront, ce n'est donc pas pour leur épargner l'épreuve que je vous demande de transformer celle-ci. Je reconnais que le seul moyen d'être à vous, c'est d'être éprouvée. Mon Dieu! tout vous est possible. Souvenez-vous du Centenier, souvenez-vous de la fille de Jaïre; eux vous disaient avec foi: 'Seigneur, guérissez!' Eh bien! voyez dans mon cœur, voyez comme il déborde de foi, lorsque je vous dis: 'Seigneur, guérissez Albert!'—Mon Dieu! donnez-la-moi, cette maladie, et qu'elle soit terrible! qu'elle brûle ma poitrine entièrement, pour purifier mon cœur. Faites bien souffrir mon gosier dont j'ai si souvent eu vanité, à cause de ma voix qu'on admire et que je me complais à faire entendre. Punissez-moi, car je suis vaine. Mon Dieu, je bénirai chaque douleur, mais alors, quand j'aurai été bien malade, vous permettrez que je meure! Oh! tout pour gagner cela! pour gagner d'aller à vous, mon Dieu, mon amour!—Tout vous est possible, acceptez ma prière. Le monde dira, surpris: 'C'est inexplicable; lui si malade et si faible, il guérit; et elle si forte, si peu délicate, elle meurt!' Et moi je penserai: Dieu ne peut-il pas tout? Dieu l'a voulu, voilà qui explique tout.”*

Contrary to all the expectations of the physicians, Albert began to revive: and as he regained strength, a strong desire arose to see his native land once more, and the new home of the family at Bourry. With many misgivings it was determined at last to attempt the journey. Eugénie wrote in her journal: "To-morrow we leave Venice! Sad as this time has been to us, I nevertheless feel a sort of regret at leaving this place, as if I was parting with some one I loved. This is always the case with me when I have enjoyed anywhere great religious consolations. It seems to me as if by changing my abode, my feelings might also change. Alas! this is so often the case with me, that I have reason to apprehend it. I am so easily distracted. Here it seemed to me so easy to love God. Each church, as I look at it even from a distance, reminds me of happy moments. There is nothing gloomy to those who love God. The heart is too full of hope and trust to admit gloom. And so, in spite of our fears and our grief for Albert, I do not carry away a painful impression of Venice. I never anywhere prayed so ardently for him as here. It seemed to me as if God always heard those prayers, and now I am going. Thanks be to Thee, my God, for all the fervent love, the thoughts of Heaven, the distaste of this world, I have been blest with here. Do not abandon me; I know too well my own weakness. The least thing will draw me aside from that blessed path which I have been lately treading. Perhaps Thou wilt permit this to happen as a punishment for my proud thoughts. Every trial Thou sendest me, I will bear, not in my own strength, but in that which Thou wilt give me."

On Sunday, April 10th, they started. In the evening Eugénie wrote to Pauline: "We are at Padua. Albert is scarcely tired at all. As soon as we had seen him comfortably in bed we went to the Cathedral. Oh, it was just what we wanted, to kneel there and unburthen our hearts by repeating a thousand times: 'My God, I thank Thee! My God I bless Thee!' * * I am so pleased to think that we shall be able to hear Mass every day before we start. How heavenly sweet is the thought of God; and when it rules the soul, how easy everything becomes. Nothing then is really sad. Mass every morning; every evening a blessed moment in Church in which

to thank God, if the day has been a good one, or to implore His aid if it has been trying. This journey is a real pilgrimage of prayer." At Verona, the bulletin was: "It is wonderful how well Albert is at present. We are quite astonished, and so grateful to our good and merciful God." At Genoa, Alexandrine wrote to Count de Montalembert: "Through the mercy of God we are so far safe on our journey."

But we cannot follow the party as they thus went on day by day. Albert bore the journey better than they had feared, and they reached Paris at last, May 18th. Hahnemann the renowned homœopathist was summoned at once, and Eugénie writes: "He is a kind, excellent old man. He was so much touched at the sight of Alexandrine, that he took her by the hand when he went away, and said, 'During the sixty years I have been a physician, I have never seen a woman so fond of her husband.' He wishes us to leave this house, where the rooms are too small."

In a few days, they were established at the *Rue de Madame*, No. 13, and Alexandrine writes: "Our apartment is pretty and spacious, and our windows look on the fine trees of the Luxembourg."

Arrangements were immediately made with the Abbé de Noirliu—the friend of Albert, of whom mention has already been made—for receiving Alexandrine into the Church; and she selected the Abbé Gerbet [afterwards Bishop of Perpignan] as her "confessor"; though up to this time she had never seen him. But while in Venice, she had read an Article of his in the *Université Catholique*, which so impressed her that she had then resolved if she ever became a Roman Catholic to choose him for her confessor.

On Whit Sunday she was joyfully looking forward to being "a Catholic" before Corpus Christi; and while she was at service that day at St. Etienne du Mont, Albert wrote for the last time in his journal: "My God, formerly I was wont to make to Thee this prayer: 'Let her be mine, O! my God; grant me this happiness, if but for one single day!' Thou didst grant it, O! Lord, and why should I now complain to Thee? my joy has been short but intense, and now my other prayer is about to be fulfilled. Thy divine goodness has granted also

that my angel wife should be received into Thy Church, and I can look forward with hope and trust to our meeting before long, where we shall both be lost in the immensity of Thy Divine Love."

At length the day so anxiously expected arrived; and Alexandrine thus describes what took place. "May 29th, Trinity Sunday. This morning I went early to mass, came home and dressed. I put on a white gown and a broad blue ribbon across my chest, the colors of the Blessed Virgin, which have always been my own favorites. This is her special month too, and I owe this grace to her intercession, and to Albert, who offered himself up as a sacrifice for me, who offered everything to God, even the joy of sensible devotion, for my conversion, only asking always to love good things. The Abbé de Noir-lieu said Mass at an altar prepared in Albert's room. When Mass was over, he beckoned to me to come and kneel down before him, and told me to make the sign of the Cross, and then I read the following profession of faith:"

Here, we regret to say, it will be necessary, before giving this profession of faith, to interrupt the narrative for a moment with some words of explanation. The *Récit d'une Sœur* is a book with which we had been familiar for some years before it occurred to us to introduce it to the attention of the readers of this journal. After writing a few pages, we learned that there was an English translation, which we procured, and have made use of whenever we had occasion to transfer passages to our pages. But on reaching this point of the story, instead of the document with which we are familiar, we discover, in *A Sister's Story*, as it is called, something very different. The profession of faith in the *Récit d'une Sœur* is such an one as we should suppose would naturally have been drawn up at this time for Alexandrine by those whom she had selected as her spiritual advisers. It is expressed in very general terms, and there is nothing to alarm her prejudices, and nothing which would appear especially distasteful to one in her situation whose life had been spent out of the communion of the Roman Catholic Church, and who was not yet very far advanced in her faith. Alexandrine had plainly been brought to the step

which she was about to take, not so much by conviction, as by her sympathy with her husband. On the point of becoming a widow she remembers that her husband's Church teaches the doctrine of "prayers for the dead;" and as she writes to her mother, this "one advantage is reason enough for choosing the Roman Catholic religion." For it follows that, even if Albert is removed from her bodily view, he is not lost to her for one moment. She is still not only his wife, but she can daily and hourly contribute to his happiness and his eternal welfare by her prayers, and by her alms. What wonder that the tide of feeling rose high, and swept over the few obstacles which remained to keep her in what was only a nominal connection with the Church of her fathers. Now this was obviously no time to annoy such a convert with all the minutiae of the Roman Catholic faith. Albert was not a narrow man. His sympathies were with the liberal party in his Church. He belonged to the party of reform, with Lacordaire, and Montalembert. The priests, also, with whom he was now in communication were not extreme men. The Abbé de Noirliu, the Abbé Dupanloup, and the Abbé Gerbet, were men of broad views and wide sympathies. Any one who will read the profession of faith as it is given in the *Récit d'une Sœur* will see that it is in harmony with the facts in the case. We ought perhaps to say also that it is a document which was carefully signed in the presence of witnesses, whose names are given. Now the translation of the book has evidently fallen into the hands of some narrow-minded person, who has felt that here was a good opportunity to exhibit a carefully prepared statement of the dogmas of the Roman Catholic Church. We do not see how it is possible to avoid the conviction that the profession of faith, as it appears in *A Sister's Story*, is a forgery, and a very clumsy one. There surely cannot have been two professions of faith any more than there can be two skulls of the same Saint exhibited for the edification of the faithful. We regret to have been obliged to call attention to a thing of this kind so little in harmony with the solemnity of the scene which we have been describing; but the blame must rest with those who have foisted this document into the translation. It certainly seems to us incumbent upon the "Catholic Publication Society" to investi-

gate this matter, of which we cannot think they can be cognizant, and to make a suitable explanation.

We will now place in parallel columns our own literal translation of Alexandrine's confession of faith, which is to be found in the original work, and that which purports to be her confession as it appears in "*A Sister's Story*."

FROM RÉCIT D'UNE SŒUR.

"In the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit:

I believe, with a firm faith, and profess all and every one of the Articles which are contained in the symbol of the Holy, Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman Church.

I believe it would be a detestable idolatry to render the worship of adoration [culte d'adoration] to any other than to God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. I believe with the Catholic Church, that it is good and useful to invoke in a supplicatory manner [manière suppliante] the Holy Virgin and the Saints, and to have recourse to their aid and their help to obtain from God his benefits, through Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, who alone is our Saviour and Redeemer.

In venerating [venerant] the images of the Holy Virgin and of the Saints, I do not attribute to them any virtue or divinity, on ac-

FROM "A SISTER'S STORY."

"In the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost:

I, with a firm faith, believe and profess all and every one of those things which are contained in that Creed which the Holy Roman Church maketh use of, viz: I believe in one God, the Father Almighty, Creator of Heaven and earth, and of all things, visible and invisible; and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God; born of the Father before all ages; God of God; Light of Light; true God of true God; begotten not made; consubstantial to the Father, by Whom all things were made. Who, for us men, and for our salvation, came down from Heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, and was made Man. Was crucified also for us under Pontius Pilate; He suffered and was buried; and the third day He rose again according to the Scriptures; He ascended into Heaven; sits at the right hand of the Father, and is to come again with glory to judge the living and the dead; of Whose kingdom there shall be no end. And in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Life-giver, Who proceeds from the Father and

count of which people ought to venerate them, ask of them any favor, and accord to them trust, since all the honor which is paid to them has reference [se rapport] to those whom they represent.

I believe that there are seven sacraments instituted by Jesus Christ.

I believe that Jesus Christ has given to the Church the power to grant indulgences, and that the use of them is salutary.

I believe that those souls who depart from this life in peace and charity, yet debtors still [redevable] to divine justice, suffer for a time in purgatory, and that they can be relieved by prayer, alms, and by the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass.

I believe that by virtue of the words of consecration, the bread and the wine offered on the altar are changed into the body and into the blood of Jesus Christ, and that this adorable Saviour can be received entire under one kind.

I believe that there is but one faith, one baptism, as there is only one Lord, and that in consequence it is impossible to please God and be saved without this faith and this baptism.

I believe that the true

the Son, Who, together with the Father and the Son is adored and glorified, Who spoke by the prophets. And I believe one holy Catholic and apostolic Church; I confess one baptism, for the remission of sins; and I look for the resurrection of the dead, and the life of the world to come. Amen.

I most steadfastly admit and embrace apostolical and ecclesiastical tradition, and all other observances and constitutions of the same Church.

I also admit the holy Scriptures according to that sense which our holy mother, the Church, has held, and does hold; to whom it belongs to judge of the true sense and interpretation of the Scriptures; neither will I ever take and interpret them otherwise than according to the unanimous consent of the Fathers.

I also profess that there are truly and properly seven Sacraments of the new law, instituted by Jesus Christ, our Lord, and necessary for the salvation of mankind, though not all for every one, to wit: baptism, confirmation, holy Eucharist, penance, extreme unction, orders, and matrimony; and that they confer grace; and that of these, baptism, confirmation, and order, cannot be reiterated without sacrilege. I also receive and admit the received and approved ceremonies of the Catholic Church, used in the solemn administration of all the aforesaid sacraments.

I embrace and receive all and every one of the things which have been defined and declared in the

faith is only in the Catholic Church, which by the succession of its pastors goes back without interruption even to the Apostles: it is the Church established by Jesus Christ, who has promised to assist it by his Spirit always to the end of the world.

I believe that we cannot be saved out of the Catholic Church, but I do not condemn individually [en particulier] any of those who have had the unhappiness to live and to die out of its communion. It belongs only to God to judge them. He alone knows to what extent their ignorance of the true faith has been voluntary and culpable.

I believe that the power of interpreting the Holy Scriptures has been given only to the Apostles and to their legitimate successors, to whom Jesus Christ has said, Go, teach all nations.

I believe then sincerely [d'esprit et de cœur] in the teaching of the Catholic Church. I wish to live and die in the bosom of this Church, through the grace of God, whom I will bless all the days of my life for having called me to the religion of my ancestors.

In the name of the Fa-

holy Council of Trent concerning original sin and justification.

I profess, likewise, that in the Mass there is offered to God a true, proper, and propitiatory sacrifice for the living and the dead. And that in the most holy Sacrament of the Eucharist there is truly, really, and substantially, the Body and the Blood, together with the Soul and Divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ; and that there is made a conversion of the whole substance of the bread into the Body and of the whole substance of the wine into the Blood; which conversion the Catholic Church calls Transubstantiation. I also confess that under either kind alone Christ is received whole and entire, and a true Sacrament.

I constantly hold that there is a Purgatory, and that the souls therein detained are helped by the suffrages of the faithful.

Likewise that the Saints reigning together with Christ are to be honored and invoked, and that they offer prayers to God for us, and that their relics are to be had in veneration.

I most firmly assert that the images of Christ, of the Mother of God, ever Virgin, and also of the other Saints, ought to be had and retained, and that due honor and veneration is to be given to them.

I also affirm that the power of indulgences was left by Christ in the Church, and that the use of them is most wholesome to Christian people.

I acknowledge the holy Catholic,

ther, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.

Paris, May 29th, 1836. The day of the Festival of the most Holy Trinity.

Martin de Noirliou.

Alexandrine d'Alopeus de la Ferronnays.

In the presence of the undersigned :

Albert de la Ferronnays.

Comte de la Ferronnays.

Montserau, Comtesse de la Ferronnays.

Eugénie de la Ferronnays.

Fernand de la Ferronnays."

mother and mistress of all Churches ; and I promise true obedience to the Bishop of Rome, successor to Saint Peter, Prince of the Apostles, and Vicar of Jesus Christ.

I likewise undoubtedly receive and profess all other things delivered, defined, and declared by the sacred canons and general councils, and particularly by the holy Council of Trent. And I condemn, reject, and anathematise all things contrary thereto, and all heresies which the Church has condemned, rejected, and anathematised.

I do at this present freely profess and sincerely hold this true Catholic faith, without which no one can be saved ; and I promise most constantly to retain and confess the same entire and unviolated, with God's assistance, to the end of my life.

Paris, May 29, 1836, Feast of the Holy Trinity.

(Signed)

Martin de Noirliou.

Alexandrine d'Alopeus de la Ferronnays.

In the presence of

Albert de la Ferronnays.

Comte de la Ferronnays

Montsoreau, Comtesse de la Ferronnays.

Eugénie de la Ferronnays.

Fernand de la Ferronnays."

Alexandrine states that Montalembert was present, but she "forgot to make him sign."

"When all was over I kissed Albert, and all our other dear ones. The Abbé Martin came up to me, and said : 'You have now brethren in every part of the world !' I felt as if a new existence had begun for me ; and I was so happy, so happy. I was quite surprised at it myself, and was almost afraid to have been in too high spirits the rest of the day with my poor Albert."

Eugénie wrote the following paragraph in her journal, the same evening. "Oh, my Lord, what can we say? or how can we thank Thee, for the mercies of this day? Thy little lamb has been gathered into the fold. She is now a Catholic! Fill her gentle soul with joy, my God. Bless and comfort her for these long years of banishment from Thee. Let this return to her true home be full of happiness. Pour down thy gifts upon her, and if out of Thy great love for her soul Thou sendest her trials, give her that immense love for Thee alone which will make her bear and love all things Thy Almighty hand can inflict. Ye blessed angels watch over her, that her peace may be great and her soul untroubled."

May 31st. Alexandrine writes: "I went with Eugénie on foot to the Chapel of St. Stanislaus College. When I got there and saw the Abbé Gerbet in the confessional, I felt frightened, and it was some time before I could summon up courage to approach it. Eugénie had told me how to calm myself by prayer."

June 1st. "Oh! my good, good God, I dare to think Thy Hand has guided me, notwithstanding my unworthiness! *
* I am so glad to be a Catholic; so glad, that it seems to me almost miraculous, and persuades me more and more of the truth of this dear religion. How I thank God, and how I thank all who have helped me. I like confession so much, though it causes me great pain. * * What a priest has my Heavenly Father sent me! He surpasses everything I had ever hoped to find in a confessor."

June 4th. Eugénie writes to Pauline: "Alexandrine, dear child, has been twice to confession, and to-morrow she will receive absolution. You can picture to yourself what a general confession must be to her with her merciless memory, which tracks out minutely the occurrences of years and years with the most scrupulous accuracy. I went twice with her to the Chapel of St. Stanislaus College. She stayed so long that I fell fast asleep, which made us laugh, for we laugh sometimes in spite of everything, and in spite of ourselves. But we feel there is no harm in it, for this kind of gaiety is not like the world's. It springs from the peace of prayer. The Abbé Gerbet thinks so too. Ah! Pauline, what an immense grace it is that Alex

should have met with him just now. She says so herself, and constantly declares that he is everything she could wish. His exceeding gentleness, and the boundless charity which belongs to his character, are perceptible in his words, and very looks, as well as in his writings."

Alexandrine now received her First Communion with Albert. The Archbishop of Paris had given his leave for Mass to be said at twelve o'clock at night, in Albert's room, so that he might go to Communion without fasting. Otherwise, in order to communicate at the same Mass with Alexandrine, he would have been obliged to receive by way of *Viaticum*, as he could not remain without food till morning, and for him to have then received this last sacrament of the Church would have been too sad for them all. Accordingly the Abbé Dupanloup (the present Bishop of Orleans)—the same who had many years before prepared Albert for his First Communion—heard his confession; and at the appointed time Alexandrine knelt down by his bedside—as he was not able to sit up—and the Abbé Gerbet began his Mass. Alexandrine wrote: "I did not know where I was, or what was passing, but soon Albert made me let go his hand—that hand which I had looked upon as something so sacred, that even at the most solemn moment of my life I could not be offending God to hold him. But he made me let him go, and said, 'Go, go; think now only of God!' The Abbé Gerbet addressed a few words to me before giving me Communion, and afterwards he gave it to Albert."

This her First Communion they all supposed at the time to be the last for Albert; but he still lingered, and on the 26th of June, Mass was again said at twelve o'clock at night in his room. Before the service he said: "The only thing I ask of God, now, is strength to fulfil my sacrifice." Alexandrine wrote in her journal: "At the moment of Communion, the Abbé Martin de Noirlieu came up to Albert, and gave one half of the Sacred Host to him, and the other to me. Albert could not open his lips without suffering, and it was for this reason that the Abbé Martin had divided the Host; but even so, he had some difficulty in swallowing, and they had to give him some water. This disturbed him, but the Abbé Gerbet—who was present—assured him it did not signify. Then Albert

exclaimed: 'My God! Thy will be done.' * * * * *

"On the next day he seemed so exhausted that it was suggested to him that he should receive Extreme Unction. His countenance did not change in the least. He said gently and quite quietly, 'Will it not be taking advantage of the graces which the Church bestows, to receive it now?' He was anointed, however, that same evening by the Abbé Dupanloup. When it was over, Albert made a little sign of the Cross on the Abbé's forehead, who received it with respect, and affectionately embraced him. Then I approached, feeling that it was my turn to receive that dear sign of the Cross which was a sweet habit of happier days. He kissed me, his parents, Eugénie, Fernand, Montal, and then Julian (his servant), who was weeping bitterly. When it came to that, Albert burst into tears, and this was more than I could bear; but he quickly recovered his fortitude, when I kissed him again, and beckoned to the Sister (the Sister from Bon Secours who had been his nurse), whom he would not leave out in this tender and general leave taking; but with his delicate sense of what was befitting, and in token of gratitude, he kissed the hand which has ministered to him, in spite of her resistance. * * * I sat down by his side. He was asleep, and I held his hand in mine."

We will not linger longer, or attempt to describe further the affecting scenes of these last sad hours, but close this part of the "Story" with two or three brief paragraphs from the journal of Alexandrine.

June 30th: "Albert, I am writing to you, leaning against your coffin. I am writing, for it is like speaking to you. Albert, do you see me now? Do you know what I am feeling? Oh! this dreadful uncertainty. * * O! my compassionate Lord Jesus, Who wept over the dead, Jesus who felt all our sorrows, Thou knowest that the more I loved him the more I loved Thee, therefore forbid me not to love him, and that with an immense love! It is only now that my love has become perfect, for now I love, I am sure of it, a perfect soul."

July 1st. "O, my God! the day before yesterday, he was still living—I still heard his voice; and yesterday I could say '*yesterday* he was alive.' And now it is further away; and to-morrow I can no longer say '*the day before yesterday*.'"

July 6th. "O, my God! Pardon my boldness, and do Thou, O, my Father, who art in Heaven, let me bring before Thee that we never ceased to bear Thee in mind; that we never wrote to each other even a little love-letter without naming Thy Name and invoking Thy blessing upon us. Remember that we continually prayed to Thee together, and that we always besought Thee that our love might be eternal in Heaven."

We have left ourselves but small space in which to introduce to our readers the other members of this large family. Yet the interest of the "Story" is by no means confined to the two whom we have made thus far so prominent. The character and history of each one might be made the subject of profitable study.

After the death of Albert, they were all—with the exception of Pauline and her husband, whose diplomatic duties carried them far away—assembled at Boury. Here Alexandrine also made her home, casting her lot henceforth with theirs. The picture of French family life which is now presented in the *Memoirs* is full of interest. The Château is described as "a fine building, more like one of the hotels of the Faubourg St. Germain than a country house, with a great staircase, vast corridors, lofty and spacious rooms, and plenty of air and light." Yet the grey clouds and "cold and moist" temperature of Normandy proved somewhat depressing to those who had been so long accustomed to the sky of Italy, and had now gone there in the first moments of their grief. Pauline, who was able to make them a hurried visit, writes, however, that their deep sorrow "was allied with peace, charity, and hours of absorbing study. It was sweetened by the mutual affection of hearts devoted to God and to one another, and hallowed by calm resignation, and joyful anticipations." She says, also: "Nothing harsh or austere met the eyes of those who visited this retreat; that unaffected gaiety which proceeds from purity of heart and innocence of life, the true sunshine of the peaceful soul, survived every storm and was always to be found there." She speaks also of "the inexpressible comfort" of arriving there, from those other lands and the busy world in which she habitually lived, and of "getting back

into that pure atmosphere of loving kindness and religion : of resting in a place where life was so regular and active, though quiet, and at the same time where the subjects and the questions which agitated the world were freely admitted and discussed, as far as they were really of any interest."

The particulars of the kind of life which the family led at the Château de Boury we are reluctantly obliged to omit. Our purpose, as we have stated before, is to illustrate their religious views and religious life ; and even in doing this we must now be very brief.

Among the pleasing pictures which are presented are several which represent their gathering as a family for "prayers." These were always accompanied with music. "Eugénie's voice, assisted by Olga's fine contralto and Alexandrine's pure and high soprano, formed a choir such as is seldom met with." Fernand, also, took a part, and their singing on these occasions "long lingered in the memory of all who heard it."

The old statesman, Count de la Ferronnays, is represented as participating with interest in these religious services. On Good Friday of Passion Week, 1837, we have a description of him as he read to the whole collected household "Bourdaloue's admirable discourse on the Passion"; and, at Easter, Bossuet's sermon on the Resurrection. Madame de la Ferronnays, in writing of her husband about this time to Pauline at Lisbon, says : "Oh ! I do envy and admire your father. Since our dear child has gone to God, he seems to be in Heaven himself."

The Abbé Gerbet had become, by special invitation, an established inmate of the house, and his presence was one of the things for which they all felt especially grateful. He was, at that time, writing his book *On the Treatment of the Soul's Diseases*. Pauline, on making his acquaintance, during one of her visits, writes : "Few, indeed, better know how to read the soul or to reveal to it its own secrets ; few men have so joined compassion to firmness or have had greater skill in imparting peace to a troubled soul, at the same time rousing it to efforts which it deemed beyond its strength. I should be tempted to say that no one ever excelled as he did in the sacred ministry, if I did not know and gratefully acknowledge that most Catholics in the course of their lives have met with some such wise

and good physician whom they have had cause to bless in time of need." She describes the "long and earnest conversations" which they had with the Abbé in the evenings, when the family were all assembled, and says "I retain the most delightful recollection of the talent, the kindness, the nobleness of thought, the gaiety and peculiar charm, which made those conversations so extremely enjoyable."

As an illustration of the good sense which seems to have characterized all his advice, we quote one only from many passages which we would gladly transfer to these pages. It occurs in a note written to Alexandrine, while absent on a visit, in answer to some inquiries which she had made. He tells her that he will be at home in a week, and will then answer her *viva voce*; but adds: "I will, nevertheless, make some general remarks this evening to quiet a little that activity of imagination which fatigues you so much. And, first, my dear child, do not be always putting this kind of questions to yourself: *What should I do—what should I feel—if God chose to ordain such and such things?* This habit is at once useless and dangerous. When you imagine, for instance, something that seems to you to contradict our ideas of God's goodness, you place your understanding and will in opposition to one another, and consequently in a false position. You cannot find a satisfactory solution, and it is only by setting aside some hypothesis not admissible that you can recover peace of mind. And, moreover, even granting these suppositions not to be altogether impossible, you should not dwell upon them when they imply the existence of extraordinary circumstances, which would call upon the will to make some exceedingly difficult effort. As I have often told you, the necessary graces are given us to do what God actually asks of us, and we must remain convinced that if we should be placed in extraordinary circumstances, as, for instance, in the case of martyrdom, God would then give us the strength we should stand in need of. If you would be at peace, my dear child, look on all these tormenting thoughts in the light of noxious creepers, which a good gardener roots up because they absorb the sap of the tree."

We quote also a "*Credo of Sorrow*" which the Abbé prepared for Alexandrine for her comfort, and to assist in guiding her

thoughts in the first sad days after her bereavement, and which she made great use of in her devotions ever after. "I believe, O my God, that in suffering with submission I help fill up the Passion of Christ. I believe that everything created in this world groaneth and travaileth as if in the pangs of labor, waiting for the manifestation of Christ. I believe that we have no continuing city, and that we seek one to come. I believe that all things work together for good to them that love God. I believe that they who sow in tears shall reap in joy. I believe that blessed are the dead that die in the Lord. I believe that our tribulation worketh in us an exceeding weight of glory, if we look not at what is seen but what is unseen: for the things we see are earthly, but the things we see not are Heavenly. I believe our corruptible body shall put on incorruption, that our mortality shall put on immortality, and that death shall be swallowed up in victory. I believe that God shall wipe away all tears from the eyes of the just, that there shall be no more death for them, neither sighing, and that there shall be no more pain, when the first earth shall pass away."

The Count de la Ferronnays himself, in writing of the Abbé to Pauline, says: "Our bright, kind, thoughtful, and comforting Abbé Gerbet introduces an unspeakable charm into our morning and evening conversations. With him science and metaphysics lose their dryness and asperity. Virtue preached by this excellent man penetrates the soul, fills the mind with light, and goes straight to the heart. * * * Oh! if our divine religion was always taught and explained as it is by this true Apostle, it would soon be universally received!"

We cannot refrain from one more extract from a letter written by the Count to his daughter at Lisbon: "Dear Pauline, how glorious faith is; how good it is to believe—to hope; and how beautiful death is when it opens the gates of eternal life. I do pity those who condemn themselves to live without faith, and to suffer, pine, and die without hope. I hear that you often have scruples and fears, but oh! my dear daughter, do not so wrong our good God or yourself. Why *I* am full of trust and hope—and if you only knew what *I* am!—if *you* are afraid, *I* ought to die in despair. Do not let us be appalled by those terrible threats which it is necessary to address to hard-

ened and impenitent sinners. We must thank God who wills to save us all, that He thus threatens those whom His love cannot soften, and who refuse to give Him their hearts. But when we are not of the number of the wilfully rebellious, when we believe and love, we have the right—and it even becomes a duty—to hope and expect every blessing from God, who is all love for faithful souls, and all mercy for those who offend Him. Believe me, do not listen to any teachers but such as speak of God with love, and to lead you to love Him; and avoid and fly from every one who would make you afraid of Him. But what business have I to be holding forth in this way? Forgive me, my dear child; I am like Gros Jean—preaching to his curé.”

The book abounds with interesting descriptions of the occupations of the young ladies of the family. Madame de la Ferronnays says, in one of her letters, that “they are doing more good than can be conceived” in the neighborhood; and we have the following account by Eugénie, written in a semi-humorous vein, of a sort of parish school which they had established. She says: “I have twenty-two scholars, and Olga as many. I teach them the catechism. I explain to them that the Blessed Trinity is God; and that the Holy Ghost is not a Saint like SS. Peter and Paul, an error to which they incline. I have a great ugly room with a Cross over the chimney-piece, and there I hold forth, and four times out of six it amuses me very much.”

In the village-church the family are all represented as making themselves of use in every way in their power. Eugénie played on the organ: and in the same humorous letter to Pauline, from which we have just quoted, she gives the following account of the manner in which she discharges her duties:—“And now to go on to something else. Ah, Madam, I thought so indeed! So in the wisdom of your scruples, you think you do not fulfill the precept of hearing Mass, if you are playing the organ all the time, and so help to kindle the fervor and devotion of others! Well, Madam, being better advised than you, I begin by raising my heart to God before Mass, and beg Him to accept my intention and to forgive all distractions. Then, when the Priest is at the foot of the Altar, and every-

body on their knees, I seat myself at the organ, and Mass goes on, as far as I am concerned, with no other means of offering up my worship, my self-abasement, my petitions, and the thousand wants of my soul, than the changes and modulations of the chords, which after all are a thousand times more expressive than any language in the world. I do not deny that I have a thousand distractions, but I recall my wandering thoughts, and remind Almighty God that my heart lies before Him, and I beg Him to pardon the infirmities of my mind. And, moreover, if I go to a second Mass, it is not a bit with the intention of making up for one imperfectly or not heard. And, to cut the matter short, it has been decided by the Church that those who play or sing during Mass, hear it in a proper manner, and we are not to think otherwise."

In the parish, too, these ladies occupied themselves with visiting the sick, and relieving the needy. "They sewed and they knit," and "made an enormous quantity of caps and petticoats" for the poor. Madame de la Ferronnays says that Alexandrine even "went so far as to prescribe for the sick!" "She rashly ordered a bread poultice the day before yesterday, and yesterday a mustard plaster!"

But it is not alone in serious duties that they are represented as occupying themselves. In the following extract from a letter of Madame de la Ferronnays to Pauline, we have a glimpse of a different phase of their life at Boury. She writes: "I had given Bertha [then a year old], on New Year's Day, an immense white dog—a toy—which she left here when she went to Paris. This dog goes from bed to bed and from room to room, and your sisters never seem to weary of the joke. They make it appear in all sorts of characters, and dress it up in all kinds of ways, and always with the same success. Two days ago, when I came to bed, I found it sitting before the fire, wrapped in a dressing gown, a shawl on its head, a pipe in its mouth, and a newspaper in its hand. Thanks to my sharp eyes [she was near-sighted], I thought at first it was your father! I was surprised that he did not move, and even felt frightened for a moment, but only just long enough for the joke. Yesterday evening, on going to bed, I saw a little hump-backed fairy sitting by my curtain, which made me start. It was *Sifflotte*—

the children's name for this famous dog—whom Olga had covered with a shawl, put a hood on his head, and her knitting in his paws. You see it is an endless source of fun, and poor dear Olga does not get tired of it. I do admire her for being so bright, so contented with her dull life, not even giving a thought to the amusements from which she is cut off, and which you all so enjoyed at the same age." On another occasion, M. Rio came to make them a visit with his English wife, and the young people brought the inevitable *Sifflotte* into play; setting him up at night in Madame Rio's room, with a book in his hand, and so had the pleasure of seeing her well frightened. We have accounts, also, of birth-day festivities, when the maid servants of the family came, dressed in white, and presented bouquets, and repeated verses which had been written by the village schoolmaster, while the people of the country around testified their interest in the occasion by firing a salute under their windows.

But we must reluctantly tear ourselves away from Boury, with scarce one additional word. We shall not attempt to describe the kind, considerate, loving mother who had moulded the character of these sons and daughters. Though differing widely in our religious faith, we bear willing testimony to the beauty of her Christian life, so free from all littleness and narrowness. A paragraph from one of her letters will show something of the spirit which animated her. She had been endeavoring to check the passionate enthusiasm with which Eugénie allowed herself to be absorbed in what she thought to be her religious duties, to the neglect of everything else, and says: "I am ready to acknowledge that I may be mistaken; but I have always thought it more perfect to make oneself all to all, and to prefer giving up some pious practice not of obligation, than to annoy or discourage those about us by going far beyond their capability. In short, never to lose sight of the great object of attracting others to the service of God, by making it appear sweet and pleasant to them."

We shall not attempt, either, to trace the story of the life of Eugénie—the self-forgetful and devoted Eugénie. In early life, her friends felt that she was too decided and uncompromising

in character. It was said of her, that "prayer, the love of God, and of the poor, and devotion to Alexandrine, formed the sum-total of her life; and she took no pains to conceal the fact that outside of this, the requirements of the world, and the people in it, did not seem to her worthy of the slightest notice." Madame de la Ferronnays said: "Eugénie brings forward her religious duties full front, even in the narrowest defiles, and seems always vexed when she is advised to practice the slightest prudence." But as years passed on, her character underwent such a change, and her interests and affections were so widened, that we find these lines of Lamartine applied to her by her sister:

"Sa voix argentine,
Echo limpide et pur de son âme enfantine,
Musique de cette âme où tout semblait chanter,
Egayait jusqu'à l'air qui l'entendait monter!"

In 1838 she married the son of that Marquis de Mun, who will be recognized by those who have read the "Memoirs of the Marquise de Montagu" [reviewed in the *New Englander*, July, 1871, p. 408] as one of the members of the family of the Comtesse de Tressé, in the days when they were all living as *émigrés* at Ploen and Witmold. After her marriage, the home of Eugénie was at Lumigny, near to Fontenay, where was the Château of Madame de Montagu, and the story of her life, as a wife and as a mother, is in no one respect less interesting or instructive than that of Alexandrine.

It is with regret too that we pass over the correspondence of these years—the letters of Alexandrine and of the other members of the family when they were absent from Boury and traveling in Germany and Italy;*—in particular the letters of Olga, while she was visiting, in Goritz (Illyria) her aunt, the Dutchess of

* Alexandrine says, in the letter in which she gives an account of her first glimpse of St. Peter's after entering Rome: "It was with the deepest emotion I saw St. Peter's again, feeling as I do now, that *I belong to it*." In her account of being present there, when the Pope said Mass, she says: "It touched me so much to look at him, and think I was now his child; and it was with a feeling of great joy that I knelt to receive a blessing from his hand. Then, at the elevation of the Mass said at St. Peter's Tomb, with what rapture I fell again on my knees amongst those poor English and other foreign ladies, who sat down all the time. Ah! if they only knew the intense gladness there is in a Catholic heart, they would perhaps make some efforts to become acquainted with our Faith."

Blacas, the faithful friend of the exiled royal family; and her descriptions of the family life there of the Duke and Dutchess of Angoulême "the Dauphin," or rather "the King and the Queen," as this loyal daughter of the Count de la Ferronnays calls them. We must pass over the letters, too, of the good Abbé Gerbet, and those of Count de Montalembert—with his account of his visit to Italy and of his pilgrimage with his wife to all the places which had become hallowed to him from their connection with his friend Albert. From the description, however, of his presentation to the Pope, we will make a single short extract. He had carried to His Holiness the January number of the *Université Catholique*, and showed to him a reply to the Abbé Lamennais, which it contained, written by the Abbé Gerbet. The Pope was so pleased with it that he read passages aloud to several persons, took it to his own room, and gave it finally to Cardinal Lambruschini. "Tell all this," he says, "to the silent Abbé, and if he is not turned into a tree in the park at Boury, I think it will interest him." In all his letters Montalembert complains that such a man as the Abbé has shut himself up in Boury. Tell him, he says: "It is not for Boury that he ought to be laboring, but for Paris and Rome, and that means the world." "The whole Church requires his services," and "has a right to them." Now that the Abbé Lamennais has assailed the Church, "all eyes are turned to him," and his Articles in reply are looked for in the *Université Catholique*. He complains that the pen of this eloquent scholar is so inactive, and says that "Boury is the bushel which covers and hides the light which God has given him to enlighten His Church."

At last, sad days of bereavement come to this happy and united family; and in quick succession we read of the death of the Count himself, of Eugénie, and then of Olga, of whom as yet we have hardly spoken. And, for that reason, we delay a moment that we may relate a few of the incidents of her sick room which will serve to illustrate the Christian spirit with which she endured her last sufferings.

We are told that one day when she had suffered more than usual, her sister kissed her with tears in her eyes, and said:

"Oh, poor child, how you suffer!" She replied that she had read that St. Bernard had once compared souls to precious stones, which are rough and dull unless they are cut, shaped, and chiselled; and she smiled and said: "We must let God cut us into shape." Another day she said: "I do not *like* pain, but I can understand that we must suffer. When the head is sick, the whole body suffers, and Jesus Christ is our Head." And on another occasion: "Every day I make a bouquet of my sufferings, and offer it to God for some one or other. I assure you I do not forget you or yours." And when the end came, nowhere have we seen the Christian spirit more beautifully illustrated than in her last words, "I believe, I love, I hope, I repent."

The Château de Boury seems now almost deserted. Its only inmates are Madame de la Ferronnays, her youngest daughter Albertine, and Alexandrine; and we are presented with a truly affecting picture of the efforts of these three loving women to comfort one another, and rise above the grief with which such a succession of bereavements had overwhelmed them. Alexandrine began to practice on the organ, and sometimes played the old familiar tunes till near midnight, feeling that she was thus soothing the sorrow of her mother; and Madame de la Ferronnays appeared to listen and to be pleased, thinking that Alexandrine was thus getting relief for herself. So the months succeeded one another, and all went on with the regularity of convent life. Madame de la Ferronnays wrote: "If the thought of God were not present to us in the midst of all our occupations, if He were not Himself the direct object of most of them, we should see nothing but death on every side of us. But He gives us strength to live; at least I hope so."

Meanwhile in these years a great change had been wrought in Alexandrine. We are told that her character, her mind, and her whole life, seemed to rise above earthly joys and consolations. She no longer had those seasons of depression, which she had such difficulty formerly in overcoming. She still thought of Albert and all the friends who were gone, and loved them with the same love, but "in a certain sense" we are told she ceased to grieve for them. Count de Montalembert

said of her "that she had now risen higher than grief." She felt that it was her work henceforth to comfort others.

We have not had the space to trace the growth of this new spirit. The strong desire had been for a long time springing up within her "of giving *all*," as it is expressed, to God. The account, in the Memoirs, of this phase of her religious experience is very brief, and ours must also necessarily be meagre; the biographer, her sister Pauline, evidently feeling that in what Alexandrine was prompted to do, "her fervor led her beyond what God required." Her spiritual director, the Abbé Gerbet, was now in the discharge of his duties removed far from her, and she had come under the influence of that remarkable person, Father de Ravignan. We need not delay here to give any description of this great orator and fascinating man. Some account of him may be found in a previous number of this journal (vol. xxix, p. 23, 1870). By his advice, she entered the "Catechumenate of the Congregation of the *Filles de Sion*." But, after spending some time there, she left it also with Father de Ravignan's advice. She wrote, January, 1845, to Pauline: "At this very moment I am returning to our dearest mother, to resume or rather to learn (*repandre ou plutôt apprendre*) my sweet path of Ruth." Pauline says: "When such a mistake has been made, not through excitement or pride, but from a simple excess of zeal, or love, the error should be humbly recognized, and the ordinary path resumed without hesitation or discouragement. It may happen that an increase of holiness and a greater facility in overcoming the obstacles of the road, show that in leaving it a while for a higher path, the soul has received no detriment, but on the contrary has in that circuitous way been brought nearer to its end." * * "Before Alexandrine went to make a trial of a religious life, the fear of not doing everything in God's service within her strength had become a continual anxiety, and she was only freed from this torment when experience had shown her the measure of her strength. It was, therefore, no doubt, as wise to allow her to make the trial, as it was prudent to put a stop to it before another step in that path—the highest of all, but to which she was not called—had injured her health, without profiting her soul." Alexandrine writes further to Pauline: "What does Augustus say about my

recent follies? I should certainly have died there by inches. Now my heart and pulse beat naturally again." Pauline says: "My judgment of Alexandrine was that she liked retirement, but had a natural repugnance to a cloistered life; and that to a certain point freedom of action and independence were as necessary to her spiritual and mental as to her physical well-being. She became convinced of this after that humble and earnest experiment, which obliged her to retrace her steps, but which did not in the least impede her ultimate progress. On her return to her home, and to what she called her parish duties, she set to work with more zeal and devotion than ever. She had loved the poor, as she had loved her God, from her childhood, but these two great loves had gone on increasing with her growth in Catholic faith, hope, and charity. And now she gave up to them everything she could give in this world, her thoughts, her time, her means, her health, and in the end her life."

Under this new impulse of devotion to others, and especially to the wretched and the needy, Alexandrine began now to give up everything for their sake. Her love for the poor became so strong that she even sought, as far as possible, to assimilate her condition to theirs. In her visits to them, she never allowed herself to be deterred either by heat, rain, fatigue, or distance. For them she deprived herself of all luxuries. She was not satisfied until every appearance of elegance was removed from her room, and it was made as bare as possible. She no longer cared for any of the things which she had formerly liked. Even the books which had always interested her were given up, and she read only "those in which God occupied the first if not the only place."

Much of her time was now spent in Paris, which Madame de la Ferronnays began to make her residence some part of every year; though she paid long visits to Baden, where Mr. Craven's diplomatic duties had carried her sister Pauline. But everywhere she gave herself up to what she now considered the business of her life, "with an ardor beyond her strength, and a generosity beyond her means."

Mrs. Craven says that "to meet the deficiencies in her resources, she gradually restricted her own expenditure to the

narrowest compass, and deprived herself of everything short of absolute necessities. One day I happened to look into her wardrobe, and was dismayed at its scantiness. When we any of us made this kind of discovery she blushed and smiled, made the best excuses she could find in return for our scolding, and then went on just the same, giving away all she possessed, and finding every day new occasions for these acts of self-spoliation. She had of course long ago sold or given away all her jewels and trinkets, but if she ever happened to find among her things an article of the smallest value, it was immediately disposed of for the benefit of the poor. For instance, one day she took out of its frame a beautiful miniature of the Princess Lapoukhyn at the age of twenty, and sold the gold and enamel frame, defending herself by saying that it was the only thing of value she still possessed, and did not in the least enhance the value of her mother's charming likeness. Two black gowns, and a barely sufficient amount of linen, constituted her wardrobe, so that she had reduced herself, as far as was possible in her position in life, to a state of actual poverty. Her long errands were almost always performed on foot, and at dinner-time she came home often covered with dirt and wet to the skin. One day, when she was visiting some Sisters of Charity in a distant part of Paris, one of them looked at her from head to foot; and then begged an alms for a poor woman much in need of a pair of shoes. Alexandrine instantly produced her purse, and gave the required amount, with which the Sister went away, and in a quarter of an hour returned, laughing and bringing with her a pair of shoes, which she insisted on Madame Albert's putting on instead of those she was wearing, which were certainly in the worst possible condition."

So interested in her work had Alexandrine become that she now carried out a plan which she had for some time entertained, but which she had thus far refrained from executing, in deference to the feelings of her friends. Having at last obtained their reluctant consent, she took a room in a convent, where she could have a home at those seasons of the year in which her friends were absent from the city, and thus continue her labors without any intermission.

Now, at last, "alone in Paris, and without any family or social duties to perform, she gave full scope to her charitable zeal." At all hours, and in all weathers, this daughter of the Princess Lapoukhyn, once so distinguished for the elegance of her dress and the elaborateness of her toilet, went out on foot, and often returned shivering and wet to the skin, to a room where to save the expense of fuel she would not allow a fire to be kept up during her absence. Her food also was very different from the living to which she had been accustomed. What wonder is it that her health suffered! "One morning at Mass in the convent Chapel, a lady happened to hear her cough, and noticing her pale looks and poor apparel, she went to one of the Sisters, and told her that there was a lady in the Church who was probably too poor to provide herself with necessaries, and that she should be very happy to supply her with milk daily, if she had not the means of purchasing it. This kind soul was quite ashamed when the Sister told her that the poor lady was Madame Albert de la Ferronnays; but Alexandrine, much amused, laughed exceedingly at the mistake, and did not treat herself better than before."

On the sixth of January, 1848, in spite of the cold, and though very unwell, she persisted in going to the Chapel of the Convent to hear Mass, and receive Communion. On returning to her room, she was obliged to lie down immediately; and it soon became evident that the end was fast approaching. She lingered for two days, and these last hours all afford fresh illustration of the sincerity and beauty of her Christian character, her love for her friends, and her thoughtfulness of all around her. But we will not attempt to relate the interesting particulars. She was continually inquiring "how long she would last;" and when she was told "perhaps a few days," she replied with regret: "Then I shall not see God to-day." She asked, as her last request, that "she might be buried like the poor;" and then on the morning of Feb. 9th, 1848, with one last loving message to the sister of Albert—"Let Pauline know how very sweet it is to die"—she passed away.

ARTICLE VI.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

PHILOSOPHICAL.

JOWETT'S DIALOGUES OF PLATO.*—"It might very well be thought serious trifling to tell my readers, that the greatest men had ever a high esteem for Plato; whose writings are the touchstone of a hasty and shallow mind; whose philosophy has been the admiration of ages; which supplied patriots, magistrates, and lawgivers to the most flourishing States, as well as fathers to the church, and doctors to the schools." Thus writes in his "Siris" the excellent Bp. Berkeley, who was so fond of Plato as to be represented as leaning upon a volume of his works, in the portrait by Smibert, and who has produced in his *Minute Philosopher* the most successful imitation of the Platonic dialogue which English literature can show. We can easily believe that it was almost with a sigh that he added: "Albeit in these days the depths of that old learning are rarely fathomed, and yet it were happy for these lands if our young nobility and gentry, instead of modern maxims, would imbibe the notions of antiquity." It would seem that Berkeley was in his earlier manhood almost the only loving and appreciative student of Plato in all England, and when he left the country he brought with him his Platonic tastes and continued his Platonic studies upon the shores of the Narragansett. We can readily believe that he reflected with no little sadness upon the increased degeneracy of the times which showed little promise of a return to more elevating studies. Could Berkeley have looked forward to the better times which were to follow, he would have found comfort in the prospect that the century after his death would find Germany and France and England moved with enthusiastic interest for his favorite philosopher, and excellent translations of all his works composed by writers so eminent as Schleiermacher, Cousin, and Jowett. Indeed, it is no slight credit to the scholarship and culture of England that within a single decade

* *The Dialogues of Plato*. Translated into English, with Analyses and Introductions. By B. JOWETT, M.A., Master of Balliol College, Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Oxford. In four volumes. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1871.

Grote's *Analysis* and Jowett's *Translation* of the *Platonic Dialogues* should both have appeared.

To the scholar and the general reader this translation of Jowett is an especially valuable gift. Whatever exception may be taken to his minute accuracy or his critical sagacity in respect to particular points, no one will deny that his scholarship is sufficient to qualify him for his undertaking. His knowledge of the original Greek and his study of all the helps both earlier and later are both unquestioned. Besides these indispensable requisites to success, he possesses others which have rarely been found in any translator, and which are of especial value to the translator of Plato. These are the rare clearness, fluency, and energy of his English style, his penetrating common sense and the complete mastery of the aims and spirit of the writer whom he interprets. There can, we think, be no question, that Plato has never been rendered so well by any translator of a single dialogue. When we consider the spirit and success with which the whole work has been executed, we cannot but express our admiration for the genius which the author has exhibited.

The Introductions are all carefully elaborated. We observe in all of them a careful analysis of the train of thought in the several dialogues, full comparative references to other dialogues, frequent incidental expositions of the doctrines taught by Plato considered by themselves and in their relations to the teachings of other philosophers both ancient and modern, and often a brief but spirited exposition of the conclusions which Professor Jowett himself has reached in the light of the most recent researches and discussions. We dare not say that Professor Jowett has always gone to the bottom, or that his opinions are to be accepted without revision; but we can affirm that he has brought to the examination of every subject an earnest sympathy with the author, a willingness to look at every question from his stand-point, and to let him think and speak for himself. In this respect Jowett's handling and method are far superior to those of the very learned Mr. Grote, who, in his *Analysis of Plato's Dialogues*, persistently looks at and judges of his opinions from the general point of view attained by modern speculation, and from the special conclusions adopted by Mr. Grote himself—conclusions which in their general characteristics are most widely removed from those of the Platonic school. We would not depreciate unduly the value of Mr. Grote's elaborate work. We do not regard it as in any sense superseded by

the Translation and Introductions of Jowett. To the philosopher especially, the severe and often chilling criticisms of the sensuous associationalist are always instructive, even though they are rarely convincing, and for this reason he will never be able to dispense with his analyses. But by the general student the work of Jowett will invariably be preferred.

We observe that many critics of this work have taken occasion to remark that it was a happy thing for modern students that they possess a version of Plato which will deliver them from the necessity of reading him in the original. We would draw the opposite inference, and would rather conclude that the liberal use of this translation will awaken the desire in not a few of our scholars to read Plato freely and familiarly in his own language. It might reasonably be inferred that a writer who is capable of being translated into such flowing and spirited English, must be incomparable when read in the facile and subtle Greek. No single Greek author is capable of being mastered more readily by a persevering course of continuous and current reading. None is so well worth the mastering for the intense and various pleasure which he imparts. The Greek of Plato ought not to be deemed more insurmountable than the German of Goethe or of Lessing. We cannot but hope that the not few students who may be allured to read Plato by the spirited and felicitous translations of Jowett, will not be content till they have acquired the power to read Plato in Plato's own tongue.

PORTER'S ELEMENTS OF INTELLECTUAL SCIENCE.*—The main principles and illustrations of President Porter's larger work are compressed into this volume of 556 pages, which is provided with a full index. In this abridged form, the work is better adapted for the uses of the class-room in academies and in most colleges. It will serve also as an introduction, preparing the way for the more copious and detailed discussions of "the Human Intellect." This manual deserves to be generally adopted, and probably will be generally adopted, as a text book in the branch of Intellectual Philosophy. The important discussions bearing closely on theology, in the larger book, are wisely retained in the abridgment.

* *The Elements of Intellectual Science.* A manual for Schools and Colleges. Abridged from the "Human Intellect." By NOAH PORTER, D.D., LL.D., President of Yale College. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1871.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

AUGUSTINE'S CITY OF GOD.*—Messrs. Clark of Edinburgh, having finished the publication of the Ante-Nicene writers, have undertaken to publish translations of some of the principal writings of Augustine, the greatest name in the history of Latin Christianity, the father of Scholasticism and of the Reformation too, and not less influential in founding the hierarchical system of the Latin Church. The series begins appropriately with the City of God—the *Civitas Dei*. It ranks with Origen's work against Celsus, at the head of the apologetic literature of the ancient Church. It is the first deliberate attempt among Christian writers to set forth the philosophy of history. It was composed on account of the accusations of the heathen, that the calamities of the Roman Empire had arisen from the wrath of the Divinities, at the desertion of their worship and at the reception of Christianity. But it goes beyond its immediate object, and involves a discussion of the fundamental principles of the Christian religion. It is the one work of this Father, equally fervid and philosophical, which is of interest to minds not caring specially for theology. Its eloquent pages have attracted the admiration of the general scholar, not less than of the divine. The translation seems to be well executed, and forms a worthy introduction to the series. The recent translations of Latin and Greek authors, if they fall behind the old versions in racy, idiomatic phraseology, have the cardinal merit of being founded on a better philology.

DORNER'S HISTORY OF PROTESTANT THEOLOGY.†—This is a poor translation of a good book. Dorner is best known through his great monograph on the history of the doctrine of the person of Christ. But this work on Protestant theology is the product of thorough studies and is quite valuable. As the title indicates, it deals principally with theology in Germany, although Holland, England, and other countries are not left unnoticed. In the first volume the gradual development of

* *The City of God*. Translated by the Rev. MARCUS DODS, M.A. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 2 vols. New York: Chas. Scribner & Co.

† *History of Protestant Theology, particularly in Germany*, viewed according to its fundamental movement, and in connection with the religious, moral, and intellectual life. By Dr. J. A. DORNER, Ober-consistorialrath, &c., &c. Translated by the Rev. George Dobson and Sophia Taylor, with a preface to the translation by the Author. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York: C. Scribner & Co. 1871. 2 vols.

Luther's own theology is set forth through an analysis of some of his principal writings, taken in chronological order. The relations of Calvinistic to Lutheran theology are the subject of a perspicuous discussion. More modern theology, as that of Schleiermacher and his school, and the systems connected with the recent philosophers, as Kant, Schelling, Hegel, is well described. We regret that the translation is so defective and inelegant. The Scottish mind is not linguistic; if it were, men would learn the German language, even in the process of translating one of these volumes. The very title-page is made unintelligible; besides that the term "ober-consistorialrath" is left untranslated for the reason, apparently, that Mr. Dobson did not know that it means "Member of the Upper Consistory." Dorner's graceful preface is printed in German, but is horribly mangled in the translation. It makes him say: "I will [*will* for *shall*] always, as I perceive, have at least to share in bearing the responsibility of so introducing it, and of this translation (which I have sanctioned without being in a position to undertake any control in connection with it), as well as of the venturous act of this preface." This is a favorable specimen of the style which the translators have adopted. In many cases it is only by conjecturing what the original was, that we can arrive at any sense. The explanatory notes of the translators are ludicrous for their misunderstanding of the author's meaning. For example, Dorner (p. 18) makes a fine remark on the excessive esteem of orthodoxy in the Greek Church, as if right character necessarily resulted from right opinions. "This," he says, "is the Greek form of determinism,"—i. e., of philosophical necessity, the fixed relation of choice to antecedents. The translator favors us with this note: "'Determinismus' is the technical name for a theory of the way in which the religious and moral action of man is determined." Verily, a clear and profound definition! The Messrs. Clark should do by Dorner's work what they did in the case of Müller's *Treatise on Sin*,—have the work translated anew by persons more competent.

BARNUM'S EXPOSITION OF ROMANISM.*—The titles of the chapters in this work are, "The city of Rome and its connections;"

* *Romanism as it is*; an exposition of the Roman Catholic System for the American people, &c., &c., the whole drawn from official and authentic sources. By Rev. SAMUEL W. BARNUM, Editor of the Comprehensive Dictionary of the Bible. Hartford, Conn.: Conn. Publishing Co. 1871.

"General view of the Roman Catholic Church system;" "The Popes and their Sovereignty;" "The Pope's allocutions, bulls, and other official communications;" "The Cardinals and the Roman Court;" "Ecumenical Councils;" etc., etc. It aims, in short, to exhibit the Roman Catholic Church from authentic sources, with many quotations from documents, yet in a popular and interesting style. The author is an accurate and conscientious writer. He has not composed a tirade against Romanism or attempted to excite the passions of men against it; but has rather designed to state facts which are drawn from Catholic as well as Protestant sources. As a book for popular circulation, it is valuable. The full index renders it easy to consult its pages on any particular topic, and at the same time shows how great a variety of information is introduced into the volume. The type and paper are excellent. The wood cuts are correct, but ugly.

LANGE ON THE GOSPEL OF JOHN.*—The readers of the *New Englander* have had the volumes of this Commentary so frequently introduced to them by us, that we need only to call their attention to the fact that a new part of the work has now appeared—the Commentary on the Gospel of John. This volume is edited by Dr. Schaff himself, though the work of translation, and, thus, the fundamental part of the preparation of it, was done by the late Dr. Edward D. Yeomans and by Miss E. Moore. Dr. Schaff has added much from his own lectures and annotations, and has, thus, given to it the impress of his own scholarship. We are glad to see that Dr. Schaff, with all his commendation of Lange, acknowledges in this volume that "he has often sorely tried his patience." This is just what he has done to our patience in other parts of his commentary. It was Daniel Webster, we believe, who said that his great rule of criticism with reference to his own performances was, "Strike out!" The application of this excellent rule to Dr. Lange's works would have saved, perhaps, one half of the labor of preparing the translation for the press,

* *A Commentary on the Holy Scriptures: Critical, Doctrinal, and Homiletical*, with special reference to Ministers and Students. By JOHN PETER LANGE, D.D., assisted by a number of eminent European Divines. Translated from the German, revised, enlarged, and edited, by PHILIP SCHAFF, D.D., in connection with American Scholars of various Evangelical Denominations. Vol. III of the New Testament; containing the Gospel of John. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1871. 8vo, pp. 654.

and one half of the expense of the volume to the purchasers. Dr. Schaff's remark, that, in his opinion, Lange "has dug more gold and silver from the mine of this Gospel than any single commentator before him," is one with which we cannot agree, and we do not believe that those who use the commentary will agree with him. In our view, Dr. Lange is decidedly a second rate commentator, and is destitute of some of those qualities which are of the highest importance in a writer on this part of the New Testament.

For Dr. Schaff's own work in the preparation of this volume, as of the others, so far as he has edited them, we give, most cheerfully, our word of commendation. The volume before us contains much from his pen that is valuable.

COMMENTARIES BY DR. HALL AND DR. WHEDON.*—These two volumes, which we introduce to our readers together, are intended for the same uses in two different departments of the church. The one by Dr. Hall, embracing notes on the Gospels of Matthew and Mark, is designed for the Sunday School teachers and other members of the Episcopal denomination, while that by Dr. Whedon is prepared for his brethren of the Methodist body. They both belong to the class of commentaries which, in the Presbyterian denomination, are represented by the Notes of the Rev. Albert Barnes. The two authors are already known, more or less widely,—Dr. Hall's book having reached its second edition, after an interval of some years since its first publication, and Dr. Whedon having already written volumes of corresponding size and character on the earlier portions of the New Testament. Commentaries of this class are not usually very profound and are not intended to be so, but they serve a very useful purpose. They will not, ordinarily, circulate very much beyond the circle of Christians who are connected by church sympathies with their authors. We presume, therefore, that these two volumes will not be extensively used by Presbyterians and Congregationalists. They seem to be carefully written and to give evidence of study.

* *Notes, Practical and Expository, on the Gospels*; for the use of Bible Classes, Sunday School Teachers, Catechists and Other Pious Laymen. By Rev. CHARLES H. HALL, D.D., Rector of the Church of the Holy Trinity, Brooklyn, N. Y. In Two Volumes. Vol. I. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1871. 12mo, pp. 429.

Commentary on the New Testament. Intended for Popular Use. By D. D. WHEDON, LL.D. Vol. III. Acts—ROMANS. New York: Carlton & Lanahan. 1871. 12mo, pp. 402.

Dr. Whedon is quite prominent in his own church, and his books contain the views and arguments of his church in the case of controverted passages. His commentary on the Epistle to the Romans has the merit of brevity—if that be a merit—as well of clearness of statement. He has evidently examined the Epistle with care, and has considered the views of able modern writers. Dr. Hall's volume will be of service to those who use it.

DIATESSARON.*—This little volume, by Rev. Dr. Gardiner, who has recently become known to the public through his "Harmonies of the Gospels" in Greek and English, is a Life of Christ in the language of the New Testament. It is, in other words, a presentation of the history of Jesus' life in a connected and continuous form, by arranging the Gospel narratives in the order which the plan of the Harmonies would suggest. The book is, of course, an unpretending one, but it will be found very convenient for all who wish to have the story thus before their eyes, and to find the parts of the narrative, which are given by the different Evangelists, located in their proper place and order as related to one another. The author has deviated from the ordinary text, and from the language of the English version, only in rare instances, and where a change seemed to be clearly required.

MEMORIES OF PATMOS.†—The name of the author is itself a guaranty for the spirit and the readableness of this book. It is a series of fervent and devout meditations, twenty-five in number, on the Apocalypse, and these are grouped in three parts:—"the things seen, or the opening vision, with Christ's charges to the seven churches,"—"the things which are," or Christ with his Church universal on earth,"—and—"the things which shall be hereafter," or Christ in heaven ruling his Church militant and triumphant." The preface shows the limits which the author has prescribed to himself, from reverence as well as caution. He expressly disclaims "the design of becoming a volunteer in the ranks of prognosticators and soothsayers," and still more "of claiming

* *Diatessaron. The Life of our Lord; in the words of the Gospels.* By FREDERICK GARDINER, D.D., Professor in the Berkeley Divinity School. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1871. 16mo, pp. 259.

† *Memories of Patmos; or some of the great words and visions of the Apocalypse.* By J. R. MACDUFF, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1871. 12mo, pp. 353.

the ultimate solution and fulfillment of any part of the ambiguous symbolism of the Book in those tragic events which, while the present pages are passing through the press, have been convulsing the nations." "He undertakes to expound or defend formally and systematically no one of the varied prophetic theories, be they 'historical,' 'preterist' or 'futurist,' which divide apocalyptic expositors." Yet he finds, in the descriptions and testimonies furnished by the Revelator's visions, enough less debatable materials for edifying thought and for encouragement to all believers. "The great words and visions" selected are "mainly from the opening and closing chapters." Without being in the form of a commentary, the work shows careful study of the language, with the use of approved recent helps. The style is animated, and the method fitted to arrest attention and leave salutary impressions.—We notice on p. 44 the phrase, "*In their midst*," which (as also "*our midst*") has been complained of as an Americanism. Worcester gives it as "of recent introduction," but cites *Ec. Rev.* and J. Montgomery for authorities.

THE SEALS OPENED.*—The author takes the ground that the Apocalypse was written by John the Apostle, near the end of his life and after the overthrow of Jerusalem. His summary of the arguments in support of these positions is brief, but clear and forcible. He adopts the general plan of interpretation which has been more commonly received by evangelical commentators, following Newman and Newton; but does not attempt to determine the events foretold so minutely as some of his predecessors. He supposes the opening of the seven seals to foretell the progress of Christianity and the persecutions attending it to the time of Constantine; the seventh seal, however, indicates in brief all that the trumpets more fully disclose, and declares the final triumph of the Church. The trumpets foretell the overthrow of the Eastern and Western Empire, the rise and conquests of the Mohammedan power, and the corruption of the Church under the Papacy. The two witnesses, prophesying in sackcloth, are the faithful in the dark ages; their death is the seeming triumph of the Romish Church in suppressing their testimony; their resurrection is the Protestant Reformation. In respect to the three days (years)

* *The Seals Opened*; or, the Apocalypse explained. By ENOCH POND, D.D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Bangor. Portland: Hoyt, Fogg, and Breed. 1871. 16mo, pp. 240, with a portrait of the author.

and a half during which they lay unburied, the author says that in 1513, at the 9th Session of the Council of the Lateran, and three years and a half before Luther commenced his attack on indulgences, a remarkable proclamation was made, that all opposition to the papal rule had ceased. The trumpets, like the seals, extend to the Millennial triumph of the Church. They are supplemented by the seven vials, and some other symbols, referring more particularly to the later events preceding that triumph; such are the development of that type of thought and action of which the French Revolution is an exponent, the decadence of the Turkish and Mohammedan power, and the overthrow of the Papacy. In the closing chapters the Millennial prosperity of the Church is foretold.

The vision of the mighty angel, in the tenth chapter, is regarded as an episode. His proclamation, "that there should be time no longer," is translated "that the time shall not be yet." This is designed to correct the error, which has from time to time appeared, that Christ's coming was to be premillennial and in connection with the wants set forth in those visions.

We do not open a new volume on the Apocalypse with sanguine expectations. Those who have studied previous commentaries on this difficult part of the Bible will probably not find in this volume much new light on the difficulties which they have already encountered. But all who wish for a clear and concise presentation of the interpretation more commonly given by devout evangelical commentators, will find this little volume admirably adapted to their wants. It is not intended to be a critical commentary; it is not encumbered with learned discussions. It is a straightforward exposition of the author's views of the meaning of the book and of his reasons for them; is written in a perspicuous style, easy and agreeable to read; and is pervaded by a devout and reverential spirit, as would be expected from its venerable author.

It is published simultaneously in this country and in Great Britain.

MEDIATION,* by an anonymous author, is a single chapter from an unfinished work, to be entitled "Thoughts on the Mediator; or the relation of Christ to the World." When complete it will be preceded by an Introductory chapter, and followed by another

* *Mediation. The Function of Thought.* Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1871.

on the Divine Being, and still another on the Occasion for Mediation. This chapter is published tentatively to ascertain whether the course of thought in the volume will meet the wants of others sufficiently to make it worth while to complete the discussion.

We have looked through the volume with some care, and have been struck by the marks of originality and freshness which it exhibits. Though the work is small in compass, it contains the results of careful reading and discriminating thought upon a great variety of the most important topics. Upon the æsthetic and emotional side there are some striking criticisms, and not a few passages which are rarely felicitous in imagery and diction. We do not always follow the author in the points which he makes nor do we always accept his distinctions, but we never lose our respect for his candor, his comprehensiveness, and his freshness. We trust he may be induced to complete the treatises.

PRESIDENT WOOLSEY'S SERMONS.*—Among all our readers there can be no need of any other recommendation than the name of the recent President of Yale College, for these two discourses preached by him in the Chapel, in connection with his retiring from the post he has so long honored. It is enough to say that in thought and style they are characteristic of the writer, and are issued in a becoming form.

ARNOT'S "PARABLES OF OUR LORD."†—As the Scriptures generally have never been so industriously explored and unfolded as now, for the benefit of common readers, so the Parables come in for their share of devout and critical attention. And this volume may be safely commended as one of the most valuable in this department. Mr. Arnot is a prominent Presbyterian clergyman in Scotland, already well-known in some quarters by other useful works. He writes for the Christian community at large, yet from the resources of study and experience. If he has not all the grace of style with which Trench has treated the same subject, and does not introduce as much patristic and other lore, yet as an expositor he is not less studious, judicious, and reverent, and will be the

* *Serving our Generation, and God's Guidance in Youth.* Two Sermons preached in the College Chapel, Yale College, by PRESIDENT WOOLSEY. New Haven, Conn.: Charles C. Chatfield & Co. 1871. 12mo, pp. 51.

† *Parables of our Lord.* By the Rev. WILLIAM ARNOT. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1872. 12mo, pp. 00.

more acceptable, except to the devotees of ecclesiasticism, for not making so much account of the *churchly* element. The first sixteen pages are occupied with an introduction discussing the nature of analogy, of parables as a mode of instruction, of the Lord's parables, and of the requisites for their interpretation. The work is a solid addition to evangelical literature in this department.

THE MISSION OF THE SPIRIT.*—We have no previous knowledge of the author of this work, and can only conjecture which "branch" of the Church he belongs to from the date of the preface at "St. Paul's Parsonage, Elizabeth, N. J." This circumstance led us to look for, but without finding, indications of "exclusive churchmanship" in the treatment of a subject so eminently spiritual. It is an earnest presentation of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, as not having had its proper place, and now especially needed in Christian literature. The Personality and Godhead of the Spirit being the subject of the first chapter, others follow on his relation to Christ's work and to the Scriptures, and his offices to mankind, especially to believers. Without claiming originality or subtlety of thought, the views held are fervent, and in the main scriptural. He ardently maintains the Wesleyan doctrine of "the witness of the Spirit," as giving assurance of "present" thought not of "eternal salvation" (p. 135). The great hope of the Church respects, in his view, a more abundant effusion of the Spirit, rather than, as an increasing number think, Christ's personal coming. "We are living," he says, "in the very midst of its culminating glories." "The rushing fires of another Pentecost are coming upon the Church now, as they have not during the centuries preceding the one in which we live" (Preface). Therein he is certainly more sanguine for the times than most of us. The style is here and there florid or declamatory to a degree more allowable for the utterance of the pulpit than for the printed page,—as in the opening of the fourth sentence in the Preface,—“Or ever his triumphal chariot, &c.,” and on p. 280, “the trumpet-blast—reverberated from the chalky cliffs of Britain's isles,” &c. To use the verb “substitute” as alone equivalent to the whole phrase “supply the place of,” as on p. 264, is unauthorized. We agree with the author that the subject demands now renewed attention. The

* *The Mission of the Spirit*; or the Office and Work of the Comforter in Human Redemption. By Rev. L. R. DUNN. New York: Carlton and Lanahan. 1871-12mo, pp. 303.

spirit of his book is excellent, especially for its animation and hopefulness. It is enriched also by the Latin copy of the eleventh century Hymn, "Veni Sancte Spiritus," with Dr. Coles' translation, at the beginning, and the "Veni Creator Spiritus," with a translation from the same hand, at the end. The mechanical execution of the volume is attractive.

GOD'S RESCUES.*—We have heard that some years ago a prominent clergyman of New York, on being asked whom he would rank first among his brethren of that city, of all denominations, answered, that for one good quality he might single out one, and for another quality another, and so on, giving several names, but for the happiest combination of all the virtues, gifts, and attainments wanted in a Christian minister, he should not hesitate to put William R. Williams at the head. Be this as it may, his name will recommend all that comes from his pen, and this little volume is characteristic of his mind and heart. It is made up of thoughtful and practical meditations on the three parables named, bearing throughout the marks of his scholarly culture, careful discrimination, and devout spirit. The style, as in all that we have seen of his writings, is remarkable for delicacy of delineation and affluence of diction. In the first of the three discourses, and in a concluding note, the parables are distinguished as referring to the different persons of the Trinity; that of the Lost Sheep setting forth the work of the Son, of the Coin that of the Spirit, and of the Prodigal that of the Father. A similar view is named, though not made so prominent, by Trench on the second Parable, in connection with the interpretation which supposes the woman searching for the coin to represent the Church. We might hesitate to admit this distinction as answering to the Trinity, or to make it of so much account. In connection with the rhetorical merit conceded to Dr. Williams, we might speak of a certain scholarly, not to say scholastic, quality of his style as sometimes impairing the best popular effect. The mechanical appearance of the volume comports with the sacredness of the theme and the beauty of the contents, fitting it for a gift of Christian friendship.

* *God's Rescues*: or, the Lost Sheep, the Lost Coin, and the Lost Son. Three Discourses on Luke XV. By WILLIAM R. WILLIAMS. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1871. 12mo, pp. 95.

THE LORD'S PRAYER.*—Another beautiful volume treating of the several clauses of the Lord's Prayer in eight successive chapters, with an Introduction setting forth its place and use as "both a form and a model." It might be superfluous to pronounce anything from Dr. Van Dyke's pen "orthodox." We will, therefore, rather say, that we have here a considerate, reverent, and engaging presentation of the ever-recurring, never-wearying theme, with as much of the literature of the subject as can be asked for within the compass, and judicious answers to the practical questions which the several petitions have suggested. The last chapter candidly discusses the genuineness of the doxology as "an open controversy," on the whole modestly favoring the continued use of the clause. In respect to matter and style, the author has taken due pains, and successfully, we think, to aid the devotions of Christians, through this hallowed form, in the family and sanctuary.

REGENERATION IN BAPTISM.†—This work, which is dedicated to Bishop Whittingham, of Maryland, and written at his suggestion and by his advice, is a defense of the doctrine contained in its title as held by the Episcopal Church—or, as the author, with the quiet assumption characteristic of his denomination, expresses it, by the Church. The writer of the book is Dr. Adams, of an Episcopal Theological Seminary in Wisconsin, and the treatise, which he has prepared, gives evidence of a good deal of reading, at least in certain lines, as well as of care in the presentation of the subject. The volume is designed, especially, for those within the Episcopal communion. Its object is to explain what is meant by Baptismal Regeneration, so that the members of the church may intelligently accept it as a foundation doctrine of their faith. The author sets forth his design as not being controversy but exposition. He, thus, avoids all offensive methods and limits himself to the defensive. The reader may, therefore, turn to the volume as a full and free presentation, if not, in the strict sense, an authoritative one, of this doctrine, by one of its hearty advocates. The plan of the book includes, first, a general laying out of the whole subject in an introductory chapter, in which the different theories of different

* *The Lord's Prayer.* By HENRY J. VAN DYKE, D.D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1871. 12mo, pp. 194.

† *A New Treatise upon Regeneration in Baptism.* By WILLIAM ADAMS, D.D., Professor of Systematic Divinity in Nashotah Theological Seminary, Wisconsin. The Church Press: M. H. Mallory & Co. Hartford, 1871. 8vo, pp. 384.

churches are given and explained. After this general preparation, the author goes on to show that the doctrine in question is contained in the Articles and Standards of the Episcopal Church, and that all who accept and subscribe to those standards are under obligation sincerely to uphold it. In this portion of his work, Dr. Adams is very minute, devoting chapters to the examination of each of the standards—considering the Book of Common Prayer, the Catechism, the Nicene Creed, and the Articles, in all of which he finds testimony to the same purport. He then enters into a long examination of what he calls the Practical Truth and Fact—discussing the matter more after the manner and in the line of a doctrinal theologian. And, finally, he takes up the exegetical side of the question, and investigates the true meaning of the several passages of the Scriptures, where, as he conceives, the doctrine is set forth. It will be seen from this brief review of the contents and aim of the book, that it is intended to be a thorough and exhaustive treatise. We do not apprehend that the author will convince our readers, should they become his readers, that their former views were erroneous. But to all who desire to see the most recent treatise put forth in advocacy of this doctrine, which lies at the very basis of the difference between our own church and the Church of England, this volume will be interesting.

1

BIOGRAPHICAL.

LIFE OF L. W. GREEN.*—Dr. Lewis W. Green, whose biography is given to the public in this volume, was a man of note in the portion of the country where he lived. He was born in Kentucky, near the town of Danville, in the year 1806. The child of Christian parents, he was early impressed with religious truth, and, though in his youth he was exposed to many unfavorable influences, the teachings of childhood retained a firm hold upon his mind and conscience. With deep convictions that he was called to the ministry of the Gospel, he resisted the allurements to the other professions, which in the region of his home were peculiarly great, as well as the persuasions of friends who predicted for him an honorable career in the service of the state. He came

* *Memoir of the Life and Character of Rev. Lewis Warner Green, D.D.*, with a Selection from his Sermons. By LEROY J. HALSEY, D.D., Professor in the Theological Seminary of the Northwest. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1871. 12mo, pp. 491.

to Yale College to commence his preparation for the ministerial work. But, after remaining here for a short period, he entered the Theological Seminary at Princeton. Before closing his studies at the latter institution, he was called to a professorship in Centre College, where he had graduated. This call he accepted. Subsequently he was licensed to preach and ordained, but he declined all solicitations to accept the pastorate of a church. This he did, not from any failing of interest in or inclination toward the duties of the pastoral office, but because the Providential summons seemed to his mind to be in another direction. His destiny was to be an educator. Calls came to him from various quarters, and, in the course of his life, he was either a professor or the presiding officer in several collegiate institutions and theological seminaries. Everywhere he seems to have had great success as an instructor, a disciplinarian, and an organizer. The testimonies given by his pupils and acquaintance represent him as remarkably well adapted to influence the minds of the young. For a period of one or two years, he laid down his collegiate work, and became the minister of a church in Baltimore. But his reputation as a teacher had become so great that he was not suffered to remain in that position. His last years were spent in his native state, in the Presidency of Transylvania University and Centre College. The breaking out of the war, in 1861, disappointed his hopes for those institutions and saddened his closing life. He was a gentle spirit in the midst of the contentions of the border land between the North and the South. He did everything to calm the strife, and waited for a better and brighter day. In the darkest time of the conflict—when all was most uncertain—he passed away, on the 26th of May, 1863. But little known in the eastern States, he was a useful and an honored man in the west and south. His friend, the biographer, has rendered a kindly service in perpetuating his memory to a later time, by recording the story of his life in this pleasant volume. Quite a number of Dr. Green's sermons are inserted in the book—following the biography. They will give the reader an idea of the style and character of his pulpit efforts.

BIOGRAPHY OF DR. GEORGE JUNKIN.*—Dr. George Junkin was a man of so much prominence as a representative of the Old

* *The Reverend George Junkin, D.D., LL.D. A Historical Biography.* By D. X. JUNKIN, D.D. "Not slothful in business; fervent in spirit; serving the Lord." Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1871. 12mo, pp. 609.

School section of the Presbyterian Church, that the story of his life, of necessity, includes the story of some of the conspicuous actions and events of that part of the Church. The two things in which this distinguished gentleman became a leader of his party, were the great movement which resulted in the division of the Presbyterian body, and the agitation connected with the subject of slavery. The writer of the biography attempts to sustain and defend the action of his brother in reference to both of these matters. He has been as successful in this attempt as the possibilities of the case would allow. At this late period, it is no easy undertaking to paint in very attractive colors the trial and condemnation of Albert Barnes, or the violent course of those who drove him and his associates out of the synagogue. The less the public attention is called to a review of that crisis in the history of Presbyterianism, the better it will be for the good fame of those who sided with Dr. Junkin. It is a little remarkable—though not altogether unnatural—that, just as the new-born harmony of the reunited denomination is becoming a subject of much satisfaction and thankfulness, the advocates of the narrow views, which are professedly laid aside, or widened, or bidden to keep silence, should come forward with a glorification of the old combatants on their side of the question. Reunion and universal good feeling are excellent things, but, as they begin to be realized, it seems to be desirable that the right and wrong of the original disruption should be brought out clearly—so such men are apt to think, in all such cases. We agree to receive you into our fellowship again, they say to the opposite party—we agree to give up the discussion of the old points for the present—but—do not forget that our party was right in the past controversy. Those sainted fathers and elder brothers of ours did not err or sin in the well-remembered crisis. The wrong was with your fathers. With this admitted, we will generously forgive them, as they are mostly out of this world, and as the controversy is as far from present scenes as they are. We will have a delightful harmony, but—please to recollect, always, that our friends were obliged, as conscientious defenders of the truth, to do just what they did.

The present Dr. Junkin has presented the history as fairly as could be expected under the circumstances, and with as much freedom from a controversial spirit. But the action of his brother and the whole story of the events of those days might well be left to forgetfulness; and we cannot but feel that it would be better

that the life of these leaders of the Old School party should be altogether unrecorded, than that the narrative of their action in those unfortunate events should be again pressed upon the public attention, with the claim that it was right.

The course of Dr. Junkin on the slavery question was equally indefensible. The author labors, through page after page, in the vain hope that he can justify what his brother did. We used to hear, years ago, such representations of the wisdom of treating the advocates of the slave system with great gentleness, lest they might get angry, but the war blew them away as with a whirlwind. This volume is published just ten years after the taking of Fort Sumter, and, therefore, just ten years after the last foundation for all its defense of the old notions was utterly destroyed. The fact is, that this venerable gentleman and all who sympathized with him—however honest they were in the views which they maintained—had no apprehension of the demands of the crisis. The slave power was determined and aggressive. It looked with supreme contempt on these excellent persons, while, at the same time, it took possession of them and employed their energies in its own service. Eloquent appeals to the popular mind to be quiet and to conquer prejudices were made by men who fancied themselves to be wisely working for the removal of the institution. But those eloquent appeals were really appeals in behalf of the increase of its power. They were weapons seized from the North and its friends by the arch-enemy of freedom. Dr. Junkin, like many other doctors and old-fashioned statesmen who tried to save the Union, was mistaken; and it is better freely to acknowledge it than to attempt to make out a case for them, as if, after all, they may have been right. The question between Dr. Junkin and Mr. Barnes may *possibly* be an open one, even after the day of reunion has come. But the question between Dr. Junkin and the anti-slavery men is settled forever against him; and the effort to settle it on the opposite side, or to show that it is still undetermined, is one in comparison with which “the damming up the waters of the Nile with bulrushes” would be an easy thing. The New School party and the men who learned the truth from New England—whatever may be true of their theology—shine brightly and clearly in their right sentiments here. There is something, as we cannot help believing, in their theological system which gave them such a nobler position on the great moral question of the country’s history.

Dr. Junkin, however, was a true patriot. He was not, like some of the politicians of his party, a man ready to abandon his country in the hour of her need, or to advise the mild course when the enemy had assailed the nation's life. From the outbreak of the war, he was a firm, unyielding, and self-sacrificing advocate of the cause of the Union. The day for action, even to *his* view, had come, and the time for persuasion was ended. The story of his leaving the Southern college with which he was connected is worthy of a place in the annals of the conflict. He proved himself a true man, and the readers of his biography will pardon much that may seem unwise or mistaken in the earlier days, because of this heroic stand which he took at the end. Had his brother left his life where he left it—with no late defense of the wrong views, but with the act that contradicted and, as it were, atoned for them—the book would have honored its subject more perfectly than it has done.

The reader of this volume will find much that is interesting in it. The man, of whom it gives the life-story, was a man of unusual powers and prominence. He was a distinguished preacher and teacher and leader in the Church. He was decided and firm in his opinions, and fearless in his defense of them. He was an earnest Christian, but with that want of toleration for others which characterized the party with whom he was associated and among whom he was educated. He was one whose biography may properly have been written and may well be read. If his biographer had written it, without defending the course which he took on the great questions to which reference has been made, we should have only commendation to bestow upon the book.

GENEALOGY OF THE STRONG FAMILY.*—Dr. Benjamin W. Dwight, of Clinton, N. Y., has rendered, in this book, a service to the family whose name it bears, which can scarcely be overestimated. With indefatigable industry and an enthusiasm which knows no bounds, he has searched out all the branches of a race, which is as strong in members as it is in name. In two volumes of 750 pages each, he has given an account of some 30,000 persons, and has, thus, enabled any one of the race who examines the book to trace out his

* *The History of the Descendants of Elder John Strong, of Northampton, Mass.* By BENJAMIN W. DWIGHT, Author of *The Higher Christian Education* and of *Modern Philology*. Albany, N. Y.: Joel Munsell. 1871. 8vo. 2 vols. pp. 768,

relationship in every direction. The recording of such a family history is a great and important work. It is a part of the country's history, and shows how the best character of the nation has been gradually developed. Dr. Dwight's method is, by far, the best that we have ever seen in any genealogical book. In the first place, he abandons the absurd course of most writers of his class, who limit themselves to the lines of the male descendants, as if the daughters had not as much claim on the family as the sons, and their children had not the family blood and inheritance as fully as the sons' children. The glory of a family, indeed, in the successive generations, is often most conspicuous in the descendants of the female line. Dr. Dwight gives the daughters and the sons an equal place, and, in this way, gives, as every genealogist ought to give, the history, not of one half of the family, but of the whole of it. He, also, presents the line of descent in each family within the general family, instead of giving each generation by itself. In this way, every person is enabled to find, at once and without long searching, his own descent from the original stock, as well as the line of his immediate ancestry and relatives. No one can examine the book, without perceiving the great advantage to the reader of this method of giving the genealogy. Dr. Dwight is connected, on the maternal side, with the family to whose record he has so generously devoted so much of his time. It is quite remarkable to notice how many distinguished persons are found within the circle of the descendants. The good old stock of New England is seen in its excellence in such a book. The fathers and mothers of our early history shine out in their virtue and in the vigor of their mental power, as one after another of their posterity, in the progress of the generations, is continually rising to eminence or blessing the world by his influence.

This book must, from the nature of the case, have a limited circulation. But to all interested in family-histories we heartily commend it. Its author ought to be abundantly repaid for his labor of love.

MISCELLANEOUS.

HALF-HOURS WITH MODERN SCIENTISTS.—Messrs. C. C. Chatfield & Co., of New Haven, have collected in a volume the essays on scientific subjects which they have heretofore published in the separate numbers of the "University Scientific Series." The contents are: On the Physical Basis of Life. By Prof. T. H. Huxley.

—Correlation of Vital and Physical Forces. By Prof. G. F. Barker, M.D.—As regards Protoplasm—Reply to Huxley. By James Hutchison Stirling.—On the Hypothesis of Evolution. By Prof. E. D. Cope.—Scientific Addresses, by Prof. John Tyndall, on the Methods and Tendencies of Physical Investigation.—On Haze and Dust.—On the Scientific Use of the Imagination.

THE TRUE SITE OF CALVARY.*—In a little volume, so thin that but for its binding it would be called a pamphlet, Mr. Fisher Howe has proposed a theory concerning the locality of our Lord's crucifixion, and has wrought out an ingenious and striking argument in support of what might seem at first a mere conjecture.

King James's translators, following the example of all their predecessors from Wycliffe onward, have given us in Luke xxiii, 33, as the proper name of the place in question, a word from the dialect of Latin Christianity, "Calvary." The name by which the place was known in Jerusalem is given by Matthew, by Mark, and by John, as "Golgotha;" and they add in Greek the significance of the name, "the place of a skull." Luke, whose style is more polished and to whom the Hebrew word may have seemed too uncouth for readers like the "most excellent Theophilus," names the place only by the Greek word *Kranion*, "Skull." Probably the name *Calvaria* was never known in Jerusalem till after the New Testament had been translated into Latin. Had the translation of *Kranion* been, uniformly, "Skull" in our Bible, as it is *Calvaria* in the Vulgate, the name "Calvary" would have had no currency among English-speaking Protestants.

Assuming that the name Golgotha or Skull was descriptive and denoted some skull-shaped eminence—an opinion which has been held heretofore by learned and judicious critics, and without which there is no reason for talking as preachers and hymn-writers do about "Calvary's mournful mount" or "The hill of Calvary"—Mr. Howe maintains that the cavernous rock known as the Grotto of Jeremiah agrees more exactly than any other place with every hint given by the sacred writers. (1) Jesus "suffered without the gate:" this eminence is outside of the ancient as well as the existing wall, and is near the well known Damascus Gate. (2) The place where Jesus was crucified was "nigh to the city:" so is this place.

* *The True Site of Calvary, and Suggestions relating to the Resurrection.* By FISHER HOWE, Author of "Oriental and Sacred Scenes." With an Illustrative Map of Jerusalem. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 8vo, pp. 68.

(3) It was known by a name signifying Skull: other travelers as well as Mr. Howe have observed a resemblance to the shape of a human skull in "the cliff directly facing the wall, with its rounded cranium and its black socket." (4) The place of the crucifixion was near a road where Simon the Cyrenian was coming to Jerusalem out of the country, and where "they that were passing by" reviled the august sufferer: this place is hard by the great thoroughfare northward. (5) The place in question was so conspicuous that the women who had followed Jesus from Galilee, standing afar off, could see what was done; and that not the mob only (who would be kept at some distance by the military guard), but the chief priests (would hardly follow a condemned prisoner to the place of execution) could stand beholding: so this hill is strikingly conspicuous; spectators on the city wall over against it could see distinctly all that was done, and many a taunt or execration from the crowd could be heard across the chasm between. (6) Golgotha was in the vicinity of rich men's gardens and sepulchers, for Joseph of Arimathea had a garden there with a new tomb in it, hewn out of the rock: such must have been the vicinity of this hill before Jerusalem fell; for "the region here about the head of the Kidron is rocky and full of excavated tombs all the way down to Jerusalem." Without affirming that the argument is absolutely conclusive, we may say that no other place has been proposed which is more likely to be recognized by anybody as the true site of Calvary, after the ecclesiastical tradition certifying the genuineness of the show-place in the Church of the Holy Sepulcher shall have become a little more palpably preposterous than it now is.

When this little book had been waiting on our table only a few days, we were startled by the announcement of the author's death. Sharing with nearer friends in the sorrow that we shall see his face no more, we may here transcribe the last words of his modest essay.

"If we shall have, in this unprofessional effort, subverted the cause of truth in any measure, or if it has been our privilege to shed any light on the locality of that grand event—of all others the most momentous in its influence and consequences to human character and destiny—we would be devoutly thankful to our Heavenly Father."

THE SECOND SERIES OF FROUDE'S SHORT STUDIES ON GREAT SUBJECTS* is no less attractive than the first, for the interest of

* *Short Studies on Great Subjects.* By JAMES ANTHONY FROUDE, M.A. Second Series. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1871.

the topics themselves, and the freshness and strength with which they are treated. Calvinism; An Address to the Students at St. Andrews; A Bishop of the Twelfth Century; Father Newman on "The Grammar of Assent;" Condition and Prospects of Protestantism; England and her Colonies; A Fortnight in Kerry, Part I; Reciprocal Duties of State and Subject; The Merchant and his Wife; On Progress; The Colonies once more; Education. A Fortnight in Kerry, Part II; England's War; The Eastern Question; Scientific Method applied to History; make a list of titles which of themselves would attract the reader if they were treated with only moderate ability. As treated by Froude, they present a succession of brilliant and effective essays by one of the most masterly of living writers. When we say masterly, we do not say trustworthy in respect to either arguments or conclusions, for we must confess that Froude is often extravagant and one-sided, even when his aims and direction are in the main such as we approve. But even in his most extravagant and unqualified utterances, he displays a manliness of conception, a brilliancy of illustration, and a directness and force of style which command attention and respect. His extreme and one-sided opinions even have some semblance of truth that make them worth considering. The essay on the Condition and Prospects of Protestantism in the present volume is for very many reasons fitted to repel and offend a right-minded man. And yet the truths which it almost caricatures are set forth with a spirit and power which make the essay most valuable and effective for a reader who knows how to use it aright. We feel warranted in recommending these volumes to those who are capable of discrimination as eminently quickening and instructive.

FOUR YEARS AT YALE.*—One of the recent graduates of Yale College, whose name, though he modestly withholds it from the title-page, we believe is generally known in New Haven, has presented to the public, in this volume, an account of the interior life of the institution from the undergraduate standpoint. The book is intended to give to those who are outside of the University an explanation of the customs and peculiarities of the student community. The author has gathered together a large amount of information on a great variety of matters. We think that he has been as successful in his work as could well be expected. Mistakes

* *Four Years at Yale.* By a Graduate of '69. New Haven: Charles C. Chatfield & Co. 1871. 12mo, pp. 713.

are noticeable in some cases, and some things are presented which will not be of much interest to the general reader. But we think few of the persons for whom it was especially designed will fail to find in it many things which they will be glad to know. We have sometimes doubted the expediency of publishing such extended accounts of a peculiar life, which can scarcely be understood by those who have not lived it. There are many, however, who will be glad to read the account because they have lived the life. The memories of College days will be pleasantly recalled, as they review the story of their old customs and occupations—and, if they are satisfied, it must be remembered that they constitute a community whose desires may well be considered.

THE LOST DISPATCH* is a short, well told objective tale, somewhat melodramatic, but well fitted to while away an unoccupied hour, without detriment to the intellect or the heart. The translation seems very well executed. Certainly the English is idiomatic and unexceptionable.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Students' Collection of Classic French Plays.—No. I. *Le Cid*. A Tragedy by P. Corneille. Edited with a complete commentary for the use of students. By Edward S. Jaynes, M.A. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1872. 12mo, pp. 110.—No. II. *Athalie*. A Tragedy by J. Racine. Edited with a complete commentary for the use of students. By Edward S. Jaynes, M.A. New York: Holt & Williams. 1872. 12mo, pp. 117.

Among the Alps; or the Happiness to be derived from doing Good. American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York. 12mo, pp. 364.

A Summer in the Forest; or Slender Hands in the Stone Quarries. American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York. 12mo, pp. 304.

Edna Harrington; or the Daughter's Influence in the Home Circle. American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York. 12mo, pp. 311.

Heart-Life. By Theodore S. Cuyler, Lafayette Ave. Church, Brooklyn. American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York. 24mo, pp. 191.

Life of John Bunyan, with notices of some of his contemporaries, and specimens of his style. By D. A. Harsha, M.A. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1871. 16mo, pp. 293.

Publications of the American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York City.—*The Bugle Call; or Summons to Work in Christ's Army.* By a Volunteer Nurse. 1871. 16mo, pp. 160.—*Facts in Aid of Faith.* By the author of "Ecoe Coslum!" Taken by permission from "Ad Fidem; or Pariah Evidences of the Bible." 16mo, pp. 58.—*The Christian Use of Money: especially in relation to Personal Expenditure.* By J. F. Wyckoff, Esq., with Introduction by Rev. Howard Crosby, D.D. 16mo, pp. 45.—*Lady Linnet.* 16mo, pp. 44.

* *The Lost Dispatch.* Translated from the German of FRIEDRICH FRIDRICH. By L. A. WILLIAMS. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1871.

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ARTICLE I.—THE ANTAGONISM OF RELIGION AND CULTURE.

Culture and Religion in some of their Relations. By J. C. SHAIRP, Principal of the United College of St. Salvator and St. Leonard, St. Andrews. New York: Hurd & Houghton.

THE attention of the reading public on both sides of the Atlantic has been recently called to the relations of culture to religion, by a book of rare merit, characterized by comprehensive thought, rare beauty of style, and purity and elevation of devout feeling. We see not how any devout man can read this book without a feeling of deep sympathy with the spirit and aim of the author, or without accepting his statement of the fundamental relation of religion to culture. If religion is anything it is everything. If it has any authority at all it has authority over the entire man. It rightfully claims to propound to every man the highest aim of human life, and to furnish the highest motives to all human endeavor. If this is so, no man can ever attain as high and noble a culture without the influence of religion as he might have attained with it. The culture

of the man whose thinking and living are without religion must necessarily lack the very highest and noblest elements to which it might have attained.

We should be far enough indeed from asserting that all men who are under the proper influence of religion are of course men of high culture. Such an assertion would be contradictory, not only to experience, but to common sense. Culture implies the development of the social, esthetic, and intellectual, as well as of the moral nature; and there are many persons whose lives and characters are in a high degree influenced by religious considerations, who are deprived of all time and opportunity for such cultivation. The hard necessity of incessant toil for the means of subsistence deprives them, for the most part, of social pleasures, of the enjoyment of the beautiful, and of all time and opportunity for the cultivation of the intellect.

And yet one of the strongest proofs of the tendency of religion to produce culture is derived from its influence on men whose lives are spent under these hard conditions. A truly religious man who has always been shut out from the pleasures which are proper to his intellectual and esthetic nature often exhibits a gentleness, a sweetness, a tenderness, a benignity of character, not only not attained by his class without religion, but not even by those who have had free access to all the fountains of culture, religion alone excepted. We often find in the humblest walks of life, in the children of poverty and toil, under the influence of religion, that ornament of a meek and quiet spirit which is closely akin to the highest culture, and which no improvement of the intellect and no combination of favorable influences, without religion, can ever impart. There have been men in every Christian generation nobly endowed with all the native gifts of mind and heart,

"But knowledge to their eyes her ample page,
Rich with the spoils of time, did ne'er unroll;
Chill penury repressed their noble rage,
And froze the genial current of the soul;"

and yet, under the influence of religion, they became truly wise men, and those who had trodden all the paths of secular learning might well sit at their feet and receive the lessons of wisdom which dropped from their lips. The existence of such examples

is undeniable ; and they prove beyond controversy that religion has a powerful tendency toward the noblest culture of which man is capable. It can and often does produce, in the most unfriendly and forbidding circumstances, developments of character higher, nobler, and better than the best which the schools, without its aid, have ever produced.

It cannot, however, be denied that in this age, and in ages that have preceded the present, many of the most highly cultivated minds have rejected the religion of Christ with aversion and even disgust, and that at the present time there is much to impress one with the belief, that high culture is antagonistic to religious faith. Certainly not a few narrow-minded religious men regard culture, especially scientific culture, with dread, as tending to unbelief; and not a few men of the highest intellectual refinement (though it is a fair question whether after all they are not as narrow-minded as their religious antagonists) believe themselves too wise to accept Jesus of Nazareth as the Christ of God. There are not a few religious men who fear, and not a few scientific men who hope, that the forces of science are too strong for the forces of faith, and that what is revered by devout men as the very ark of God is about to fall into the hands of the uncircumcised Philistines.

It is, therefore, highly proper to inquire what are the causes of this unnatural antagonism, and by what means it may be terminated, and harmony restored between the intellectual and the moral world.

One cause of the aversion of men of taste and culture to religion is the fact, that the religion which actually prevails is partial, inadequate, and therefore to a certain extent untrue. It may be asserted, without any fear of exaggeration, that the last and highest attainment of the human soul in this world will be, fully to comprehend the lessons which Jesus Christ taught, and fully to apply them to man's individual life and his social relations. In every age, perhaps in every sect, there are those who discern some truths of the Christian religion. But to a great extent they are truths wrenched away from those relations to all truth which they sustained in the conception of the Great Teacher, and are therefore divested of their full and proper influence in the formation of character; or they are cumbered

with misconceptions and falsehoods so gross, as to rob them of a part or all of their saving power.

For example, the divine Author of Christianity taught the doctrine of self-denial, and illustrated it in forms of speech and action the most striking and impressive, and his teachings and life have made a powerful impression on his followers through every age for a period of more than eighteen centuries. And yet to what a fearful extent have men misunderstood and perverted the lesson! The critic of keenest sight may safely be challenged to show any asceticism in the life or teachings of the founder of Christianity. But age after age men have misunderstood him. The notion that God may be pleased by suffering self-inflicted, and endured without any providential necessity, has flowed down the stream of Christian history for ages, and imposed upon millions of believers in Christ a yoke grievous to be borne, and infinitely degraded the doctrine of self-sacrifice from that exalted position on which the divine Master placed it. Even as late as the seventeenth century, Blaise Pascal could vie with Torricelli, Galileo, and Newton in discovering the hidden laws of nature, but he could not disentangle the Christian law of self-sacrifice from the rubbish with which in his age it was overlaid; and therefore wore an iron collar next his flesh as a means of religious discipline and edification. So long as the religion of Christ is thus distorted by wrenching away its greatest truth from its true position in the system, we have no occasion to wonder that thoughtful, cultivated men are tempted to regard it with disgust and aversion. Who in that age could imagine that so enlightened a man as Pascal—so gifted above ordinary mortals—did not understand that religion of which he was, with all his follies, so illustrious an ornament? And who that had been emancipated from the then ruling spiritual despotism, and trained to free thought, could help regarding such a doctrine of self-sacrifice with aversion? In like manner every distortion of the doctrines of religion must tend powerfully to array men of liberal culture and free thought against religion itself.

Matthew Arnold has made the supposition that Virgil and Shakespeare had made the voyage to America with the Puritan Pilgrim Fathers, and suggested the question whether they

would not have found their company intolerable. There are other reasons why they would have found the company of those God-fearing men intolerable besides superiority in culture, which it is our purpose to suggest under a subsequent head. But the character of the Puritans was faulty in respect to the very matter of which we have just been speaking. Macaulay's hard saying, that "the Puritan hated bear-baiting, not because it gave pain to the bear but because it gave pleasure to the spectators," is neither in strictness true, nor worthy of the grave historian of the English Revolution. The Puritans of those times had a high and just abhorrence of that and many other demoralizing public amusements; and the writer who has represented them as purely and simply malignant hypocrites has not only violated Christian charity, but degraded himself from the position of an impartial historian. And yet this saying contains a half-truth. There was an element of asceticism in the Puritan character. They were too ready to suspect sinfulness in anything that afforded amusement and pleasure. They were too much disposed to make war on whatever ornamented the person, or gratified the taste. And if on this account the Pilgrim Fathers would not have been agreeable companions to such men as Virgil and Shakespeare, it was not because they were sincerely and grandly religious men, but because their religion was on one side partial, distorted, and inadequate. Principal Shairp asks whether Virgil and Shakespeare would have fared better in the company of Paul the Apostle or John the Evangelist. We answer that we see no reason to suppose the same repelling force existed in these ancient representatives of Christianity which certainly is found in English Puritanism. If the two poets mentioned could not have enjoyed Paul's speech on Mars' hill, that fact would certainly afford no proof of their high culture.

There are few fields of thought more worthy of the best powers of the Christian thinker than the inquiry, how far and wherein the peculiar aspects and teachings, the creeds, the governments, the ceremonies, of the religion of the present age are repulsive to men of thought and cultivation on account of their failure adequately to represent the great conception of the Founder of our religion. So long as we persist in our present

arrangements for subjecting that kingdom which he expressly declared not to be of this world, to legislatures, judicatories, and executive authorities devised, constituted, and administered by men; so long as we continue to cover over the face of nations and the world itself with rival governments, each exercising its functions in the presence of every other, and claiming jurisdiction in the name of the one divine Ruler and Head over the same territory and the same individuals, and thus destroying the religious unity of Christendom, and filling it with confusion, conflict, and anarchy, we shall have little reason to wonder that men of cultivation are little attracted toward the Church, and feel little admiration for that which claims to be the kingdom of God among men.

If the Founder of Christianity conceived of such a state of things as now exists in Christendom, and deliberately planned it as the normal condition of that "kingdom of heaven" which he came to establish, we could surely have little respect for his wisdom. If we are ever to bring to an end the long antagonism between religion and culture, it is high time for all devout men to set themselves in earnest to bring the Church, as it presents itself to the inspection of thoughtful men, into closer agreement with the original conception. To say that the present factious condition of the Christian Church is inevitable and must be perpetual, is to say that Jesus Christ founded anarchy and confusion without end.

But the cause of this antagonism is not found alone in the inadequacy and imperfection of our religious ideas and lives. It is equally found in the partial and imperfect character of our culture. Our religion has chiefly to do with the moral nature, and seeks to rectify our relations to the universe by setting us right with that God who made and governs it. Our culture has chiefly to do with our intellectual and esthetic nature; and leaves the moral too often neglected and dwarfed, and therefore ill-prepared to appreciate those high truths which religion reveals, or to submit to those obligations which religion imposes. Principal Shairp says "Goethe, the high-priest of culture, loathes Luther, the preacher of righteousness." Can any one familiar with Goethe as he appears in his autobiography, or even in Lewes' *Life of Goethe* after an accomplished scholar

has done his best to vindicate this "high-priest of culture" against his own representations of himself, fail to see why Goethe hated Luther, and that it indicated not so much that the Reformer's religion was at fault, as that the poet's culture was one-sided and imperfect? How could a man over whose heart and life moral and religious considerations exerted so little influence enjoy or even tolerate the intense religious earnestness of Luther? That definition of culture, according to which Goethe is its highest and best specimen, is certainly a one-sided, inadequate, and therefore false definition. No man can duly consider what the great German poet and philosopher admits to be true, and what the partial advocate, who has so zealously labored to defend Goethe against Goethe, relates and confirms of his indifference to the moral relations and influence of his own life; of his cruel and unprincipled treatment, in several instances, of the beautiful and lovely women who had been won by his personal attractions, and the fascination of his conversation and manners; of his conduct in his domestic relations to the woman whom he ultimately married; and of his cold and selfish indifference to the destiny of his country in her great struggle for independence against French imperialism—no one can duly consider the admitted and unquestionable facts of his life in these and a great many other particulars without being convinced that the highest and noblest part of his nature—the moral part—was not cultivated, but a neglected and barren waste. When such a man withholds his sympathy from religious men and religious truth, we refuse to admit that it is any proof that true culture, rounded and complete on all sides, has any natural antagonism with religion. This man hated earnest religion because he bore along with him, from youth to old age, a neglected and corrupted moral nature, and lived in the practice of loathsome and hateful vices. When we have said so much, we have said all which this case requires or permits to be said.

What we have said of Goethe is true in greater or less measure of multitudes of otherwise cultivated men, who have manifested their aversion to religion. They have lived out of the universe where God governs, and where moral character is recognized as the one center around which every man's highest well-

being is clustered, and on which immortal destiny hinges; and in a little world of art and beauty and poetry and song. In that little world they have sought and thought they found a heaven,—a satisfying portion for a human soul, with little thought of moral obligation any farther than relates to the regulation of the social amenities of the little circle in which they live. Religion would intrude into this paradise of art, and proclaim to its selfish inmates their relation to universal, toiling, sinning, suffering humanity. It would teach them the necessity of preparing by the cultivation and renovation of their moral natures for an immortal destiny under the moral government of God. It would teach such a man as David Hume, that he had something to care for besides the acquisition of literary fame, and to live for besides the enjoyment of his own “growing reputation,”—and not only him, but all others who have pursued culture in a like selfish spirit, though they have not avowed it so unblushingly as Hume did in the closing scenes of his life.

The men of exclusive devotion to a literary and artistic culture do not like such an intruder into their earthly art-paradise. The reason why they do not, is not because she is not of beautiful and comely form and lovely spirit, not because her message is not true, but because she does utter truths which grandly and irresistibly rebuke the selfish and earthly life they lead. The men who lead such a life have given it out that they are the men of culture, and to no small extent this giving out has been accepted by the multitude, and their aversion to religion is the antagonism of culture and religion. Let us speak the truth; it is only the aversion of a narrow and one-sided and selfish culture to a religion which is as comprehensive as humanity, and would teach us and teach them to emulate in our lives the self-sacrificing philanthropy of the man Christ Jesus. For such a life the “high priest of modern culture” had no taste, and therefore he was averse to religious men and a religious life. He is imitated in this age by a host of followers who have small partnership with him in his genius.

It seems to be commonly assumed that men of genius are perfectly acquainted with any subject of which they choose to speak; especially that they are of course to be presumed to

have a perfect understanding of a subject so much upon men's tongues, and so familiar to their ears from their very cradles as religion. And yet it is true of men of genius as of other men, that they must remain ignorant of every subject to which they have never given earnest attention, on which they have never candidly thought. For this reason it often happens that men of high intellectual cultivation live in enlightened religious communities in profound ignorance of religion. They are ignorant of it for the reason that they never make it an object of earnest thought and enquiry. They live in their art-world just as the devotee of wealth lives in his money-world, and give no earnest heed to anything which is not art—just as men supremely influenced by the greed of gain give little thought or care to anything which cannot be converted into money. To this latter class of men, learning, religion, social pleasures, all pass for little or nothing, unless they can be coined into cash. We have no difficulty in estimating such a man. He is narrow-minded. The absorbing love of money has belittled him—shrivelled him to dimensions too small for the proper capacity of a human soul.

Just so the culture which leads a man to treat religion with neglect and contempt, and produces a character on which moral considerations make little impression, and moral obligation sits loosely, is a narrow-minded culture: it shrivels the soul: it deprives a man of the proper dimensions of his manhood. When we notice that Tacitus, surrounded by the disgusting superstitions which made up the hoary paganism of Rome, handed down to posterity the Christian religion branded as an "*crassa superstitio*," we are astonished that a man so enlightened should fall into an error so egregious. But a little thought convinces us that he did it through sheer ignorance: he had never thought Christianity worthy of a serious examination. In instances well nigh innumerable, the sneers of men of genius and learning at religion have precisely the same import. They do not imply that these men have given the subject their earnest and candid attention, and after such an investigation have thrown the weight of their great intellects against it; but that they have neglected to think of it, just as Tacitus did, and condemned it in utter ignorance of what they con-

demned. The Christian religion has never suffered greater injustice in this world than from the great, and in other respects cultivated minds, that have rejected and contemned it without examination—rejected it just as the man of avaricious life rejects both religion and culture, because they belong not to his little universe of money-making.

We seek in vain to reconcile such culture with religion. It is no more reconcilable than the supreme love of money, or insatiable ambition is reconcilable with it. Such culture is essentially false, narrow, selfish. In all such cases the only way to put an end to the antagonism is to substitute a true culture for a false one, a culture which comprehends the whole man for one which excludes and neglects his highest and noblest endowments. Thus far we have been traveling a plain path; we must make our culture and our religion more perfect, and in proportion as we do so, we shall bring them into more harmonious relations with each other.

But there is a third cause of antagonism between them more difficult to deal with. Especially is this true of culture attained by the pursuit of science. Religion and science have different aims, and pursue different methods. Religion seeks to find in nature a personal God: science interrogates nature in the pursuit of general laws, in uniform accordance with which the forces of nature act; and her achievements in this direction have been truly wonderful. It will not be strange if at length she has become a little conceited and arrogant. She has succeeded in tracing laws of order and harmony in regions which, through immemorial ages, had seemed the empire of caprice and accident. She has risen from one generalization to another still more comprehensive, till at last she has become impatient of the necessity of a Creator, and proposes, by an extension of the domain of law, to dispense with the function of a law-giver. It has come at length to be true that every cultivator of science meets some temptation to engage in this rebellion against the reign of a personal Creator.

Religion and Science differ too in their methods. Science knows no method but observation and experience, and the use of logical induction in interpreting the facts thus furnished. Religion soars higher, and listens for the voice of God himself

speaking in the ear of his needy children, and manifesting to them his will, and their duty and destiny, in modes not comprehended in any of the laws which science has discovered. These higher modes of manifesting divinity, of which religion informs us, may still be strictly in accordance with the general laws of the universe: but if so, those laws are too high up for us to reach and verify them. They are laws of which our limited knowledge of the whole system never permits us to see more than a single application, and therefore that application seems to us an event without law; and such an event is always distasteful to the mind of exclusively scientific habit. Such a mind approaches religion under the influence of a strong prejudice against it.

In dealing with this part of the subject, Principal Shairp concedes, or seems to concede, to unbelief more than truth either requires or permits. He says: "it is well we should be convinced on rational grounds that science, simply as science, can never reach God." He quotes with approbation from Dr. McLeod Campbell, "No telescope will enable us to see God. No finest microscope will make Him visible in the act of working." Certainly not. But neither will any telescope make us see gravitation. All which the telescope can disclose to us is the existence of phenomena, which can only be satisfactorily accounted for by the law of universal gravitation. So no telescope can indeed make us see God; but the universe around us is full of phenomena, open to universal experience and observation, of which the existence of a designing Creator and righteous moral Governor of all things is the one only adequate explanation. Science as truly gives us God as it gives us gravitation. The apostle Paul was not mistaken when he wrote: "the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead."

If it is said man is finite and God is infinite, and the finite can never understand the infinite, we answer, the prattling babe is quite incapable of comprehending his father. The thoughts, the designs, the activities, the works of that father are as truly incomprehensible to his child as the mind of God is to our limited vision. But does not that child know his father? his exist-

ence? his presence? his power? his love? Not certainly the full extent and range of any of his attributes, but their reality he does know, admire, and love. And in precisely the same sense does short-sighted man know God, and this is the only sense in which it is needful that one should know him, in order to lead a devout, religious life. Certainly science does not reveal God to our senses. But neither are space or time or power or cause revealed to our senses. They are intuitions which transcend sense, and to our intuitions equally the phenomena of the universe reveal a creating God.

If it be said that in order to know God our moral nature must be sound and in healthful activity, we answer, certainly: the glory of God,—his Godhead is not his mere creative power, but his moral attributes,—his righteousness,—his wisdom,—his love; and this true Godhead no being will ever know that is not in moral sympathy with it. A being without virtue can no more know virtue or a virtuous being than one blind from birth can know colors and admire beauty. The want of such moral vision is the one blinding cause which produces all the atheism there is among men. In this high and only religious sense, the man of science, if proud and selfish in spirit, never can by his science know God, any more than a man of the greatest genius could ever by science understand the laws of light without eyesight. But no one would think of saying that the science of optics cannot teach the true doctrine of color, because one must have vision in order to understand it. If the mind is healthy and sound and active in its highest powers and functions, nature—science—does give us God; and science gives no truth to any one, in whom those mental powers, by which that truth is to be discerned, are not in a state of healthful activity. To this law the relation of science to God and religion forms no exception.

This is the all-sufficient explanation of the striking fact that both John the Baptist and Christ himself began their ministry by preaching the doctrine of universal repentance. Men think that whenever they will they can turn their thoughts to religion, and solve its problems and settle its claims by the mere action of the intellect, as in astronomy, or chemistry. There is a previous question of infinite moment and importance, which

each one of us must answer for himself. Is the soul in health? Is the moral nature sound? And a true solution of this question will bring us all back to the point from which Christ and his great Forerunner begun their labors. Repentance must be our first work. We must begin with moral healing, just as the man blind from birth, if he would understand optics, must begin with a surgery which should unseal his eyes and let in the light of heaven. This is not only an unwelcome truth to men of culture, provided that, as often happens, they are proud and selfish in spite of their culture,—but to all the multitudes who are living without God in the world. Such antagonism between culture and religion can only be reconciled by repentance and a life of true virtue. He who attempts the solution of the problems of religion without taking into the account the sanitary condition of his own soul, is certainly destined to a miserable failure.

The disposition so to extend the domain of impersonal laws as to exclude from the universe the active agency of a personal creator and ruler, is the very tap-root of that unbelief to which the exclusive pursuit of physical science tends. No man, who in his inner soul believed in such a personal creator and ruler, would hesitate to believe in the supernatural in such a case as the introduction of the Christian religion into the world. He would feel the full force of the argument of Paul before Agrippa: "Why should it be thought a thing incredible with you that God should raise the dead?" To a believer in God this question carries along with it its own answer. And yet the atheistic negations of unbelief rest on no basis of argument. No science has proved to the lowest degree of probability any prevalence of material laws in the universe which do not originate in, and depend upon, a personal creator. Science in all its grandest achievements has utterly failed to show that the action of the soul of universal humanity in recognizing God in nature is not a true intuition, as worthy of implicit faith as the intuition of matter, or of existence, or of moral freedom. And yet how many men are found at present scoffing at the credulity of those who, behind all the skill and order and harmony and beauty of the universe, see a personal creator, an architect and builder of the heavens and the earth, scoffing where angels

adore, and yet setting up themselves as examples of the highest culture of the human soul! We have good reason to pray to be delivered from such a culture. It is the culture of pride and arrogance; a culture which neither makes men more modest or more virtuous.

There is yet another tendency of an exclusively scientific culture which we cannot pass over in silence. It is its tendency to beget mental habits unfriendly to the proper influence over the mind of that sort of evidence which must necessarily be our guide in most of the practical concerns of life, the evidence of testimony, or more generally of what logicians distinguish as probable evidence. Physical science can admit of no other evidence than that of rigid demonstration and the testimony of the senses. And yet these kinds of evidence bear but a humble part in solving the real difficulties of practical life, whether of the individual or of society. The practical questions we are called to determine are such, that we can rarely have the evidence of our own senses, or of demonstration. Their decision depends, by the necessity of the case, on balancing opposing probabilities. And yet on their right decision hang issues of the greatest moment to ourselves, our friends, and our country. True practical wisdom consists in determining rightly and safely in cases where we cannot walk by sight—for sight is impossible—nor by demonstration, for of that the case does not admit. On such wisdom our success in our own private affairs, the well-being of the State, and the political well-being of the world, depends. Exclusive devotion to physical science does not tend to cultivate such wisdom; but to disqualify the mind for such affairs. We say exclusive devotion, for we admit that the study of physical science has its place, and should play a certain part in the formation of every man's character. It is one of the factors of every good education. But it should not be pursued exclusively—cannot be without making the mind weak, one-sided, and incapable of dealing successfully with all the complicated difficulties and unavoidable uncertainties which surround human life. No wise man would think of giving a youth an exclusive education in material science, to fit him for the law, or for a judicial career, or for a law-maker, or a statesman.

One of the most eminent advocates of scientific culture has objected to the study of the classics, because, in the pursuit of these, the youth is constantly obliged to rely on authority, for the meaning of words, and for the interpretation of particular grammatical constructions. He might as well object to that appointment of Providence, or law of nature—whichever he pleases to call it—by which we have any childhood at all. By the very fact that we begin life in infancy and spend so many years in feebleness, ignorance, and dependence, we cannot but form those very habits of relying on the authority as well as on the strength of others, just as we do in the study of the classics; and Mr. Herbert Spencer's quarrel, after all, is not with the study of the classics, but with an inevitable law of nature.

In the consideration just suggested, we have the true explanation of the reaction at present manifest in many quarters against classical study. In common with the very conditions of our lives in childhood and youth, it does form in us the habit of healthful reliance on authority; it does teach us to rely, with such faith as the conditions of humanity require, on evidence which is merely probable, and to make our way as safely as possible amid all the uncertainties of this our earthly existence. With such mental habits, the man of exclusively scientific culture has no sympathy—with such evidence he has no patience; he refuses to believe at all, unless he can have certainty. Rather than balance opposing probabilities and believe doubtingly and yet act as though he believed certainly, he prefers to stand on what he chooses to consider the proud eminence of sneering scepticism. And yet to take such a position is to unfit oneself for any of the practical realities of human life.

Religion is a practical thing: he who imagines that it is not, who places it in the regions of speculation, has committed a fatal error. It is as truly a practical thing as any of the common affairs of the present life. Wisdom in respect to religion depends on the same conduct of the understanding as wisdom in respect to the affairs of our every day-life. All depends on fairness and candor, on the control of the appetites and passions, and the subjugation of the whole man to the governing power of reason and conscience. There is need of the same faith in

evidence which is only probable, the same balancing of opposing probabilities as in all other practical affairs. It is not strange, therefore, that a habit of mind which sets many scientific men against the study of the classics as an important part of education, and which ought, in logical consistency, to set them in rebellion against that law of nature which dooms us all to pass through the helplessness and dependence of infancy and childhood, should also disqualify the same men for religious faith, throw them out of sympathy with the Christian religion, and lead them to adopt, with a fervor proportional to their zeal for their favorite sciences, a creed of anti-religious negations. What might have been *à priori* expected has certainly in many instances actually happened.

For such an antagonism between religion and culture we know but one remedy. Such scientists must go and sit for once at the feet of Jesus of Nazareth, till they can learn from him one of his most characteristic lessons. Let them not take the alarm too hastily; we do not ask that they believe in his supernatural powers, or his resurrection from the tomb where Joseph of Arimathea laid him. That is not by any means the first lesson which we propose. We only ask that they sit at his feet long enough to learn that other lesson, which is quite independent of his miraculous powers, "Except ye be converted and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." There is a "kingdom of heaven." For our present purpose it matters not whether Jesus of Nazareth founded it or not. It is a fraternity of Christ-like souls of all climes, and all nationalities, and all worlds. No man can gain admission to it who has not learned this lesson of Jesus. He may have the genius of a philosopher, the learning of a sage; but he must still have the heart of a child. He must have learned "to esteem others better than himself," "to look not on his own things, but on the things of others." He must have so modest an estimate of his own powers in presence of the problems of the Universe, of his own attainments, in comparison with the whole range of possible knowledge, as to feel himself to be but a child, and to listen with reverence to any words that fall from the lips of any superior in wisdom. If any one has not this spirit in him, he has not the temper of mind which is suited to

this our humanity. He cannot belong to the fraternity of humble and modest and loving ones. He is proud and must dwell in that solitary isolation which pride always produces, till he is converted and becomes as a little child. Then shall he enter the kingdom of heaven and know its blessedness. Till then he may despise it, but it in return must sorrowfully disown him as deficient in those qualities which form the basis of all virtuous character. The antagonism is not between such a man's intellect and the doctrines of religion, but between his heart and the only true moral standard of the Universe.

If there are prevalent among us such conceptions of culture, and modes of education which tend to such habits of thought and life, we cannot too earnestly deprecate their influence, or seek their amendment. They are not alone unfriendly to religion: they are no less hostile to those loving subordinations which make domestic happiness possible, and render the State capable of freedom without anarchy. There is nothing which we as a nation have more reason to dread, than an education which awakens the mind to activity, and opens to it the fountains of that knowledge which puffeth up, without training it to modesty, to humility, to faith, to subordination. This is a serious subject, which cannot be too thoughtfully considered by a great people engaged in the laudable endeavor to provide for universal education. We are no enemies, we are earnest friends of the cultivation of the physical sciences. But we regard the exclusive claims set up for them in some quarters, not only as arrogant, but as eminently dangerous to mental soundness, to subordination, to virtue.

We cannot therefore avoid the conclusion, that the causes of the antagonism between culture and religion are to be found in the inadequacy of our religion to express the sublime conception of its founder, and in the one-sidedness and incompleteness of our culture. And the remedy must be sought in honest efforts more completely to interpenetrate the practical religion of the time with the thought, the heart, the spirit of the Divine Master, and to round out all our systems of culture, till they shall comprehend not merely the intellectual and esthetic, but the moral nature of man. We cannot help thinking that just in proportion as such efforts are earnestly put forth, on both sides, the din of the long conflict will die away, and the "lion and the lamb will dwell together."

We think this subject worthy of the most serious consideration of all the leaders of our religious thought. What man of sense did not see the folly and madness of the attempt to impose upon the world as an essential article of the Christian faith, the doctrine of infallibility? And yet are not Protestants often guilty in greater or less degree of similar folly? Are not many of our sects—ought we not rather to say all?—contending for some things, either in modes of stating faith, or in forms of organization, which are really as indefensible as infallibility? And how much the tenacity with which we hold such things, and the attitude of conflict with one another into which we are thus brought, expose religion itself to the cutting and damaging sarcasms of unbelief! There is but one way in which religious men can rid themselves of all responsibility for the long antagonism between religion and culture. They must consent to relax their hold of every foreign element which has attached itself to Christianity in its progress through the ages, and realize to the utmost possible extent the conception of the Divine Author of Christianity in the actual religion of the present hour. Much has been accomplished towards the attainment of this end in the last three hundred years. Much, very much, yet remains to be done. Here is noble work for all the talent engaged in religious thought in our age, far nobler than to strengthen the walls by which Christian sects are divided from each other, or to defend with any argument however ingenious the peculiarities by which one's own sect is distinguished.

We cannot close without expressing the wish that Principal Shairp's book may have a wide circulation, and that it may be candidly and prayerfully read by young men in pursuit of liberal culture. We could wish indeed that he had been more felicitous, than we think he has been, in stating the real relation of science to religion. His language in reference to this subject is certainly not well guarded, and has, we regret to say, exposed him to unfriendly criticism in some highly respectable journals in this country. But the aim of the work is excellent, its spirit admirable, and its style is so clear, chaste, and truthful as to be quite refreshing amid the sensationalism which so shockingly abounds. We rejoice to know that young men are trained in the Scotch universities under influences so pure, truthful, and devout.

ARTICLE II.—JOHN WOOLMAN.

The Journal of John Woolman. With an Introduction by
JOHN G. WHITTIER. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co.
1871. 12mo, pp. 315.

JOHN WOOLMAN died one hundred years ago at the age of fifty-two, in York, England. Born in this country, in Northampton, Burlington County, New Jersey, reared among plain people, with no other education than almost any lad might have in the place and time, a member of the Society of Friends, and a minister after the manner of that sect, he had gone abroad on one of the religious errands well known among them, and traveling from one of their meetings to another in fulfillment of his mission he lay down to die of the small-pox, then so prevalent and so much dreaded, among those who had been all strangers but for the affinities of Christian faith. Most unambitious in his aims, studying to be quiet, and disclaiming and shunning every thing like popularity or distinction, he could have made no impression by his presence or his death among the notables of that English ecclesiastical city. Yet now we have a beautiful edition of this man's *Journal*, with extracts from his writings and an admiring introduction by a most popular American poet, from one of our principal publishing houses, while the notables of that city with all their respectabilities are forgotten. There is something suggestive in the contrast.

We speak thus of this volume not that it is a resurrection of what has been buried for a century in entire forgetfulness, but that it renews the memory of a remarkable man, brings him into a larger circle of readers, and extends a reputation which hitherto has been mostly limited to his own religious denomination. Every Christian community has its "saints" as really as that of Rome, though without the formality of canonization, and every such sacred roll, not overlaid with ceremonies nor tainted with superstition, should enrich the whole Church. The *Westminster Review*, in an elaborate article on Quakerism,

remarked that it was richer in biographies than any other sect. It has been common to commemorate the most esteemed ministers and other members of the Society, whether men or women, by publishing their journals, and by testimonials from their brethren. John Woolman has long had a high place on their calendar. Several editions of his writings have already had considerable circulation. The miscellaneous reader will learn from Mr. Whittier's preface to the present volume, what we have known from other sources, that the rare quality of the man has not wholly failed of recognition in very different communions. Dr. Channing, we are told, pronounced his Journal "beyond comparison the sweetest and purest biography in the language," adding, "it was not a light to be hidden under the bushel of a sect." "Edward Irving pronounced it a god-send." In certain literary quarters too, where the author least expected or sought applause, it has won some flattering distinction, as from Charles Lamb in his *Elia*, who says, "Get the writings of John Woolman by heart;" and the English barrister, H. C. Robinson, who belonged to Lamb's circle, which was far enough removed from severe religious partialities, calls the book "a perfect gem," saying of the author, "His is a *Schöne Seele*, a beautiful soul." "One of the leading British Reviews" even went so far as to pronounce him "the man who, in all the centuries since the advent of Christ, lived nearest to the Divine pattern." We do not take it upon us to sanction this last assertion, nor yet to gainsay it, but we are glad to learn further from the introduction to this edition that the author of "The Patience of Hope," besides the beautiful tribute which we have not room to quote, "has in preparation an appreciative review" of Woolman's "life and character." We cite these testimonies to get the more attention for a work we have before learned to prize, and also as showing how the way has been prepared for the present edition. The introduction, itself of fifty pages, we need not say is a loving tribute from Mr. Whittier's hand, and enhances the interest of the volume. It was well that Woolman should find an editor who is at once a true poet and an earnest Friend, and has been moved to this work by the zeal of a philanthropist, especially in the anti-slavery movement, of which Woolman was one of the earliest

and most exemplary leaders. In the former editions, after the autobiography, about as much more space was occupied with essays and tracts published by Woolman on religious and philanthropic subjects, particularly in behalf of slaves, and of the laboring and suffering poor in general, with some of his letters; most of which are omitted in this volume, as not now so needful or applicable as when they were written, some twenty-five closely printed pages of selections being retained in the Appendix after the Testimonies from Friends. It was not injudicious to curtail this part of the book for wider use, the chief interest centering in the Journal itself, and room being thus gained for the Introduction, while the more curious reader may still resort to the older collection. Of the many to whom the subject is new, we think Mr. Whittier will not be disappointed in believing that, differing as they may in particular judgments, "they will all agree in thanking him for introducing them to the Journal of John Woolman."

We, too, venture to expect thanks from some of our readers for first drawing their attention to this autobiography, which we may be more sure of doing through some notices here of the man and of his life. Not that we propose any formal analysis of his character, for indeed a character of so fine a spiritual quality as his ever eludes such formal handling, even as many a choice text loses its flavor and dies out under some of the artificial processes unhappily known as "sermonizing." But we have some things to note of the Journal, and of the author who, being what he was, yet lived in this world a hundred years ago, and "was not, for God took him."

A key note of the whole is struck in the first sentence of the first chapter:—"I have often felt a motion of love to leave some hints in writing of my experience of the goodness of God, and now, in the thirty-sixth year of my age, I begin this work." And these are the themes of his book, as they were of his heart and life,—this "goodness of God," the needs of His creatures, his own infirmity and dependence, the "motions of love" in the depths of his soul, tremulous "as the needle to the pole," and the ever recurring sense of the pure presence of that Lord whom he so often designates as "the Truth."

Like so many other saintly men, he traces back his religious

course to childhood. "Before I was seven years old," he writes, "I began to be acquainted with the operations of divine love." One day going from school he left his companions at play, and out of sight read by himself the twenty-second chapter of Revelation, about the "pure river of water of life," and his "mind was drawn to seek after that pure habitation which he believed God had prepared for his servants." The scene might give an artist an illustration for this book. It was characteristic of the boy that having stoned a robin who was fluttering about her nest, he was at first "pleased with the exploit, but after a few minutes seized with horror at having in a sportive way killed an innocent creature while she was careful for her young." Then he tells us how "in shame and confusion" he "remained silent" when his father talked with him of "an undutiful reply" to his mother's reproof for some misconduct, and he "retired and prayed to the Lord to forgive" him. "I do not remember," he adds, "that I ever afterwards spoke unhandsonely to either of my parents, however foolish in some other things."

At "the age of sixteen years" he "began to love wanton company," and though "preserved from profane language and scandalous conduct," yet "perceived a plant" in him "which produced much wild grapes." He goes so far as to say: "Upon the whole my mind became more and more alienated from the truth, and I hastened toward destruction." His errors, such as they were, and repentings and backslidings, the "youthful vanities and diversions" which were his "greatest pleasure," and the struggles they cost him, still leave us to suppose that his youth was in the world's eye comparatively pure. As Macaulay has noted in the case of Bunyan, in comparing him with others, his confessions must be taken with some allowance for the severity of such a man's judgment toward himself. Then there came a time of dangerous sickness, and with it "darkness, horror, and amazement;" "in great affliction, both of mind and body," he "lay and bewailed himself;" till "that word which is as a fire and a hammer broke" his "rebellious heart," his "cries were put up in contrition," and he "found inward relief." Still again relapsing into "mirth and wantonness," at the age of eighteen he "felt the judgments of God" in his "soul, like

a consuming fire," and thus he went through conflicts, and defeats, and victories, for which we must refer the reader to his own narrative. Before being settled in that trust and love for which he became so distinguished, he entered deeply into that experience which, as much as any thing else, marks the early course of eminent piety among the Friends, and may be summed up in the strength of one word, *contrition*. 'We hold up this fact to the attention of any who would cite him as only a philanthropist, as if his shining record might countenance them in making little account of what are called "convictions of sin."

We cannot better describe the type of the piety that emerged from this strife than by here transcribing from the *Journal*:—

"I kept steadily to meetings; spent first-day afternoons chiefly in reading the Scriptures and other good books, and was early convinced in my mind that true religion consisted in an inward life, wherein the heart doth love and reverence God the Creator, and learns to exercise true justice and goodness, not only toward all men, but also toward the brute creatures; that as the mind was moved by an inward principle to love God as an invisible, incomprehensible Being, so, by the same principle, it was moved to love him in all his manifestations in the visible world; that as by his breath the flame of life was kindled in all animal sensible creatures, to say we love God as unseen, and at the same time exercise cruelty toward the least creature moving by his life, or by life derived from him, was a contradiction in itself. I found no narrowness respecting sects and opinions, but believed that sincere, upright-hearted people, in every society, who truly loved God, were accepted of him.—As I lived under the cross, and simply followed the opening of truth, my mind from day to day was more enlightened, my former acquaintance were left to judge of me as they would, for I found it safest for me to live in private, and keep these things sealed up in my own breast. While I silently ponder on that change wrought in me, I find no language equal to convey to another a clear idea of it. I looked upon the works of God in this visible creation, and an awfulness covered me. My heart was tender and often contrite, and universal love to my fellow-creatures increased in me. This will be understood by such as have trodden the same path" (p. 58).

On coming of age he was employed by a shop-keeper, and soon entered into the religious services of his people. We get a hint of their reverent ways when he says, "One day, being under a strong exercise of spirit, I stood up and said some words in a meeting; but not keeping close to the divine opening, I said more than was required of me." A stranger would see nothing so uncommon in the fault as in his repentance that followed it. When again he spoke, "feeling the spring of divine love opened," the result was happier. He expresses the doctrine of the Friends when he writes,—*"Being thus humbled and disciplined under the cross, my understanding became more strengthened to distinguish the pure spirit which inwardly moves upon the heart, and which taught me to wait in silence sometimes many weeks together, until I felt that rise which prepares the creature to stand like a trumpet through which the Lord speaks to his flock."*

About this time, on being asked to write a bill of sale for the transfer of a slave, he acknowledges his first scruples regarding the lawfulness of that traffic. Consenting, though with later self-reproach, he refused a second like application, firmly yet meekly avowing his conviction; he "was not easy to write it;" and from that point is dated his course of strenuous opposition, not only to the traffic, but to "slave keeping" as a practice that he believed "inconsistent with the Christian religion." He is understood to have been a pioneer in this country in this reform.* The "institution" that has since struggled so long and so hard, had then quiet possession wherever introduced, even among Friends, contrary as it must have seemed to their traditions. For setting himself against it single-handed, of course Woolman is widely honored, and it is in this view even more than from denominational partialities that Whittier, himself "the poet of freedom," now ushers him anew before the public. We need not here enlarge on the value of the service as then rendered, but in the review we see how well fitted Woolman was for so difficult and delicate a work, especially among his own brethren in the south. To bear the needed

* There were earlier protests in this country, and particularly we recall one, of an official nature, against the slave-trade, by Richard Saltonstall, of Ipswich, in 1645.

testimony wisely and successfully, required not only his fidelity to conscience, but such abounding and abiding love as his. His anti-slavery labors are in marked contrast to the fierce denunciation and acrid invective of some later reformers. These last have indeed their office. There are times when organized evils in society must be assailed as with a storm of wrath. Such was the mission of some of the ancient prophets, and this was the tone of some of the earlier Quakers. But John Woolman was of another type. He went about burdened with the woes of the oppressed, rather than charged with resentment against the oppressor, tenderly pleading in their behalf, and tenderly appealing to the divine love as well as justice. "For the hurt of the daughter of my people am I hurt." It is in this light that he is fitly appreciated.

He had now become a minister in the Society of Friends in the only way recognized among them, that is, by using the appropriate gifts under divine direction, as he believed, and being acknowledged accordingly by his brethren, but not receiving pecuniary support from this source. "Perceiving merchandise to be attended with much cumber," he turned from same promising offers of business, learned from his employer the trade of a tailor, and afterwards "wholly laid down merchandise," foregoing its profits, that he might live in a simple way, which was all he desired, with as little as possible of "outward care" or "entanglement." In this part of the narrative the reader will see a contrast to those professed Christians who "extend" their business upon every opportunity, and then make "business" their apology for neglecting devotion and beneficence. He soon entered upon one of those religious or missionary journeys which are a peculiar institution among his people,—undertaken "with the unity of Friends," to which they attach much importance,—designed to cheer and revive their brethren in various places, and to convince and awaken "them that are without." On these enterprises they have gone with their messages of invitation and warning into all parts of the world, to emperors, sultans, and popes, as well as to savages in the wilderness and South Sea islands. Much of the interest of their many memoirs relates to these self-denying labors. Woolman and an associate first visited several of the Southern

provinces, holding meetings on the way, sometimes lodging in the woods, and afterwards New England. Interspersed in these accounts we find more domestic incidents, a filial tribute to his father upon his death, and quaint and sometimes touching expressions of piety. His father, on being told by his sister Elizabeth of "the decease of their sister Anne," said, "I reckon sister Anne was free to leave this world!" "Elizabeth said she was. He then said, 'I also am free to leave it;' and being in great weakness of body said, 'I hope I shall shortly go to rest.'" And this is the quaint record of his marriage: "About this time, believing it good for me to settle, and thinking seriously about a companion, my heart was turned to the Lord with desires that he would give me wisdom to proceed therein agreeably to his will, and he was pleased to give me a well-inclined damsel, Sarah Ellis, to whom I was married the eighteenth of eighth month, 1749."* We could not expect of him, in this or any other relation, a record inferior to the testimony afterwards borne to him by his brethren, that "he was a loving husband, a tender father, and was very humane to every part of the creation under his care." Meantime wherever he went he did the work of a philanthropist, caring for the poor and for laborers as well as for bondsmen, and dissuading the people from luxury and from whatever seemed contrary to the simplicity of "the Truth." Whittier beautifully says of him in a note:—"From his little farm on the Rancocas he looked out with a mingled feeling of wonder and sorrow upon the hurry and unrest of the world; and especially was he pained to see luxury and extravagance overgrowing the early plainness and simplicity of his own religious society. He regarded the merely rich man with unfeigned pity. With nothing of his scorn, he had all of Thoreau's commiseration for people who went about bowed down with the weight of broad acres and great houses on their backs."

* Only a few years before this date Whitefield, who was never married, at Northampton, had greatly admired President Edwards and his wife, and in his journal calling her "a daughter of Abraham," refers to his own prayers that God "would send him a daughter of Abraham to be his wife," adding, "Lord, I desire to have no choice of my own." Mr. Tracy's comment is:—"He had not yet learned, if he ever did, that God is not pleased to make such 'sweet couples' out of persons who have no choice of their own."—*The Great Awakening*, ch. 7.

Perhaps the most striking example of the missionary enterprises in which he was so often engaged may be found in his visits to the Indians on the Susquehanna, of which the details are given in the eighth chapter. The exposures, toils, and perils which he voluntarily encountered on this errand, his personal lowliness and simplicity, his most considerate care for the natives in all their interests, his conscious nearness to the unseen Lord, and hourly trustfulness, make a rare picture to be reverently studied. Instead of showing specimens, we refer our readers to those pages in their integrity.

Of course, as a Friend, Woolman would take no part in war or its accessories. A good idea of the singlemindedness and scrupulous delicacy with which he and others of his sect have maintained their protest on this subject, may be had from this paragraph:—"Fourth of fourth month, 1758. Orders came to some officers in Mount Holly to prepare quarters for a short time for about one hundred soldiers. The officer told me that he came to desire me to provide lodging and entertainment for two soldiers, and that six shillings a week per man would be allowed as pay for it. The case being new and unexpected, I made no answer suddenly, but sat a time silent, my mind being inward. I was fully convinced that the proceedings in wars are inconsistent with the purity of the Christian religion; and to be hired to entertain men who were then under pay as soldiers, was a difficulty with me. I expected they had legal authority for what they did; and after a short time I said to the officer, If the men are sent here for entertainment, I believe I shall not refuse to admit them into my house; but the nature of the case is such that I expect I cannot keep them on hire; one of the men intimated that he thought I might do it consistently with my religious principles, to which I made no reply, believing silence at that time best for me. Though they spake of two, there came only one, who tarried about two weeks, and behaved himself civilly. When the officer came to pay me, I told him I could not take pay, having admitted him into my house in a passive obedience to authority. I was on horseback when he spake to me, and as I turned from him, he said he was obliged to me; to which I

said nothing; but, thinking on the expression, I grew uneasy; and afterwards, being near where he lived, I went and told him on what grounds I refused taking pay for keeping the soldier" (p. 131).

The type of Woolman's religion was of course largely that of the estimable brotherhood with whom he was so fully identified, and who may well acknowledge him as a "representative man." At the same time it has a most marked individuality; and it was probably this aspect of the man, together with his kindness and transparency, running into many a turn of thought and phrase, which particularly attracted Charles Lamb. His freshness and originality are felt in his writings as in his life. Hence Robinson says: "An illiterate tailor, he writes in a style of the most exquisite purity and grace. His moral qualities are transferred to his writings." Apart from mere literary attractions, as a representative Friend he may be studied with interest by earnest Christians of all communions. It will be observed that he dwells more on holiness than pardon, on being sanctified than justified; on Christ as our Prophet and King than as our Priest, and his work now done in us rather than that which was once done for us; on present conformity to the divine Pattern, than on prospective blessedness. The two tendencies of thought and feeling thus indicated have been always known among the best Christian people, not as wholly separated, much less as antagonistic, but as one or the other predominating, and thus characterizing individuals and even communities and periods, while also in many instances happily combined. The former has prevailed among the Friends from the beginning, while for more than a generation past, with many of their "birth-right members," the latter has been so far given up as to create schism and defection. The reaction from this error brings those who are now known as "orthodox" nearer in sympathy to the larger bodies classed as Evangelical. Long before these divisions, without denying the more objective views, Woolman moved chiefly in the same direction as the earliest Friends, and must be acknowledged as a pure and beautiful example.

And in him, as in other noted Friends, we mark the combination of piety and philanthropy. Religion has these two

aspects, as being God-ward and man-ward. Or, the Christian character has the side of godliness and the side of humanity. Some would confound and others would separate them. They are certainly combined in the Scriptures, and notably in the great Example, as indeed radically one. There is always a tendency to disproportion between the two in the ideals and the practice of Christians, and sometimes reaction from one toward the other. The memoirs of Friends show these two things kept together in culture and attainment, perhaps more generally than in any other sect (if that word must be used at all), and Woolman is an instance. If he had been a recluse, he could not have been more frequent and fervent in communion with God : if he had been all the time among men, he could not have cared more assiduously for their good. We ask the attention of some who are forward to admire him as a philanthropist to the fact, equally evident in these pages, that he was not this alone, nor this independently. His beneficence may not be separated from his saintliness. He was a branch that abode in the true Vine, and therefore brought forth all this fruit.

Holding as we do that every Christian body may learn something from every other, we would stir the question whether the practice of Woolman and his associates has not a lesson for some people, in our own and kindred denominations, in the conduct of those meetings for social worship which are less formal than preaching services. He records of certain meetings at Newport,—“The spring of the ministry was opened ;” by which he aptly phrases their well known doctrine that prayer or speech in a worshipping assembly properly proceeds from an inward impulse believed to be divine. Without consenting to Barclay's more rigorous propositions, we acknowledge a truth here. Most ministers, we suppose, have some experience responding to Woolman's description. In such assemblages much ought to be left to the spontaneity of Christian hearts consciously surrendered to the divine presence and guidance ; and when nothing offers itself from this source it were better to worship together in silence than to fret themselves because nothing is said, or for the leader to pump others or himself “where no water is.” There is an incongruity which would be amusing if it were not upon reflection offensive, in praying

that the Holy Spirit would take the direction of a meeting—a most becoming prayer—and then watching and goading brethren (if not sisters also) with much ado at every interval, as if the thing most undesirable to the Lord were “silence before Him.” We set John Woolman’s ways over against all such exhortations as, “Occupy all the time, brethren,” and “Let no time be lost.” Of these last galvanic appeals we scruple not to say, Let us have done with them.

But that which chiefly marks Woolman to our eyes, whether among the members of other communions or of his own, though not easily defined, we may best express by saying his character is largely made up of renewed instincts and intuitions. It is not enough to speak of his conscientiousness and benevolence, which, as held descriptive of the principles of good men in general, allow a sense too cold and formal to answer well to the impression he makes. We have to think of these best things as in him extraordinarily sensitive, tender, ready, deep laid, and self-moved, as if in the core of his being and pervading all the fibres of his common life. The new nature, born of the divine, supplanting the old, has attained to unwonted maturity, already working with like simplicity and freedom. Such perceptions as his come through such feelings. His meditations of themselves tend upward like incense, his prayers are “out of the depths” of reverence, and the daily life is the pure effluence of a pure soul. So fine is his rectitude, that it often detects moral deviations invisible to others, and even by them reckoned imaginary. His broad and delicate charity exceeds the sympathies of most good men. The ways of a man so unworldly and independent must be somewhat peculiar, and no wonder if some of his scruples and self-denials have raised a smile as eccentricities. His abstinence from certain products of slave-labor, in which however he has not stood alone, did not spring from calculating the effects of their use, so much as from a feeling that would shun the slightest participation in the related wrong, and the reader will observe the delicacy of the illustration (p. 231) where he cites David’s conduct in refusing to drink the water for which he thirsted when it was procured by his three “mighty men” at the hazard of their lives. More singular was his refusal to wear dyed cloth, yet one of his

objections was surely creditable, that dyes were invented not only "partly to please the eye," but "partly to hide dirt," while he had almost a passion for cleanliness, recoiling from impurity, whether moral or physical, as a voluptuary from pain. He declined drinking from a silver cup when offered, as being on his guard against luxuries, and also from his sympathy with the poor, whose wants might be relieved by their cost. So on his voyage to England he shunned the luxurious arrangements of the cabin and took a place in the steerage. And in the four months of his religious labors in that country he chose to travel on foot, from observing the hard lot of the post-boys and the ill-treatment of the horses. Far from all affectation, he rather shunned than courted attention to himself, even pained that he should have to appear singular in these courses. It will be observed, too, that he does not make himself a rule for others, never imposing on them his plain or austere practices. It was a part of his religion that in these peculiarities he only yielded to an inward "necessity laid upon him," and never lost charity when his example or judgment was not followed. "I do not," he says on one point, "censure my brethren in these things." Most of his scruples grew from his sympathy with the wronged and the needy, with whom he identified himself to a wonderful degree. "The burden of the laboring poor rested heavily upon him." "He was, to use his own words, mixed with his fellow-creatures in their misery, and could not consider himself a distinct and separate being." "His singular conscientious scruples, his close self-questionings," adds the editor, "are prompted by a tender concern for universal well-being; an earnest desire that no act or omission of his own should add to the evil and misery under which the creation groans." Even in the peculiarities here noted we see a minute efflorescence, or an overgrowth (if such there may be) from a rich, spiritual soil. The chief and abundant product in his life is seen in "whatsoever things are true, honest, just, pure, lovely, of good report." His tenderness and self-abnegation, the high plane both of his piety and philanthropy, affiliate him with some of the choicest spirits in other communions and other times, and among them some whose position in respect to doctrines and rites seems farthest removed from his own.

How readily their spiritual affinities have brought them together where now they "live unto God."

The record appended to the *Journal* in this as in earlier editions shows that his end was in harmony with his course. "His last public labor," says Whittier in a note, "was a testimony in York meeting in behalf of the poor and enslaved. His last prayer on his death-bed was a commendation of his 'fellow creatures separated from the divine harmony' to the Omnipotent Power whom he had learned to call his Father." His labors and overtaken sympathies had left him ill fitted to resist the malady that cut short his life in its maturity. "Though in a foreign land," such a man indeed was "not far from home." We may transfer to him what Cotton Mather said of the lady Arbella Johnson, only reversing one word, that he "took *Old* England on his way to heaven." The testimonies of God's children going home one after another, though not necessary, are always welcome, and Woolman's utterances were still in his own manner. "He said he had settled his outward affairs to his mind, had taken leave of his wife and family as never to return, leaving them to the divine protection, adding, 'Though I feel them near to me at this time, yet I have freely given them up, having a hope that they will be provided for;' and a little after said, 'This trial is made easier than I could have thought, my will being wholly taken away.'" To a young friend who had ministered to him, he said, "My child, thou seemest very kind to me, a poor creature: the Lord will reward thee for it." "Awhile after he cried out with great earnestness of spirit, 'O my Father! my Father! how comfortable art thou to my soul in this trying season!' Being asked if he would take a little nourishment, after some pause he replied, 'My child, I cannot tell what to say to it; I seem nearly arrived where my soul shall have rest from all its troubles.'" He described his disorder as at times coming "like a whirlwind" over his mind, which, however, "had hitherto been kept steady and centered in everlasting love," and "if that be mercifully continued," he said, "I ask and desire no more." When medicine had been ineffectual, and a friend anxiously asked, "What shall I do now?" he answered, "Rejoice evermore, and in every thing give thanks," but soon added, "This is sometimes hard to come at"

When some hope of his recovery was expressed, he replied, "My hope is in Christ; and though I may seem a little better, a change in the disorder may soon happen, and my little strength be dissolved; and if it so happen, I shall be gathered to my everlasting rest." And to his medical attendant: "My dependence is on the Lord Jesus, who I trust will forgive my sins, which is all I hope for; and if it be his will to raise up this body again, I am content; and if to die, I am resigned; but if thou canst not be easy without trying to assist nature, I submit." Still he commemorated the divine goodness and cared for others: "How tenderly have I been waited on in this time of affliction, in which I may say in Job's words, 'tedious days and wearisome nights are appointed unto me;' and how many are spending their time and money in vanity and superfluities, while thousands and tens of thousands want the necessities of life, who might be relieved by them, and their distresses at such a time as this in some degree softened by the administering of suitable things." And this is the last simple record, for the morning of his death: "He asked for pen and ink, and at several times with much difficulty, wrote thus: 'I believe my being here is in the wisdom of Christ; I know not as to life or death.'" So it was that on the "second day, 5th of tenth month," 1772, he fell asleep on the breast of Him whom, with the loving reverence of the kindred spirit, George Herbert, he might have called, "My Master Jesus."

ARTICLE III.—REMARKS ON THE STYLE OF CHINESE PROSE.

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A PROFESSOR of Chinese in America is reported to have said that "in the Chinese language there is no such thing as a florid style or a beautiful style. Style is not taken into consideration. It is in writing the language that skill is displayed; and the man that executes the characters with dexterity and ingenuity is the one that understands the language."

Though somewhat unexpected as coming from the chair of a Chinese professor, this opinion is not novel. It expresses but too truly the estimate in which the literature of China has been generally held by the learned world.

The value of Chinese records is fully conceded. The great antiquity of the people; their accurate system of chronology; their habit of appealing to history, as the only tribunal before which they can arraign their sovereigns; and especially their practice of noting as a prodigy every strange phenomenon that occurs in any department of nature, all conspire to render their annals an inexhaustible mine of curious and useful information. Add that these annals are not restricted to what is known as the history of the empire; but that one or more such works may be found recording in minute detail whatever has been thought interesting or instructive in the history of every department and district; and we have a mass of such literature that stands without a parallel among the nations of the earth.

It is in these that our *savans* may find, extending back in unbroken series for thousands of years, notices of eclipses, comets, star-showers, aerolites, droughts, floods, earthquakes, &c. &c., as well as a comparatively faithful account of the rise and fortunes of the most numerous branch of the human family.

But, while admitting that it is worth while to encounter all the toil of a difficult language in order to gain access to such a field of research, who ever dreams that the Chinese language

contains anything else to repay the labor of acquisition? Who ever imagines that in pursuing his favorite game, instead of traversing deserts and jungles, he will find himself walking among forests filled with the songs of strange birds, and perfumed with the fragrance of unknown flowers, while ever and anon he is ravished by the view of some landscape of surpassing beauty? As soon would the student of literary art expect to find the graces of diction among the hieratic inscriptions of Egypt, or the arrow-headed records of Assyria, as to meet them on pages that bristle with the ideographic symbols of China. It is with a view to correcting such prevalent impressions that this paper is written. In attempting this, however, I do not propose a disquisition on the value of Chinese literature in general, nor commit myself to the task of elucidating the principles of its rhetoric and grammar; but limit myself rather to the single topic of style; and more particularly the style of its prose composition. This is a subject which, I am aware, it will not be easy to discuss in such a manner as to render it intelligible or interesting to those who are unacquainted with the Chinese language. Style is a volatile quality, which escapes in the process of transfusion; and illustrations of style, however carefully rendered, are at best but as dried plants and stuffed animals compared with living nature. Chinese, moreover, being from our idiom the most remote of all languages, suffers most in the process of rendering. I fear, therefore, that the best versions I may be able to offer will only have the effect of confirming the impressions which it is my object to combat. That such impressions are erroneous, ought to be apparent from the mere consideration of the antiquity and extent of the Chinese literature. For, to suppose that a great people have been engaged from a time anterior to the rise of any other living language in building up a literature unequalled in amount, and to suppose that that literature contains nothing to gratify the taste or feed the imagination, is it not to suppose its authors destitute of the attributes of our common humanity? Are we to believe that the bees of China are so different from those of other countries, that they construct their curious cells from a mere love of labor, without ever depositing there the sweets on which they are wont to feed?

It is not always true that external decoration implies internal finish or furniture; still we may assert that it would be impossible that the taste which the Chinese display in the embellishment of their hand-writing and letter-press should not find its counterpart in the refinement of style.

They literally worship their letters. When letters were invented, they say, heaven rejoiced and hell trembled. Not for any consideration will they tread on a piece of lettered paper; and to foster this reverence, literary associations employ agents to go about the streets, collect waste paper, and burn it on a kind of altar, with the solemnity of a sacrifice. They execute their characters with the painter's brush, and rank writing as the very highest of the fine arts. They decorate their dwellings and the temples of their gods with ornamental inscriptions; and exercise their ingenuity in varying both chirography and orthography in a hundred fantastic ways. We may well excuse them for this almost idolatrous admiration for the greatest gift of their ancestors, for there is no other language on earth whose written characters approach the Chinese in their adaptation to pictorial effect.

Yet all this exaggerated attention to the mechanical art is but an index of the ardor with which Chinese scholars devote themselves to the graces of composition.

Their style is as varied as their chirography, and as much more elaborate than that of other nations. If they spend years in learning to write, where others give a few weeks or months to the acquisition of that accomplishment, it is equally true that, while in other countries, the student acquires a style of composition almost by accident, those of China make it the earnest study of half a life-time.

While, in the lower examinations, elegance of mechanical execution joined to a fair proportion of other merits is sure to achieve success, in competition for the higher degrees, the essays are copied by official clerks before they meet the eye of the examiner; style is everything and hand-writing nothing. Even the matter of the essay is of little consequence in comparison with the form in which it is presented. This is perceived and lamented by the more intelligent among the Chinese themselves. They often contrast the hollow glitter of the style of

the present day with the solid simplicity of the ancients; and denounce the art of producing the standard *wen-chang* or polished essay, as no less mechanical than that of ornamental penmanship. The writer has heard Ch'ung-hau, who himself wields an elegant pen, speak of the stress which the literary tribunals lay on the superficial amenities of style, as a "clever contrivance adopted by a former dynasty to prevent the literati from *thinking too much*."

Still, however sensible to its defects, Chinese scholars, without exception, glory in the extent and high refinement of their national literature. "We yield to you the palm of science," one of them once said to me, after a discussion on their false notions of nature and its forces; but he added—"You, of course, will not deny to us the meed of letters."

The Chinese language is not so ill adapted to purposes of rhetorical embellishment as might be inferred from its primitive structure. Totally destitute of inflection—its substantives without declension, its adjectives without comparison, and its verbs without conjugation, it seems at first view "sans everything" that ought to belong to a cultivated tongue. Bound, moreover, to a strict order of collocation, which its other deficiencies make a necessity, it would seem to be a clumsy instrument for thought and expression. Nor do I deny that it is so in comparison with the leading languages of the West; but it is a marvel how fine a polish Chinese scholars have made it receive, and what dexterity they acquire in the use of it. It possesses, too, some compensating qualities. Its monosyllabic form gives it the advantage of concentrated energy; and if the value of its words must be fixed by their position, like numerals in a column of figures, or mandarins on an occasion of state ceremony, it makes amends for this inconvenience by admitting each character to do duty in all the principal parts of speech. In English, we find it to be an element of strength to be able to convert many of our nouns into verbs. In Chinese, the interchange is all but universal; and it is easy to perceive how much this circumstance must contribute to the variety and vigor of expression, as well as to economy of resources.

The advice which Han-yu gives as to the treatment of the Buddhist priesthood, is *jìn ch'i jìn, lu ch'i tū, hwo ch'i shu*;

literally *man their men, house their temples, fire their books*; an expression of which all but the last clause is as unintelligible as the original Chinese. To the Chinese reader it means, "burn their books, make laity of their priests, and dwelling-houses of their sacred places;" and in its native form it is as elegant as it is terse and forcible.

Before all things, a Chinese loves conciseness. This taste he has inherited from his forefathers of forty centuries ago, who, having but a scanty stock of rude emblems, were compelled to practice economy. The complexity of the characters and the labor of writing confirmed the taste; so that though the pressure of poverty is now removed, the scholar of the present day, in regard to the expenditure of ink, continues to be as parsimonious as his ancestors. While we construct our sentences so as to guard against the possibility of mistake, he is satisfied with giving the reader a hint of his meaning. Our style is a ferry boat that carries the reader over without danger or effort on his part; theirs is only a succession of stepping-stones which test the agility of the passenger in leaping from one to another.

The Chinese writer is not ignorant of the Horatian canon, that in "striving after brevity he becomes obscure;" but with him obscurity is a less fault than redundancy. Accordingly, in Chinese, those latent ideas to which a French writer has lately drawn attention play an important part. In return for a few hints, the reader himself supplies all the links that are necessary for the continuity of thought. This intense brevity is better adapted to a language which is addressed to the eye, than it would be to one which is expected to be equally intelligible to the ear. Light is quicker than sound. *Segnius irritant animos demissa per aurem.*

Next to conciseness, or perhaps in preference to it, the Chinese writer is bound to keep in view the law of symmetry. He loves a kind of parallelism; but it is not that of the Hebrew poets, whose tautology he abhors. It may consist of a simile; but more frequently it merely amounts to the expression of correlated ideas in nicely corresponding phrases. Every sentence is balanced with the utmost precision; every word having its proper counterpoise, and the whole composition moving on with the measured tread of a troop of soldiers.

Dr. Johnson's famous parallel between Pope and Dryden, and the studied antitheses of Lord Macaulay, are quite in accordance with the taste of the Chinese. When they meet with such a passage in a foreign book, they usually exclaim, "This writer knows something of the art of composition." And where, in addition to a superfluity of words, they find, as they often do, a neglect of their cardinal principle, they do not fail to express their disgust.

A difficulty in rendering the Christian Scriptures is, that the translator is not at liberty to measure off his periods according to the canons of Chinese taste; and he not unfrequently gives unnecessary offence by retaining all the circumstances of gender, number, and tense, where the sense does not require them, and where the genius of the Chinese language and the rules of Chinese rhetoric alike reject them. In this respect, the earlier translations were particularly faulty; and of the more recent versions, one at least (that of the Delegates) is distinguished for classical taste.

In such a task, the distinction between the *dolmetscher* and the *übersetzer* which Schleiermacher has so clearly drawn, should always be kept in view. For, difficult as is the task of translating out of a foreign language, that of translation into it is still more so; and still more essential is it that the translator be thoroughly imbued with its spirit. He must himself be in a manner naturalized, in order that his literary offspring may enjoy the privileges of citizenship.

The bane of Chinese style is a servile imitation of antiquity. This not only confines the writer within a narrow circle of threadbare thoughts; it has the effect of disfiguring modern literature by spurious ornaments borrowed from the ancients. The authors of the Thirteen Classics are canonized. Infallible in letters as in doctrine, every expression which they have employed becomes a model; or rather, I should say, a portion of the current vocabulary. But, like the waters of the *King* and *Wei*, the diverse elements refuse to mingle, giving to the most admired composition a heterogeneous aspect, which mars its beauty in our eyes as much as it enhances it in those of the Chinese. A premium is thus placed on pedantry, and fetters are imposed on the feet of genius. The peculiar dialect which

we sometimes hear from the pulpit, made up of fragments of the sacred text skilfully incorporated with the language of every day life, may serve as an illustration of this singular compound.

In spite of this imitation of antiquity, they are, age after age, insensibly drifting away from their standard. A law of movement seems to be impressed on all things, which even the Chinese are unable to resist. By consequence, each century in their long history, or more properly each dynasty, has formed a style of its own. The authors of the *Chau*, *Han*, *Tang*, and *Sung* periods are broadly discriminated.

China abounds in literary adventurers of the stamp of Constantine Simonides, and the prevalent antiquity-worship affords them encouragement; but happily she has her critics too, as acute as Aristarchus of old.

The great schools of religious philosophy are also strongly differentiated in their style of expression. The Confucian, dealing with the things of common life, aims at perspicuity. The Tauist, occupied with magic and mystery, veils his thoughts in symbols and far-fetched metaphors. The Buddhist, to the obscurity inseparable from the imported metaphysics of India, adds an opaque medium by the constant use of Sanskrit phrases which are ill understood. Subdivisions of these great schools have likewise their peculiarities of style. Of these, however, I shall not speak, but hasten to indicate certain species of composition, each of which is characterized by a style of its own.

In no country are private correspondence, official despatches, and didactic and narrative writings distinguished by more marked peculiarities.

In China, the style of epistolary intercourse, instead of approaching, as with us, to that of familiar conversation, is singularly stiff and affected. Whatever the subject, it is ushered in by a formal parade of set phrases, and finished off by a conclusion equally stereotyped and unmeaning. Form dominates everything in China. It is seldom that a letter flows freely from the heart and pen even of an able writer; and as for the less educated, though quite capable of expressing their own thoughts in their own way, they never think of such a thing as throwing off the constraint of prescribed forms. It is amusing

to see how carefully one who hears of the death of a relative culls from the letter book a form exactly suited to the degree of his affliction. If the Chinese wrote love-letters (which they never do), they would all employ the same honeyed phrases; or, like Falstaff, in the "Merry Wives," address the same epistle to all the different objects of their admiration.

By way of sample, here is a "note of congratulation on the birthday of a friend." "The Book of History lauds the five kinds of happiness, and the Book of Odes makes use of the nine similes. Both extol the honors of old age. Rejoicing at the anniversary of your advent, I utter the prayer of Hwa-fung; and, by way of recording my tally in the seaside cottage, I lay my tribute at your feet, by retaining the whole of which you will shed lustre on him who offers it."

In this short note we have five classic allusions, two of which require a word of explanation. The prayer of Hwa-fung was for the emperor Yau, that he might be blessed with a happy old age and numerous posterity. The "tally in the seaside cottage" refers to a legend in which one of the genii, when asked his age, replied that he "could not reckon it by years; but as often as the azure sea became a field for the planting of mulberry groves, he was accustomed to note the event by depositing a tally. Those tallies now filled ten chambers of his dwelling."

The reply to the foregoing ran as follows:

"My trifling life has passed away in vanity, unmarked by a single trait of excellence. On my birthday especially this fills me with shame. How dare I then accept your congratulatory gifts? I beg to decline them, and prostrate pray for indulgence."

The official correspondence and State papers of the Chinese are for the most part dignified, clear, and free from those pedantic allusions with which they love to adorn their other writings. Whoever has read, even in the form of a translation, the memorials on the opium trade laid before the emperor Taukwang, or the papers of Commissioner Lin on the same subject, cannot have failed to be struck with their manifest ability. Some of them are eloquent in style and masterly in argument. Imperial edicts are generally well written; but those of the

emperor Yung-ching are of such conspicuous merit that they are collected in a series of volumes, and studied as models of composition.

The didactic style, whether that of commentaries on the classic texts, or of treatises on science, morals, and practical arts, is always formed in accordance with the maxim of Confucius, *Tsze tah erh ye*, "enough if you are clear." Such writings are as lucid as the nature of the subject, the genius of the language, and the brain of the author will admit. The commentaries on the classics are admirable specimens of textual exposition.

The narrative style ranges from the gravity of history to the description of scenery and the humorous anecdote.

Its ideal is the combination of the graphic with simplicity. Of the historical writings of the Chinese, so far as their style is concerned, nothing more can be said than that they are simple and perspicuous. Interesting they are not; for their bondage to the annal and journal form has prevented their giving us comprehensive *tableaux*; while the idea of a philosophy of history has never dawned on their minds. In descriptions of scenery the Chinese excel. They have an eye for the picturesque in nature; and nature throws her varied charms over the pages of their literature with a profusion unknown among the pagan nations of the West. Chinese writers are particularly fond of relating incidents that are susceptible of a practical application. Of this allow me to furnish one or two illustrations.

"Confucius was passing the foot of the T'ai-shan, when he heard a woman weeping beside a new-made grave. There was something so sad in the tones of her voice, that the sage leaned his head on his hand and listened. Then sending Tsz'-lu (one of his disciples), he said to her, 'Madam, you weep as though you were loaded with many sorrows.' She replied, 'What you say is true. First, my husband's brother was devoured by a tiger, then my husband was killed, and now my son has been eaten.' 'But why do you not leave this fatal spot?' 'Because,' said the woman, 'here among the mountains there are no oppressive magistrates.' 'Mark that, my children,' said the sage addressing his disciples; 'oppressive magistrates are dreaded more than tigers.'"

This is from Tan-kung of the Chau dynasty. Liu-tsung-yuen, of the Tang period, has a similar narrative in which a poisonous reptile takes the place of the tiger. A poor man was employed to capture the spotted snake for medicinal purposes, and had his taxes remitted on condition of supplying the imperial college of physicians with two every year. The author expressing his sympathy for his perilous occupation, the man replied, "My grandfather died in this way, my father also, and I, during the twelve years in which I have been so engaged, have more than once been near dying by the bite of serpents." As he uttered this with a very sorrowful expression of countenance, "Do you wish," said I, "that I should speak to the magistrates and have you released from this hard service?" His look became more sorrowful, and, bursting into tears, he exclaimed, "If you pity me, allow me, I pray you, to pursue my present occupation; for be assured that my lot, hard as it is, is by no means so pitiable as that of those who suffer the exactions of tax-gatherers."

I add a specimen, in the same vein, from Liu-ki, a writer of the Ming period, who flourished no more than five hundred years ago. "I saw," he says, "oranges exposed on a fruit-stand in mid-summer, and sold at a fabulous price. They looked fresh and tempting, and I bought one. On breaking it open, a puff of something like smoke filled my mouth and nose. Turning to the seller, I demanded, "Why do you sell such fruit? It is fit for nothing but to offer to the gods, or to set before strangers. What a shame! What a disgraceful cheat!" "Well were it," replied the fruit-seller, "if my oranges were the only shams." And he went on to show how we have sham soldiers in the field, sham statesmen in the cabinet, and shams everywhere. "I went away silently musing whether this fruit-seller might not be after all a philosopher, who had taken to selling rotten oranges in order to have a text from which to preach on the subject of shams."

The last two pieces, though separated from it by a space of from twelve to sixteen hundred years, are evidently modelled after the first. I have quoted them to show that Chinese writers are not always servile in their imitations, or timid in denouncing the corruptions of their government.

Another kind of style is that of the *Wen-chang*, or polished essay—a brief treatise on any subject, constructed according to fixed rules, and limited to six or eight hundred words. In our own literature it answers to the short papers, such as those of the *Spectator* and *Rambler*, which were so much in vogue in the last century—invariably ushered in by a classic motto, and expected to be a model of fine writing.

The production of these is the leading test of literary ability. The school-boy writes *wen-chang* as soon as he is able to construe the native classics, and the gray-haired competitor for the doctorate in the examinations at the capital is still found writing *wen-chang*. In all the world there is no kind of literature produced in equal quantity—excepting, perhaps, sermons. Nor is their prodigious quantity their only point of resemblance to the productions of the western pulpit. They always have a text from the sacred books, which they analyze in a most artificial manner, and uniformly reduce to eight heads. They aim at nothing beyond exposition, on the principle that the moderns can do nothing more than unfold the germs of ancient wisdom; originality is renounced, and, as already intimated, their chief adornment consists in the artful interweaving of sacred and modern phraseology. Like the inlaid wares of the Chinese, or the mosaic pictures of the West, the more numerous and minute their component parts, the more are these compositions admired. Of no practical utility except as a mental gymnastic, the style of these essays exerts an influence through the whole range of literature. Indeed, the term which is commonly employed to cover the whole field of *belles lettres* is no other than *wen-chang*.

Here is the opening paragraph of an essay which took the first honor in a recent examination for the doctorate.

Subject—Good-faith and Dignity. “When we begin, we should look to the end. Good-faith and dignity of carriage should therefore be objects of our care. By faith we mean that our acts should respond to our promise; and by dignity, that our bearing should be such as to repel any approach towards insolent familiarity. This is only obtained by cherishing a sense of right, cultivating a regard for propriety, and at the same time maintaining a sympathy for our fellow men.

In this earthly pilgrimage what we most desire is to escape the blame of being untrue. We choose our words with care for fear we should be untrue to our fellows. We choose our actions with care for fear we should be untrue to ourselves. And we choose our companions with care, lest we should prove unfaithful to our friends, or they should prove unfaithful to us. By so doing, we can fulfill our obligations, maintain our dignity of character, and yet preserve inviolate our social attachments. Within, we shall have a heart that feels its self-imposed engagements as much as if it were bound by the stipulations of a solemn covenant; while without, we shall wear an aspect that will command the respect of those who approach us."

"Enough," you will say, "those thoughts are all very commonplace. It is of no use to translate any further." And truly; for a translation can never do justice to the subtle qualities which caused this performance to be crowned among seven thousand competitors. The delicate sutures which blend its various elements into a harmonious whole must, of course, like the wavy lines of a Damascus blade, disappear when cast into the crucible of the translator.

From what has been said of the style of schools, periods, and different provinces in the empire of letters, it follows that, notwithstanding their propensity for imitation, Chinese writers must be as strongly individualized as those of other countries. If gifted with original genius, they form a style of their own; if not, they produce in new and undesigned combinations the traits of earlier authors by whom they have been most deeply impressed. Confucius professed to be an imitator; but he was eminently original. Direct, practical, and comprehensive, his thoughts are expressed in language at once concise and rhythmic—resembling as much as anything else those choice lines of Shakespeare, which by their combined felicity of idea and expression have become transformed into popular proverbs. Whether like the Hindoo *guru* he threw them into this form as the text for his daily discourse, or whether they were reduced by his disciples, it is not in all cases easy to determine. But certain it is that, stripped of their attractive dress, whatever their intrinsic merit, they never could have attained such universal currency. The teachings of Confucius owe as much to style as

those of Mohammed. The extent to which style was studied in his time we may infer from the account he gives us of the manner in which the elegant state papers of the Principality of Cheng were produced. They were the work of four men with long strange names. One "drew out a rough draft," a second "sifted the arguments," another "added rhetorical embellishments," and the fourth finished them by "polishing off the periods."

Lau-tse, the contemporary of Confucius, though somewhat his senior, left his instructions to posterity in "five thousand words," cast in a semi-poetical mould. Obscure and paradoxical like Heraclitus of Ephesus, surnamed the Dark (a writer with whom it would not be difficult to trace other points of analogy besides their common partiality for enigma), his dark pages are illumined by many a flash of far-reaching light. Each of these great masters impressed his style on the school which he founded.

Mencius is Confucius with less dogmatism and more vehemence; while the wild fancy of Chwang-tse reproduces the characteristics of Lau-tse in exaggerated proportions.

With both, the current of their diction flows like a river, but in each case it wears the complexion of its distant source.

As another example of a contrast in manner, I may adduce two historians of the Chau period. Hung-yang-kau and Tso-chew-ming both confine themselves to the role of expositors, taking the Confucian annals as their text; but the first often commences with a minute analysis of the text, while the other proceeds at once to a narrative of facts. The former, for instance, thus expounds the heading of a chapter:

"First year, spring, royal first moon." "Why the first year? Because it was the commencement of a new reign. Why does he mention spring? Because the year began at that season. Why in speaking of the month does he prefix the word royal? To indicate that it was fixed by the imperial calendar. Why refer to the imperial calendar? To show that all the states are united under one sovereign," &c., &c.

From Tso-chew-ming I cite a passage, which, whether it do or do not exhibit any other peculiarity, will at least show the absence of interrogation marks.

Text—*The Prince of Cheng conquers Toan and Yien.* Premising that the belligerents were brothers; that their mother had abetted the rebellion of Toan, the younger; and that the Prince, pronouncing against her sentence of banishment, had taken a solemn oath never to see her again until they should both be under the ground, the historian continues: "The Prince soon repented of his hasty oath. The Governor of Ying-ku heard it, and came with a present. The Prince detained him to dine. Ying-ku put aside a portion of the meats. The Prince inquired the reason. Said Ying-ku, 'They are for my mother, who has never tasted such royal dainties.' 'You have a mother then,' said the Prince; 'alas! I have none.' He then told him of his oath, at the same time informing him of his repentance.

'Why need your Majesty be troubled on that account,' exclaimed Ying-ku. 'If you will only make a subterranean chamber with two doors, and meet there, who will say that you have not kept your oath?'

The Prince took the counsel, and meeting his mother beneath the ground, they became mother and son as before. How perfect the piety of Ying-ku, who devised the plan!"

The great masters of style are a thousand years later than these last; and then we find philosophers, poets, and historians in such constellations as to make the dynasties of Tang and Sung a golden age for Chinese letters. Then flourished such writers as Han-yu, surnamed the Prince of Literature: Li-po, in whom the planet Venus was believed to be incarnate; the three Su, father and sons; and a host of others whose light has not yet reached the western shores, and whose names it would be tedious to recount. Their names, musical enough in the tones of their native land, are harsh to occidental ears. What a pity they have not all been clothed in graceful Latin, like those of Confucius and Mencius! These sages, if they owe to their style in a great degree their popularity at home, are almost equally indebted for their fame abroad to the classical terminations of their names. Name is fame in more than one sense, and more than one language—in Chinese as in Hebrew—and it is obvious that in the western world no amount of merit would be sufficient to confer celebrity on a man bearing

the name of *K'ong-foo-tsze*! I refrain from farther extracts. For reasons already given, no translation can do justice to the style of a Chinese writer; and a volume, instead of a brief essay, would be required to give an approximate idea of the other qualities of what the Chinese describe as their *elegant literature*.

To their poets we have made no reference, as that would open up a distinct field for inquiry. It is on their poetry that they especially pique themselves; but, as I think, with mistaken judgment. For while their prose writers, like those of France, are unsurpassed in felicity of style, their poetry, like that of France, is stiff and constrained. Like their own women, their poetical muses have cramped feet and no wings.

For variety in prose composition, the nature of the language affords a boundless scope. For, not to speak of local dialects, the language of scholars, or the written language, ranges in its choice of expressions from the familiar *patois* up to the most archaic forms. In China, nothing becomes obsolete; and the writer is thus enabled to pitch his composition, at option, on a high or low key, and to carry it through consistently. There are, for example, three sets of personal pronouns, that correspond to as many grades of style; while there are other styles in which the personal pronoun is dispensed with, and substantives employed instead.

Founded on pictorial representation, the language is in many of its features highly poetical, the strange beauties with which it charms the fancy at every step suggesting a ramble among the gardens of the sea-nymphs. Nor is it a dead language, though in its written form no longer generally spoken. It contains "thoughts that breathe, and words that burn"—writers whom the student will gladly acknowledge as worthy compeers of the most admired authors of the ancient West. I say "ancient," for China is essentially ancient. She is not yet modernized, and finds fitter parallels in pagan antiquity than in modern Christendom.

The time, I trust, is not far distant, when her language will find a place in all our principal seats of learning, and when her classic writers will be known and appreciated.

ARTICLE IV.—IMMANUEL KANT.*

I. *Kant's Sämmtliche Werke.*

II. *Fichte's Sämmtliche Werke.*

III. *Erdmann's Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie.* Berlin, 1866.

IV. *Kiesewetter's Darstellung der kritischen Philosophie.* Berlin, 1824.

V. *Journal of Speculative Philosophy.* St. Louis, Mo.

OF all the great men of the mysterious German nation, Immanuel Kant is to the world, outside of Germany, perhaps the most mysterious. That he was a great man in his time we all have heard, but wherein that greatness of his consisted, thereof we are lamentably ignorant. Of his numerous works, only one, *the Critique of Pure Reason*, is generally known to the English-speaking public, and even this fragment of his system has been so misrepresented, partly by translations and partly by commentaries, as to have estranged the author and that public even more than if he had not been known to it at all. As it is, Kant passes current as a skeptic, and the wonder is, how a skeptic could have exercised that tremendous influence upon European literature, religion, and particularly science, which is generally ascribed to Kant. His life certainly affords no clue to it.

Born on the 22d of April, 1724, in Königsberg, where his father, of Scottish descent, was established as a saddler, he was educated in strictly religious principles, and from 1740–1746 studied theology, philosophy, and mathematics in the Königsberg University. He then accepted an engagement as tutor and remained in that employment until 1755, when he began his

*The editors of the New Englander publish the following statement and vindication of the principles of the Kantian philosophy on account of the spirit and ability with which the paper is written, and the light which it casts upon some of the doctrines of Kant which are not easily apprehended. Some of the positions taken by the writer they do not accept.

career as professor at the Königsberg University, a career which he followed until the year 1797, when the weakness of old age compelled him to retire. He never married, nor did he ever travel further than a few miles from his native city. The only serious conflict with the world, in which he was engaged, was when in 1794 he published his *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason*, which induced a reprimand from the Prussian Government as "containing misrepresentations and degrading statements of many fundamental doctrines of the Bible and of Christianity," in consequence of which reprimand Kant publicly declared his resolve neither to write nor speak publicly again on matters of religion. Nevertheless, he would have recommenced his lectures on the *Critique of Religion* after the death of Frederic Wilhelm II, had not old age weakened his powers too seriously. Notwithstanding, he did take his revenge in a very caustic and outspoken Article, republished in his minor writings. DeQuincy misrepresents the whole transaction, and descends to downright falsification in describing Kant as an atheist. Kant died on the 12th of February, 1804, in the eightieth year of his life. In social life he was extremely genial and agreeable. He courted society, dressed neatly, loved a game of billiards, and in all respects had the air and manners of a gentleman. His sympathies during the great political struggles of his epoch were always with the liberal side: he sided with the Americans as well as with the French, and with the Americans in their union-tendencies as opposed to the extreme state-rights party, as well as with the more moderate republicans in France in their opposition to the execution of Louis XVI. His life was without a blemish.

The celebrity of Kant is, therefore, not to be in any way ascertained by an investigation of his life; it lies all concentrated in the lectures that he read and books that he wrote at the Königsberg University, but dates more particularly from the publication in 1781 of his *Critique of Pure Reason*. For in his earlier years, and indeed up to 1770, Kant in his lectures on philosophy followed pretty closely the school of Wolff. It was chiefly through the influence of the French and English skeptical and empirical writers of that time, that Kant was first shaken out of the dogmatic security which that school,—in this respect like all previous systems of philosophy,—imposed upon

its followers, and induced to enter upon that thorough and earnest investigation, extending through twelve years, which resulted in the discovery, to the elaboration of which he devoted henceforth his whole life, and which established his renown and his greatness. The smaller works that were written before the appearance of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, reveal the struggles that agitated the reformer in respect to many points, and show how one of the idols of scholastic philosophy fell down after the other under the operation of his critical scrutiny.

This discovery may be briefly described by stating the characteristic distinction of Kant's *method* from the method of all previous philosophers;* for it is in the method or form alone that the whole distinction lies, as indeed must necessarily be the case where an entirely new system presents itself. It was not through the discovery of any particular new objects in the heavens that Copernicus revolutionized astronomy, but through the adoption of an entirely new method or manner of viewing these subjects.

All the Greek philosophers, and indeed all the philosophers before Kant—Leibnitz, perhaps, excepted—held it as their fundamental maxim, and indeed as constituting the science of philosophy, that by means of that science, or by means of thinking, man could rise to a knowledge of things beyond the sphere of common consciousness; and that thus a world altogether beyond perception and unconnected with perception could be opened to the philosopher. They pretended the possession of a science, through which the existence of a God and the immortality of the soul, the creation of the world, etc., could be demonstrated by simply a drawing of conclusions, and exhausted their ingenuity in devising new premises and drawing new conclusions in a manner to excite the applause of the astounded multitude. In the course of time it appeared, however, that by the same manner of drawing conclusions from a premised conception the very opposite could be proved of what had been proved by the first party, and that hence it could also be proved that the existence of God, immortality of the soul, simple substances, etc., were

* This distinction is elaborated with great perspicuity by Fichte in his *Sum-clear Statement*. See *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, St. Louis, Mo. Vol. ii, pages 6 and 7.

impossible. So the philosophers continued arguing indefinitely against each other, as they do indeed yet up to the present day in the same absurd manner; the dogmatic idealists of the school of Schelling, Hegel, on the one side, still drawing conclusions to prove their ideas, and the dogmatic realists of the Herbert Spencer, Mill, Comte, Vogt, and Büchner school still drawing conclusions to prove them impossible, using the same arguments in the same obstinate manner that have served for thousands of years to confuse mankind.

It was chiefly through the reading of Hume's *Essay on Causality* that Kant was first thoroughly shaken in his dogmatic assurance. Hume, it will be remembered, tried to prove, that the conception of cause and effect is simply the result of a habit we have of connecting phenomena, which we have frequently observed to follow others, with those which precede them. This statement led Kant to consider how it could be possible for no matter how many thousands or millions of observations of *sequences* to change their whole character by turning into the conception of *cause and effect*. How could quantity change into quality? No matter how many times I observe the stone to become warm as the sun shines upon it, how can the mere habit of noticing the sequence all at once change into the assertion, that it is the sun which *causes* the stone to become warm? No analysis can derive from the conception of sequences—however numerous—the conception of causality. The conceptions of a million sequences still remain merely conceptions of sequences. Hence the conception of causality must be a synthetic one, that is to say, must *necessarily*, through a law of the human mind, connect with the conception a certain kind of sequence, so that the one cannot be thought without the other. How is this possible? How are such synthetic conceptions, *a priori*, possible? That analytical conceptions should be valid for all men is self-evident, since the analysis predicates of the subject only that which the conception of the subject itself involves; hence, if there are disputes about analytical judgments, those disputes can be only word-disagreements. That synthetic conceptions, *a posteriori*, should be valid for all men is equally self-evident, for men do not dispute upon empirical matters, but only disagree; and all empirical

conceptions are synthetical, that is, add a new predicate to another empirical conception. For instance: the discovery of the magnetic power in iron added a new conception—that of attraction—to the conception of iron. The question, therefore, which presents itself for solution is this: How are synthetical conceptions, *à priori*, possible?

Kant thinks that Hume, had he but propounded to himself this question seriously, or had he considered that those conceptions *must* be possible, since the whole science of mathematics is based on them, would have made the same discovery which he announced in his *Critique of Pure Reason*—a discovery that necessarily solved *all* the problems of the human mind at once. For if we cannot dispute about empirical propositions, which are all synthetical, nor about analytical propositions, since disputes about them can be only word-disputes, the question—how synthetical propositions, *à priori*, are possible?—must involve all the rest of rational knowledge; and the discoverer of the answer to that question must thus become the discoverer of a science which will fathom all the powers of reason, determine its limits, and forever debar the possibility of disputes on purely *à priori* subjects. That Kant saw this full scope and importance of the work he was about to undertake, and was proudly conscious of the greatness of his task—the greatest task ever submitted to man—is evident throughout all his three Critiques, and is expressed with particular emphasis in his *Prolegomena*, which latter work is to be especially recommended to students of Kant as a most admirable condensation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and written with all the elegance and warmth of diction this great man was so thoroughly master of. This proud consciousness also should do away once for all with the utterly false charge of skepticism which is so often preferred against Kant. After his great discovery opened upon him, never was there a man less skeptical. Again and again he refers to the absolute certainty, which he has established for all times for philosophy and indeed for all sciences. If any man was ever without a doubt, it was Immanuel Kant.

That such synthetic judgments, *à priori*, were possible became evident to Kant when he reflected—as Hume had not reflected, and what indeed had escaped all previous philosophers—that

all mathematical judgments are of such an *à priori* synthetical character. No matter how often you think 7 and 5, the conception of 12 will never arise in your mind except by a new distinct act; no matter how often you think the shortest line between two points, the conception of straightness will never commingle and unite with it except by a new distinct act of the mind. Every mathematical proposition is thus synthetical, and since they are all *à priori*, synthetical *à priori*. This reflection encouraged Kant in his suspicion that the same ground in human reason which gives rise to the synthetical *à priori* propositions of the science of mathematics, also gives rise to those synthetical conceptions, *à priori*, upon which the science of physics is based, of which the chief one, that of causality, Hume had with so much plausibility represented as no real new conception, but simply the expression of a quantitative difference. It was, therefore, quite appropriate to divide the one question—how are synthetical judgments, *à priori*, possible?—into the two: how is a science of pure mathematics possible? and how is a science of physics possible? The reply to these questions must inevitably show whether other *à priori* synthetical propositions are possible, or—the former two questions exhausting the whole phenomenal world—whether a science of metaphysics is possible?

Kant gave twelve years of profound study to the work which was to solve these questions, and then wrote it in a few months. Being thus in its method not a drawing of conclusions from assumed conceptions, but in the nature of an investigation as to whether reason had the power to propound synthetical conceptions, *à priori*, he appropriately called his work a *Critique of Reason*, and he called it a *Critique of PURE* or rather of *THEORETICAL Reason*, because it was to confine itself exclusively to that faculty of general reason which cognizes an outside world. It is all the more necessary to remember this, as the unwarranted presupposition, that by *Pure Reason* Kant meant reason in general, in all its faculties, has led to innumerable misapprehensions.

Kant, therefore, divided his *Critique of Pure Reason* into three parts: the first part—*Transcendental Aesthetic*—solving the problem how a science of pure mathematics is possible; the

second—*Transcendental Logic*—how a science of pure physics is possible; and the third—*Transcendental Dialectic*—whether a science of metaphysics is possible.

The first part solves its problem in this manner: whatsoever reason becomes conscious of is necessarily an affection of its inner self. Such an inner affection language calls *sensation*. But reason could not become conscious of this affection did it not cast it outside of itself, and look upon it as outside of itself or different from itself. This power of beholding is called in language *contemplation*.* But, furthermore, reason could not become conscious of a single contemplated sensation, or object outside of itself, unless such an object were not merely an object in general, but a particularly determined object, and hence distinguished from and related to an infinite multiplicity of other external objects—a power of distinguishing external objects from and relating them to each other, which language terms *conception*. Reason, therefore, cannot be conscious of anything, and hence cannot be reason, unless it, 1, *sensates*, 2, *contemplates*, 3, *conceives*; all of which three functions are in language included under the one general term of *perception*. Now the sensations that arise in us, being altogether empirical, that is to say, we being utterly unable to ascribe them to our own activity,† but rather compelled to attribute them to something not ourselves—to a non-ego, are clearly in so far utterly beyond being accounted for. But that these sensations should be taken hold of by our ego, and thrown outside of us, and again related to and distinguished from each other, is just as evidently ascribable only to our own activity, for the conception of an external influence creating a sensation within us involves in no manner whatever the conception of a reproducing this sensation outside of us. There must be, therefore, in the nature of our reason a power thus to contemplate an outside of

* We must again insist that no one can enter into KANT's discovery who does not translate his word *Anschauung* by another word than intuition. Kant himself lays so repeatedly stress upon the necessity of distinguishing *Anschauung* from intuition that it seems gratuitous to dwell upon it. *Anschauung* is literally: beholding, gazing upon, looking upon, contemplating.

† The ground is, that the conception of reason is that of a pure activity, which thinks only itself. Hence it cannot, in proper language, call also that reason, which it distinguishes from itself as not such activity.

us, in short, to contemplate a space, and space can be nothing but such an absolute contemplation of the ego, wherein it posits its infinite sensations in the shape of a *together* or co-existence of infinite points and lines. Thus it becomes clear how *geometrical*, synthetical propositions, *à priori*, are possible. They are possible, because reason in order to become conscious of sensations must project out of itself the contemplation of space, wherein reason can thus draw infinite points and lines, and hence move synthetically.* But these sensations, thrown outside of us into space, could also not be cognized if they were not distinguished by the ego *in the ego itself*, and related to each other *in it*; a relation and distinction which is possible only if the ego contemplates itself as an infinite series of successive moments. Thus besides the contemplation of space the ego must have a contemplation of time as not a *together* but a *succession* of points, and from this is explained how *arithmetical* synthetical propositions, *à priori*, are possible. They are possible, because reason in order to become conscious of sensations must contemplate itself as an infinite series of moments linked together, which it combines by its own absolute power and hence synthetically. But a consciousness of sensations is also not possible unless those sensations are placed in relation to each other by means of conceptions; and thus from the science of pure contemplation, or of *Transcendental Æsthetic*, we are necessarily driven into the science of pure conception, or *Transcendental Logic*.

This second part of the *Critique of Pure Reason*—which has for its problem how a science of pure physics is possible—solves its problem in the same manner as the first part, namely, by showing that consciousness could not be possible had we not certain *synthetical à priori conceptions*, or forms of relation, for all the sensations we objectivate in space and subjectivate in time. Kant calls these forms of relations *categories*, and enumerates them correctly enough, but adds: "I purposely abstain from the deduction of these categories, although I may be in possession of it." To save space we may here as well supplement Kant by Fichte's deduction, which runs somewhat as

* See Fichte's Sun-clear Statement in *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, vol. ii, pp. 72 and 73.

follows: Reason cannot become conscious of itself, or conscious at all, unless it has sensations which it contemplates in space, but which it cannot ascribe to itself. For the conception of reason is that of a pure activity, and hence it cannot ascribe a passivity, such as sensation is, to its own free agency. Hence language calls that which produces the sensation in the ego a non-ego. This is objectivated in space in a multiplicity of objects, and reproduced in the ego in the form of time. Now in so far as this non-ego is distinguished from the ego as not it, we call it in language *qualitatively* distinct; but in so far as it is also related to the ego, we call it *quantitatively* related. Reason can, therefore, never become conscious of a sensation except under the form of the two conceptions—*quality* and *quantity*—both of which conceptions are contained in the third one of *relation* in general; and in so far as all external objects are likewise both opposed to and related to each other, it will be impossible to conceive them except under these same three forms of relation or categories, and hence the whole science of physics has these three forms for its basis. But each of these three forms separates necessarily again into a triplicity; for the conception of quality arises from the one object, the ego, being viewed as a *reality*, its opposite, the non-ego, as a *negation* of that reality, and both of those conceptions uniting in the one of *limitation* or determination. Again, the conception of quantity arises from the one object, the ego, being viewed as a *unity* related to a non-ego as a *multiplicity*, and both of those conceptions uniting in the one conception of *totality*. Finally, the relation of the ego to the non-ego can be viewed as either the non-ego determining the ego, which is called in language the *causality* relation, or the ego limiting itself by positing a non-ego, which is called in language the *substantiality* relation, or finally, as each determining the other equally, which in language is called *reciprocal determination*.

Kant has, therefore, solved the second part of his problem by showing, that consciousness of externalized sensations would not be possible had not reason in itself an absolute power of relating itself to an opposite, and thus of uniting opposites in synthetical propositions; and this proof, namely, that consciousness would otherwise not be possible, has shown itself to be the

“supreme principle of all synthetical judgments.” But this very proof has already in point of fact made useless the consideration of the third question—whether a science of metaphysics is possible? For if synthetical propositions, *a priori*, have universal validity only because and in so far as consciousness of the sensations, which we objectivate in space, is not possible without them, all other synthetical conceptions that assume to relate to other cognitions than those that occur through sensation and contemplation are clearly not to be proved, nay, must involve inevitable fallacies.

When Kant, therefore, nevertheless enters upon the investigation of that third problem, he no longer establishes, but simply criticizes; and a disregard of this fact—which explains why Kant in the third book of his work uses a tone of undecidedness and query different from the tone of the first two parts of his work—has also been productive of much misapprehension. A pretended science of metaphysics, which claims that it can obtain knowledge of objects not given in sensation through the use of synthetical conceptions, *a priori*, i. e., by drawing conclusions, must rest upon misapplication of those conceptions, for the very reason that those conceptions are valid only because and hence in so far as they make possible consciousness of objects given in sensation. Now such a misapplication may occur in three ways. Those categories may be applied by reason either to itself as it thinks itself outside of all conscious perception; or to the thought of the totality of all external objects—a totality which can never become an object of conscious perception; or to the unity of both the totality of reason and the totality of external objects, which again can never become an object of perception. The misapplications of the first class Kant calls *paralogisms* of reason; those of the second *antinomies*; those of the third *ideals*.

The unwarranted application of the three categories to reason in a fictitiously assumed state of that reason beyond actual perception, has given rise to the three following assertions concerning the nature of that reason, or of the soul: 1st, that the soul is *quantitatively* a unity, i. e., numerically identical in the various conditions of its time-existence; 2d, *qualitatively* a simple; 3d, *relatively* a substance. Upon these three syntheti-

cal propositions the philosophers before Kant had built a science of rational psychology, chiefly with a view to establish the immortality of the soul. Kant in showing the unwarrantedness of such application demolishes that whole science, and leaves to the science of psychology simply an empirical character. The immortality of the soul can be neither proved nor disproved by any application of the categories to the conception of the ego. The proof by means of the *relative* category of substantiality is thus refuted by Kant. The conception of substance can in no wise be applied to the ego as mere self-consciousness, but only to accidents (empirical qualities) in the ego, and is nothing but the thought of the unity of accidents. But even if it could, and if the soul were considered as a substance, its immortality would by no means follow. The conception of a substance, as that which is permanent, does in no wise contain the conception of eternal memory, which is the very thing immortality signifies. The second proof by the *qualitative* category of personality, attributing personal identity to the ego, Kant refutes thus: Since the thinking of "I am," which constitutes personality, is altogether an empirical fact, it cannot be used to predicate of the ego something altogether beyond factical or empirical experiences.

The unwarranted application of the three categories to the totality of external objects has this peculiarity—that it results in *two sets* of three *a priori* synthetical propositions, each set of which flatly contradicts the other. The ground of this peculiarity is, that the totality may be viewed either as simply an infinite series, each link whereof is dependent upon the other, and no one independent, only the whole of the series being regarded as independent; or as a series whereof the totality is a part embracing the series. Hence, if the category of *quantity* is applied to the first view of the totality, there results this synthetical assertion: The world has no beginning or limit in time or space; but if applied to the second view there results the very opposite assertion: The world has a beginning in time and is limited in space. Again, if the category of *quality* is applied to the first view, there results this synthetical assertion: No composite consists of simple parts; there are no simple parts; all parts of matter are infinitely divisible; but if

applied to the second view the assertion becomes diametrically opposite, as follows: Each composite substance in the world consists of simple parts; there exists nothing but what is simple or composed of simples. Finally, under the category of *relation* the first view results in this assertion: Everything in the world happens according to the law of causality, and there is no such thing as freedom; but the second view again results in the very opposite assertion: All the occurrences in the world cannot be explained by means of the law of causality, and hence there must be such a thing as freedom.

Now this application of the categories being utterly unwarranted, since the totality of external objects cannot, under either view, ever become an object of perception, it follows that all of the six assertions are absurd, and that it is as foolish to try to prove a creation of the world, simple atoms or freedom, as to try to disprove them. Like the immortality of the soul, they are utterly beyond proof or disproof; *always let it be well understood—proof or disproof—through the categories.* Is it not a matter of infinite shame to our race, that in spite of this clear exhibition of the absurdity of trying such proof, the scientific world on either side, idealistic and materialistic, still goes on using these antinomies, each side abusing and reviling the other and refusing to acknowledge that both are talking nonsense?

The unwarranted application of the three categories to the conception of the unity of both all reason and all external objects, has given rise to the synthetical proposition of the existence of a *quantitatively ONE, qualitatively REAL, relatively SUPREME CAUSE* of both all reason and all external objects. The quantitative element of the proposition being self-evident, if the other two elements can be proved, only two proofs have been attempted to demonstrate it, 1, the ontological proof, which applies the qualitative conception of reality to that unity, and 2, the cosmological proof, which applies to it the relative conception of causality; for the third physico-theological proof is nothing, as Kant himself states, but a mixture of the other two. The first proof is the famous Cartesian one. If we can apply to the unity of the totality of all reason and of all external objects the predicate of reality, then that unity must also *exist*, and hence must be a Supreme Being, since existence is a

reality. To this proof Kant replies: If your last predicate of existence is already contained in the first one of reality, that is, if it is an *analytical* conception, then you have committed simply a miserable tautology, and have not advanced one step further. You have merely said that to think a certain thing as real and to think it as actually existing is one and the same. But if you confess, as every rational being must confess, that the conception of existence is a *synthetical* one, then you have not proved anything at all, since in that case I may attach all possible reality to that unity and yet cancel the conception of existence. The second proof runs thus: If a dependent being is assumed, then there must necessarily be an independent being as its cause and origin. To this Kant replies: It has already been shown in the third antinomy that it is a fallacy to assert an independent being as a first cause. The conception of causality or origin cannot be applied except to phenomena of actual consciousness.

It is, therefore, just as absurd and contradictory to try to prove or disprove the existence of a God, as it is to prove or disprove the immortality of the soul, a beginning of the world, etc. By an application of the categories none of these problems can be solved or even considered, for they lie utterly beyond the sphere within which alone the categories have application. A science of supersensuous objects (metaphysics) is therefore altogether impossible, and should henceforth and forever be considered by all rational men, able to understand this proof, as thus impossible. Rational men ought, therefore, to waste no more time upon the sciences of ontology, rational psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology, all of which are of such a metaphysical character; but should devote their energies either to cultivate the *sciences* of the actual world or to improve the actual world itself by labor, or finally to study the only metaphysical science possible, if it can be called metaphysical, which is the one just established in the *Critique of Pure Reason*; and which is not a science of supersensuous objects, but a science of reason itself, a science of knowledge, which, though it may be improved in form, is altogether incapable of being improved upon or added unto in the slightest degree, so far as its contents are concerned.

Such was the result that constituted the first heroic deed of Immanuel Kant: and to turn from his pages to the old scholastic ravings of Spencer, Mill, Büchner, and Vogt on the one side, and Hegel, Schelling, and all the ontological writers of the present age on the other side, makes one blush for the impenetrable stupidity of mankind. For, with the single exception of Fichte, not a single philosopher of repute has followed the footsteps of Kant; Schelling, and after him Hegel, have led men back to the idle—though as preliminaries valuable—speculations of the Greeks and the scholastics, whilst the materialists have ever since plunged into the sea of metaphysics with the same purpose which has characterized them at all times.

But thus far, that is in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant had established merely the sphere of *theoretical* reason, or of the power of reason to *cognize* external objects. Sensations in the ego having been assumed as given, Kant had shown a power in the ego to cast them outside of itself, a power which explained the possibility of a pure science of mathematics; and a power to relate them to each other, a power which explained the possibility of a pure science of physics. He had furthermore shown the absurdity of applying those forms of relation to other objects than the objects thus cast outside into space. In so far, therefore, as he had shown in the ego a power of contemplating, a power of relating, and finally an absolute power of examining itself—the very result of which last power was his *Critique of Pure Reason*—Kant had shown the ego to be free; but in so far as the sensations of the ego were assumed to be given to it, the ego appeared to be dependent upon an opposite *other* than itself. Actually, *realiter*, the ego seemed to be determined by a non-ego; formally, *idealiter*, the ego seemed, however, to be self-determined by its own laws of viewing.

Whilst the *Critique of Pure Reason*, after two or three years of unappreciative silence on the part of the public, was gradually beginning to stir up the minds of men—as no other book of the kind had ever before done—Kant prepared himself to fill up the immense gap that had been left.

This immense gap was the problem to discover the source of the sensations, which in the *Critique of Pure Reason* had been assumed as given. Reason, taken to task and asked to account

for the phenomena that occur in it, had thus far replied: I can very well explain why I should have a power of contemplation and a power of conception, since otherwise I should not be able to have cognition of the sensations that occur within me, and hence should not be intelligence; but I cannot in any like manner account for my having sensations at all.

And, indeed, if the ego were merely a power of cognition of external objects and their relations, or were merely theoretical reason, there would be no accounting for sensations in it. If reason, therefore, is able to account for them, there must be in reason another power than that of cognition, and for the sake of realizing which power, reason has that faculty of cognition. Thus the faculty of external cognition will become a secondary one, a faculty simply for the purpose of realizing its primary one. Such a primary faculty lies indeed, as we saw at the beginning, in the very conception of reason, as an absolute activity, which thinks or posits only itself; a self-determining power; in other words, a moral power. It is because reason is a moral or practical power of acting, that it is also an intelligence.

But it is also clear, that, if the ego is such an absolute activity or moral power, it can never comprehend itself as such in theoretical cognition, since all theoretical cognition applies merely to given sensations, and hence its consciousness of itself as thus self-determining must be of an entirely different character. It cannot be a mediated, it must be an immediate, absolute consciousness. There must occur in every rational being a consciousness of its determining its own self. That there is such a consciousness, a moral consciousness, cannot be proved by theoretical cognition, and hence lies utterly beyond the sphere of what language calls proof, and for this sort of consciousness language has the expressive name of *faith*. I have *cognition* of the external world; in my own absolute moral self-determination I have *faith*. To confound both classes of consciousness together is an abuse of language, which leads to inevitable antinomies and errors. Hence strictness of language is absolutely essential. That there is such a consciousness of absolute self-determination, or of an impulse in reason to act in a certain manner, utterly regardless of physical inclination, etc.,

is evident from the empirical fact, that we constantly apply the conceptions of goodness and badness to human acts. Just as the existence of the science of mathematics, therefore, proved to Kant that synthetical cognitions *a priori* must be possible, so the existence of judgments concerning goodness and badness proved to him that synthetical principles (rules of action) *a priori* must be possible—for else how could such qualitatively distinct conceptions and words arise?—and the only question remained: *how* are such synthetical practical laws *a priori* possible?

Having paved the way for this investigation in his *Fundamental Principles of a Metaphysic of Morals*, written in 1785, four years after the appearance of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant, in his *Critique of Practical Reason*, published in 1788, undertook to solve the problem in the same thorough and scientific manner he had employed in the *Critique of Theoretical Reason*. But from the very nature of the case, as already stated, the explanation here had to take an entirely different standpoint. Synthetical cognitions *a priori* are possible because consciousness of given sensations would not otherwise be possible; but synthetical laws *a priori* are possible simply because they are made manifest; there is no ground for them, nor can there be a ground for them, if they are to be what they are, namely absolute. If the ego is a power, altogether determining itself in its actions, it is absurd to ask for a theoretical proof of it; it can be proved only by each individual's own consciousness. If I am impelled to act in a certain manner, and so impelled without cause or motive, simply because I am so impelled, or *not* to act in a certain manner, equally without cause or motive, nay in opposition to all possible motives,—modes of acting and not acting, that language denominates moral or good,—why, it is absurd to ask for a cause. In so acting I am self-determined, or absolute.

It is strange, how difficult this seems to the comprehension of most men. An inveterate hankering lingers in their minds to apply the categories, which are applicable only to empirical sensations externalized in space, to this utterly different and opposite consciousness of absolute self-activity; the sole characteristic whereof is, that it appears as such an impulse of abso-

lute activity, or, as Kant expresses it, under the form of the categorical imperative: *Thou shalt*. Every one who has become conscious of this impulsion, of this command, "Thou shalt," within him, has thereby attained the only possible knowledge of the absolute self-determination of the ego; for this moral impulse, "Thou shalt," can be traced to no cause, no motive, inclination, or external origin, and hence is its origin itself. Indeed, if it could be so traced, it would be no longer absolute or moral, and hence the criterion of all moral acts is, that they cannot be so traced.

The first part of Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*, or the part which he calls the *Analytic*, is devoted, first, to developing the character of practical reason as such absolute self-activity or moral law; secondly, to unfolding the object of the moral law, as the promotion of the good; and thirdly, to showing the possibility of realizing it in the sensuous world, which possibility Kant establishes thus: The fundamental principle of moral law is necessarily: *Act in such a manner that the maxim of your will can be valid always as the principle of a universal legislation*. Now by subsuming this law under the law of causality, which controls our view of the sensuous world, it becomes quite easy to apply the supersensuous principle to the sensuous world. All that is necessary is to change the above formula of the law to this: *Act always in such a manner that if that act should occur through a law of nature, you could look upon it as possible through your will*.

It is of great importance to keep in mind, what Kant has insisted upon already in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, but what he has developed quite at length in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, and reiterates in his *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, and his *Religion within the Limits of Reason*, that of the three objects of metaphysical speculation: God, immortality, and freedom, only freedom can be proved by an immediate fact of consciousness. True, it cannot be demonstrated by theoretical cognition, though at the same time theoretical cognition can not demonstrate its impossibility; but it can be shown as the supreme activity in every person who has done a moral act.

In the second part of the *Critique of Practical Reason*, or the *Dialectic*, Kant develops how, from this conception of freedom, reason now successfully derives those conceptions of God and

immortality, which theoretical reason had vainly tried to prove by applying the categories of the understanding to objects outside of all perception. For this conception of a self-determining activity acting in the form of time and space and individuality, in short as a human being, upon the sensations which it has externalized in space, and distinguishing this its activity from all other activity that courses through its body, aroused by the given sensations, as an absolute or moral activity : is, when synthetically connected with that other activity, evidently the conception of an activity which always attempts to overcome the other activity completely and at the same time is always checked in these attempts. Hence it is the conception of a will that in each moment in which it realizes itself, finds itself newly checked, and thus of a will that in order to be what it is, can be only in the form of a will existing through the whole infinite series of time-moments, that is to say, as an immortal will. Again : if this absolute activity is to interfere in a system of externalized sensations that are connected with each other by the law of causality, these two conceptions can be united together only in the one synthetical harmonizing conception of a totality of that whole absolute activity in all its infinite acts and that whole system of externalized sensations in all its possible occurrences. Now such a synthetical conception is called in language God. The two conceptions of immortality and God can, therefore, be proved only from the basis of the conception of freedom or morality, and have validity only so far as that conception is admitted. That I am free, no theoretical proof can show to me ; I can know it only immediately ; but if I know myself to be free, then must I also assume the conception of a harmony between my free acts and the world of nature ; which conception is that of a divine governing power (Leibnitz's pre-established harmony), and the conception of an infinitely continued existence of my individual will. But further I cannot go ; and if I now proceed to take this conception of a divine governing power, and apply to it those categories of being that apply only to the world of being, as, for instance, the categories of substance, cause, first beginning, etc., or to predicate of it such other empirical predicates as personality, etc., I fall into unwarranted dogmas and absurd contradictions. When I say, for instance, that God is a person, I either mean

nothing at all and hence talk nonsense, or I apply the word person in the sense in which it occurs in language, where it involves subject-objectivity, material body, thinking, feeling, etc. But I certainly can never prove, or even maintain, that God is a thinking, feeling, etc., body in space and time. It is the same with all other empirical predicates applied to God. Either people use those predicates as language has determined them—and then they make God a sensuous being—or they use those predicates without any clearly defined meaning, and then they talk nonsense.

With these results of the *Critique of Practical Reason*, the problem of the source of sensations in the ego had been thus solved: The ego or reason by its very conception is pure activity knowing itself to be such. But it cannot know itself as such unless that pure activity has been checked and is constantly checked. Thus the conception of the ego as a knowing of itself makes necessary that the conception of the ego as a pure activity should be somewhat modified, or, rather, that to it there should be synthetically added the conception of an unknown check, or a non-ego. This check is the source of sensations which the free power of contemplation of the ego externalizes, and by its power of conception relates to each other under the forms of the categories as a world of nature. Within this world of nature as part of it, and hence in so far to be viewed as subject to the same forms of categories, or as a material body, the ego everlastingly develops its absolute activity as a moral law, and thus becomes conscious of itself as an absolute self-determining power. The only remaining question is: how can the ego possibly become conscious of its free acts as realized in the world of nature, if the whole world of nature can be looked upon only as under the law of causality?

In his *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, published in 1790, Kant solved this problem and therewith finished his critical labors. The answer runs as follows: *If a consciousness of freedom is to be possible and if reason is to be possible*, there must be possible another mode of viewing the world of nature than under the law of causality. Now such another view does exist, and is in language called the view under the law of purpose or design.

If we view all nature as a world of purposes, then we can very well connect with it the conception of free activity; and

we can make this connection moreover in a twofold manner, by referring it either to the subject or to the object. In the first case we frame æsthetical judgments, in the second case teleological judgments. The fact that we do use these forms of judgment in every moment of our lives is a retroactive proof of that freedom, which alone makes possible their use. Kant thus separates his *Critique of the Power of Judgment* into two parts, the first treating of the *Power of Æsthetical Judgments* and the second of the *Power of Teleological Judgments*; each part separating again into an *Analytic* and a *Dialectic*. It is not necessary for the purpose of this Article to enter into an examination of this work, which in many respects is the completest of KANT's three Critiques, its general scope having been made sufficiently clear. It is of more moment to survey the whole ground gone over, and ascertain the results obtained.

The *Critique of Pure or Theoretical Reason* shows that synthetical *a priori* cognitions are possible, by establishing, that without them consciousness of external objects would not be possible. In showing this, it at the same time limits all those cognitions to objects of perception.

The *Critique of Practical Reason* shows that theoretical reason could not be possible if the ego were not originally a power of absolute freedom; but readily confesses the impossibility of proving such freedom by theoretical reasoning. Each individual must ascertain in himself whether he is free and hence whether synthetical *principles a priori* are possible. It can, however, be shown negatively, that if he does not admit it, he never can explain his external cognitions; and in so far a proof can be established.

But if he thus is convinced that he is free, then the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* demonstrates that he can no longer view the world of nature simply under the forms of theoretical reason, but must also look upon it under the forms of æsthetical and teleological reason; and again, each individual who uses æsthetical or teleological *judgments a priori* in his daily life—as all men do—thereby announces himself a free being.

Having thus completed his system, Kant devoted the remaining years of his life to apply its principles to the sciences of law, morals, and theology. His application of these principles to the science of physics had already appeared shortly

after the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in 1786, under the title: *Metaphysical Fundamental Principles of the Science of Physics*. In 1793 he published the work *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason*, in many respects of paramount significance, as Hegel has justly enough observed. This work, as has already been mentioned, caused a reprimand to be addressed to Kant from the Prussian Government; while, on the other hand, many of his "upheaved" adherents considered it a sign of dotage and a compromise with orthodoxy. In 1795 and 1797 he published two works, *Eternal Peace* and *Metaphysical Fundamental Principles of a Science of Law and a Science of Morals*; and in 1798 Kant concluded his literary labors by his *Anthropology*, a book full of rare knowledge, profound observations on men, characters, sexes, races, and nations, and which should be read by every student who wishes to become thoroughly acquainted with the author of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. It is, moreover, a chief example of the exquisite clearness of style, which Kant possessed to so rare a degree. No other German philosophical writer, not even Leibnitz, can at all compete with him in this respect; unless it be Fichte in his popular works. But Fichte's style—though more compact and vigorous—lacks that literary finish which characterizes the style of Kant. It is, in itself, an æsthetical enjoyment to read the well-built periods and watch the fluid grace of Kant's diction. His *Prolegomena* are a marvel of symmetrical arrangement down to the minutest details of language; and it is only in his *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason*, which was not prepared by him for publication, that the sentences move unevenly and heavily. This will sound strange to many who have heard wondrous stories about the incomprehensibility of Kant's writings, their clumsy terminology, and interwoven sentences. But the chief reason why these stories have been set afloat, is this: there is in all mankind an almost insurmountable tendency to dogmatize on subjects outside of external perception; partly because it flatters man's vanity—for how can I refute your assertions about matters and things that neither you nor I, nor any rational or irrational being can possibly know anything about?—and partly, because men's minds have naturally been more occupied with the observation of external objects than with that of their own modes of thinking. Now to all such dogmatic minds the

everlasting nonsense that men like Mill, Spencer, Büchner, etc., write about the origin of the world, origin of language, origin of consciousness, etc., seems so lucid and profound, that they really never consider, that it is impossible to know about the *origin* of anything. The very utmost they may do is to deny the dogmatical realistic assertions of Mill, Spencer, etc., by opposing to them equally dogmatic, and hence unfavorable, idealistic assertions on the same subjects, and thus to substitute for the nebular theory a creating God, for the mathematical development or evolution theory the theory of design and purposes, and for the of category causality the category of freedom. And just in proportion as these dogmatic assertions—whether of the realistic or idealistic character—appear to such minds clear as sunlight, whilst to critical minds they appear as arrant absurdities, do the results of critical philosophy seem to them incomprehensible. That both dogmatic parties are, to some extent, in the right; that is, that it is quite proper and absolutely true, and necessary, to consider the world of external objects as a mathematical arrangement, and yet equally proper and necessary to consider that same world as a world of design and purposes—seems to them the flattest contradiction. They cannot believe that Kant really meant this, they will not even accept his most energetic assertions that he did mean this, and thus their want of understanding, rather than ascribe it to their own stupidity, they prefer to charge to an obscurity of style in Kant's writings which has no existence. These dogmatists think it wonderfully wise to ask: but what is this world of nature in itself? what is this star, this air, this heat, this light, this piece of sugar, this book, not as related to us but *per se*? and cannot be brought to see that their very question implies, I shall tell *them*, tell *their reason*, what it is, hence in telling must relate it to them. This lump of dirt is to me a lump of dirt, to the ant perhaps a wonderful orb with fields and lakes, to other animals perhaps an unknown universe, to still others mayhap it is heat, or magnetism, and in itself—i. e., unrelated to anything at all—nothing at all.

Even still more absurd than the charge of unclearness in the style of Kant's writings is the charge already referred to that his philosophy is a skepticism; and it seems incredible how

this charge could ever have been raised by any one who ever read one of Kant's great works, were it but the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In that work as well as in the two following Critiques, and in his *Prolegomena*, Kant in the most emphatic terms announces himself as the discoverer of a new science, which before him had no existence whatever, though also as the destroyer of a pretended science that had been flourishing for thousands of years. "I came to abolish the science of metaphysics and to establish in its place a science of reason, which will and must remain as it is established by me so long as reason is reason," is in substance his continued assertion. And when charged with presumption in making such pretensions, his reply runs: "As well might Copernicus be charged with presumption in establishing the science of astronomy, or Newton in establishing his science of gravitation. It is precisely because, like their discoveries, mine is one of method, that it is unassailable; it is because theoretical reason can never view external objects under any other categories than those of quantity, quality, and relation, that all theoretical reason and all external objects must for ever be subject to these laws of the human mind, and that the human mind can never, if it is to remain reason, apply these categories to other than external objects of perception and thus can never arrive at a theoretical cognition of God, immortality, origin of the world, simple substances, or freedom."

Of Kant's many followers, only Fichte adopted fully and seized in its world-historical importance the great discovery claimed by Kant. In his *Science of Knowledge** he endeavored to give it that systematic shape which Kant had not in the remaining years of his life found leisure or inclination to give to the three Critiques in their unity. Throughout his whole life Fichte seized every opportunity to disclaim any merit of discovery in this elaboration of his Science, and to announce this discovery of Kant's as the greatest event, in the history of the human race, since the promulgation of Christianity. That it has not yet made further progress is one of the many discouraging phenomena in the development of our race.

* *The Science of Knowledge*. Published by J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1868.

ARTICLE IV.—ROTHER ON REVELATION AND INSPIRATION.

PART II.—INSPIRATION, OR, HOLY SCRIPTURE.

THE necessity of holy Scripture is directly involved in that conception of revelation which was set forth in the previous essay. The purpose of revelation is historically to prepare for Redemption, and finally to bring it to pass, thus itself becoming historical. It is not intended to be a meteor, glancing through the world for a moment, but to fix itself in the heavens like a shining sun, gradually to shed full, clear light upon the whole circuit of our world. It must embody the historical being and life of our race,—strike its roots down into history, and be naturalized there. It must be an historical power, a factor of the history of the world in its development. For this end it must pass into tradition; and this can be made secure only when the record is fixed in writing. Without a record side by side and contemporaneous with it, divine revelation would run its course in vain, and could not attain its end. By this authentication of the record it is made certain that it will be handed down to subsequent ages, and, moreover, that it will be kept pure, free from the corruption which attends mere tradition. To attain its end it must be understood with essential correctness at the time of its entrance into the world; yet it cannot then be absolutely, completely comprehended,—this can be only after the human vision has been purified and strengthened by its means. Sinful man can attain to a perfect understanding of revelation only step by step, through a long series of approximations. Again, the parts can only be understood through the whole, the earlier through the later. Thus a record of revelation is doubly necessary for its comprehension,—a record of its earlier parts to those who receive the later, and a record of the whole to those who are to understand the relation of the parts to the whole. Every one sees how the Old Testament economy can be understood only with the aid of the New, and *vice versa*. That the tradition of revelation may be

enduring, and that the understanding of it may be complete, there is, therefore, a necessity for an accurate, authentic record of all its stages, by which it may be made present to men.

Moreover there is required a record of revelation which shall make known to us not simply what has been learned through it, but give us a living impression of how it was learned, the whole supernatural procedure of it, that we may come into personal connection with it,—live it over again; for only thus can we understand it. I confidently appeal to all devout readers of the Bible to say if their experience does not testify that it is not so much its instructions and incitements which so peculiarly edify them in their intercourse with it, as the purifying and vivifying influences of a sacred world, ruled over by a supernatural power, of the immediate presence of God himself, into which they are raised as soon as they pass the threshold of this wondrous book. The original documentary sources of history have a peculiar power to transport us back into a distant and strange circle of life, to place it before the eye of the mind. This power belongs in a remarkable degree to the Bible; and it will be well to impress upon ourselves at the outset of the present investigation, that this is just the character of the record of revelation which we postulate; for the facts of revelation can only be made present to us through an original documentary record. Such is the position occupied by the holy Scripture, the vehicle of revelation, not to be confounded with the revelation itself.

This is not, indeed, the view taken by the Reformation theology in general, in its doctrine concerning the Scriptures, though it is the view which it should have received, in accordance with the circumstances of the origin of the Reformed Churches. For the problem before them was, to discover what genuine, original Christianity was, and to reinstate it; an historical inquiry, the main branch of which related to the records of the Christian Church. The strife between the Reformed Churches and the old Church was a controversy with reference to the sources of Christian truth, in which the former rejected unwritten tradition, and laid great stress upon the Bible, on the presumption that it alone, of all the records which have come down to us concerning the revelation of God in Christ, is truly

authentic. Some of them even consciously rested their exclusive acceptance of the Bible on this ground.* But the historical mode of viewing Christianity, and religious things in general, was not at that time, to say the least, universally current.

The fundamental idea in the doctrine of the Church concerning the Scriptures is, that they are the word of God; and that they are the word of God because they are inspired by God. Accordingly it has been held to be the first religious necessity, a principal condition of true piety, that we should be in authentic possession of a complete, ready-made system of abstract religious knowledge, immediately imparted by God himself, absolutely perfect and infallible. It was thought that without such an authority there could be no foundation for certainty with regard to God and our relations to him, no trust in our salvation through him. Without this anchor-ground of faith, established by external Divine authority, our faith, it was thought, would be tossed about on the waves of doubt and despair. Hence there was a strong tendency to refer the holy Scripture exclusively to the Divine agency, to exclude from its origin all human agency or even mediation, since this would inevitably bring with it more or less pollution and adulteration. But since the Bible undeniably came into existence by the hands of men, it was thought that it must be represented as having come into being by their hands only, and not in any way by their minds; the human authors merely writing, and not composing it, being conscious of serving as the hands or pens of God in writing. But there never really existed any such Bible as this theory was invented to account for, nor any such experience of human writers as was imagined to account for it. And if any one holds this idea of holy Scripture, he must, to be consistent, hold this view of its origin, and cannot adopt any of those modifications of the theory which seek to bring it nearer to our experience.

Yet the conception which we have described is the very doctrine of the old dogmatic theologians concerning the Scriptures, and by virtue of which they called them the word of God. According to them the holy Scriptures are literally the word of

* As, for instance, Hyperius. See Heppes.

God, to this extent,—that God is the immediate author of them, the human writer being only a mechanical instrument, and not being truly the author of his own writings, but a mere amanuensis, a mere pen with which the Holy Spirit wrote. Inspiration, they taught, was not divine enlightenment, not the expression in writing of something which filled the consciousness, but a submission to the impulse of the Holy Spirit, a lending of the hands to him to write with, and not in an ecstatic state, but with perfect consciousness and freedom, whether understanding or not that which was written.

The simple fact that the different books of the Bible have their peculiarities, their individual physiognomies, especially in reference to language, is enough to overthrow such a theory as this. No consistent thinker will fall into the error of seeking to render this theory tenable by limitation of it. The slightest limitation changes it into one which differs *toto genere*; for the biblical writers must be either active or passive. When the inspiration of the biblical writers is confined to assistance or superintendence by the Holy Spirit, that is not at all a modification or softening of the old theory, but a total abandonment of it; and the same is true if different degrees of inspiration are assumed, or a different inspiration for different elements, or an inspiration extending to one element only, whether that be the religious element, or the articles of the creed, or the more important articles of the creed. Hence, on this theory, the Bible was held to be absolutely infallible, without any error of any kind, and even without any fault or barbarism of style. Hence, too, the efficacy of the Bible as a means of grace was made dependent on this absolute inspiration. If the inspiring Spirit was the sole agent in the origin of the Bible, of course the relation between these two must be a permanent one,—a mystical, intimate, and individual union of the word with the Holy Spirit. The holy Scriptures were held to have a supernatural efficacy in our salvation, a truly divine, converting, and regenerating power residing in *them*, not in the external use of them.

Such was the strong and literal sense in which the old Protestant theology held to the divine origin and quality of the Bible. But how did it prove it? It did not prove it! There

was the Bible itself to substantiate its own claim to be the very word of God. And no other course was possible. For if the holy Scripture is the final authority to which all religious questions must be brought, then it must carry in itself the decisive proof of its authority. No demonstration can be to the point. The ultimate, decisive testimony to the divine origin of the Bible is the experimental knowledge of its peculiar divinity, through the Holy Spirit dwelling in it and working through it, the internal testimony of the Spirit that it is the word of God, the very intrinsic power and efficacy of the divine word and the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scripture and through the Scripture. The "testimony of the Holy Spirit" can only take the form of an experience in the consciousness of the efficacy of the holy Scriptures as something supernatural. But the theology of the Church, while relying on "testimony of the Spirit" as the religious foundation of our belief in the divinity of the Bible, has nevertheless held that it could be proved to the reason, and has put forth many arguments, *indicia*, or *κρίτηρια*, both external and internal. In their use of the external criteria, however, the old theologians perpetrated the inconsistency of founding their argument on the trustworthiness of the human authors of the Bible as eye-and-ear witnesses; forgetting that on their theory of inspiration the sacred writers were merely pens, not persons, with varying moral and historical qualifications. The inconsistency was sought to be remedied by making a distinction between the two kinds of belief produced, *fides humana*, and *fides divina*; the former of which, they taught, is produced by proofs addressed to the reason, while the latter is a living, subjective persuasion, wrought by the testimony of the Holy Spirit in the soul. The proofs of the reason, they taught, were suitable to address to those who were far away from the Bible, in order to draw their attention to it, and induce them to use it; and when thus used it would testify of itself in its own divine way, and work a real belief, a *fides divina*, in their minds. The human arguments made the Bible's divinity credible, but did not establish actual faith in it, yet put us in the way which led infallibly to that faith. Another use of the proofs of the reason was to enable those who believe, to repel doubts and all external assaults.

If now we proceed to a criticism of this theory of holy Scripture, we must, at the outset, recognize the fact that all its parts are inseparably connected together, so that we must accept it all or reject it all. To accept it with the reservation that it shall be improved or modified is impracticable.

Perhaps the most striking part of the theory is the prominence given to the "testimony of the Spirit," and to this doctrine I give it my most hearty concurrence, though perhaps I should change somewhat the form of its expression. But this very doctrine, of the "testimony of the Spirit" shows that our old theology derived its theory of the holy Scriptures from a religious interest chiefly, and not from scientific grounds; for it expresses the religious experience of every true evangelical Christian. Here the evangelical doctrinal system first obtained an independent foundation. As Twisten says: "If belief in the divinity of the Scriptures rests on something besides the intuitive perception of that divinity, then it may be asked whether that something else must not be higher than they, and the Roman Catholic will object that you make Scripture depend on the authority of the Church, and then make the Church depend on the Scripture, while the rationalist will object that you prove the Scripture to be divine by means of reason, and yet will not accept reason as the ultimate judge. But faith in the Scripture rests neither on authority nor on reason, but upon the new life in Christianity, which God causes by his word, and which carries immediate conviction with it. If it were otherwise," he continues, "what would be the condition of the laity (the great body of the Church), who are in no condition to test the weight of scientific proofs? Do we not demand of them a still more unreasoning trust than that which we charge upon the Roman Catholics? For they think they are following God, when they follow the Pope and the Church; but our people follow their learned men, who make no pretence to be more than mere fallible men, and some of whose errors and contradictions cannot be overlooked."

The Scriptures themselves give the same view. Faith in the preaching of the Apostles is there recognized as true faith in so far as it rested, not on "human wisdom," by means of "enticing words," but upon the "power of God," through the "demon-

stration of the Spirit and of power;" and the true hearing of the word is there made conditional upon the opening of the heart by the Lord himself (Acts xvi, 14). "He that is of God heareth God's words." And what other means could divine grace use so effectively for opening the inner vision, to see the Divine, as the presence of the revelation of the Divine within our human horizon,—in other words, the record of divine revelation, the holy Scripture, the mirror in which the Divine is seen most clearly? That new sense, by which the divinity of the holy Scriptures becomes real to us, is awakened in us by the Scriptures themselves. But we can only become conscious of the divinity of the Bible in the same degree in which this new sense is awakened in us; the force of our faith in the Bible is proportioned to the strength of our Christian faith in general. Our faith in Christ finds in the Scriptures the medium through which God begets in us the new sanctified life, and draws from thence the well-founded conclusion of their divine origin. When we attain to faith in Christ, and our life begins to develop in him, we are conscious of the unity of this new life in us, and that which presents itself to us in the Scriptures,—only that is pure, powerful, and complete, while ours is impure, deformed, and faint. This consciousness becomes stronger in us as we experience that the new life in us is strangely aided, purified, nourished, and strengthened, by contact with the divine life which flows in the Scriptures in all its original power. And so we can but look upon the Scriptures as a peculiarly effective organ of the same divine principle which has imparted new life to ourselves.

Such was the position of the Reformers. Through such an experience they came to an unconditioned trust in the Bible, which is the peculiar and so-called formal principle of the Evangelical Church. It was through the use of the Bible that they came to an evangelical belief in Christ; but it is none the less true that through their new belief in Christ they arrived at full and unconditioned trust in the holy Scriptures.

Strauss, indeed, will have it that this is the Achilles' heel of the Protestant system: "For," he says, "if the inner testimony of the Spirit is to assure me of the divinity of the Scriptures, who shall assure me that this feeling within me has its origin in

the working of the Holy Spirit?" There need be no mistake here, for the revelation of the Divine Spirit is made through the Scripture itself, and, in regard to the second point, Strauss has failed to notice that the Christian life is one specifically new, and that he in whom it is begun is fully conscious of it as such. That the Spirit which bears witness to him concerning the Bible is not his own spirit, he knows as certainly as that he has become a new creature in Christ (however imperfect), and he knows that it is the Spirit of God, because his new life consists in communion with God.

Thus the doctrine that the holy Scripture is the word of God, and that it is inspired and infallible, are not at all scholastic inventions, but have a distinct religious basis and motive. They flow, as dogmas should, out of the experience of the evangelical Christian in the use of the Bible, and are an attempt scientifically to explain that experience. But the more difficult the problem the more easily errors may have arisen, especially as the theologians of the Reformation were here almost on new ground, and neglected the important distinction between "revelation" and "holy Scripture." We cannot be too earnest to inquire whether their views coincide with those found in the Scripture itself, and with the facts there recorded. Here is the test of complete submission to the authority of the Bible. Do we take it as it actually is, for what it claims itself to be, or with vain imagination seek to make it correspond to our opinions or needs? If the actual Bible is not holy and divine enough for any one, he must confess that his ideas of the holy and Divine were not derived from it. To adhere to a pre-conceived notion about it, contrary to its own testimony, is to be disobedient to it.

The phrase "word of God" is less prominent in the Bible than in the theology of the Church, and the conception denoted by it is not the same. In the Old Testament, it marks an important distinction between the religion of the Israelites and the heathen religions. In the Old Testament, God is described as a personal and rational being; all his works are outward expressions of his thought and will, that is, they are words. All his working, creative as well as revealing, is thus represented as a speaking, and its result as a word. (Gen. i, 3; Ps. xxxiii, 6.)

In the Old Testament "the word of God" means not only the very words of God himself, which he spoke to his prophets (e. g., 1 Sam. iii, 7, 21), but also divinely revealed truths in the broadest sense, or commands, promises, or threatenings. The parallel phrase, "testimony of God," is applied both to the tables of the law and to the law itself. The ark is called the "ark of testimonies," and the tabernacle, as the place where God was revealed, is called the "tabernacle of testimonies." When the knowledge of the divine revelation was committed to writing, by divine arrangement, in the Old Testament Scriptures, and men began to collect the records of revelation together, they also began to consider these books as the word of God. Through these writings the later Israelites became partakers of the words which God addressed to his people when he revealed himself to them. For *them*, these books were the word of the Lord, and the distinction between the two terms was lost, for to them it had no advantage or interest (Ps. 119 *passim*). That which is so enthusiastically praised throughout the 119th Psalm seems to be the *book* of the law, the writer's reflection not tarrying upon any distinction between the law itself and the holy books which contained it. Afterwards, when prophecy was silent in Israel, and God no longer spoke to his people directly, but addressed them only through the medium of their holy records, they could hardly help seeing these as the direct word of God, and completely identifying the two. The first believers in Christ of course shared this view, and it spread abroad with Christianity. Even the Apostles called the letter of the Old Testament Scriptures the *λογός τοῦ Θεοῦ*, and that in a very pregnant sense,—for to them it was not a mere word, but a living, working, divine power. (1 Pet. i, 23; Heb. iv, 12; 1 Thes. ii, 13). To them God's words were outward expressions of his being, and hence his living power worked in and through them; but the word of the Old Testament was the word of God, not because it was written by him, but because it was the record of what God had done for men through revelation. All divine revelation was to them the "word of God," the "oracles of God," the *ῥῆμα Θεοῦ*. (Heb. v, 12; Rom. x, 17.) Whatever the Son received from the Father, and spoke in the world with his full authority; what-

ever the Apostles, as the messengers of Christ, preached concerning him and the mystery of salvation through him—all preaching of the Gospel—was placed in the same class. (John viii, 36; v, 38.) The Saviour himself expressly calls the revealed message which he brought from the Father to us, the word of God, *λογὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ*. (John xvii, 14, 17.) And how could the Apostles help speaking in the same way of their own evangelical preaching, when they repeated after him the message from heaven? They knew that they preached the Gospel “with the Holy Ghost come down from heaven,” and considered their message as one in the name and by the command of God. (2 Cor. v, 20; Eph. vi, 20.) They preached it “not as the word of men, but, as it is in truth, the word of God,” and were certain that Christ spoke in them. Peter calls Christ’s own preaching to the Israelites a word sent from God (Acts x, 36), calls the preaching of the Gospel the “gospel of God,” the “word of the gospel,” or simply “the word,” or “the word of the Lord,” or even the “word of God.” In the first epistle of Peter the preaching of the Gospel is expressly placed in the same category with the *ῥῆμα Θεοῦ* of the Old Testament; and in Eph. vi, 17, both the written word of the Old Testament and the words of Christ living in the memory are placed together, and the same term applied to them, *ῥῆμα Θεοῦ*. We do not find the New Testament called the word of God in Apostolic times, for it was not then in existence; but as soon as the preaching of the Apostles concerning the revelation of God in Christ was committed to writing (the record of the great things of God), and from these records was formed the New Testament,—then this too began to be considered as the word of God. This may be historically proved to have been the case. Why, indeed, should that which, as living speech, was the word of God, cease to be so when committed to writing?

It is then an entirely scriptural thesis that the Scriptures are the word of God; but in what sense? Not in the sense of our older theology, a word literally dictated by God himself. The evangelical Christian, in using his Bible, receives the impression that in it God himself is speaking to him; but when he attempts to frame a dogmatic theory, he becomes conscious of a contradiction, to which, indeed, our evangelical theology

abundantly testified; for many things in the Scriptures themselves would not fit in with its theory. So a distinction was made (as by Buddaeus) between that which was and that which was not necessary to salvation in the Scriptures; or (as by Töllner), the Bible was said to contain, not to be, the word of God. But this was a complete subversion, and not a mere modification of the old theory. And no such distinction between form and matter can be satisfactory. For every true Bible-reader knows that what most powerfully impresses him, in his intercourse with the Bible, is just this,—that in it, as nowhere else, the most familiar religious truths appear in such a natural, living, majestic form as though they were bathed in an unearthly light, so that he finds himself convinced of its reality and compelled to give himself up to it. The matter and the form are inseparable.

But if the old theory is untenable, and these distinctions cannot save it, what shall be put in its place? Evidently, the true biblical idea. We shall not, however, find that the idea of the word of God is completely worked out, and clearly and plainly stated in the Scriptures; and therefore the term can only be used relatively, generally, and can never determine exactly in what sense any particular passage possesses this property of being the word of God. We are, however, in possession of another conception into which that of the word of God has developed, and in which it is now, for us, clearly expressed, and that is divine revelation. The word of God is his revelation; and the latter term should take the place of the former. The Bible is the original record of revelation, that is, of the word of God. There is a distinct tendency in the theology of the present day to remove the traditional confusion between the terms "Revelation" and "Bible," and it were well removed even at the expense of the entire disuse of the term "word of God." For surely our reverence for the Bible will suffer no loss if we call it the *holy* Scripture simply, nor would our evangelical theology be overthrown, but would rather gain in clearness and strength.

We come now to the doctrine of the inspiration of the Bible; and here no step must be taken without questioning the holy Scripture as to what it says about itself. No one could ever

derive from the Old Testament the idea that its composition took place under a specific, guiding operation of the Divine Spirit upon its authors, not to say such an operation as was supposed by our older theology. If in certain particular cases God commanded Moses or any other prophet to write down certain things which he had made known to them by revelation, this has nothing to do with any such theory of inspiration; still less can passages like Ex. iv, 12, "I will be thy mouth and teach thee what thou shalt say," be of any use here, for they refer to preaching, not to writing. We read in the Old Testament for the most part only of divine illuminations, visions, and instruction imparted by God to the prophets whom he chose to be his organs,—never of inspirations imparted under purely passive conditions. The prophets speak of the judgments of the Lord, but say not a word of any inspiration received in writing them down. The Old Testament claims to derive nothing from inspiration except the law and the prophetic oracles. The didactic and historical portions are given by the writers simply as such, without the slightest indication that they received the knowledge of them through divine revelation; but rather with express mention of its sources.

Among the later Jews, however, especially about the time of Christ, we find a theory of inspiration very similar to that of our older theologians. When the people of Israel, returning from exile, turned with burning zeal to the Mosaic law, and enthusiastically embraced that as their highest good and the only source of true knowledge, their reverence for it was easily turned towards the letter, the written text itself, both of the law and the other writings which had been added to it. They now sought to extract from the letter of the sacred record everything which was held to be worth knowing in any relation whatever. On the one hand, the living voice of prophecy was dumb; on the other, there was a collection of sacred books, the records of the history of the people of God. How could there fail soon to arise a superstitious veneration of the letter of these books? We find traces of it even in the Apocrypha of the Old Testament, as well as in Philo and Josephus. The Jewish tale of the miraculous restoration of the lost books by Ezra, which was repeated by many Church fathers, is a proof of this.

What does the New Testament teach us as to the inspiration of the Old? We must divide this question into two; first, what did the Saviour say on the subject? and second, what did the Apostles and the other New Testament writers teach? No one can for a moment deny that Christ regarded the Old Testament economy as, in the most peculiar sense, a divine revelation, and the Old Testament Scriptures as the witness concerning that revelation, in which his soul dwelt as in a sanctuary, and which he used as the instrument of all his teaching. His discourses show that he had a most thorough and minute acquaintance with them, that he lived in their innermost essence, in their spirit, in the great religious and moral ideas which flow in them, and that he assumed the freest position in regard to their letter. How differently did he employ them from his learned contemporaries. With his keen eyes, keen through purity and holiness, he read very different things in the Scriptures from the masters in Israel around him; not digging into them with sharp investigation, but using them like a mirror, reflecting the heart of his heavenly Father, to place the great ideas of the previous revelation clearly in his soul, especially the great maxims of God's holy government of the world. We need especially to notice the fact that the Saviour's religious and intellectual life was unfolded in connection with the study (if that is a suitable term) of the Old Testament. The further he entered into this sanctuary, the more striking would he find the references to himself there contained. He found the Scripture parallel with his consciousness, and became conscious that it testified of him. So he appealed with perfect confidence to its testimony concerning himself, and considered his life the necessary fulfilment of the picture there drawn. The roots and germs of all the main points of his doctrine are found in the Old Testament. He adhered strictly to the canonical Scriptures, and entered into no connection with the ideas of the schools or sects of the time. He used the Bible to prepare himself for his mission, not like a scientific inquirer who strives to attain to an objective understanding of it, to obtain the truest explanation of it. They are in error who think of the Saviour as having a complete exegetical knowledge of the Old Testament: in his

discourses there is extremely little explanation of it; but rather he grasped the fundamental grand ideas of the Old Testament revelation with a sure hand, and threw surprising light on those questions which were darkest to his learned contemporaries. Except a few explanations with reference to special controversial questions, we find Jesus explaining Scripture only in three places, Luke iv, 4, 16, xxiv, 24, 25, and xxiv, 44-8, and of these the first passage is not properly an explanation of Scripture, and is of very doubtful genuineness. The Saviour never professed to be an infallible and complete expositor of the Old Testament. Exegesis is a purely scientific operation, the means for which were not in existence in that age, and even now are greatly wanting in regard to the Old Testament. He knew how to make the sharpest distinction between real knowledge and that which is merely conventional, and adhered closely to the former, rejecting all scientific curiosity, all questions incompatible with his historical position.

It needs no proof that the Saviour treated the Old Testament revelation as of divine authority, yet he considered it inferior to the new revelation given in his own person. He spoke without hesitation of the Mosaic Law as belonging to the Jews, in contrast with himself (John vii, 19 and 22; v, 45; x, 84). Undoubtedly, too, he treated the letter of the Old Testament as of divine authority, yet only two passages are usually relied on as proof that he considered it as the result of inspiration, Matt. v, 18 (or Luke xvi, 17), and Matt. xxii, 43. But neither of these is to the point. In the first, the promise that not one jot or tittle of the law shall pass away while earth or heaven shall remain, evidently refers to the law itself, not to the letter. In the other passage, "How then did David in spirit call him Lord?" Jesus affirms that David composed the poetry of the 110th Psalm in a state of ecstasy, in the spirit, nothing more, and makes no assertion whatever about the way in which this prophetic prompting was committed to writing. On the other hand, we infer that he did not share the ideas of his Israelite contemporaries, with great probability, from the fact that he often expressed his dissatisfaction with the current way of regarding and using the sacred books. He boldly told their learned men that they did not understand the Scriptures, and

that it was a delusion if they thought they possessed in them, that is in the book, eternal life. He spoke in a condemnatory way of their searching of the Scriptures, as proceeding from such a perverted point of view. No dogma of the inspiration of the Old Testament can be founded on the Saviour's words.

But how was it with the Apostles and other writers of the New Testament? Our Lord gave his disciples no instruction on this point, but left their conceptions undisturbed. Therefore we find in the New Testament authors the same views of the Old Testament and the same practice in its use as among the other Jews of the time, though they show plainly all the difference between the new Christian spirit and the spirit of the Judaism of the time. They considered the Old Testament as the immediate word of God, even those portions of it which are not given as having been directly spoken by God. All "that which was written" was the word of God; they heard God speaking directly in it all, without a thought of the human persons who appear speaking and acting there. They knew nothing about considering their Bible from an historical point of view. They refer to it abstractly, as the Scripture, or the holy Scriptures, or the sacred writings, without mentioning any particular author. They introduce Old Testament quotations with the formula that God or the holy Spirit speaks or has spoken thus. The epistle to the Hebrews quotes passages with "God says," in which, in the original, God is spoken of in the third person. It even quotes (Heb. i, 10) a passage in which God, or the Son of God, is addressed in the second person, as though it were spoken by God. In 1 Tim. iii, 16, the sacred writings are expressly said to be inspired (*θεοπνευστα*), and though we cannot deduce, from an expression of such indefinite meaning, any definite theory of the inspiration of the Bible, yet it proves that the author shared the view of the subject common to the Jews of his time. It is certain that in the apostolic doctrine the idea of inspiration was far from being distinct and sharply defined, like that of our Church dogmatics, yet the analogy between them is plain. Once at least, in 2 Peter i, 21, the prophetic inspiration is spoken of passively, as absolutely over-ruling. Though the second Petrine epistle is of doubtful authority, yet in this case it is confirmed by the first, which,

(i, 10) in the Old Testament prophecies, makes the prophesying subject to be, not the prophet's own individuality, but the Spirit of Christ, the prophets being mere organs; whence it followed that the time and time-relations at which and under which their Messianic predictions should be realized, remained concealed even to themselves. On the whole it cannot be denied that the Apostles, though they did not directly and clearly say so, attributed prophetic inspiration even to the act of writing, *actus scribendi*, of the Biblical writers. We can also trace this view through the earliest post-apostolic Church, whose use of the Old Testament constantly rested on this ground, even before the assumption had been made of the inspiration (*θεοπνευστία*) of the writers of the New Testament.

In intimate connection with this inspiration-doctrine of the Apostles, we find a peculiar method of exegesis, which they applied to the Old Testament text in a way that to us often appears strange. Now the doctrine and the exegesis must stand or fall together. The question is, can we, with an honest exegetical conscience, press both these, the interpretation which the New Testament writers put upon the Old Testament and the hermeneutical grounds upon which it rests? The difficulty does not lie in the use of the Messianic element, but in the arbitrariness with which, even in unimportant cases, Old Testament passages are quoted. For instance, in the last chapter of the epistle to the Romans, the unobjective character of this apostolic exegesis is to me most evident. The fact that in the New Testament writers there frequently appears a species of interpretation of Old Testament passages which no well versed exegete of to-day could use, is so plain to all eyes that even the most distinguished defenders of the Church dogma of inspiration confess that in this respect the Apostles "followed a free method of treatment."

The New Testament writers often quoted the Old Testament from memory, and, here and there, with such changes in the wording as materially alter the sense. In Matt. ii, 6, for instance, a quotation from Micah v, 2, is translated "And thou, Bethlem, in the land of Juda, art not the least," etc.; the original means exactly the opposite. These writers, too, quote from the Septuagint, for the most part, even when it misrepresents

the original. Generally this makes no difference with regard to the purpose of the quotation, but sometimes the words quoted are entirely foreign to the Hebrew text, having been mistaken by the translators; such cases occur at least in the epistle to the Hebrews. The words quoted, Heb. i, 6, "Let the angels of God worship him," do not occur in the Hebrew at all, but are an addition to the Alexandrian version in Deut. xxxii, 43. In Heb. x, 5, an argument is drawn from the words of the text, Ps. xl, 7, "A body hast thou prepared me," which are a mistranslation of the original, and, in all probability, were introduced into the Septuagint only through a blunder of the copyist. In Heb. xii, 27, the author argues from the passage in Haggai ii, 6, resting the entire weight upon the words, "yet once more," found in the Septuagint, where the original has, "it is a little while." Even where they do not follow the Septuagint, but seem to have had the Hebrew text before their eyes, as is particularly the case with Paul and John, and often in the first gospel, they apprehend the Old Testament passage in a way which an impartial interpretation cannot allow, whether they followed the exegetical traditions of the Jewish schools, or went their own independent way. In Matt. viii, 17, the passage, Is. liii, 4, is applied to Christ's miracles of healing, undoubtedly wrongly; or, if this meaning is right, then 1 Peter ii, 24, is wrong in applying the words to the death of Christ upon the cross. Paul explains the same passage, Gen. xiii, 15, in two different ways, Rom. iv, 16, and Gal. iii, 16. Above all, it cannot be denied that the New Testament writers, and especially Paul, find predictions and types of events in Old Testament passages and facts, which in their historical sense do not contain any such things; and that they draw from Old Testament texts things which the authors themselves would never have thought of. Many of the Old Testament passages which are treated in the New Testament as prophetic references to the Saviour, we now consider with propriety as indirect Messianic predictions; but it is indubitable that they are quoted as direct predictions.

It does not help the matter to say that the Apostles held to a double or manifold sense of Scripture; the science of hermeneutics knows of no such thing; and, moreover, when Paul in the Galatians, ch. 4th, argues from an allegorical inter-

pretation of Genesis xxii, he is very well aware that it is an allegory, and says so.

The difficulty of forming a correct opinion is enhanced by the usual way of putting the question. For it is natural that those who cannot accept the apostolic exegesis should be of the opinion that it was the method current among the Jewish schools at that time, that is the Rabbinical exegesis. But the name Rabbinical is joined to various entirely different things, without regard to history;—the *halacha* and the *haggada*, the exegetical practice and tradition of the time of Christ, and those of the middle ages. Some suppose that the Jewish exegesis was a purely arbitrary invention, a gratuitous display of absurdity. The fact is, it was, in its origin, a child of necessity. This arbitrary and tasteless artificialness of the old Jewish interpreters of Scripture had its origin in their inability to explain the Bible truly. The complete understanding of the Old Testament was not possible to the Jews at that time (1 Pet. i, 10–12). True interpretation depends upon the science of hermeneutics, of which they were destitute; nay, their theory was the exact opposite of a science. For since they believed in the miraculous origin of the letter of their Scriptures, the historical interpretation, the only true one, was excluded. The prophetic books, removed from the light of their historical origin, were a dark labyrinth. The interpreter could do nothing but mystify their meaning by conjectures.

The first believers in Christ of course took the same position with regard to the prophetic books. Even they were in part without the necessary conditions for explaining them. They had, however, this advantage over their countrymen, that they knew what was the theme of all the Old Testament prophecy, the general sense of which was thus open to them. The first Christians and especially the Apostles were obliged to take up this subject. For them, the interpretation of the Old Testament was a problem of such urgency that it could not be laid aside. The Gospel made its appearance as the announcement of the fact that in Jesus of Nazareth the promises of the Old Covenant were fulfilled. The proof of this assertion must have formed the chief topic for the edification of the first Christians in their religious assemblies. These proofs could only be

adduced by the explanation of the prophecies in detail. The problem was, so to explain the prophecies, by means of the light cast upon them from the new revelation, that what had heretofore been inexplicable in them should now be completely unfolded. The problem was an exegetical one. But an exegetical investigation could not be brought successfully to a close in haste, in a moment, when the necessary conditions were absent. The road out of the difficulty had long been hidden by the Jewish schools, and became more and more involved. The result of the attempt could only be insufficient, and to a greater or less degree, arbitrarily subjective. It is historically certain that the earliest Christian interpretation of the Scripture was of exactly this typical, allegorizing, and divining kind, and was officially authorized in the early Church.

If now we examine the use made of the Old Testament in the apostolic writings, from the point of view which we have attained, we shall find nothing surprising about it. Its affinity with the current usages of the Jewish schools of the time is not to be concealed; but there is the characteristic difference between them of the different spirit in which a method essentially the same was handled, and the skill with which the Apostles held themselves aloof from the tasteless artificialness which fill the Rabbinical interpretations. The New Testament writers, whilst they make use of the Old Testament as much as possible, do not always have a clear conception of its exposition. The distinction between exposition and mere application, like that between prophecy and historical parallel, is one which they often lose sight of. They were looking in the Old Testament for New Testament ideas, and where they saw them they saw prophecies of the New Testament. And the clearer the new light thrown upon the Old Testament in general, to the Israelite who believed in Jesus, the more would he expect every detail which had been dark, to be illuminated from the same source. Doubtless many passages which had before been unintelligible, had thus arbitrary interpretations assigned to them, by those who, having found the Messiah, wished to find him everywhere.

Many of the proof-texts taken from the Old Testament by the writers of the New, are not in the true sense proof-texts at

all. In fact they did not seek there for proofs in the sense of grounds for their Christian belief, but in the full certainty of faith they heard there a many-voiced echo of their fixed belief, and the universal reply was to them a new confirmation. But how was this consistent with a belief in the inspiration of the letter of the Old Testament? Since this *theopneustia* was not considered in an historical light, the spiritual interpretation of the divinely inspired text seemed perfectly natural. The principle of the miraculous inspiration of the letter carried with it the spiritualization of the letter. The position of the early Christians towards the Old Testament was very different from that of a modern exegete. They heard there not so much the voice of the individual authors as of the abstract, "holy Scripture," or, more exactly, God himself. They believed that God spoke to them in every written word. Paul puts this belief in the form of a doctrine, in Rom. xv, 4, and iv, 28, 1 Cor. ix, 10, and x, 11. The Christian spirit found many things to stumble at in the Old Testament, which seemed to it to be erroneous, and which it resisted. Such things the reader had to reconcile, as best he could, with his own consciousness, certain that the sacred word could not contain anything contrary to the highest truth, that is—Christianity.

Having thus described the mode of interpretation used by the writers of the New Testament, to which they are led by the presupposition that the letter of the Old Testament is inspired, the question comes to us:—do we find this supposition confirmed or refuted by its consequences? I answer without hesitation,—refuted.

We will now turn to the more difficult question in regard to the New Testament. Does this make the impression upon us that it is the work of the Holy Spirit? Every one who possesses the power of discerning the Spirit is conscious that the New Testament, if any writing in the world, is an inspired writing, in the sense of 2 Tim. iii, 16. To be convinced of this it is only necessary to compare the apostolic writings with the oldest Christian literature, that which immediately succeeded them, the so-called apostolic Fathers. What a contrast between the two literatures! What a gulf divides them! How sharply do the elevation, richness, freshness, naturalness, and sound-

ness of the one contrast with the littleness, poverty, emptiness, stiffness, and timidity of the other! There can be no contest here.

The main question is,—does the New Testament give itself out as the product of inspiration? An affirmative answer has generally been given, but, it is now candidly admitted by many defenders of inspiration, on precarious grounds. The principal weight is usually laid on the *à priori* argument from the less to the greater. “The inspiration of the Old Testament being proved,” says Phillippi, “that of the New follows so much the more as the revelation of the latter stands higher than that of the former.” If so, the Apostles should have considered their writings as more important or more fully inspired than those of the Old Testament. But they would have looked upon this as a presumptuous usurpation. If this *à priori* argument is pressed, the reply must be that the presupposition on which it rests is not proven.

The New Testament undoubtedly testifies to the fact that its authors, especially the Apostles, were men enlightened by and filled with the Holy Ghost. The Saviour promised to the Apostles, in place of himself, another Comforter, the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of truth, whom the world could not receive, who should ever dwell in them and teach them all things, tell them what to say, lead them into all the truth, and make known to them the Father. He promised to them the presence of the Spirit especially when, in their apostolic mission, they should be brought before spiritual and temporal rulers for trial, to teach them what and how to speak. This promise, according to the New Testament, began to be fulfilled at the first Pentecost after the Lord's ascension. The way for the apostolic work could only be opened through a wonderful miracle. From this point onward the twelve, hitherto so timid, appear like new men, and seem, in spite of their human weaknesses, as though standing in pure, radiant light. They, with Paul, who was added to their number, pursued their mission with a joyful consciousness that they did not stand alone, but acted in the power and authority of the Holy Spirit. Paul boasted that he did not receive the Gospel from men, but through a revelation from Jesus Christ, and, as he describes his preaching at Corinth, did

not declare the testimony of God with human oratory and wisdom, but in the demonstration of the Spirit and of power,—with a higher wisdom, which belongs not to the natural human consciousness, and which is incomprehensible to the natural man, but which was revealed to him by God through his Spirit. And he spoke of the things thus learned, “not in the words which men’s wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth.” In 1 Cor. vii, 10, Paul distinguishes plainly between the express word of the Lord and his own word, and in 1 Cor. ix, 8, between the word of the Old Testament and his own, yet at the same time expresses his confidence that he has the Spirit of God.

We must conclude from these *data* that the possession of the Spirit is not confined, according to the New Testament doctrine, to the Apostles, but extends to all true believers, without any *specific* difference. The promise of the Paraclete imparted to the twelve evidently applied, not to them alone, but also to all true believers. Jesus spoke of them not in contrast with each other, but in contrast with the world. Complete and intimate communion with him depends, not on membership in a limited circle, but on loving him and doing his will. When Jesus said, “I will ask the Father and he will give you another Comforter, that he may be with you always,” the last word of the promise plainly shows in what sense he meant the term “you;” that he meant, not the twelve, who would soon have done with time, but all who, to the end of days, should be believers in him. At Pentecost the Spirit fell, not upon the Apostles alone, but all the first believers. The miraculous gifts which appeared for the first time at the Pentecost, afterwards appeared frequently at the baptism of converts. (Acts viii, 14; x, 44; xix, 2.) The doctrine of the New Testament is that all true Christians possess the holy Spirit. (Luke xi, 13: John vii, 39: Acts ii, 16; vi, 3; xi, 24: 1 Pet iv, 14: Rom. viii, 9; xiv, 17; xv, 13: 1 Cor. iii, 16; vi, 19; xii, 8: Gal. iii, 2: Eph. i, 17; iv, 30; v, 18: 1 Thes. iv, 8: 1 John ii, 20; iv, 13.) And this is exactly in accordance with the Old Testament promises. (Is. xlv, 8; lix, 21: Jer. xxxi, 33: Joel iii, 1: see also Wisdom vii, 27.) The numerous gifts and powers which Paul enumerates in Rom. xii and elsewhere evidently do not belong exclusively to the

Apostles, but to the whole congregation of believers. John teaches in the strongest terms that all true Christians have received the anointing of the Holy Spirit, and by it have been instructed in all truth. (1 John ii, 20.) The Apostles did not have a Holy Spirit of their own, but all believers have the same, though in very different measure. At the so-called council of Jerusalem the Apostles did not claim the Spirit for themselves exclusively, though they attributed their decision to its influence.

It is an idea foreign to the New Testament that the Apostles, in the composition of their writings, were under the influence of the Holy Spirit in a way specifically different from his usual indwelling and inworking in them. Moreover, such a supposition is accompanied by many difficulties. "I cannot believe," says Bleek, "that Luke had a higher kind of inspiration in writing the book of Acts than Paul and Peter had in the sermons there recorded. It is very probable that the Apostles experienced the control of the Spirit in different degrees at different moments of their work; but this could not have depended on whether they were writing or speaking." The Apocalypse alone of the New Testament books claims inspiration for itself, yet not for the committing of it to writing, but only for its contents, on the ground of a special revelation made to the author of it by the Saviour. Only two other passages can be thought to make a similar claim—1 Tim. v, 18, and 2 Pet. iii, 15. In the first, "for the Scripture saith, thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn, and the laborer is worthy of his reward," the last clause seems to be quoted from the Scriptures, but is not found in the Old Testament, and only occurs in the sermon of Jesus, Luke x, 7 (and, with a slight change, in Matt. x, 10). But nothing compels us to join the phrase, "the Scripture saith," to the last clause of the verse; the first clause only is probably quoted as from Scripture, and the second as a mere common proverb; for Paul, in quoting the words of Jesus, usually quotes them expressly as such. In the other passage, the author mentions the epistles of Paul, "which they that are unlearned and unstable wrest, as they do also the other Scriptures." Here it is possible that "other Scriptures" may not mean the Old Testament; if it does, then the epistles of Paul are placed in the same category with it. But even if

this is conceded, the force of the testimony is much weakened by the strong suspicion which exists of the genuineness of this epistle. Some other passages have been thought to be against this view, but they are either irrelevant or refer to the spoken word, not to the act of writing.

The inspiration of the apostolic writings, as taught in the New Testament, rests upon the fact that the promise of the Holy Spirit to the Apostles was given in connection with the commission which they received to preach the Gospel. It was when the Saviour sent his disciples forth for the first time that he promised to them the presence of the Spirit of God when they should be obliged to defend themselves before the rulers. It was in this last conversation, in which he was preparing them for the time when they must do their work in the world alone, that he promised them the presence of another helper. It was on the evening of the day of his resurrection, when he was sending them abroad in his name and giving them authority to forgive sins, that he breathed upon them, with the words: "Receive the Holy Spirit." It was when he assigned to them their mission to testify of him in Jerusalem, in Judea, and to the ends of the earth, that he commanded them to wait until the power of the Holy Spirit should come upon them from on high. The possession of the Spirit was closely connected with their apostolic mission. In the case of the Apostle Paul it was the Holy Spirit that directed his departure from Antioch, that expressly led the way where he was to preach the Gospel, that accompanied him wherever he went and ensured a hearing to his preaching. But how does all this indicate an inspiration of the apostolic writings, in the sense of the theory of the Church-theology? It can only do so on the supposition that the composition of these writings was the highest exercise of the apostolic office. Our older theology took this for granted; indeed it follows directly from the confusion of the terms "revelation" and "holy Scripture" with each other. The Apostles received no command from the Saviour to write anything about him, and the most of them never used the pen. In the case of the few who composed writings, this department of their official work seems to have been something unusual, appears in the back-ground of their oral preaching, and generally contrary to

the usual order of their personal work. Even the Apostle who left the largest amount of writings is no exception.

But on this question, whether the New Testament claims to be inspired in the sense of our Church-dogmatics, it is equally important to consider the testimony which the writings themselves give, direct or indirect, as to the way and manner of their origin. The Bible presents itself to us throughout as a collection of writings brought together by an historical process, having their origin in the work of human writers. It would never occur to one reading the historical books of the Old Testament that the Holy Spirit prompted the pens of the writers. Why then should it be thought that the Holy Spirit suggested the contents, which might have been supplied by oral or written tradition? These books often expressly claim to rest on written sources. Is the poetry, then, of the Old Testament the dictation of the Holy Spirit? It has been well said by Kahnis, "there is no poetry apart from humanity; whoever finds poetry in the Old Testament recognizes the human element there." So in the proverbs of Solomon; "what a contradiction in the assumption that the Holy Spirit dictated their worldly wisdom." So, too, the prophets, "wrote as they spoke, out of their individual peculiarities. The one fact that the later and less original ones made use of the writings of the earlier, is enough to disprove the theory." The case is the same with the New Testament. Would any one recognize these books as writings in whose production the authors were in a passive condition, laboring mechanically, mere slate-pencils? The exact opposite strikes every reader. They take a position just like every honest historian, teacher, letter-writer. They were clearly conscious of the motive and end of their writings, and derived the impulse to write from the particular circumstances which surrounded them, and the relations in which they stood with both large Christian circles and individual persons for whom their message was intended. (Luke i, 1: Rom. i, 11; xv, 15: 1 Cor. i, 11; v, 1; vii, 1: 2 Cor. i, 8 f.; ii, 1 f.; vii, 12; xi, 1 f.: Gal. iii, 1 f.: Col. ii, 1: 2 Thes. ii, 1 f.) Excepting the historical books and the Apocalypse, these authors wrote, not for after generations or the whole of Christendom, but for the immediate present and its necessities. In their histories they

go to work just as any careful reporter would do. They usually draw from written sources, sometimes from their own knowledge, sometimes that of others. (John xix, 35: 1 John i, 1-3.) They undeniably used, in part, each others writings, and interwove whole narratives of others in their own. Who can recognize, in this process, the dictation of the Holy Spirit? How can the theory of the Church dogmatics remain, for instance, in spite of the account which Luke gives of the motives and method of his writing? Such passages give us a look into the workshop where these books were constructed. Where the apostolic writers put forth well considered religious doctrines, they expressly give us the result of deep, inspired reflection upon the great facts of the revelation of God in Christ, and the problems which there press upon the thinking mind. They did not all answer the same questions, nor from the same point of view, nor in the same manner. Even in the same author we find the same question, at different times and in different circumstances, approached from different sides, and solutions advanced not in the same terms.

And as the New Testament writers derived their material from ordinary, natural sources, so they used it just as other writers. In the treatment of it their peculiarities of mind and of religious experience are most apparent. As Riehm says: "The testimony of the biblical and especially of the New Testament writers is not only that of the Holy Spirit, but also and most intimately their own, derived not only from divine inspiration, but also from the deepest depths of the human spirit, from the hints of experience, from the pains of humiliation, from the formation and development of the new man within them, from the long apprenticeship of the spiritual life."

Moreover, these writers have each his own peculiar characteristic style of writing, and in the most of them we find a certain awkwardness in the use of language, and a ruggedness and stiffness of the forms of speech, as is natural and usual with writers who have not had much of the training of the schools, and are not accustomed to express their thoughts in writing. These things do not impair the value of the books for the purposes intended, but how can they be attributed to the Holy Spirit?

It is certain, also, that the earliest Church, immediately after the Apostles, knew of no holy Scriptures except the Old Testament. The course of events soon led to the equalization of these books with the Old Testament and the transference to them of the same ideas, but it was a gradual process. It was natural that the Saviour's words and the record which contained them should be thought of equal value with the word of the Old Testament. Yet we do not find the New Testament expressly declared to be inspired and placed in the same rank with the Old earlier than Theophilus of Antioch, in 180. From that time it is universal.

But though we are thus completely perplexed by the holy Scripture, on the supposition that it is inspired in the ordinary sense, yet this is only one side of the answer to our question. To this it must be added that the Bible *does* impress us with the thought that it is an inspired book. If there is any dogma that has religious roots, that is, an expression of the religious consciousness of the evangelical Christian, in the sphere of his personal religious experience, it is the dogma of the inspiration of the Bible.

[To be continued.]

ARTICLE VI.—APOSTOLIC PREACHING.

PREACHING never has been and never can be the instrument of ceremonial and sensuous faiths; and since it does not belong to merely natural religions, nor even properly to the old Hebrew economy, except when the God-commissioned "prophet" proclaimed in startling tones—soon silenced—the word of the Lord; and since Christ appointed preaching to be the new instrumentality of propagating his faith, as the most spiritual agency of a spiritual religion, a religion which is itself, above all, a Word, we are compelled to go to the Word of God to learn the true nature of preaching, and are led to modify our theories, however plausible and splendid, in accordance with the teaching of the Scriptures, especially of the New Testament.

There is a comprehensive passage in the first chapter of the first epistle to the Corinthians which sets forth the spiritual and profound nature of Christian preaching; and we venture to make a literal translation of this, while at the same time endeavoring to bring out its full meaning:

"For the word (the doctrine—the preaching) of the cross is indeed folly to them that perish, but to us, the saved, it is the power of God. For it is written: I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and I will bring to nothing the prudence of the prudent. Where remains the wise? Where the learned disputant of this world? Has not God made the wisdom of this world to be folly? For since in the wisdom of God the world by means of its false wisdom knew not God, it has pleased God through the folly of the preaching (of Christ) to save the believing; since the Jews demand a sign, and the Greeks strive after wisdom; but we preach Christ crucified, to the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the Greeks a folly; but to the called themselves, whether Jews or Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God. For what is counted the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men. For ye perceive the nature of your calling, brethren, that not many wise after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble are among you; but the things that are counted foolish by the world God has chosen, that he might put to shame the wise; and the weak things of the world God has chosen, that he might put to shame those that are mighty; and the things that the world thinks ignoble, and those that are despised, God has chosen, and what is even of no worth, that he might destroy what is esteemed of worth: so that no flesh might glory in God's sight. But through him ye are in Christ Jesus, who has become to us wisdom of God, and righteousness, and sanctification,

and redemption: that, as it is written, whoever will glory, let him glory in the Lord.

So also I, when I came to you, came not with excellence of speech or of wisdom, to preach to you the testimony of God. For I determined not to know anything among you but Jesus Christ alone, and him crucified. And I was with you in weakness and in much fear and trembling, and my teaching and my preaching consisted not in persuasive words of human wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and power, in order that your faith should not rest on human wisdom, but on God's power."

The party in the Church of Corinth who were instructed in Greek philosophy, and the Jew-Christians who cultivated the dialectics of Rabbinic theology, and all who were attracted by the classic eloquence of the skilled Alexandrian preacher, Apollos, were strongly inclined to the view that the gospel demanded for its success the aid of philosophy and the persuasive influence of trained eloquence. When, however, the gospel, as simply and earnestly preached by Paul and the other apostles, began to show the living fruits of its tillage in the hearts and characters of renewed men, blossoming out like a garden or a vineyard, then what appeared to be foolishness was seen to be wisdom, and not only wisdom but *power*; so that in those overwhelming manifestations of divine energy in the gospel, all mere human wisdom and its teachers were swept away. This foolishness of preaching was not foolish preaching; but it was foolish only in the estimation of unbelieving men who trusted in philosophy and in learned reasoning for living spiritual results. Such persons made the gospel of none effect, while they left out of preaching *the vital thing*, the water of life that creates life, the element of the Cross, rendered effectual by the demonstration and power of the Spirit. On the other hand, they, however unlearned and contemptible in the world's estimation, who yielded themselves readily to the call of God in the gospel, rose into the circle of that higher wisdom of God. The crucified Christ, the manifestation of *the love of God* in his Son sacrificing himself for men, the coming of Deity into humanity to work out a new divine life in our sinful nature, a truth ever new and life-giving, this forms the divine element in preaching. Preachers may differ in their ways of setting forth this truth; they may differ as widely as did the bold, unartistic Paul and the skilled Apollos; but if they have placed supreme reliance on the wisdom of the

cross and not on human wisdom; if, holding up Christ to men as the way of eternal life, they have trusted in his spiritual and mightily drawing power; if they have hid themselves behind the cross they preached; if they have literally despised themselves and their own learning and eloquence in comparison with the divine factors of the Cross and the Spirit in the work of conversion, these men, it may be in much weakness and trembling, have been true preachers of the gospel; and glorious is this apostolic succession of Christ's preachers like a track of heavenly light across the world's tempestuous history.

In the passage commented upon and in other writings of the apostle, we do not hold that he denied the human element in preaching; but he saw its incompetence, and he placed no reliance upon it. He made constant use both of eloquence and learning in his preaching. He made the most of himself and of what knowledge he had as an orator. The hill of Mars, so near the bema where Demosthenes spoke three centuries before, under the same clear sky to people of the same cultured race, suggests no unfit comparison in the aptness, force, beauty, and burning earnestness of the two great orators, lifting their assemblies above the mean and narrow circle of things, and breathing into them nobler passions. Undoubtedly the learning and eloquence of the Greek schools at Corinth for which the Christian Church there had itching ears, and which the apostle did oppose, contained something essentially false. It was the early cropping out or development of the false worship of the *γνῶσις*, the tendency to depend entirely upon the faculty of knowledge, rather than of faith, in spiritual things, a germ of that gnostic philosophy which afterwards so troubled the Church and wrought such evil. It was an eloquence which was made the instrument of a wrong knowledge and a false philosophy. He was afraid of its influence. He firmly resisted its introduction into the Christian Church, even in the case of Apollos, who, perhaps, was inclined to its methods although he was a true Christian preacher and brother.

But true faith also has its philosophical or knowledge-side, and in the elucidation of truth it is impossible entirely to avoid the philosophical mode of treatment.

The gospel is a body of truth, though its order may be subtle. It goes out from one centre, is guided by one law of development, and is adapted to the mind's wants and intuitions. It appeals to the mind's higher consciousness, to the consciousness of what has been called "the rationalized intellect," when it is brought into the condition of original rectitude, when it judges rightly. To teach, then, the gospel, one must proceed in the main according to intellectual methods; and that the gospel may have its full influence on the mind, it would seem as if it should be set forth in its original divine order and in harmony with the mind's divine laws. It is not to be taken out of the category of rational truth, although supernatural influences accompany it and are *superadded* to the truth, in order to rouse the dead energies of the mind, and to render the mind fit to receive into it that new life which the truth brings; as the seed remains apparently dead in a dead soil until touched by influences from above, until heaven's heat and moisture penetrate its chill darkness, quickening it and the earth in which it lies.

We are to inquire how the human preacher is to use his human instrumentality,—which human instrumentality is presupposed in the fact of there being a preacher—to use this in harmony with the apostolic theory of preaching.

What, then, in this light of the apostolic theory is the first great element of Christian preaching, which makes it the peculiar thing it is, which separates it in some sense from all other kinds of discourse? We answer it is *interpretation*. As it is the highest glory of God in his word to be the Revealer, so it is the highest glory of the preacher of God's word to be the interpreter.

This, from its importance, may be said to be, comparatively speaking, the only thing he has to do, or for which he is responsible. What was the process as we have it from the Scriptures and the earliest records? In the primitive Christian assembly he who knew the most of Christ was he who spoke; at first it was the apostle who had actually seen and walked and talked with Christ in intimate soul-communion, and who continued with him in his temptations; then one of the Seventy, or any one who by his intelligence, age, or faith, was best fitted to answer the earnest question, "Tell us, friends and brethren,

what you know about Jesus Christ, about what he did and said, above all, about his death on the cross." It was brief question and answer, from the heart to the heart. Each cast in of his knowledge, of his doctrine, of his prophetic insight, of his faith, of his feeling, of his "gift," whatever it might be, as moved freely by the Spirit. There was no such thing as a discourse, or a sermon, by a regular preacher, excepting when a Peter, or John, or Paul, chanced to be in the assembly, who was commissioned directly of the Lord to indoctrinate his young church in the new faith. After these first actors passed off the scene, the same process essentially went on. Preaching was an *interpretation*, or exposition, by some competent teacher, of the documents relating to the same wonderful life and death of the Divine Founder, of the histories and the letters that had been written by original eye-witnesses; some portion of these was read, and the teacher, or the presiding elder, or perhaps the simple lay-brother who felt moved to do so, rose and spoke in way of explanation and exhortation, catching his theme and inspiration from the passage which was read; and this continued to be mainly the method of preaching even down to the time of Origen, and we may say almost to that of Augustine; for it was not until quite late that the style of preaching ceased to be almost purely expository, or founded directly upon the portion of Scripture read as the regular lesson of the day, without much if any regard being paid to the unity of the discourse, or the idea of art in its method; except in occasional panegyric orations, such as those pronounced upon martyrs, and those spoken on the Feast and Fast days of the Church. Whatever may be the corruptions of the earlier ages of the Church, it must be said that in the main, down to a late period, the Scriptures continued to be not only the text but the *immediate fundamental subject* of preaching, chiefly in the way of a running practical commentary, like the well-known homilies of Chrysostom; and yet in these very ages, especially in the Greek Church, and through the influence of Greek culture and the Greek philosophy, the sacred oration, the formal "sermon," as the Latin name for it was, built on art-principles, balanced in its unities like a Greek tragedy or piece of sculpture, mingling the ivory and gold of human philosophy and eloquence in the cunning workmanship of man's device, succeeded the simple

homily which was poured out of the heart of the primitive disciple, as it was touched by the warm ray of God's Spirit, like the bird's song that welcomes the dawn. There was a revolution wrought here hard to define, but which nevertheless *brought something in between* the Word and its pure interpretation and impartation to men's spirits by the preacher; so that the gospel, the Cross of Christ, the love of God, the living, throbbing heart of Jesus, was not brought to bear in its vital and divinely transforming power directly upon the heart of man; and if, in its superhuman energy and heat, it penetrated through the intervening medium, it was greatly diminished and deadened in its influence. What was that something?

While there is no doubt that philosophical thinking entered into preaching by a natural development of the theological element in the Church, when the Church began to feel the influence of a more philosophical culture; and while it is not to be denied that this was a necessary and desirable development, showing progress, or the way to progress, as indicating the absolute claims of religion upon the reason and whole nature of man; yet this does not change the truth that Christian preaching should found itself not on a philosophy of truth, but on Christ, on his gospel, on the gospel's original interpretation. The preacher's thought should work intelligently upon the truth, should mould it into forms of belief; but, primarily, he is a simple announcer, or medium, of the truth; a channel for God's word to run through; therefore for him to preach primarily from a *system* which is derivative instead of from the divine word; for him to preach from the *rationale* of Christian truth instead of the living Christ himself, who was crucified and is risen again; this is interposing, as we have said, something between the Word and its pure interpretation to men's hearts, and this certainly was not the apostolic way. What we wish distinctly to contend for is; that *the basis of Christian preaching is not theology, nor anything else but the Word of God made effectual by the Spirit of God*. We are the last to deny the claims of theology, which, as opening to us great thoughts and lines of thought, as bounding all we know both of God and man, is the worthiest and highest field of human reason, and which is a vast aid to the preacher, enabling him, philosophically speaking, to

go to the bottom of subjects ; but theology is variable while the Word is eternal, theology is human while the Word is divine, and that preaching which is fitted to redeem souls and build up the kingdom of divine love on earth, must be also divine in its foundation.

It may be that we are fighting a fiction of the imagination, since all who have theories about preaching, stoutly affirm that their theory is based on the word of God. It may be so ; but we are desirous only of clearly establishing the principle that the word of God and nothing else—that Christ, who is identical with the Bible—is the real root and source of preaching. You may be an instructor in physical science, in philosophy, in political economy, if you please ; but if you are a Christian preacher, what God has revealed of himself in Christ, the gospel of Jesus Christ, in a word, Christ, forms your main and in one sense (though we do not now speak of its comprehensiveness) only theme. It is yours to preach all that God has revealed for the moral renovation of the world, and all this is gathered up in Christ to diffuse itself into all and fill all with the fullness of God. But it is Christian truth flowing forth from Christ, fitted for the soul's life, spiritual, made vital with the blood of the Cross, and the divine breath of the Spirit, and not science, that you are to preach.

The work of interpretation is greater and more comprehensive than some imagine. The greatest poet is nothing more than an interpreter. To be an interpreter, one must know the language that he interprets, and the speech and thoughts of both parties between whom he stands. He may possess all scholarship and wisdom, but if he cannot render the thoughts of God truly, purely, he is a failure as a preacher ; he is crippled on the angelic or divine side of his mission. If, too, he does not comprehend the human soul, and cannot interpret God's truth to it, he is a failure. He needs all his power and skill to be a simple interpreter, just as the mechanical photographer can never take the place of the true artist as the sensitive and true interpreter of nature. Even the lowest idea of interpretation requires great and peculiar gifts. Niebuhr says : " Exegesis is the fruit of finished study." To expound the truth of God's word the preacher must employ the most penetrative analysis

and the broadest generalization. In true exegesis there is a field for originality. But to be original, exegesis must be thorough and independent, so that the inspired Word speaks to one's own mind, so that the Spirit speaks to the soul and awakens great and fresh thoughts, and the preacher becomes a mouth-piece of God. A mechanical mouth-piece, like a brazen trumpet, to be filled by God's breath? No. But a living organism, potential and alive with divinity, filled in all its compass with a higher spirit. He should be an interpreter of God not only in word but life. He should be an incarnate presentation of the gospel he preaches. His whole being, his unconscious influence, all his acts, movements, impulses, should interpret to men the great thoughts of God's tenderness and grace. To be an interpreter of God's will, of God's love, to men, how few are even approximately, or in the faintest measure, fitted to fill this office! We sometimes think we have too many preachers instead of too few, and are almost disposed to shut down the gates, and press young men back from taking up this great work, on account of its greatness, feeling that quality is infinitely better than quantity; but God's way is the best, and he can raise up his instruments out of all characters and dispositions among men.

Inspiration presents us with two elements, the human and the divine; we enter the one through thorough study and the honest application of our own powers to the literary and historic subject-matter of the Scriptures; we enter the other through prayer, faith, love, obedience, humility, and the direct aids of the Holy Spirit. To interpret an author we must penetrate his inmost spirit; and to interpret the divine author we must do this. The spiritual meaning of the word of God yields itself to him who suffers himself to be guided by the Spirit, who alone comprehends the mind of the Spirit. This "pneumatical exegesis," as it has been called by a German writer, does not interfere with, but makes use of scholarly exegesis, or the employment of the human power to come at the sense of Scripture; but scientific hermeneutics fails to lead us into the mystery of divine truth, where the spirit of its life, the inner glory of its power, dwells. It is a matter of almost painful regret that Dr. Arnold, when hesitating in regard to the work to

which he should devote his life, did not choose that to which he was so strongly drawn, viz: the interpretation and preaching of the word of God.

"He had a very remarkable, I should rather say (if I might), wonderful discernment for the divine, as incorporated in the human element of Scripture; and the recognition of these two separate and most distinct elements—the careful separation of the two so that each shall be subject to its own laws, and determined on its own principles—was the foundation, the grand characteristic principle of his exegesis. Our Lord's words, that we must "render to Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and to God the things which are God's," seemed to him to be of universal application, and nowhere more so than in the interpretation of Scripture. And his object was not, according to the usual practice, to establish by its means certain religious truths, but to study its contents themselves—to end, in short, instead of beginning with doctrine. Indeed, doctrine in the strict sense, doctrine, as pure religious theory, such as it is exhibited in scientific articles and creeds, never was his object. Doctrine, in its practical and religious side, as bearing on religious feeling and character, not doctrine in the sense of a direct disclosure of spiritual and material essences, as they are in themselves, was all that he endeavored to find, and all that he believed could be found, in the teachings of Scripture.

He approached the human side of the Bible in the same real historical spirit, with the same methods, rules, and principles as he did Thucydides. He recognized in the writers of the Scriptures the use of a human instrument—language; and this he would ascertain and fix, as in any other authors, by the same philological rules. Further, too, the Bible presents an assemblage of historical events, it announces an historical religion; and the historical element Arnold judged of historically by the established rules of history, substantiating the general veracity of Scripture even amidst occasional inaccuracies of detail, and proposing to himself, for his special end here, the reproduction, in the language and forms belonging to our own age, and therefore familiar to us, of the exact mode of thinking, feeling, and acting, which prevailed in the days gone by.

But was this all? Is the Bible but a common book, recording, indeed, more remarkable occurrences, but in itself possessed of no higher authority than a faithful and trustworthy historian like Thucydides? Nothing could be further from Dr. Arnold's feelings. In the Bible he found and acknowledged an oracle of God—a positive and supernatural revelation made to man, an immediate inspiration of the Spirit. No conviction was more deeply seated in his nature; and this conviction placed an impassable gulf between him and all rationalizing divines.”*

This fundamental conception of preaching and the preacher, if carried out, would tend

1. *To make preaching more truly spiritual, and more successful in the conversion of souls.*

If the pure truth is purely interpreted, it is a testimony of God, made clearer and more transforming to the soul by the inward “demonstration of the Spirit and of power.” A divine breath comes over preaching. The Spirit takes these things of Christ and shows them to men. Men are turned to God by a power above human persuasion. Preaching becomes more than the most powerful eloquence; it becomes a true “*prophesying*.” This was Origen's conception of preaching. He speaks of a “*prophesying*” still remaining in preaching; yet as not taking the place entirely of human gifts and studies. He says: “Sed in his quæritur, si potest esse aliquid in nobis vel ex nobis prophetica species, quæ non totum habeat ex Deo, sed aliquantulum etiam ex humanis studiis capiat.” The apostle, he thought, spoke of this kind of prophesying (1 Cor. xii, 31), “But covet earnestly the best gifts”—which, according to xiv, 1, meant prophesying—“Follow after charity, and desire spiritual gifts, but rather that ye may prophesy.” This is not the prophecy spoken of in Luke xvi, 16, “The law and the prophets even until John”—but that spoken of in 1 Cor. xiv, 3, “But he that prophesieth speaketh unto men to edification, and exhortation, and comfort.”

This prophetic power could be obtained, according to Origen, through *study*, on the condition that the study be earnestly and believingly pursued to the end of preaching God's revealed

* Stanley's *Life of Arnold*, Am. Ed., p. 196.

truth, and to its human results God would add what comes directly from him, the prophetic gift; or, literally, in Origen's own words (*Commentar. ad Rom.*). "*Et ideo adhibere studium ad hujuscemodi prophetiam possibile nobis est, et est in nostra potestate, ut nobis in hæc operam dantibus, se secundum rationem vel mesuram fidei facimus, addatur et illa, quæ ex Deo est, prophetia.*" This is a bold and profound conception. If the preacher will do his best, will purely devote himself to interpret divine truth, will bring his own energies, thought, untiring study, all his acquirements, skilled learning, feeling, heart, life, every faculty of body and mind, with earnest strivings and prayers, and concentrate them on the one holy aim of setting forth to men, and sowing in their hearts and lives the will of God as manifested in the gospel of the Son of God, then in and through these human studies and contentions and prayers, God's spirit will breathe and move, until the preacher's words become words that burn with a superhuman energy, and he shall speak "in demonstration of the Spirit," as one empowered to save souls. Dr. Bushnell puts this thought in such forcible terms that we gladly quote him; "Preaching deals appropriately in the supernatural, publishing to guilty souls what has come into the world from above the world—Christ and his salvation. We ask how often, with real sadness, whence the remarkable impotence of preaching in our time? It is because we concoct our gospels in the laboratories of our understanding; because we preach too many disquisitions, and look for effects correspondent only with the natural forces exerted. True preaching is a testimony; it offers not things reasoned in any principal degree, but things given, supernatural things, testifying them as being in their power by an utterance which they fill and inspire. It brings new premises, which of course no argument can create, and therefore speaks to faith. And, what is most of all peculiar, it assumes the fact, in men, of a religious nature, higher than a merely thinking nature, which, if it can be duly awakened, cleaves to Christ and his salvation with an almost irresistible affinity. Hence it is that so many infidels have been converted under preaching that went directly by their doubts, only bringing up the mighty themes of God and salvation, and throwing them in as torches into the dark blank

cavern of their empty heart. They are not put upon their reason, but the burning glow of their inborn affinities for the divine are kindled, and the blaze of these overtops their speculations and scorches them down by its glare. Doubtless there are times and occasions where something may be gained by raising a trial before the understanding. But there may also be something lost even in cases where that kind of issue is fairly gained. Many a time nothing is wanting but to speak as to a soul already hungry and thirsty, or if not consciously so, ready to hunger and thirst as soon as the bread and water of life are presented. No man is a preacher because he has something like or about a gospel in his head. He really preaches only when his person is the living embodiment, the inspired organ, of the gospel; in that manner no mere human power, but the demonstration of a Christly and Divine power. It is in this manner that preaching has had effects so remarkable."

This truth is not in the least superstitious, because we presuppose the finest and most continuous, as well as intense, use of the human faculties. How can it not be so when the mysteries of God's truth are concerned? The servant of the Lord devotes his *mind* as his best offering. God claims it. Only in his best doing does God also do. The divine meets the human in the mind's best moods, in its heights of exaltation, in its purest efforts and humblest self-devotion.

This apostolical theory of preaching tends also

2. *To a less formal and rigid, and a more textual and free method of preaching.*

Form is essential. A great part of a preacher's intellectual preparation is done when he learns how to think; when he learns how to develop his ideas in the necessary order of thought. This organizing habit of mind is of prime value in preaching, since little true instruction can be given without some deeply meditated plan. Loosely constructed sermons leave commonly but a feeble impression upon hearers. But there is a vast power in freedom. To have sermons always reared on the same ground-plan, like building Shaker houses in a row, however trim and well built they are, they become heartily wearisome; better the picturesque irregularity of an old fendal town, where the houses nod at each other in all sorts

of queer gables and angles. Dr. Emmons struck out a method of composing a sermon—an admirable method from text to “improvement”—lucid and firm as an iron and glass conservatory; and he stuck to this; he never deviated from it, for it was the true product of his genius, and the hot-house of his logical ideas. Whatever the text, whatever the character or design of the sermon, it was cast in this rigid translucent form. This had a beauty and consistency and even at times majesty; but Paul did not preach in this way, nor Chrysostom, nor Luther, nor even Calvin. There is the variety as of a forest or mountain nature in the sermons of these preachers. Sometimes they were closely logical, and sometimes, and most generally, they were expository, abrupt, practical, untameable by any rules of reasoning or art. Variety is of vast value. The preacher has no right to fall into a stereotyped form of sermonizing, for he must consult all sorts of minds, and the wants of a miscellaneous congregation, many of whom are illiterate, are not reasoners, cannot grasp a syllogism, and must be addressed through the sensibilities and imagination, and by a style of address that touches the heart. How many different kinds of preaching there are! Every sermon should have variety; it should never be exclusively dogmatic without the practical element in it, nor should it be entirely practical without the doctrinal element. One should sometimes preach hortatory sermons like trumpets, or bugles, to wake men from sin's deadly sleep. Sermons upon the life of our Lord are endlessly rich with lessons for the present time. But it seems to us very unfortunate when a preacher runs on an iron track, let it be theological, when the sermon is but the reproduction of his theological studies, or, if a young man, of his notes of theological lectures: or let it be pictorial and composed of nothing but illustrations; or let it be ethical, where the sermon never rises to the summits and glories of the supernatural. And we would go so far as to say that a preacher may dwell too exclusively on the supernatural regions, so that he shall become himself a kind of bloodless spiritual monster, a dehumanized abstraction, sublimated beyond human passions, and having no Christ-like feeling for human nature, having no power to come down to the wants of living men. Such a preacher should be put in a glass case

in the top of the steeple, or in the crypt, like relics of saints in old cathedrals.

Some preachers strike but one chord that renders back a terrible clang—sin and perdition—solemn truths, and, above all, the fact of human sinfulness, too true, absolutely necessary to be known—but is this the only chord in the gospel? Some preachers see nothing but the hopeful side, the vision of a man of good digestion, and dare not draw the darker picture, so that their preaching lacks background and power. Some preachers deal with the metaphysical dogma till they lick up the springs of life as with a tongue of desert wind; while others dwell so entirely on the busy, unreasoning present of facts, that thinking minds are not helped in their difficulties, and never go to the foundation, rationally speaking. Now we believe that a return to more simple Biblical preaching would help this variety, and bring freedom.

Topical preaching, which develops from the text a particular theme, and makes *that* the subject of the sermon, requires artistic handling, shuts itself up to strict laws of discourse, is a purely logical process requiring brief texts that contain complete themes, and is apt sometimes to lead to a neglect of the text, suspending the sermon on the proposition instead of the text, and is thus moulded by the impulse of the preacher instead of the text. However useful and good this method is and has been, it should not become the exclusive method, because it tends to make the sermon really but a word of man. In contradistinction from topical, or theme, preaching, we would suggest the adoption, to a greater degree at least than is now the fashion, of the *textual* sermon. What is the textual sermon? It is one where the text itself, instead of a subject taken from the text, is the theme; where the text is the subject immediately treated of; where the text is followed faithfully, yet in its orderly connections and organic life. The text may be longer or shorter, and this is the beauty of the textual sermon, that the text *may be* a longer portion of Scripture, embracing more of scope and variety, like one of the parables, or a whole history, or a great truth, as set forth fully in the 13th chapter of the First of Corinthians, or an entire Psalm, in which the inner life of the writer is subtly manifested. The

stiffness would be taken out of preaching. It would become flexible and free. It would be also greatly enriched. The textual sermon develops the deepest richness of the text, following it in its living details, never crystallizing into formal propositions, but at the same time teaching clear lessons, regardful of the deep unifying thought. The teaching is thus wrung from the Scriptures; it is the first pressing of the grapes, it is the pure oil from the rock, it is the original, fresh, and living truth, like a cordial to the soul, affording spiritual refreshment. The subject of textual preaching is, in a word, *Christ*, one yet multiplex, the same yesterday, to-day, and forever, the crucified yet risen and living, the compendium of spiritual truth, the interfused and living whole that is contained in every part of the Word. In this way each soul may receive something that is suited for its wants, the simplest child and the deepest thinker. Margaret Fuller, after hearing the eloquent Channing preach upon the dignity of human nature, is reported to have said: "Somehow it fatigued me, and put too much on me—I was glad to go home and read what Jesus said, Ye are of more value than many sparrows; that I could bear." So every one can bear what Jesus says, can receive the Scriptures, can feed upon this living bread, can find just what each soul needs, can realize the truth that Christ's words, "they are spirit and they are life," and it is therefore the preacher's duty and honor and joy to become a pure medium of Christ's words, a true interpreter of His thoughts and love to men.

The theory of preaching, which it has been the aim of this Article to set forth, is fitted

3. *To show where really reside the true life, power, and lasting permanence of preaching.*

We profess a sincere admiration for Henry Ward Beecher as a preacher, and have borne distinct testimony in these columns to our faith. We love and revere the man because we perceive in him one whose whole soul is in earnest to reach *living men* with the living truth, and to bear it in upon their minds, as each mind is in need, so that everyone may be made perfect in Christ Jesus. With his immense vitality, his wit, his pathos, his sympathy with the people, his strong homely address, he carries all before him. But another man who has not a tithe

of his genius, his adaptation, his knowledge of human nature, his imagination, his eloquence, and who never can have these qualities, may still prove himself to be a true and successful preacher called of Christ; but he will have to work upon other lines, and what he loses in psychological insight, he will have to make up in the faithful interpretation and presentation of the Scriptures; preaching with all the point, and love of men, and earnestness of which he is capable. He must depend mainly upon the divine sources of the Word and the Spirit. If he fails in eloquence he must not fail in spirituality. Christ has made humanity divine, and there is a divine element in humanity. Mr. Beecher, we believe, has done and is doing a great work in bringing up the *human* side of preaching, in applying the word to all men and to all the concerns of human life, and to all sides of human nature, in showing that the preacher must know men, must study and mingle with and truly love men in order to save them, must bait the hook and throw the line with skill, must vary his methods, must wait and watch for souls, for the individual soul, must get in the shadow, must descend into the stream, must twist, and turn, and plan, and be wary and patient, and be bold when the moment for action comes. This is admirable. This means business. This is coming to the point. This is good fishing. Would we had more of it. Still in the long run and for all men, there are other and higher qualities than even adaptability. Human tact is good, but divine wisdom is better. John Wesley was noted more for boldness than for tact, though he was not without tact; but he ran full against men's prejudices, he overpowered and conquered them with the boldness of the love he had for them. Frederick W. Robertson did not go much among the people; he was a scholar and lived among his books; but when he spoke, the workingmen, the common people, were there in crowds to hear. Why did they love to hear him, the accomplished scholar? It was because they saw he had a real regard and love for them; because they saw a true man's heart in him, the heart of a true ambassador of the love of God to their souls. So one man must work in one way, and another in another, as God gives him ability. But where is the grand underlying power of preaching? That is the

question. Is it human or divine? Is it man's skill or God's wisdom? Is it the preacher converting men to God, or God converting men through the preacher? Is the Christian faith, though a nobly rational system, a rationalistic rather than supernatural system? Is the preacher powerful because he has great energies, and uses a wide sweep of eloquent motives, or because he is a man full of faith and of the Holy Ghost? Can the Christian preacher, while he uses the book of nature, neglect the Bible? Where lies the *converting power*? Is it in himself, his love, his sympathy, his self-crucifixion, or in Christ's crucifixion, in the love of God in Christ? We are opposed to all Bibliolatry; it may be a narrowing and fatal idolatry. We believe that we must have regard to the spirit rather than to the letter of the Bible. We believe that all of God's inspiration is not contained in the Bible; but that He also speaks in nature, in man, and through all His works. We believe that all we find and possess of Christ Himself is not contained in the Bible, but that Christ is risen, and living, and omnipresent as a divine Spirit, giving purifying light and freedom to all men. The preacher may draw his arguments and illustrations from all sources outside of the Bible, and his field is as broad as human interests, as man's sin, sorrow, and wants, as God's love and working. There is no freer place, as Mr. Beecher says, than the Christian pulpit. It is opened to every inspiration of God, to every wind that blows from the four corners of the world. But with all this freedom, is the preacher to lose sight of the gospel? Is he to preach another way of life than through Christ? Is he to preach anything and everything he chooses on every subject, nature, science, political economy, government, art, beauty, morals, and leave out the divine element? Can the subtle infusion even of the spirit of Christ, of his divine humanity, into our preaching, permit us to neglect the great objective truths of the gospel—the fact of sin, the need of repentance, of faith in a Saviour, of a regenerating Spirit? If so, we should soon come upon bald humanitarian ground, and should eliminate the supernatural element from preaching. It would thus come down at once to a human level, and would take its place along with moral reform, education, literature, and the press. But could it stand

its ground with these mighty powers? Do the life and permanence of the pulpit depend upon its periodic intellectual rehabilitation, so that it may keep pace with its gigantic rivals in the field of popular influence? Can the infusion of fresh thought, the aid of extraordinary genius, the better application to the wants and hearts of men and to the humanity of the present age? Can a more scientific form, more culture, more eloquence save the pulpit? The pulpit ought to have all these things in a scientific age like this. These things are needed; especially fresh thought, nature, sympathy with living men, knowledge of the human heart, intelligence of all kinds. There is no incomparability here, and we protest against being misunderstood: the finest intellects of our universities should enter this work, the mind that sees God through the beautiful, and the mind that sees Him in the region of pure knowledge and ideas. But all these things may really be possessed and exercised outside of the sphere of the pulpit. Men are no longer bound by prescriptive ideas, even the most sacred—they go to drink wherever a spring of power is opened. They go to Emerson, to Herbert Spencer, to Comte. Can you keep them from sitting at the feet of these eloquent men and drinking in their philosophy by merely raising up new Chalmerses and Beechers? The truth is that methods are changing, and no man, no human being, will be allowed to give advice to others, or will have a right to give advice to others, unless men go to him and ask advice of him, perceiving in him a wisdom beyond their own, a wisdom which comprehends the inward want and knows how to satisfy it. If the radical teacher can fill the want, men will seek council of him. Preachers themselves are a disgust, who preach only themselves and their own wisdom. They soon will pass into oblivion as a class of public teachers, if they have nothing deeper than this to stand upon. Christ said to his apostles, "Preach the gospel, and I will be with you alway even unto the end of the world." He promised, before leaving the world, to send them the Holy Spirit, to take his place as a divine presence and power in the minds of men. He told them that the Spirit, the Comforter, the Enlightener, "when He is come, He will reprove (convict) the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment; of sin because they believe not on me. Howbeit when He, the

Spirit of truth, is come, He will guide you into all truth ; He shall not speak of himself ; but whatever He shall hear, that shall He speak ; and He will show you things to come." The apostles were not to preach in their own strength or wisdom, but as sustained and taught by a divine wisdom opening to them Christ and the things of God, by a personal though unseen Presence comforting them, guiding them, given their word power to enter, sanctify, and save souls. A supernatural influence working in the hearts of men accompanied the word preached, and here was their power and commission to preach. The Divine Spirit, *inwardly testifying to the truth*, convinces men of the evil that is in their hearts, and leads them to look to the blood that cleanses from all sin. The human soul in every age responds to such preaching. It perceives in it a higher hope, wisdom, and truth. Like the jailer of Philippi, awaked by the midnight earthquake of divine power shaking his guilty spirit with dread, men will cry out, "Sirs, what must I do to be saved ? And he said, Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved." In this supernatural element of the Cross,—of God actually giving Himself for man because He loved him so much as to save him from the power of sin and death—and of the Spirit constantly brooding in and over minds as the unseen presence of Christ, or of divine light and love, going with the truth by an inward effectual working ; here alone, whatever external modifications and enrichings and adaptations to the present age and its wants may be necessary, is to be found the living element of power in preaching, and the eternal groundwork and hope of its enduring influence in the world in all time to come. This fundamental truth is all we have desired now to establish ; it is not all that could be said on the subject of preaching. While we do, doubtless, as Mr. Beecher says, know more concerning spiritual things than the apostles, and preaching itself has wonderfully developed since their day ; yet, it is alone by working in their way, by founding himself on their divine method, by holding to their faith in the central principle of all spiritual life, that the preacher can expect to maintain his ground and to win men to the glorious hope of the Gospel.

ARTICLE V.—THE DOCTRINAL BASIS OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL.

THE doctrinal basis of fellowship which was inserted in the Constitution of the National Council, at Oberlin, reads as follows:—

“They [the Congregational Churches] agree in belief, that the Holy Scriptures are the sufficient and only infallible rule of religious faith and practice; their interpretation thereof being in substantial accordance with the great doctrines of the Christian faith, commonly called ‘Evangelical,’ held in our churches from the early times, and sufficiently set forth by former General Councils.”

The vote to adopt this language was unanimous; yet, since the adjournment of the Council, quite different interpretations have been put upon it, which have given rise to opposing statements as to the proper construction of the words used, and as to the real intent of the Council itself.

The Preliminary Committee, in the printed draft of a Constitution, laid before the Council, reported the following paragraph:—

“They agree in belief, that the Holy Scriptures are the sufficient and only rule of faith and practice; their understanding of the doctrines thereof, and their harmony with the other parts of the church universal, being sufficiently expressed in the declaration of faith set forth in National Council, at Plymouth, in the year 1865.”

When this came under discussion, the first clause was amended, by inserting the word “sufficient” before the word “rule,” and the word “religious” before the word “faith;” and then a motion was made to substitute, in the latter part, a reference to only the closing portion of the Plymouth Declaration; that which recites the faith common to all evangelical churches. The debate which ensued brought out these objections to the original form: (1) The entire Plymouth Declaration was too long, too rhetorical, and too much occupied with phraseology growing out of that special occasion. (2) It did not, after all, define the faith of the churches, but referred back to the action of previous bodies. (3) It was not generally familiar to the churches, or easily accessible. (4) It committed

the denomination afresh to old and minute Confessions, when the tendencies of the times and the work to be done, in the home and foreign field, called for the adoption of a broader, and a simply evangelical platform. Against the proposed substitute, as phrased, it was objected: (1) that it seemed to quote the latter part of the Plymouth Declaration, as though it were the whole; (2) that it did not preserve a historic connection with the past, so as to show that neither the denomination, nor its faith was new; and (3) that some were anxious to retain a distinctively Calvinistic platform. After a debate, occupying parts of two days, the whole matter was referred to a special committee of five, who reported the phraseology which was finally adopted without farther discussion, and by a unanimous vote; the chairman of the committee stating that probably it did not perfectly express the exact wishes of any party, but that it might be accepted as the second choice of all.

In such circumstances, it is not surprising that a difference of interpretation should spring up; nor can it be ended by an attempt to show what the committee talked over in their private sessions; as such a document, once reported to the Council, became its property, and, when adopted, expressed its meaning, which might or might not be coincident with the ideas of members of the committee. It is one of the commonest of occurrences, in deliberative bodies, that members agree to a certain form of words, for quite opposite reasons and with very different constructions; each of two parties accepting the language in its own sense. As there was no debate on the adoption of the final phraseology, the interpreter is left to the natural force of the words, and to the incidental indications of the sentiment of the body. In the present case such a method is the more necessary and legitimate, since even the two individuals who, by joint suggestions, prepared the form (with the exception of one word) adopted by the committee, differ widely in the interpretation. We will examine the two variant interpretations, after narrowing the matter down, by noting the points of agreement as to the Doctrinal Basis.

1. It is agreed, that there is no variance of understanding as to the clause setting forth the sufficiency of the Scriptures.

2. It is agreed, that, whatever may be the true intent of the remaining phraseology, it binds only the Council itself. It is part of the Constitution of the Council, and sets forth *its* basis of agreement. That body has no power, whatever, to regulate the creeds of the local churches, or of District and State Conferences. These will continue to be made, whatever their respective members choose that they shall be. The language in question simply states the organic fellowship of the National Council, or the doctrinal platform upon which those ministers and churches must stand, who shall take part in its proceedings.

L The language of the Doctrinal Basis has been interpreted, as first affirming the general "Evangelic" faith of the churches, and as then endorsing in substance the additional peculiarities of the old Confessions.

When some declare that it was with such an idea of its meaning that they voted for it, their brethren are bound to believe them; but it does not follow that such votes represented the general sentiment of the body. The explanation in question meets with these difficulties:

1. It is not the natural sense of the language, grammatically and rhetorically considered. It requires the words "held" and "set forth," which are introductory of the last two clauses, to refer not to "doctrines," the near and natural antecedent, but to "interpretation," a very remote antecedent. That this is felt to be a strain on the language, appears from these facts: that some of those who prefer this explanation, admit that the form of the words does not favor it; and that the chairman of the special committee, while seeking, in a communication to "*The Advance*," to sustain it, is compelled to confess, that it is "almost harsh in construction." Indeed, in order to make it hold at all, it becomes necessary mentally to insert (as the chairman states it, in print) the word "being" before each of the two clauses just mentioned, thus: "Their interpretation thereof being in substantial accordance with the great doctrines of the Christian faith, commonly called Evangelical, [being] held in our churches from the early times, and [being] sufficiently set forth by former General Councils." How "harsh" and uncalled for this is, when another meaning lies upon the very face of the

sentence, needs scarcely to be indicated. Grammar and rhetoric instinctively reject it.

The sentence, as originally constructed by the joint suggestions of the chairman of the committee and the writer of this Article (who was not on the committee, but was incidentally consulted), and presented to the committee, differed in one word only; "as" was inserted before "held." This absolutely necessitated the reference of "held" to the nearer antecedent, "doctrines," and it proves what must have been the original meaning of the words. In the committee, as the writer is credibly informed, one member thought that to strike out the "as," would strengthen the language; but the four others could not be made to see it, though at last they yielded the form for the sake of a united report. The one probably imagined that the sentence might then admit of the "almost harsh" construction now in question; but evidently the four either did not think such could be the effect, or did not wish it to be so taken; as they preferred the other form; but, as one of them said, "Four yielded their judgment to one, for the sake of unanimity in the result." And plainly no real change of grammatical construction was thereby made; the assertion was only less carefully defined; instead of an endorsement of the evangelical doctrines "as held in our churches from the early times," we have only the broad fact affirmed that they had been "held." And so the Council would naturally understand it, in the vote of acceptance.

2. This explanation renders the clause, "held in our churches from the early times," a meaningless truism, unworthy of assertion; or else it necessitates for it a meaning derived from the previous clause, and destructive of the very object avowed by those who urge it, since it makes the sense coincide with the other view. For if the word "held" does not refer to "doctrines," but to "interpretation," and if it introduces an additional clause, not dependent on the preceding for its idea, then all that it asserts is, that our churches have had an interpretation of the Scriptures from the early times—a fact not likely to be disputed, and as little needing to be asserted! But if, to avoid such emptiness of meaning, it be claimed that the idea is, that *the interpretation just described*, in the previous clause, is

what has been "held in our churches from the early times," then it must be remembered that all that was claimed, in that clause, for the interpretation was, its accordance with "evangelical" doctrines. Consequently that then is all, which is declared to have been "held by our churches from the early times," and to have been "sufficiently set forth by former General Councils." Thus the meaning becomes the same as though the words "held" and "set forth" referred to "doctrines," rather than to "interpretation."

3. This explanation claims a unanimous vote in behalf of the very thing to which a large portion—and, as the writer thinks, the majority—of the Council were strongly opposed. If, in the view of some of the brethren, it implies great "credulity" to think that the Council could have intended a broad, catholic, historic, evangelic basis, to others it would imply an equal share of that same quality, to suppose that the Council *unanimously* voted to do that which a large and influential portion was avowedly determined not to do. Neither the language of the Basis, nor any lack of acuteness on the part of those referred to, favors such a preposterous idea. On the contrary, some, at least, of those who had favored a re-endorsement of the Old Confessions, felt that they had yielded the point. A letter from one of them lies before the writer, which says of the explanation which is now under consideration: "Had it been understood, it would have at once roused violent opposition. For, analyzed, it is a re-affirmation of the Westminster and Savoy Confessions, as affirmed substantially in 1648, 1680, and 1865. I *thought* we had left that and them out, so far as their *peculiarities* went. I remember that the 'old school' men paused! I remember telling young Sturtevant [who moved the original amendment] 'You have got, in another way, all you wanted.'" This witness is from the conservative ranks, and had special opportunities to know the sense in which men of that tendency accepted the form of Basis proposed. We come, now, to the other explanation, to wit:

II. The Basis simply declares the "evangelical" character of the interpretation given to the Scriptures by the Congregational churches; and thus presents the catholic, historic doctrine, on which Protestant churches are and ever have been

agreed, as a satisfactory bond of denominational fellowship. In favor of such a view of the action of the Council, the following considerations will have weight:

1. This is the natural, unforced, grammatical construction of the language; as is conceded by some, who yet, from their knowledge of a certain part of the Council, think that so liberal a basis could hardly have been intended. It requires the interpolation of no words to help out the construction; it compels no confession of "harshness;" it reads smoothly; it immediately suggests itself to the mind.

2. It gives an excellent and appropriate sense throughout, making these three affirmations: (1) that our Congregational churches hold to the "evangelical" system of faith; (2) that they always have held to it, since the early history of our land, so that we are not a new body of churches, with a new faith, organizing ourselves into a denomination; and (3) that the details of that evangelic faith will be found in the Confessions approved by former Councils, from which one may learn their historic and theologic relations. Thus the Basis admirably avoids disowning anything which either we or our fathers have held additional to the common evangelic faith of the catholic church; and it even puts one on tracing out the actual facts of the case, while it insists only upon a "substantial accordance with the great doctrines of the Christian faith commonly called Evangelical," as the ground of fellowship. At the same time, it cuts off any possible claim of recognition by churches Congregational in government (as are Unitarian and Universalist churches) but unevangelical in faith. Many such have sprung up within the last century; but their faith is not the evangelic faith of our churches "from the early times."

3. It accords with the entire tone of the Council, from the beginning to the end of its sessions. As it is a failure to apprehend this fact, which leads some to accept the other explanation, it will be well to consider several illustrative particulars.

For many years there has been a steady growth of sentiment in the Congregational churches in favor of assuming a broad, catholic position, such as should invite and render practicable the coöperation of all evangelical Christians who could adopt our democratic church polity. This sentiment found strong

expression in the discussions of the Boston Council on its Doctrinal Basis, and led to the curious wording of the noted compromise document adopted by it in the session on Burial Hill, at Plymouth; which first accorded, in careful phrase, a "substantial" agreement with the old Confessions, and then concluded with the warm adoption of a simply evangelic creed common to the whole historic church. This action met with wide concurrence, and was followed, in various parts of the land, by the organization of numerous churches on the basis of that concluding evangelic creed, and by the occasional reception to fellowship of ministers of Arminian sentiments.

Not long after, the Presbyterians withdrew from the American Board, in the foreign missionary work, leaving that Society to the support of the Congregational churches; whereupon Secretary Treat read a paper at the annual meeting (1870) on "The Udenominal Character of the Board," and the Board itself took this action: "*Resolved*, That, notwithstanding the change now taking place, this Board, in its spirit, its appointments, and its administration, will adhere to its time-honored basis of udenominal catholicity, and will maintain, without discrimination, all the missionaries who shall continue in its service; according to the fundamental declaration of its charter, that the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions exists 'for the purpose of propagating the gospel in heathen lands, by supporting missionaries and diffusing a knowledge of the Holy Scriptures.'"

The American Board held its annual meeting for 1871, at Salem, Mass., just six weeks before the Oberlin Council. There its President, Rev. Mark Hopkins, D.D., made an impressive address, largely devoted to an exposition of the broad, catholic character of the Board, which yet was the organ of the Congregational churches. He remarked: "It was willing to send any earnest Christian man. He would not, perhaps, as things were now, send a Close Communion Baptist; for if he (the President) went to the mission where he was, the Baptist would not let him commune with him; nor a High Church Episcopalian, who would not let one preach from his pulpit, who disagreed with him on doctrinal points; but he would send a Methodist, Lutheran, or any man who would recognize him as a Christian and a minister."

A large number of the New England and other delegates to the National Council were at this meeting in Salem, and came to Oberlin under the inspiration of this noble, catholic view of Congregational methods.

Just five weeks before the Council at Oberlin, another gathering of many of its delegates was held at New Haven, Conn., to hear the Inaugural Address of President Porter of Yale College. That able Address set forth, among other things, the object and claims of the 'Theological Seminary connected with the College, and used these liberal words: "The advantages that such a seminary derives from the fostering care of a great literary institution might be extended to schools of other Christian denominations. As it is, this school is open to students for the ministry from all quarters, and makes little reference to their special doctrines or ecclesiastical preferences. The Seminary is most of all concerned, to expound and defend the Christian truths that are universally received by evangelical Protestants."

Coming together with such ideas, equally expressed by men from the East and from the West, and meeting at Oberlin, where similar views had always been current, the National Council was surrounded and pervaded by an atmosphere of liberality. Hence the prompt motion to amend the submitted form of a Doctrinal Basis, by endorsing only the concluding catholic creed of the Plymouth document. Hence the early reading, and subsequently the warm and unanimous adoption of Dr. Budington's paper on Christian Union, and the vote to have it printed in immediate connection with the Constitution itself—a fact which may reasonably be cited as shedding light upon the intent of the Doctrinal Basis in the Constitution. Hence the general and earnest commendation of Dr. Bacon's discourse before the Council, on The Churches and the Church; which was delivered after the discussion of the Doctrinal Basis had commenced, and which produced a powerful effect in deciding wavering minds in favor of a broad and catholic basis. Hence the paper, read before the Council by the present writer, on Congregational Literature, urging the adoption of a generous unsectarian basis, as necessary to inspire a fresh and influential literature; in which were these words: "If

Congregationalism be wise, it will assume correspondingly new positions, and place itself in the front rank of Christ's present army, face to face with present foes. Then it will have a literature born of the inspirations and necessities of the times. If it shall eschew provincialism and narrowness; if it shall assume to represent something geographically broader than New England, and something theologically broader than the Westminster Confession of Faith; if it shall renounce the aspect of a sect, and shall squarely plant itself upon the apostolic and primitive platform of a communion of all evangelical churches and ministers, dropping from its tests whatever would make church or ministry other than simply Christian; if it shall offer itself now, as it was in the early churches, as the only true and possible point of union, as a bond of fellowship, drawing together, in liberty, brethren of various schools of thought, modes of worship, and methods of action; it will not only grow rapidly in numbers, but it will attain to a grand elevation of character, and will pour out its 'latter-day' utterances in a literature which will be full of the New Testament glow, and instinct with its life and power." In reading this paper, on the evening of the day upon which the Doctrinal Basis was adopted, the writer expressed his gratitude to God, that the Council had that day assumed the very position which the paper urged; nor did a single member afterwards call the assertion in question, publicly or privately, so far as is known. Hence, also, the enthusiasm with which the subsequent measures were taken, to impart new energy to our Home Missionary work, especially amid the heterogeneous population of the West and South, where churches are to be gathered from all races and from professors of all Christian creeds; it being felt that the action of the Council on the Doctrinal Basis had placed Congregationalism on high vantage ground, and that the way was now open not only to utilize "the New England element" of immigration, but to evangelize the entire mass, and to gather all true believers into churches that should be simply evangelical.

4. But the case is decided in favor of this interpretation by the self-interpreting action of the Council itself, which surely knew its own mind. One article of the Constitution, adopted subsequently to the Doctrinal Basis, allows "such Congrega

tional General Societies for Christian work," "as may be recognized by this Council," to be "represented by one delegate each," etc. Now it is a fact, that the leading societies used by our churches, and thus referred to as "Congregational," are committed by their charters and constitutions only to an evangelical basis. The American Board even proclaims itself "undenominational," as we have seen. The Constitution of the American Missionary Association, in its third article, declares that "any person of evangelical sentiments, who professes faith in the Lord Jesus Christ," etc., may be a member. The American Home Missionary Society is even broader. The language of its Constitution is: "The object of this Society shall be to assist congregations that are unable to support the gospel ministry, and to send the gospel to the destitute within the United States." Before the annual meeting of 1870 (which struck them out) these words were added: "Also to coöperate with evangelical Christians in the support of Home Missions in nominally Christian countries, to such an extent as the funds of the Institution may justify." Yet these societies had delegates in the Council, and were "recognized," though attention was called to this vagueness in their utterances, as being "Congregational." Subsequently, to avoid any narrow, straight-laced doctrinal or ecclesiastical interpretation of the word, in connection with this subject, the Council adopted, as the third of its By-Laws, the following: "The term 'Congregational,' as applied to the general benevolent societies, in connection with representation in this body, is understood in the broad sense of societies whose constituency and control are substantially Congregational."

But again, the Council received to full membership the delegates from the Kentucky churches, who explained that their churches and Conference were distinctly organized upon the evangelical basis alone, ignoring all distinctions between Calvinism and Arminianism; and that they did not feel at liberty to apply for membership, if the Basis of the Council was to offer any narrower ground of fellowship among ministers and churches. This action was an interpretation by the Council itself of its own position, and was the establishment of a precedent which should be a guide to future action.

With such grounds upon which to rest, it is not surprising, that this interpretation has received the support of *The Advance*, from the very adjournment of the Council, no one publicly calling it in question for nearly two months; and that subsequently it has been sustained by President J. M. Sturtevant, D.D. (in the *Advance*), by Rev. A. S. Quint, D.D. (in the *Congregationalist*, and in the *Congregational Quarterly*), by the *Christian Union*, in the department of "The Church," conducted by Rev. Edward Beecher, D.D., by the *Independent*, one of whose editors was a member of the Council, and, in the same paper, by Rev. W. L. Budington, D.D., the Moderator of the Council. There remains no doubt that it will be accepted by the denomination, and will prepare the way for an enlarged Christian usefulness, and for an increased unity of the disciples of Christ.

If now, it be asked, What is there new in the position thus assumed? the answer may easily be given. That which has ever been the spirit and tendency of Congregationalism has now taken positive and practical form. That which has been true occasionally, locally, exceptionally, is now to be acknowledged universally, on principle. That which has been done to individuals is to be applied to churches. It long has been customary to receive into our churches, by letter and on profession, members who did not accept the peculiarities of Calvinism. Of recent years, a minister would sometimes be accepted, whose sentiments were Arminian. But now the way is open, so far as the National Council is concerned, for whole churches, with their pastors, to unite with us, irrespective of such peculiarities, if they be thoroughly "evangelical." If the churches and ministers of an entire Methodist Conference should choose to separate from their denomination, and to become a Conference according to our polity, and should send ministerial and lay delegates to the National Council, the delegates would be received, according to the platform adopted at Oberlin. This action does not mean that any theological seminary, church, or individual, has discarded Calvinistic views, or is under any obligation to be silent respecting them. It does not disown any of the old Confessions. It allows them to stand in their historic and theologic dignity, as the exponents of the faith held by our fathers, and still held in substance by their chil-

dren. It only refuses to make them tests of fellowship. It recognizes the fact that while they are noble monuments of the conflicts of former ages, they are not so well related to the battles now in progress. The Church of God has moved on to meet new issues of transcendent consequence, and it adapts its fellowship to the changed circumstances. As the foes of the gospel unite and become increasingly powerful, its friends cannot afford to divide on minor differences which no longer invite attention or excite interest. So we put "Evangelical" instead of "Calvinistic" on our banners, when we march to the battlefield, and form in line with our Christian brethren in front of the enemy. At home, around our firesides, and in our neighborhood visits and discussions, we can be as much more than "evangelical" as we may severally please. In the National Council we agree to hail as comrades all whose interpretation of the Scriptures is "in substantial accordance with the great doctrines of the Christian faith, commonly called 'Evangelical,' held in our churches from the early times, and sufficiently set forth by former General Councils."

The value of such a broad, catholic basis may be estimated from its relation to the progress of our own denomination, to the increased unity of the visible church of Christ, and to the development of theologic truth. There can be no doubt that the progress of Congregationalism has been greatly retarded by the former limitation of its denominational fellowship to Calvinistic ministers and churches. There were many saints, who could easily be convinced that our polity was preferable to all others, both on the ground of Scripture and of expediency, and who were in sympathy with our style of piety, as to intelligence and culture; but their educational prejudices or constitutional tendencies were such as to render them averse to the rigid Calvinistic system laid down in the Westminster Confession of Faith. Cherishing no objection to our belief of that system, they were unwilling to have it imposed upon themselves. One attraction in the Episcopal church long has been, that no such test of ministerial fellowship was applied. A clergyman might be a Calvinist or an Arminian, as his idea of truth should require; or he might decline to defend either theology distinctively; the question was not raised at his ordination. He subscribed the

"Articles" in such general Christian sense as he preferred to assign, and reconciled them with the doctrine implied in the liturgy, as well as he was able, no man calling him to account for his logic, his exegesis, or his self consistency! Doubtless this fact has had to do with the decision of many young men, who have entered the ranks of the Episcopal ministry, and to whom its High Church sacerdotalism was an objection and not an argument. We cannot but think, too, that often a Unitarian converted to evangelical views passes by us, his ecclesiastical kinsmen, into Episcopacy, because our platform of fellowship has seemed to be narrow. So, also, intelligent, cultivated Methodists, wearied with the incessant changes of the itinerancy, restless under the yoke of a centralized power, and convinced of the conformity of our simple polity to the directions of Christ and the example of the apostles, are retained within their system, because they are not prepared to renounce minor peculiarities of theology. The way will now be open for evangelical churches and ministers to come to us from every quarter, the principle of elective affinity drawing those who are at once earnest and liberal, intelligent and charitable. And then, as we go forth, south and west, to occupy the new territory, we appeal to the heterogeneous population with special advantage, carrying to them the simple gospel, and asking all to embrace it, and to unite upon it, as in the primitive churches. Surely this opens a bright prospect for the progress of Congregationalism, as the representative of evangelical church-democracy and Christian coöperation.

The effect must also be happy in its bearing upon visible Christian union. True saints are now one in character and in life-union with Christ. Even the present division into organized denominations is not as serious a breach of outward unity as it might be, or as it has been. A growing interfellowship has removed something of ancient asperity, and has led to many methods of joint labor for the common cause. Still, the lines are defined with so much precision according to theological differences, and the rivalry is often so warm in new communities, that undue heat is generated, money is wasted, and work is not a little misdirected. In proportion as they shall come upon common ground, jealousies will cease, and the spirit

of love will have freer course. It would then seem to be the duty of each to liberalize its own doctrinal basis of fellowship, so that the divisive sect-feature may disappear, even if the denominational organizations shall survive. To such a modification the basis adopted by the National Council at Oberlin is, on our part, an invitation. We have led the way in the direction of a closer union of those who, as respects doctrine and polity, are fundamentally agreed. We have said to the Christian world, that while denominations may still be unavoidable, owing to conscientious differences of sentiment as to the prescribed organization of the church and ministry, they should be made as few as possible, and not be multiplied by basing them also on minor theological differences. To all evangelical Christians who can accept our simple church polity, with its two principles of liberty and coöperation, we offer the opportunity of working together in a fraternal communion; whether theologically they be Calvinists, Lutherans, Arminians, or even to a certain extent Sacramentarians; whether they baptize by sprinkling or by immersion; whether they worship with or without a liturgy. Can this be done without the exertion of a powerful influence upon other denominations? Must not the Presbyterian body (including, as it does, a Congregational leaven) sooner or later raise the question, whether there should not be a similar liberty among those who conscientiously hold to that form of church organization? An affirmative answer would bring back the great Cumberland secession, which unites Arminian sentiments with a Presbyterian ecclesiasticism. The powerful Methodist Episcopal organization can hardly resist the effect of the liberal action of a Calvinistic denomination like ourselves. If we consent to allow Arminian ministers to stand upon our platform, can they, for any length of time, refuse to allow Calvinistic ministers to stand upon their platform? They have always pictured us as narrow and bigoted, and will they consent to sit themselves for a portraiture of such qualities? As to the Baptists, they are already Congregational in polity, and, under the new pressure of our present example, will only the more rapidly hasten to free themselves from their self-imposed imprisonment within the walls of an exclusively immersion-fellowship. The Episcopalians are already on this

broad doctrinal platform, practically ; though in the unfortunate form of allowing ministers to interpret "Articles," which are manifestly Calvinistic, in an Arminian sense ; just as they graciously permit the Low Church to put a "Pickwickian" construction on the language of the Prayer Book in the Baptismal office ! Thus, when our example shall have had its full effect, we may expect to see evangelical Christendom less at war with itself, and the surviving denominations reduced to those who feel obligated to maintain certain fixed forms of church polity. Those forms will then have a fair opportunity to compare their Scriptural authority, and to exhibit their relative efficiency in Christian work.

Nor must we overlook the bearing which this broad basis of doctrinal fellowship will have upon the progress of theology. The moment these minor differences cease to be sectarian divisions—so that a change of opinion shall no longer be followed by exclusion from denominational fellowship, and a loss of pecuniary support—there will begin to be hope that they will be studied without prejudice, and will be gradually settled according to their merits. This idea is receiving illustration among ourselves as regards the peculiarities of "Old School" and "New School" Calvinism. Had we allowed ourselves to divide into rival denominations over this difference, the disasters would have been many, the benefits would have been few or none, and there would have been no approach to theological unity. Men necessarily committed to a given theory are not apt to abandon or to modify it. But as with us a minister might be either "Old School" or "New School," without impairing his ecclesiastical standing, the discussion was left to its theological merits, and has been quietly settling itself on exegetical and philosophical grounds. A similar result we may fairly anticipate with respect to many of the doctrinal differences which have hitherto separated denominations. Pastors and other clergymen will consider them in private, will discuss them in ministers-meetings, and will write and preach upon them publicly, not as champions of a sect-idea, but simply as advocates of gospel truth. Theological seminaries will be schools of theologic thought rather than grim sectarian fortresses ; and while each will properly have a distinctive charac-

ter, as representative of some peculiar philosophic scheme of doctrine, or practical method of training, they will more powerfully and hopefully, because more freely, affect the mind of the church. Theology will thus have a healthful and natural growth, the elements of bitterness and the temptations to a bigoted conservatism and a reacting radicalism being largely removed.

In view of these outlooks into the future, as well as from a regard for all the principles of a Scriptural church communion, we hail with Christian joy and a true denominational pride, the noble step of the Congregational churches, at Oberlin, in their adoption of a simply evangelic basis. When to this we add the organization of a permanent National Council, meeting triennially, for general consultation, and the inauguration of a bolder and more efficient Home Missionary policy, the obvious consequences of the action are so many and so important, and so plainly open a new chapter in the history of the denomination, that it may truly and frankly be called A NEW DEPARTURE.

ARTICLE VII.—BELOIT COLLEGE. ITS ORIGIN AND AIMS.

JUST forty years ago, the famous Indian Chief, Black Hawk, let loose the dogs of war—his Sacs and Foxes—against the power of the United States. The military operations that followed were little more than a wild chase of the savages, from central Illinois up through the valley of Rock River into central Wisconsin and thence westward to the Mississippi, where the struggle terminated in the capture of the wily leader. In the midst of the region thus traversed, lies the site of Beloit College, once a favorite camping-ground of the Indians and a chosen, perhaps sacred, spot with the race that preceded them. Within the college enclosure are still preserved some fifteen or twenty earth-works of the mound-builders.

The brief strife of arms brought into notice the wonderful beauty and fertility of this country, and steps were taken immediately to open it for the inflow of emigration and Christian civilization. The town of Chicago was organized in 1833, with only twenty-eight voters on the ground. The village of Milwaukee was laid out in 1835. In the same year, the first public sales of land within the boundaries of Wisconsin took place. Then through the two lake-ports a flood of settlers poured in to occupy the prairies and openings between Lake Michigan and the Mississippi river, with a rapidity up to that time unexampled in this or any other land. Wisconsin was organized under a distinct territorial government in 1836. Its whole population then numbered about 11,000. In 1838 it had become 18,000,—in 1840, 31,000,—in 1842, 47,000,—in 1845, nearly 120,000, and, by the census of 1870, it is over 1,000,000. The same movement filled up with like rapidity the northern part of Illinois, a tract of country homogeneous in all its physical features, and fitted also, by the homogeneous character of its incoming population, to be united with Wisconsin in one field for the work of higher education.

The course of emigration runs naturally on the lines of latitude, and Yankee eyes are quick to discern the good chances as

they open. Hence there was a large infusion of New England elements in the stream of human life which poured in and spread itself over this attractive field. Puritan ideas of the home, the school, the church, and the college, were thus transplanted and took root here with the first upturning of the prairie sod. Those sent out as missionaries to take possession of this goodly territory in the name of the Lord Christ, were especially moved by the rapid crystallization of society under their eye and the evident necessities of a very near future, promptly to organize as best they could all the forces of Christian civilization. Among these they regarded a Christian college of prime importance. So within ten years of the time when the Indian council-fires were extinguished by the Black Hawk war, we find these men in council, as did the New England fathers, praying together and "thinking on a college"—"a colledge," as Cotton Mather says, "the best thing that ever New England thought upon."

These thoughts were deepened as these brethren met other ministers and representatives of northwestern churches in convention at Cleveland, in June, 1844. They became defined and matured in four successive conventions held in that and the following year, for the specific purpose of considering what could be done to found a college. In these deliberations were heartily united the ministers and churches of Wisconsin and northern Illinois, who, in association, presbytery, or convention were joined to maintain the one pilgrim faith in this region, made one by its geographical necessities and the common characteristics of its growing population. The main question was settled in the third convention, which met May 27th, 1845. There were in attendance forty-two ministers and twenty-seven laymen, representing all the Congregational and Presbyterian ecclesiastical bodies then in this region. They were aided by the counsel of several college officers and pastors of churches from other parts of the country. If it is considered how feeble and scattered were the churches in that day, and how few and poor the facilities for traveling, it will be understood how deep and strong was the impression on their minds of the importance of the question brought before them. With great carefulness and prayerfulness, they studied the present and prospective wants

of the field, and what the Lord would have them do to meet these wants in respect of means for high intellectual, moral, and Christian culture. It was an hour of thrilling interest, never to be forgotten by those present, when, with hearts enlarged and harmonized by contemplating the great common object, after an hour of special prayer, they gave expression to their unanimous judgment, approving and confirming the resolution of the first convention—"That the exigencies of Wisconsin and Northern Illinois require that there be a college and a female seminary of the highest order located in this region, one to be in Northern Illinois contiguous to Wisconsin and the other in Wisconsin contiguous to Illinois." In accordance with this action, Beloit College and Rockford Female Seminary were established.

Such was the origin of Beloit College. No individual ambition—no local interest or money speculation—no partisan zeal—no crotchets of radicalism—no wild conceits of eccentric minds, called it into being. It was born of patient, thoughtful consideration on the needs of human society, the grand purpose of God's redeeming providence, and the instrumental agencies by which God's good-will to men is carried out in the progressive advancement of Christian civilization towards its final consummation of peace on earth and glory to God in the highest. It was the child of the churches—cradled in prayer and faith and the holy consecration of love for truth and right—for God and men. It stands, from its beginning, identified with the world-wide interests of Christ's kingdom among men. Like this, in all essential respects, was the origin of nearly all the institutions of these young States to which the Western College Society has extended its fostering care.

It is not our purpose to follow out, in detail, the unfolding of the enterprise thus begun. A concise outline must suffice. A charter for the college was obtained from the Territorial Legislature of Wisconsin in 1846. In the summer of 1847, the corner-stone of the first college building was laid, and in the autumn of the same year, the first class was received as Freshmen for the prescribed course of study. The central idea in the whole movement was to provide for the true work of an American college according to the main features of the New

England model—that is, the thorough discipline and liberal culture of young men for four years in the transition period from youth to manhood. It was designed at first to hold the institution strictly and exclusively to this proper college work. But it was soon found that, for lack of classical academies or their equivalent in the region, a preparatory school must be provided as a necessary adjunct.

The commencement in July next will be an anniversary of special interest, because it will mark the completion of the first twenty-five years in the life of the college. Leaving a full review of the period to be more fitly presented then, we may state now that during this quarter of a century nearly 2000 young men have been for a longer or shorter period under its culture. Nearly two hundred will have completed the full course and been graduated. All these, both the partial and the complete fruits of its direct work, may be reckoned as a clear addition to the results of higher education in the land. For in this time, partly through its indirect influence, as many young men, probably, have gone from this field to seek the benefit of older colleges at the East, as would, without the presence of this institution, have sought a liberal education anywhere. Nine-tenths of all who have enjoyed in any degree the culture of this college, have found their life-work in the West. The remaining tenth are scattered over the wide earth, many of them filling places of important trust in connection with the pulpit, the public press, and the work of Christian missions.

During this period of twenty-five years, the financial resources of the college have grown, from the gift by the people of Beloit, according to their early pledge, of a site and first building, in value not less than \$10,000, till, through the benefactions of many friends in the West and the East, the college has accumulated a permanent property estimated at more than \$225,000,—its running expenses having been, mean time, kept up, by close economy and careful management, without incurring debt. This sounds small by the side of the millions set down to some of the New England colleges. But here, it is a sign of some strength. It answers well the purposes of the "dimension stones" at the bottom of a foundation, on which the walls of a goodly structure, yet to be builded up, may safely rest. Its

value is enhanced by the consideration that a great part of the funds thus far gathered, is the fruit of real self-denying devotion to the great interests which the college represents; and rich spiritual blessings, above all price, have come in answer to the fervent prayers which accompanied and followed the gifts of God's people.

But we must turn from this glance at the past to consider the future of Beloit College. We shall attempt only a concise statement of a few thoughts respecting its ideal object, its embarrassments, and its wants.

The object of the college, distinctly contemplated in the outset, kept steadily in view through all its history, and regarded in the policy of its administration now, with a profounder sense of its importance than ever before, is *to make thorough work with young men in the training part of a liberal Christian education.*

To expand and explain, we say, with young men, under the conviction, confirmed rather than shaken by the prevalent discussions respecting the co-education of the sexes, that the culture of true manhood is best carried on in an atmosphere essentially *masculine*, as that of true womanhood is in an atmosphere essentially *feminine*. Whether or not individual exceptions need to be recognized and provided for, we will not stop here to discuss. We speak confidently of the general rule for the general quality in either case.

We say again, "*in the training part*" of young men's education, to distinguish a period in the life and a stage in the process. The period of life referred to is the four years which immediately precede the time when the man, adult in body and in mind, is left to his own free choice and independent action. By common understanding and consent, a man comes of age on completing twenty-one years of his life. Peculiar circumstances may hasten or postpone the time which one shall give to college work; but for most, the best period, no doubt, is that which lies between the ages of seventeen and twenty-one. And the process contemplated for this period is a systematic, widely varied, and precise drilling of all the powers of the mind by actual exercise in the great leading departments of human thought and learning. The end sought is not so much to make great acquisitions of knowledge, as to gain facility in the man-

ifold operations of which the mind is capable, so that all its faculties shall be trained, brought under command, and made reliable for any purpose. Considerable knowledge will be acquired in the training process; but the best part of it will be in the form of fundamental principles and methods and general outlines—starting-points and guides for the more specific and exhaustive studies of a later stage. For, as there is presupposed a previous elementary education, through which some knowledge has been gained and the powers have been somewhat developed, so there is anticipated an advanced stage, when, in some defined line of effort, the man will furnish himself for his life-work of investigation or achievement. Such *training* all true leaders of men must and will get. If they have not opportunity to come under the prescribed regimen of a college, they will subject themselves to self-imposed task work, as did Franklin and Lincoln, to gain the same end, at considerable disadvantage. To make this training thorough and efficient, it must be carried on under a prescribed intellectual and moral regimen, close and severe. It properly belongs to that time of life when the man is under tutors and governors. It is not consistent with permitting its subject, to any great extent, to follow his own inclination merely and exercise his own option as to the branches of study and the kinds of practice he will attempt; for the object of the training is to bring out the neglected faculties and strengthen the weak ones, so as to secure a symmetrical development of the man, with a will-power that can, if need be, overcome aversion and cross inclination.

We speak of *thorough work*, referring not to the completeness of a finished result, but to the process as involving work, mental exertion, strained up in each effort towards the limit of the mind's ability. To accomplish this, the method of teaching must be chiefly by recitation in which the student is held to a daily accountability, to test both his faithfulness in application and the style of his mind's action in appropriating, assimilating, and expressing truth. Only by thorough exercise are the powers of either body or mind expanded or strengthened. Only by such actual tests does one come to the knowledge and full possession of his own powers or acquisitions. No man knows that

he knows a thing, till he can express it clearly to another's apprehension. To habituate young minds to close application, to accurate investigation, to sound reasoning, and to clear statement, is a *work* of patience and perseverance with both learner and teacher. To consider and treat it otherwise is to encourage shams. They who go to college just "to have a good time" make an egregious mistake, and the regimen of the college ought to be such as to reveal and correct the mistake. But under the law of habit, that which is begun as task-work grows easy, till, at length, work itself becomes play,—the most satisfactory and enjoyable play to which a man can give himself. One has "a good time" in college just in proportion as he is by his own efficiency under its regimen molded to this habit, so that he can find pleasure even in task-work because he takes hold of it conscious of his power and with heartiness.

We speak of this as part of a *liberal Christian education*, recognizing the tendency of this culture to bring the mind into its true freedom, and recognizing also the relation of Christian truth to all other forms of truth which are made the subjects of study, and the value of Christian precepts to keep the soul in all its action true and right under a sense of accountability to God, its Father. The soul gains freedom, not by breaking away from all law, not by declaring its independence of all external authority, not by casting aside, as of no account, the results of human thinking, accumulated through the ages; but by a full understanding of the laws of its own being and the free exercise of its powers in conformity with those laws, by willing subjection to the rightful authority of God, its moral governor, and by the grateful acceptance of that which the world's master-minds have wrought out as food for its thinking, to be digested and assimilated and made part of its own life and growth. The fetters which need to be broken are the clogs of laziness, the bands of ignorance, the cramps of prejudice, the narrowness of restricted observation, the intolerance of self-conceit, the bigotry of exclusive devotion to particular research. With respect to his special line of work, the man loses nothing; with respect to the proportions of his character and the grandeur of his general movement and influence, he gains much by this liberalizing culture. To give the balance of complete development, the

poise of noblest manhood, Christian truth and morality need to be infused through all the educational process. And we emphasize the word *Christian* in this connection, to indicate further the intent that the results of the culture given shall be, as fully as possible, consecrated to the propagation of the truth and the extension of the power of Christianity in the world, by directly increasing the number of able preachers of the gospel.

We are aware that these thoughts are not new—quite otherwise. As old ideas perhaps, in the love of novelty which characterize our times, they have been too much set aside and lost from view. We cannot believe that the world has outgrown them, or can outgrow them, since they spring from the very constitution of man's nature and his wants. We bring them together here, to make definite the object which Beloit College aims at. It appears an object quite distinct from that of the common school or the academy on the one side, and from that of the professional, the technical, or the scientific school on the other. We cannot see that it is properly embraced within the purview of a true university. Because the object is so clearly defined and so important in itself and its relations, it may fitly be made the chief, not to say the single object of an institution or class of institutions. It seems likely to be best realized when prosecuted as a specialty. Up to a comparatively recent period, this was the chief, the peculiar work of Yale College, and great and blessed have been her achievements. Whether under the transformation which is changing Yale College into Yale University, just this work through which her glory in the past has been won, will be as well and fitly accomplished, remains to be seen. We feel sure it is not best that every college should be ambitiously pushing in the same direction. It would seem, too, that the object defined must be but imperfectly attained, when made, as it is in many institutions, only an adjunct to an immense variety of miscellaneous work, mostly of a lower grade. However it may be elsewhere, the aim at Beloit is steadily fixed on perfecting a true college work in the line indicated. If, in the future, the college shall be called to undertake some higher, broader work, it will be only as she shall have proved herself true to this her present mission.

To success in this mission, she now bends all her energies, content with the work and with such honor as may come from its faithful performance.

There are embarrassments which hinder the attainment of this object, especially as respects the numbers of those who come into and go through the full course of training. Prominent among these is the fact that the object itself is but partially understood or appreciated. On the proper field of the college, there is now probably a population of one and a half millions. It has grown to this number within thirty years, chiefly by immigration. The early emigrants were mostly young people, characterized by general intelligence, great energy, and indomitable spirit; but the proportion of liberally educated men among them was much less than was found among the early pilgrims of New England, or than is now found among the citizens of the Eastern States. Many strong, vigorous minds have been developed by a practical training under the pressure of immediate responsibilities thrown upon them. They have done well, and are highly to be honored for what they have made of themselves. Yet through the whole frame-work of society, there is an obvious lack of those ideas and sentiments which are the fruit of broad, liberal culture. Hence the aim of the college fails to be fully appreciated, and the value of its work is underrated. Not many parents seek its benefits for their sons. Not many young men set their aspirations in this direction, till they come within the direct influence of the institution.

The last remark suggests another embarrassment from the want of academies and schools in which young men can be prepared for admission to college. If this region were dotted here and there, as New England is, with institutions like the two Phillips Academies and Williston Seminary, the embarrassment just referred to would be very much relieved. These would be so many centers of influence working all the time on the public mind, in full harmony and co-operation with the college, and sending year by year recruits for college classes already initiated in the training process. But this help is, in great measure, wanting. Four-fifths of all who have been graduated at Beloit, were dependent on the college for the preparatory as well as for the advanced culture. During these

twenty-five years, public school systems of a high order have been established in each of the two States. These are doing much to promote general intelligence. The friends of the college have been foremost in helping on this movement, and none rejoice more heartily than they in the results. Yet it must be confessed that not much aid comes from this quarter to further the direct object of the college. So much are the teachers of all grades, even those in the High schools, under the general influences first referred to, that in very many cases a boy's thought and desire for a collegiate education would be repressed rather than encouraged. Through the thoughtful and timely suggestions of teachers, hundreds of bright, active minds might be induced to seek that liberal culture which would expand and enrich their own souls and send into society trained leaders, whose influence would leaven the mass with elevating and refining elements.

We will name only one other embarrassment. It comes from the rapid development and material prosperity of the region, in the form of a strong temptation to young men to cut short the time given to their intellectual training, that they may hurry into active business. Amid the distractions of bustling enterprise around them, with the prizes of wealth, office, and power, apparently within their reach, and laboring often under the embarrassment of scanty pecuniary resources, it is not strange that many, started on the college course, should grow impatient of the long road before them and turn aside, and that many others should be deterred from starting at all. It happens thus that college classes, on an average, lose half their numbers on the way, and it is sometimes difficult to sustain the interest and spirit of those who remain.

These are real embarrassments; yet there is a brighter side even to this condition of things. The life and activity characteristic of a new country furnish excellent material for the college to work upon, when brought within its range. Those who come to college, come of their own accord and with a purpose, and they respond kindly and heartily to the efforts put forth for their thorough training. The people generally, if their ear can be gained and the merits of the case can be fairly laid before them, are quick of apprehension to take up right ideas;

and many of those in prominent stations, to which they have lifted themselves without the benefit of early education, conscious of their own deficiencies, join with earnest zeal in commending and supporting a genuine college work.

Sustained by these encouragements, amid the embarrassments named, the college has held on its way, true to its own ideal, confident that the surest way to success was to keep the standard well up. The results which already appear are very cheering, and exceed the brightest expectations of its founders. By the steady maintenance of its standard, and through the influence of its alumni and others who, in attendance on its instruction, have understood its aim, the community has been in a considerable degree educated to appreciate its object and divine its advantages. And now for its future enlargement and increased usefulness, its immediate *wants* may be indicated in a general way under three particulars. There is needed, first, the active influence of educated men, especially of ministers of the gospel, in the region, to give to parents and their sons right ideas of what a liberal education means and of its value. The work of the college has been much aided in this way, but vastly more would be done if all felt a personal responsibility in this matter. Why should not each pastor charge himself with the duty of seeing that his flock, however small, be constantly represented in the college by at least one earnest student? Why should he not enlist the teachers in the public schools to co-operate with him for this end? The effectiveness of such influence has been abundantly illustrated in the history of older colleges in the East. The considerations before suggested, make it of the highest importance for all true college work in the West.

The second immediate want of Beloit College is a distinct foundation on which its preparatory school can be set up, separate from the college, yet under the direction and control of the college trustees and faculty. This is needed that the legitimate object of the college, as defined in this Article, may stand out to the apprehension of both students and the public in its distinctive characteristics. With such an arrangement, too, the restlessness which naturally springs from long familiarity with one set of instructors and one routine of duty, prompting the

student to break off in mid career, will be relieved. Faculty and students will engage with more zest and zeal in the studies of the college course, the standard of scholarship will be raised and the thoroughness of the training will be enhanced. It is believed that the moderate sum of \$25,000 will provide for this object. Is there not some one among the readers of this Article who will love to give his money and his name to such a foundation?

Then there is the great want, ever pressing, of additional endowments, for the immediate relief and for the necessary enlargement of the college. With the closest economy, the current expenses of the institution exceed the reliable income by nearly \$2000 each year. The deficiency has been met by the avails of outstanding general subscriptions and miscellaneous property—a resource which must be soon exhausted. Rightly to fulfill its object, the college must rapidly enlarge its operations: a foundation is needed for the support of a librarian and treasurer. Its corps of instructors must be increased, that the pressure on the members of the faculty of double duty in daily exercises may be relieved, so that they can advance their own culture, and come with ever fresh life and interest to their work. Such enlargement is essential to keep the prestige already gained, and to give the institution steady growth, proportioned to the growth of all things around it. The very life of a college, as of all other living things, depends on such growth. To meet deficiencies and to provide for this necessary enlargement, that the college may have a fair start for its next quarter-century of living progress, the sum of \$100,000, to be added to its permanent endowments, is imperatively needed, and earnestly sought for. What safer place for permanently productive investment can be found? What nobler monument can a faithful steward, entrusted of God with wealth, desire, than to have his name and memory identified with the life and growth, and perennial, precious fruits of such a Christian college?

ARTICLE VIII.—A QUESTION IN CONGREGATIONALISM.

Ecclesia: Church Problems considered in a Series of Essays.

Edited by HENRY ROBERT REYNOLDS, D.D., President of Cheshunt College, Fellow of University College, London. London: Hodder and Stoughton. First Series, 1870. Second Series, 1871. New York: A. D. F. Randolph & Co.

THE future historian of the theological literature of England in this generation will remark a characteristic mode of discussion and publication as distinguishing it. This method is neither that of ordinary book-authorship, nor that of quarterlies and other periodicals, nor yet that of occasional tracts and pamphlets, whether by one author or by many, whether to be afterward collected, or not to be, into volumes. It combines many of the advantages, and avoids many of the inconveniences, of each of these plans, by producing simultaneously, in a single volume, essays by different and mutually irresponsible writers in general sympathy with each other, on subjects mutually related, with no more of preconcert or editorial supervision than may be needed to save from repetition or cross-purposes. It combines the brevity and point of the occasional pamphlet; the power of coöperation and combined influence incident to the quarterly or monthly; and the strength of a sustained, continuous appeal to the public attention on one general subject, which belongs to the "bound volume." At the same time, it is neither ephemeral and perishable; nor does it protract discussion over long intervals of time, and imply promises for the future, and involve the writers in certain prescriptive responsibilities; nor does it deter busy men from beginning to read the volume by binding them over to finish it. It is a most convenient, serviceable, many-handed engine, that "stands ready to smite once and smite no more," unless more be necessary.

The first notable success of a volume of this kind—in the case of the "Essays and Reviews"—was so out of proportion to the absolute value of the contents of the book, that it is not strange that the method was promptly adopted by other com-

panies of writers,—first for the immediate purpose of controverting that agitating and unwholesome little bundle of neologies, and afterward for the positive expression and vindication of the various schools and tendencies of British theology. It is strange, and, on the whole, not creditable to the activity and efficiency of American theology, that this new type of literature is not represented amongst ourselves. The successive volumes of "Boston Lectures" come nearest to it, but after all they are not of the same sort. The knot of really vigorous American scholars, holding independent convictions on subjects of serious concern, and having "the courage of their convictions," who should be first to adventure together into this new field of literature, would be sure of a hearing from the public.

Two of the most recent and notable works of this class are the series of Essays by moderate High Churchmen of the Establishment, edited by Dean Hook, once famous as Vicar of Leeds, under the title "The Church and the Age," and these volumes entitled "Ecclesia" from the pens of Independent Non-conformists. We name the two together for the sake of remarking the general superiority of the essays of the Dissenters, to those of their graduated, titled, and beneficed brethren of the Established Church, in elegance of style, breadth of thought, thoroughness of argument, and almost every quality of excellence.* The superiority is unmistakable, and all the more impressive from the fact that, all things considered, it was hardly to have been expected. The temptations to a narrow polemic view of current questions, on the part of British Dissenters, are many, and their opportunities of the highest liberal culture are unrighteously few. All the more honor, then, to the scholarship and liberality which demonstrates that their best men are "standing in a large place," such in point of catholicity and comprehensiveness as challenges the deference of "the comprehensive church" itself.

* We must except from the comparison the Article on Modern Missions in *Ecclesia*, which in a literary point of view is one of the less praiseworthy Articles in the series; and the Article by Sir Bartle Frere in *The Church and the Age*, on Results of Missions in India, which is quite the best thing in that volume. But both these essays are so valuable that the firm or society that should reprint them together for American circulation in a neat little volume would render a good service to the whole Christian community.

Of course, writings conceived in such a temper, cannot be occupied with that indiscriminate vindication of partisan traditions which is characteristic of vulgar polemics. That is poor generalship which knows no art of defense but to keep all you hold, at all costs and all hazards. And yet when the capable soldier takes command, and begins to strengthen his line by abandoning untenable outworks, how few there are that are able to see that this course, instead of being treacherous abandonment of the defense, is really the one condition which makes defense, in the long run, practicable! Congregationalism owes much to such men as the writers of these essays, for the great but invidious service of examining its line of defense, and condemning the untenable points. Is it not better that this should be done in the council of its friends than by the successful assault of its enemies?

The main object of this Article is to introduce to the consideration of American Congregationalists a single one of the weighty questions put by the Rev. J. Guinness Rogers, B. A., in his essay on "The Congregationalism of the Future." This essay is a thoughtful forthlook to the time when, at the approaching disestablishment of the Episcopal Church in England, Congregationalism will be placed on a new footing—on nearly the same footing, in fact, which it already occupies in America. Accordingly it deals with questions that are already practical to us. But with all its freedom of criticism, it makes no mention of that usage which is the universal and most grievous blemish and corruption of American Congregationalism—the imposition of codes of dogma as conditions of membership. The reason why this abuse is not mentioned by the English writer is because it is unknown to English Congregationalism, as it was unknown to American Congregationalism until a comparatively recent period. It was no part of the original institute adopted by the New England fathers. It would have been utterly abhorrent to their principles and feelings. It never was deliberately adopted at any time, but stole in as an indolent and corrupt practice, and came into universal use, not by the care of the churches, but through their carelessness. It is not, at this hour, intelligently approved by Congregational ministers, as a body, but holds its place in church usage by

that exaggerated *vis inertiae* which belongs peculiarly to Congregationalist traditions from the very fact that the system has no written statutes, and therefore no law but tradition. It is condemned by a hundred reasons, both of expediency and of duty, and sustained by no single argument that does not rest upon the false and mischievous definition of *faith* as meaning assent to propositions.

The question of administration which our writer presses upon the consideration of his brethren is stated in his own language thus :

“ Looking more closely at the constitution and practices of Congregationalism as it is, with the view of ascertaining whether any or what changes may be made to meet the objections of those who admit that it has laid hold of certain grand principles of Church polity, but are staggered by present modes of administration, we are necessarily led to consider its conditions of Church fellowship, and the plans adopted for their enforcement. Those who have been so trained in Nonconformist ideas on Church membership, that they have almost come to regard the details of its arrangements as of Divine appointment, have but very inadequate conceptions of the revulsion of feeling produced in the minds of those who have been educated amid other associations, when they are first brought into contact with the practices that till recently obtained in all our Churches, and which even now are to be found in the majority. To some the idea of an investigation into their private religious experience by comparative strangers, in order that a report of the results may be made to a meeting of the Church, is so distasteful and repellent that they at once turn away from the community which requires it. They shrink with a sensitiveness which it is impossible not to respect from laying bare their most sacred feelings,—those which they would hardly confide even to their most intimate friend,—to visitors with whom they have little or no acquaintance, and whose want of tact in the prosecution of their inquiries, may very possibly furnish little guarantee that their judgment will be formed with wisdom and discrimination. Others object to it on the ground of principle as well as of feeling. They regard the whole proceeding as essentially inquisitorial in its character, and insist that as no man has a right to assume such a position of authority in relation to another, so he in his turn is not justified in sacrificing his Christian liberty by allowing another to assume it to him. They have no objection freely to converse on the subject of their Christian profession with a minister or others, but they demur to its being insisted upon as a necessary condition to Church fellowship. Holding that a profession of Christian faith spontaneously and intelligently made should be accepted as genuine, unless there be distinct evidence to the contrary, they regard Churches who require more than this as usurping a power which Christ has not committed to them, which has no warrant in the New Testament, and the exercise of which is attended with serious practical evils. They urge, further, that experience has proved that such attempts to maintain the purity of the Church defeat their own purpose, operating as barriers to prevent the entrance of many whose lives would adorn a Christian profession, and yet failing to exclude those against whom they are specially directed. A third class go further still, and deny the

propriety of establishing any distinction at all. Advocating the multitudinist theory which consistently enough finds its place in a National Church, they demand that the doors of the Church should be thrown open to all who choose to enter, and that any separation between believers and unbelievers should be left to Him who knoweth the hearts and who alone judgeth righteous judgments.

Can Congregationalism, with a due regard to its own principles, properly make any changes in deference to these views?"—*Ecclesia*, I, 482-4.

Distinctly repudiating the view of this third class, and reaffirming the principle that a true Christian church should be a church of true Christians, the writer returns to the question, by what processes shall this principle best be carried into practice?

"Congregational principles stand on an entirely different ground from the usages which are based on them. For the former there is ample Scriptural authority—the latter have at best only the tradition of a denomination, or the evidence of experience, to allege in their favor. The former therefore must be maintained until it can be shown that we have been misled as to the meaning of the New Testament—the latter are open to such modifications as a wider experience may dictate, or as the altered circumstances of the times may appear to demand. Yet there is a style of argumentation which puts them both on the same basis, and quietly assumes that the demonstration of the one carries with it the proof of the other also. It is proved, as it can be proved easily enough, that the true spiritual life in Christ is an essential qualification for membership in Christ's Church, and here it is supposed that the whole necessity of proof ends, that everything else follows as a matter of course, that the visitation and personal examination of each candidate by the minister and a deputation from the Church, followed by a report on the whole to the assembled community, and the verdict pronounced thereupon by a body who at best can have very scanty materials on which to form a decision, are just as Scriptural. To all this an objector may reasonably demur, and when he comes to demand proof at each stage of the process, those who are engaged in the defence will not be long before they find themselves in sore straits. At the very next stage of the argument,—at the assertion that as every member of a Church should be a Christian, therefore he is bound to satisfy the Church that he is so, and that for this something more is requisite than his mere profession, their difficulties will begin. It is a position which an objector is sure to challenge, and for which it will not be easy to adduce that Scriptural proof on which alone Congregationalism professes to rest. The New Testament warrants the separation of the Church from those who do not live in accordance with the laws of Christ; and it would justify the refusal to admit such into the Church. We would go even further, and say that it would warrant the adoption of a more rigid law than that which was applied to men just gathered in from heathenism; but to infer from this that it gives a Church authority to institute tests by which the inner life of men should be proved, and the conformity of their experience with the standard of the Gospel decided, is to press the conclusion further than the premises warrant.

A good deal has been gained when this simple distinction between the essential and accidental parts of the system is made clear: it is at once understood that the

abandonment of present modes of administration does not involve any alteration in the fundamental law of Church fellowship; that a proposal for the abolition of all distinction between the Church and the congregation would find as little favor with the members who feel the necessity of some change, as with those who adhere most rigidly to the old system; that nothing more is contemplated than an improvement in the mode of working out principles which will be retained in all their integrity. The idea of leaving the responsibility wholly with the individual himself may indeed at first sight seem startling and revolutionary, but a more careful examination may possibly dispel much of the alarm that is felt. It is true that at present the Church apparently assumes a good deal of responsibility in each decision, but it is only in appearance. It is by the candidate himself the Church's opinion must in the majority of cases be shaped; for how can the Church judge of the inner life except by the help of what he communicates. He narrates the story of his awakening to spiritual consciousness, of the hours of secret penitence through which he has passed, of the inward conflicts through which he has fought his way into the kingdom of God, or of those more gentle drawings of the Spirit of God, by which he has been led to a knowledge of the Saviour, and an enjoyment of that peace which He imparts to the soul. If he should simply be using unctuous phrases which he has borrowed from others, and with which the clever hypocrite never finds any difficulty in making himself acquainted, if beneath the fair exterior and the profession in which it is impossible to detect a flaw, he conceals an unregenerate heart, or if he has been mistaking the working of natural feelings for the presence and influence of the Spirit of God in him, how is the Church to unmask the deception? All that it can do, at best is to pronounce a judgment on the supposition that the statements to which it has listened are genuine. It is, therefore, after all, the profession of the individual himself which determines whether he is to be accepted or rejected.

It is important that we should remember the limits within which our action in this matter is confined. Conversation with a judicious pastor or friend, such as all desiring to be right would seek, if it is not insisted upon as a condition of communion, may do much to enlighten and help a man. It may be useful in guarding him against crude and hasty views, and may stir him up to a more searching self-scrutiny, help to quicken the sensitiveness of conscience, and elevate his entire conception of a Christian profession and its demands. It may teach him to discriminate between mere temporary excitement and true spiritual feeling, or supply encouragement and help where it is needed by those of timid and shrinking spirit; but this kind of moral guidance and support is about all that one man can do for another here. Every man must bear his own burden and act for himself in the decision of the question, the most solemn with which any one can have to deal, whether he is prepared, knowing what Christian discipleship involves, to adopt the name and assume the responsibilities connected with it, and anything which has the slightest tendency to weaken the sense of his individual responsibility here is an incalculable evil. This most assuredly is the case with the ordinary mode of procedure in Congregational Churches. Great care may be, and generally is, taken to guard against the notion that the Church has pronounced the accepted candidate a Christian. But the fact remains that he has been subjected to such an investigation as it was thought necessary to institute, and that he has so far satisfied those by whom the enquiry has been conducted that he has been welcomed to Christian fellowship. That fact tells with him far more than a thousand

cautions. He has passed the ordeal, and it is difficult to make him understand that even those who have instituted it do not regard it as a decisive test. Thus the Church, intentionally or not, appears to assume a most onerous responsibility, and the man has obtained what he accepts as an implied assurance as to his own spiritual state, an assurance that will weigh little with those who are intent on working out their own salvation with fear and trembling, but which will be most greedily welcomed and fondly cherished by those to whom it will be most dangerous. Most pastors of long experience will, I believe, testify that this is no imaginary or unfrequent evil; but I fear that what comes under our observation gives but a very inadequate conception of the injurious influence that is exerted. The positive advantages of a system must be great indeed if they are sufficient to counterbalance the evil of fostering that self-deception to which the soul is only too prone.

But will any one, who has had an extensive acquaintance with the working of the system, venture to say that such advantages have been secured, or that as a whole the results have been satisfactory? It would not be sufficient, in order to justify such statement, to be able to prove that *as a rule* those who are accepted by the Church are consistent Christians, while those who remain outside show by their lives that they have had no experience of the practical power of the Gospel, and that the line which is drawn does, with such exceptions as might fairly be expected, represent with great fairness the distinction between the Church and the world. Even so general a statement is not to be accepted without examination. There are some who would go so far as to pronounce it the very opposite of the truth; but could it be shown to be true, it is really little more than might be said of any system. There are certain marked features of religious character which it is almost impossible to ignore, and that those in whom they appear are ranked accordingly, is nothing very wonderful. There are some who would be welcomed by any Church; there are others who, if they were to seek admission, would be just as certainly rejected by any body which attempted to preserve the purity of its communion. It is by its action on other classes, in the detection of formalism or hypocrisy, or in the attraction of persons whose morbid conscientiousness would keep apart from those with whom they have nevertheless deep spiritual sympathy, that the ordinary usage is to be tried, and it is here that it has signally failed on both sides, in relation to those whom it excludes as well as to those whom it admits.

It is a frequent subject of regret among all ministers that there are so many in their congregations of whose piety they entertain no doubt, who cannot be persuaded to join the fellowship of the Church. It is easy to say that their religion is imperfect, as it has not taught them to subdue the pride which rebels against the requirements made of them; that if their love to Christ were deeper they would be more willing to accept the cross which they are asked to bear for His sake, and that their reluctance to submit to the ordeal applied by the Church is itself a proof that, whatever excellence they may possess, they are not fitted to enjoy the privileges of Christian fellowship. The charity which thinketh no evil ought to rebuke such harsh judgments, and facts continually prove that they are as fallacious as they are severe. Such reasoning, indeed, assumes all that has to be proved. If Christ has imposed this upon all who would be His faithful disciples, for them there must be an end of all controversy. Natural feeling may chafe against such demands; but if they are made by the Master, those who desire to

keep His commandments must cheerfully comply with them. But the ground on which the opposition to them rests is, that they are not made by the Master at all, and that from first to last, they are a human device, and a device inconsistent with the genius of the Gospel and with Christ's mode of treating human souls. He was ever tender, pitiful, mindful of the peculiarities of men's temperaments and circumstances; ready to welcome the faintest germ of penitence and faith, and to aid its development; always encouraging the timid and helping the feeble. It was His glory that He would not break the bruised reed nor quench the smoking flax; and how, it is asked, can it be supposed possible that He can look with approval on the system, which meets the soul at the very beginning of its pilgrimage with demands so onerous, that the timid and the sensitive are sure to recoil from them. The advocates of a more generous policy demand, therefore, that these barriers be thrown down, not because they appear formidable to themselves, but because they hold them to be unauthorized, and because they feel that they are calculated to repel those whom Christ, with His tender consideration for the weak and ignorant, would have encouraged and welcomed.

It is not for those who have always maintained the rights of conscience themselves, to sneer at these scruples in others, and to impute to a want of Christian principle that which is the result rather of a desire to guard the liberty of the individual against the usurpations of the Church. Even if it should be considered that these objects are mistaken, it will scarcely be maintained that their mistake is sufficient to warrant their exclusion from fellowship, and yet that must be the case so long as the existing methods are preserved. They may find a home in other communities, but the doors of Congregationalism are barred against them. There can be little doubt that it does thus continually lose men whose lives would adorn their profession, and whose intelligence, earnestness, and independence would contribute materially to the strength of any society with which they were connected.

Nor do these constitute the only class thus kept outside. Timidity, quite as often as pride, leads men to shrink from the investigation of spiritual life, which our Churches have hitherto thought necessary. It may be said, and said with truth, that the difficulties are greatly exaggerated, that the interview even with a couple of deacons is not so terrible a thing as the imagination paints it, and that the cases are rare in which there is anything that ought to disturb even the most sensitive or alarm the most timid. But such a plea really involves the most emphatic condemnation of the system. To represent the enquiry as so harmless and unmeaning, is really to abandon the only ground on which it could possibly be defended. If it is to have any value, it ought to be one of the most searching inquiries that can be instituted, conducted by the wisest and gravest men the Church can find, who should take all possible care, in order to arrive at an opinion on which the Church would be justified in acting. Notoriously this is not the case in a great number of instances, but this is the light in which it presents itself to outsiders; and therefore it is that many, whose earnest piety is beyond a question, shrink from the application of such a test, especially by those with whom they have little or no acquaintance, and either remain outside the Church or having made up their minds to dare everything rather than lose the privilege of a Christian communion, prepare for the inquiry with a fear and trembling which, in several cases, I have known to be attended with serious consequences. My own doubts as to the wisdom of the system were awakened years ago by observing the pain-

ful effects produced on the physical and mental health of some candidates, for I could not but feel that Christ had never intended to impose suffering of that character on any of His disciples as a condition of their reception into His Church. To tell me that these timid ones are scared by phantoms of their own creation, increases instead of relieves the difficulty. The only plea that could be urged for such a course is its necessity, but if the inquiry instituted be for the most part of a superficial, almost of a formal character, even that fails. As a safeguard for the purity of the Church it is illusive, and yet a grievous burden is laid upon the individual conscience. The fact is, if the inquiries were generally of the nature they ought to be, they would long since have become intolerable. It is only because they are generally made so easy that they have survived; but in making them easy they are made practically worthless.

It is said that the Church cannot concern itself about exceptional cases, that it must provide against the admission of unworthy men, and that, if the plans it adopts for this purpose unhappily exclude those whom it would joyfully receive, it is one of those inevitable imperfections that attach to all human systems. The argument is specious, but it leaves out of consideration one of the great ends which a Church should seek to secure. It is meant to be a gathering of those who love the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity, and it should aim to embrace in its fellowship all who desire that privilege, and who possess this one qualification for enjoying it. *It should not be more anxious to be pure than to be complete*, and therefore should seek to include all who are Christians, as well as to exclude all who are not. It is not in any sense a private society, partaking of a character of a club, and entitled to lay down conditions which shall give it a selectness beyond that which is required by the law of its constitution. Admission to its communion is not a privilege which it can give or withhold at pleasure, or in relation to which it can lay down arbitrary laws, but a right which every Christian can demand. That Church cannot answer to the true idea of a Church of Christ, which has regulations that exclude from it those whom Christ has received to His fellowship. The principle seems obvious, but it has been and is constantly ignored in practice. Christian societies have continually acted, and do still act, on the assumption that they have rights of legislation as well as administration, that they can exact certain things from their members beyond those which Christ has prescribed in the New Testament, and that they are justified in depriving recusants of the benefits of Church fellowship. But, surely, if the spirituality of a Church is impaired by the introduction to its ranks of those who are not Christians, its catholicity is destroyed on the other hand when its laws interfere with the admission of those who are.

It would be a thankless task to insist upon the utter insufficiency of the system as a guarantee for that purity for the sake of which it is preserved. There are few Churches whose records do not furnish melancholy evidence that a most careful and jealous watchfulness cannot prevent the intrusion into the Church of men who have neither part nor lot in the great Christian heritage. No doubt these are just such errors of judgment as fallible men were sure to commit, but the question recurs,—Why ask them to form a judgment at all? They are not to be blamed for the natural and necessary mistakes they commit, but for taking upon themselves functions to which they are confessedly unequal, and in the discharge of which they are, as all experience shows, continually falling into error, fraught with most mischievous consequences. My own acquaintance with Congregational Churches enables me to assert with great confidence that the evils which might

have been expected to arise in the administration of such a polity are extremely rare, that it is not often that the gates of the Church are opened or closed in obedience to mere personal feeling, and that though many mistakes are made they are for the most part errors of judgment. But while this ought to be remembered in justice to the men, it does nothing to take away the force of the objection to the system. Those who are engaged in carrying it out may be, and in general I believe they are, under the influence of right motives, and are conscientiously anxious to do their duty. But a man may be eminently conscientious and very crotchety, extremely narrow, capricious, and wayward in the formation of his opinions, disposed to attach importance to trifles and to underrate some of the clearest evidences of Christian character, and any one of these faults will detract from the value of his judgment. To discharge the duty assigned him with even a moderate degree of efficiency, there must be in his character a combination of qualities seldom met with. He should have great spiritual insight, but, at the same time, a power of holding his judgment in suspense, such as men with clear, intuitive perceptions seldom possess. He should have a sympathetic temperament so that he may win his way to the hearts of others, and at the same time possess the strength of mind which would preserve him from those too lenient and flattering estimates of character to which such a spirit would incline him. He must have the caution which would save him from being imposed upon by that unctuous talk which is generally found to be in inverse proportion to the depth and reality of spiritual feeling, and yet he must have that hopeful trust which will teach him to recognize, even amid many signs of weakness and imperfection, the presence of a simple faith and a sincere love, as yet, perhaps, only in its beginnings, but on this very account needing to be met with genial confidence. Freedom from prejudice, boundless tact, large and varied experience, power to enter into the special difficulties of others, and considerate tenderness blended with keen discrimination, strictness that shall not degenerate into severity, charity that shall not be blindly credulous, and last, but not least, confidence in his own judgment, associated with that humility which ought to be the great characteristic of a man called to such an office, are qualities indispensable to those who are to guide the Church in its decisions as to those who seek its fellowship. The bare enumeration of them is sufficient to show how few there can be who have even a moderate degree of fitness for the work. Yet, according to present arrangements, each Church ought to contain several. It cannot be thought wonderful that they are not found, that the investigation is often of a most perfunctory kind, that there is nothing like uniformity in the judgments pronounced, that some err as much on the one side from comprehension, as others on that of restriction, and that Churches are continually discredited and distressed, as time and experience show them the mistakes they have committed.

The remedy for these evils some would find in increased stringency of the preliminary investigations. But if the difficulty be, as most will admit, to find men who can conduct them with any approach to success, it is evident that no attempt to make them more severe will meet the case. The tendency of Congregational Churches has been for many years past in the contrary direction, and the changes which have been made have not lowered their character. The demands made upon candidates have been gradually relaxed. First, the oral statement made to the Church was abandoned, or a written one substituted for it, and in most cases even this has been altogether discontinued or made optional. A considerable

number of Churches have gone further still, and no longer insist on the visitation by the deacons and other members. There is a growing feeling that the system has not guarded against the evils it was intended to avert, and that it has itself created others of a very serious character; that it is open to question (to say the least) whether the most free and liberal plan—one on which all who desired to make a public profession of faith in Christ, whose lives are in harmony with their profession, should be accepted—would have introduced a greater number of unworthy members, while it is certain that there is a tendency in the present plan to foster pride and exclusiveness in those who, having been received into the sacred circle themselves, fancy that they are invested thus with a right to pronounce on the fitness of others to join them. It is, perhaps, hardly to be hoped that the Churches will at once, or will even speedily, renounce the practices in which they have been educated; but it will be something if they are led to recognize that these do not form an essential part of independency, and that those who advocate their disuse are just as zealous for the spirituality of the Church, and just as ready to adopt wise means for securing it, as those who most earnestly insist on their retention. It is not proposed to tamper with the basis of our Church constitution, namely, that the Church of Christ should consist only of those who are "sanctified in Christ Jesus, called to be saints." It is not desired even to abolish the necessity of a distinct act of public profession on the part of each member in that application for fellowship, which in the ordinary course would be received at one meeting and decided at the next ensuing. It is asked only that the Church should regard a profession as genuine, unless the life shows it to be the reverse, and that it should abandon the idea of judging as to the reality of the spiritual life, leaving every one to feel that the act is solely his own, and that to his own Master he stands or falls. I firmly believe that the purity of the Church would be at least as secure on this plan, as on that at present in vogue, and that the adoption of it would sweep away many of the most serious hindrances to the spread of Congregationalism among the very classes whom it is most desirous to influence. It is unquestionable that the ranks of our Churches are recruited principally from the ranks of the young, that comparatively few candidates for admission are found amongst men of mature years and high culture, and that numbers who have grown up in our congregations, and who have not in early life entered the Church, continue to remain outside, though their lives indicate them to be sincere Christian men. The truth is, they are unwilling to face the ordeal which the Church has instituted. Age, education, every influence which increases the sensitiveness of a man, and indisposes him to unveil his soul to the gaze of others, hold men back who yet painfully feel their position, and would, under another system, gladly enrol themselves among Christian professors. Is it wise or right for us to tell such men that they are too proud, that their shrinking from the test the Church thinks necessary is a sign of remaining corruption which they ought to put away, that the cost is trifling for a privilege so great? Nothing is more flattering to our own self-complacency than to adopt a tone such as this;—whether it be Christian, or wise, or edifying thus to sacrifice to our net, and to burn incense to our drag, is a very different question. We are certainly robbing ourselves of much strength, and the only thing that can justify a course which certainly operates as a serious discouragement to many godly souls, is a clear proof that we are obeying the commands of our Master. If such proof be not forthcoming, our procedure is as unchristian as it is suicidal" (pp. 488–502).

We present this long extract as being, both for its substance and for its source, worthy at least of very respectful consideration among Congregationalists; and considering the complication of our Cis-Atlantic usage with the miserable corruption of imposed creeds, its claim upon the attention of American Congregationalists is a very special one. It is not strange that when points like this have been raised in the course of sectarian controversy, or thrust at us by the shrewd, cynical wit of Dr. Holmes, they have failed of being very seriously pondered. The *ab hoste doceri* is doubtless right and noble, but it is not, ordinarily, human. We have here the counsels of an undoubted friend; and from these it is easier to learn.

The whole case, both *pro* and *contra*, will be before our readers if we add, from the second volume of *Ecclesia*, the remarks of that singularly acute disputant and lucid writer, the Rev. R. W. Dale, evidently, though not expressly, directed against the very essay by Mr. Rogers, in the first volume, from which we have been quoting.* His historical statement of English Congregationalist usage on the point in question is to us not the least interesting part of what he has to say.

"The customs of our churches vary; fifty years ago it was not unusual to require the applicant for membership to appear at the church meeting, and to declare publicly his loyalty to the Lord Jesus Christ; and every member present had the right to propose any question to him relating to his personal religious history. In many churches, till very recently, every applicant for membership was expected to address a letter to the church containing a profession of his religious faith—not of his theological creed—and some information concerning the circumstances and influences which led him to decide to live a Christian life. It is still usual for one or two of the members of the church to visit the candidate before he is received into fellowship; and it is on their testimony and that of the pastor that the church determines whether he shall be received or rejected. The "visitors" are sometimes deacons, sometimes private members of the church. . . . In nearly all cases, the candidate is "proposed" at one church meeting, and his application is voted upon at the next, the month's interval being intended to afford opportunity for information to be sent to the pastor if it should happen that any of the members know that the candidate is an unfit person to be received into membership. . . .

"These practices look very much more formidable on paper than they are in reality. Nearly always, before there is any application for membership, the rela-

* The title of Mr. Dale's Essay is "The Idea of the Church in Relation to Modern Congregationalism." An Article from his pen, in the first volume, on "The Real Presence," is an admirable piece of theologizing.

tions between the pastor and the applicant are so intimate that a special interview is unnecessary. "Visitors" who have any tact and delicacy satisfy themselves of the religious earnestness of candidates without any formal examination. Looking back over a ministry of eighteen years, I cannot recall more than two or three cases in which what is sometimes called the "ordeal" of admission has prevented persons from applying for membership."

"Not more than two or three" would seem to be two or three too many souls to repel from Christian communion by any merely arbitrary and human tradition—if it is merely arbitrary, which is the point in question. "*One* of these little ones" is more than the chief Pastor is willing to lose. But we would suggest that the largest mischief from such bars to church communion is done, not in the case of those few who come almost to the point of approaching the Lord's table, and turn back, and of whom a single pastor recalls two or three in eighteen years: but in the case of the many who are hindered by these usages from coming near the church to begin with, and whom the pastor cannot recall, because he never hears of them.

Mr. Dale proceeds to consider "the validity of the grounds on which a change is demanded." We state the two points of his answer in brief, trusting to the intelligence of the reader, or referring him to the essay itself, for details.

1. It is said that our customs are not sanctioned by the practice of the apostles. Granted. But in the apostolic days the circumstances of disfavor, and sometimes of persecution, in which the church was held, made inquiries like these needless.

2. "It is also alleged against the traditional usage of Congregationalism, that the church ought not to assume the responsibility of affirming, even by implication, the sincerity of a man's religious faith." But there are few ministers who do not solemnly remind the new member that the vote of the church conveys no infallible assurance of eternal life. No man's doubts of his own salvation are ever suppressed by the fact that his name is on the church roll. Further, it is impossible for a Congregational Church to escape the responsibility of recognizing the personal religious faith of its members. A man cannot enter into the church, without being received by the church. The act is a reciprocal one.

Let us conclude these extracts with the sound and instructive paragraph in which Mr. Dale presents his own strictures on the

method of administration of the usages which on the whole he would have preserved:

"The real ground on which, as it seems to me, the customs of Congregational Churches are open to objection, is this:—they appear to imply that as soon as a man has received the life of God, the life will so distinctly reveal itself in new forms of thought and emotion, that there will never be any difficulty in recognizing its presence. This is a very grave mistake. The first movements of the supernatural life are generally very obscure. It must gather strength before it can manifest itself in an unequivocal manner. In innumerable cases the consciousness of regeneration does not immediately follow trust in Christ. We rely upon Him for redemption from this present evil world; but very often, months and even years pass by before there is any vivid sense of actual redemption. And yet it is certain that although the reality of the new birth may not at once be capable of direct verification either to the regenerate person himself or to others, every man who trusts in Christ receives immediately both the pardon of sin and the gift of eternal life. But the usages of Congregational Churches appear to suggest that faith in Christ and the regeneration, which, as we know, is granted in immediate response to faith, are not adequate qualifications for church membership,—that there must also be certain developments of the supernatural life, sufficiently determinate and sufficiently obvious to demonstrate their supernatural origin to other Christian people. We wait till the regenerate children of God are able to speak and to walk, before we are willing to receive them into the divine "household." All that we have a right to ask for is an assurance of personal trust in Christ; wherever this exists, our own faith should make us certain that whether or not we can discern the signs of regeneration, the man is really regenerate."—*Eccleria*, II, 384.

ART. IX.—NOTES AND COMMENTS.

Dr. DÖLLINGER has been thought by some to be over-timid in regard to the bearings of the Infallibility dogma on civil society and the rights of the State. But here comes the *Dublin Review* (for Jan., 1872), the able organ of the British Ultramontanes, which boldly, frankly—we might say, audaciously—avows that what Döllinger apprehends really follows from the new dogma! The bull *unam sanctam* of Boniface, asserting the lordship of the Pope over princes and over every human creature, is declared to be *ex cathedra*, and so binding on the conscience! That is, the enormous pretensions of the mediæval Popes to a control over governments, are clothed with the attribute of infallibility,—pretensions which Catholics, not liberals only but moderate conservatives also—have professed to consider obsolete and of no force. The organs of the Pope sanction the inferences of Döllinger on this point. Moreover, the *Dublin Review*, speaking of religious persecution, or laws for the punishment of heresy, says (p. 2): “It is undeniable that for the existence of such laws the Church is mainly responsible.” These laws, then, must not be condemned. “The Holy See,” says the Dublin reviewer, “has condemned the following proposition, that the Church ought to be separated from the State, and the State from the Church” (p. 190). The bull of Gregory XVI, the *Mirari vos*, denouncing the free reading and circulation of the Bible, is also *ex cathedra*. These bulls of Boniface and Gregory are affirmed, correctly as we think, to have been addressed to the whole Church. Now what say our American Ultramontanes and Infallibilists to these avowals of the *Dublin Review*? Why should not they be as frank and outspoken as their Dublin contemporary? We want them to tell us what they think of the Bull *unam sanctam*? Is it *ex cathedra*—for the whole Church? Is its doctrine binding on the consciences of faithful Catholics or not?

The *Contemporary Review* for February has an Article by Mr. Ffoulkes, who went into the Romish Church from the Anglican, and has now gone back again to the Anglican fold, on John Henry Newman's recent reprint of his “Essays,” which were writ-

ten before Newman became a Roman Catholic. These "Essays" are now republished, with annotations for the correction of errors, retractations after the manner of the great Augustine; though *retractations*, it should not be forgotten, signifies not "retractions," but "reconsiderations." Mr. Ffoulkes was driven back from Romanism by a study of the Greek controversies, and of the history of other so-called schismatical bodies. He still holds to his theory of priestly succession; but with Pusey and his party considers that "Catholic" comprehends the Greeks and Anglicans, not less than the Latins who acknowledge the primacy of the Pope. The *Dublin Review*, in its complimentary notice of Newman's volume, regrets that the essay on Lamennais, which reflects on the Pope's temporal power, should be reprinted with so little correction. It is a hard thing for a man like Newman to accommodate his thinking to ultramontane orthodoxy. He is a singular example of the power of a single idea or conviction to govern intellect and conscience. Starting with the fixed belief in a visible, external, organized Church, he looks for a society answering to his ideal, and finds it in the Roman communion. Misgivings, difficulties, historical perplexities, suggestions of conscience and of taste, are counterbalanced and neutralized by this one notion of an external spiritual commonwealth. Yet it is hard for so intellectual a man to keep his reason in chains. There will be some point where symptoms of rebellion will appear.

The same number of the *Contemporary Review* contains an Article by Mr. John Hunt on Rationalism and Ritualism in the English Church. Mr. Hunt has published an excellent book on the "History of Religious Thought in England," the second volume of which has just appeared. He knows well the history of Anglican theology, and, among other valuable services, incidentally exposes the false readings of that history which have been put forth by the Puseyite school. There are no more disingenuous perversions of theological history than the attempts of Pusey, Newman, and others, to interpret the fathers of the English Church into a conformity with "Anglo-Catholic" themes.

Speaking of the Roman Catholics, we are reminded of a matter on which we sought for light in the last number of the *NEW ENGLANDER* (Jan., 1872). We there compared the Creed, in the *Récit d'une Sœur*, with the same as translated and published by the Catholic Publication Society in New York. The original

creed has been interpolated and mutilated in an astonishing manner. Who is responsible for this altering of a document signed and attested? We have had no response to our inquiry. We shall be obliged to reiterate it until some response is given. We make no charges. There are dishonest Protestants as well as dishonest Roman Catholics. It is no pleasure to find dishonesty anywhere. But here is a religious publishing house which puts forth a translation differing essentially from the original. Large additions are made in a particular theological direction. Wilful changes of this nature in a business paper would send the author of them to the penitentiary. We repeat the inquiry, How are the great discrepancies between the creed of a Roman Catholic lady as written by herself and as printed by the Catholic Publication Society to be explained?

The withdrawal of the Rev. George H. Hepworth from the denomination of Liberal Christians has attracted more attention from other religious bodies and from the public in general than similar events usually occasion. It is not a very unusual occurrence for a so-called orthodox clergyman to go over to the Liberal ranks. It less frequently happens that a Liberal clergyman comes into the fellowship of the orthodox—perhaps, because the number which he leaves behind is relatively small. But the seceder is usually allowed quietly to follow his convictions, and is dismissed with no very violent demonstrations of disrespect. Mr. Hepworth has not been so fortunate as to escape a little rather rough handling from some members of his own former communion. Some things have been said of him which, whether true or false, might better have been left unspoken under the circumstances, at least by those who uttered them; and which those who uttered them undoubtedly regret by this time more sensibly than their best friends could do for them.

That his associates should have been disturbed by his departure from the Liberal body is not in the least surprising. He had been a popular clergyman, and a clergyman for the people—one of the few of his denomination who were conspicuous for success among common men. He had been conspicuous in Boston not only as a drawing preacher, but as bent on raising up others like himself who should carry the simple, Liberal gospel to the consciences and hearts of plain every-day men and women, and fire their souls with a fervent zeal for the spiritual life to promote which this gos-

pel has long been said to be eminently fitted. When a conspicuous and costly church in New York needed a popular preacher, Mr. Hepworth was transferred to that city of all faiths, to exercise his special function in fulfilling the sign for which Liberal Christianity has so long waited to see fulfilled—"To the poor the gospel is preached." He tried the experiment, and with what results? According to his own testimony, he had found that so far as the truths which he has preached have been commended to the hearts of his hearers, they have been most nearly like those which Evangelical Christians believe and preach; and that so far as he has sought to kindle his own soul to the fervor and zeal which should give him power with men, Christ had more and more completely filled the field of his mental vision, till he was at last constrained to confess him, in the words of a disciple of old—"My Lord and my God!"

So far as the testimony of Mr. Hepworth's experience of the Liberal doctrines in his own soul and in his preaching is concerned, this testimony is worth no more and no less than Mr. Hepworth's competency to judge and honesty to assert, may make it to be. If he is as weak and vacillating, as excitable and ambitious, as his quondam friends now assert that he always has been, his testimony is worth less than it otherwise would be. We do not wonder that these friends are especially sensitive that it should have been so emphatically pronounced, and by a man who at least has the ear of the public, if he does not deserve their confidence. For this testimony touches a point upon which Liberal Christians have always been the most positive, and in respect to which they have scarcely admitted a denial—that their more rational views of man's needs, and what the gospel can do for them, need only to be tried by any man to be commended to his confidence; and that the reason why the orthodox reject them, is because they cannot deliver themselves from the films of prejudice and the fears of tradition. But Mr. Hepworth says: "I was born, cradled, and bred amid the influences of Unitarianism. I drew its peculiarities in with my mother's milk; and every tendency in my early life ran in that direction." He asserts "that with one painful effort he tears himself up by the roots," and yet that he is constrained to do this by the failure of Liberal Christianity to satisfy his spiritual wants. We know the Protestant sometimes says this when he becomes a Roman Catholic, and the non-Ritualist when he proclaims that he has discovered the Church; but neither proclaim,

with Mr. Hepworth, that what he has been seeking for is the Christ for which his soul has longed, not knowing what it was longing for. When the Protestant becomes a Romanist, or the non-Unitarian becomes an intense Churchman, those whom he leaves can give as a reason, that he is not satisfied with the simpler gospel of Christ, because there is in the evil heart of unbelief a powerful bias to forsake Christ; but when a man like Mr. Hepworth goes from the Liberal scheme to the Evangelical, the Liberal friends whom he leaves cannot, on their theory of man's wickedness or his wants, very easily explain the process. It is almost by a logical necessity that they are forced to explain it on the orthodox theory, and to say that he could not leave their fellowship and demand another Christ than they themselves allow, unless he is a bad or a weak man.

We express no opinion at all upon the wisdom or unwisdom of Mr. Hepworth's conduct in respect to the Unitarian body. Holding the views which we do in regard to the person and work of Christ, we welcome to our fellowship any man who accepts these views. We are, however, especially gratified that Mr. Hepworth has discovered that it is not to the dogma as a scholastic statement, or to the words of a creed as words, that many of the so-called orthodox attach any special importance; but it is because the dogma and creed which they accept set forth in the language of reflection and of science man in the guilt and wants of which he is conscious, and the loving Christ in the help and deliverance which he offers. All men who hold right practical views of the Gospel are true believers we doubt not, whether their creed is long or short, whether it is definite or vague; and to all such we extend our most cordial Christian sympathy, as "holding the mystery of faith in a pure conscience." When the creed or dogma is exalted above the practical truths and the personal forces which it symbolizes, then it becomes an empty idol. Those Unitarians who agree with us in these opinions, will not find it difficult to understand why it does not strike us as very courteous on their part to assume that no man can accept the doctrine of the Trinity or the Incarnation, and yet have any claim to the name of a truly Rational or Liberal Christian.

The habitually or almost habitually supercilious tone in which many Unitarians speak of these doctrines as entirely beneath the consideration of any man who respects his own intellect, indicates a narrow judgment of the mysteries of existence, as well as a limited acquaintance with the history of human speculation.

ARTICLE IX.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

PHILOSOPHICAL.

ÜBERWEG'S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.*—The publishing house of Scribner have embarked in an enterprise which deserves the support of all lovers of learning, and especially of all students of theology and metaphysics. It is proposed to issue a series of works which shall serve as manuals, thorough and learned, without being too copious, upon all departments of these sciences. The ability, erudition, and the judicious and catholic spirit, as well as the literary experience, of Drs. Smith and Schaff, the superintending editors, augur well for the success of the undertaking. The great fault of Clark's Theological Library, the well known Edinburgh series, is the faulty character of so many of the translations. The editors of the projected American Library will guard against this evil. Their first publication, the first of the two volumes of Überweg's History of Philosophy, a handsome book of 487 pages, has made its appearance, a comely and welcome herald of the volumes that are to follow. Überweg is in some respects a model manual. It is not too long, nor is it too short. A difference of type separates the more from the less important statements, the principles from the elucidations. But the feature that will first attract the eye of the experienced student is the bibliography, a characteristic of capital value and importance. Almost every earnest student loses much time in ferreting out the sources of knowledge, in ascertaining what they are. The lists of books in Überweg are singularly full and exact, and the brief criticisms upon them are quite serviceable. The present volume carries the subject through the middle ages. In the volume that is to follow, President Porter will add notes upon English and American philosophy. Parishes and individuals who are inquiring for the right works to add to the minister's library, cannot do better than to subscribe for this series.

* *Theological and Philosophical Library*; a series of text-books, original and translated, for Colleges and Theological Seminaries. Edited by HENRY B. SMITH, D.D., and PHILIP SCHAFF, D.D., Professors in the Union Theol. Seminary, New York. Vols. I and II. Überweg's History of Philosophy [translated by Geo. S. Morris, A.M., with additions by Noah Porter, D.D., LL.D.], &c., &c. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1872.

TAINÉ "ON INTELLIGENCE"* introduces the author as laboring in a somewhat new field of activity, yet not altogether new; for if we remember rightly he attracted public attention several years ago by a trenchant criticism on Monsieur Cousin and the Eclectic school. Even his art-criticisms suppose a philosophy of man that is pronounced and peculiar, and his very vigorous work on English literature is written in the spirit of a psychology that is, at least, well known to himself. He urges in his preface to the work before us that "history is applied to psychology, psychology applied to more complex cases. The historian notes and traces the total transformations presented by a particular human molecule or group of human molecules, and to explain these transformations writes the psychology of the molecule or group, etc., etc. For fifteen years I have contributed to these special concrete psychologies; I now attempt general and abstract psychology."

The particular type of "general psychology" which Tainé represents in this volume, might be inferred from the phraseology of *molecules* which he adopts. We do not need to read many pages to discover that he is an ardent advocate of the associational psychology which is received by Alexander Bain and John Mill, and does not shrink from accepting its legitimate consequences. We use the term advocate advisedly, for the entire essay may justly be regarded as an eloquent argument for this special theory, rather than a candid enquiry concerning the acts and laws of the human spirit. Regarded as the argument of an ingenious and well furnished pleader, it is admirable for its skill, its affluence and effectiveness. It begins with a brilliant illustration; it proceeds step by step, with steady, but unobserved progress, taking position after position, each looking towards the end, which, if it is not always apparent to the reader, never escapes the eye of the author. At each new step forward, or turn in a new direction to either side, the author, with dexterous, perhaps with unconscious readiness, conceals the fact that a skillful substitution has been effected, or a quiet sophism has been allowed. There never fail, however, abundant examples or apt illustrations. After the discussion is finished and the argument is mastered, it would not be surprising if the unskilled or uninstructed reader should exclaim—

"How charming is divine philosophy!
Not harsh or crabbed as dull fools suppose."

* *On Intelligence*. By H. TAINÉ, D.C.L., Oxon. Translated from the French by T. D. HAYE, and revised, with additions by the author. New York: Holt & Williams. 1871.

It would be a rude shock to such a reader to suggest that the system which his author so skillfully defines is substantially the same with the doctrines of Hume—"A sensation is a strong impression, a recollection is a weaker impression, an imagination is an impression still weaker;" and sensations, recollections, and imaginations are subjective tendencies, that attract or repel one another, according to molecular relations, and so account for all the varieties of psychological phenomena. The large support which these views are supposed to receive from the discoveries of physiology, is readily disposed of to the mind that reflects that a mind with intuitions and beliefs must be pre-supposed, in order that a science of physiology itself may be possible, or that analogies from physics and physiology may be transferred to the processes and combinations of the human spirit. These primary intuitions and beliefs, it would seem, cannot be explained by any molecular theory such as Taine adopts when he declares that: "All that observation detects psychologically in the thinking being are, in addition to sensations, images of different kinds, primitive or consecutive, endued with certain tendencies and modified in their development by the concurrence or antagonism of other simultaneous or contiguous images."

While we reject as unsatisfactory the theory of the Intelligence which is maintained in this volume, we find the volume itself most abundant in its suggestions. The facts and illustrations are various and interesting, and they are set forth with the eloquence and spirit in which the author is surpassed by few living writers. The work is one which all students of psychology will find it necessary to read and desirable to possess.

MANSEL'S *METAPHYSICS** is a reprint, with a few alterations, of the very comprehensive treatise under this title in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, which is familiar to and greatly prized by all students of philosophy. For the general reader it is perhaps the best treatise in the language which aims to give a general outline of the topics and questions embraced under this title. It consists of an introduction, explaining the significance of the appellation and the principal topics which it covers. I. An outline of Psychology, in which the several divisions are briefly but concisely treated. II. Ontology, in which the questions appropriate to metaphysics pro-

* *Metaphysics*; or, the Philosophy of Consciousness Phenomenal and Real. By HUGH LONGUEVILLE MANSEL, B.D. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1871.

per are explained and discussed, the relations of the finite to the infinite are set forth, and the ground of our belief in the several kinds of reality are also explained. For the general reader and the advanced student, the treatise has some important advantages, and it may be recommended as a very convenient book of reference. The Kantian proclivities of the author are not concealed; but they are not offensively obtruded, and do not especially interfere with the usefulness of the volume as a class or reference book.

PROFESSOR BASCOM'S LOWELL LECTURES* treat of the following topics, viz: 1. Mind, the Seat and Source of Knowledge; 2. Primitive Ideas. 3. The Field of Physical Facts. 4. Resemblance not the Sole Connection of Thought. 5. Matter: its Existence and Nature. 6. Consciousness the Field of Mental Facts. 7. Right the Law of Intellectual Life. 8. Liberty. 9. Life: Nature and Origin.—The Mind. 10. Interaction of Physical Forces and Spiritual Forces. 11. Primitive Religious Conceptions. 12. Classification of Knowledge; Form of Development.

These topics will readily be recognized as fundamental to Science, Philosophy, and Religion, and they are all treated by the author with his usual energy and comprehensiveness. Though he has expressed his views in respect to some of them in his *Principles of Psychology*, he has broken new ground in the present volume, so far at least as to discuss these topics in new relations, and from points of view before unoccupied by himself. Upon some questions we should dissent from the views which he propounds; but we commend the volume most warmly as an important contribution to fundamental Philosophy in its two-fold application to Science and Religion.

JOWETT'S TRANSLATION OF PLATO.†—Prof. Jowett's long expected translation of Plato follows not long after Mr. Grote's elaborate and voluminous paraphrase of the Platonic Dialogues, which, with the dissertations appended, fills about as much space as would a full version of the works which are thus minutely analyzed. No English scholar has surpassed Grote in the judicial

* *Science, Philosophy, and Religion.* Lectures delivered before the Lowell Institute, Boston. By JOHN BASCOM, Prof. in Williams College, etc., etc. New York: G. P. Putnam & Sons. 1872.

† *The Dialogues of Plato*, translated into English, with Analyses and Introductions. By B. JOWETT, M.A., Master of Balliol College, Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Oxford. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1871. 4 vols.

fairness with which he weighs evidence and presents a verdict, or in the impartiality of his representation of another's views. Few have equaled him in breadth and exactness of erudition, on all matters pertaining to Greek history and literature. But Mr. Grote was not a Platonist. In the cast of his mind, in his philosophical predilections, he belongs to the opposite school of thought. He was one of the earliest of the distinguished advocates of positivism in England. Hence although Plato finds in him a just and candid, he does not find in him a sympathetic or applauding, critic. Mr. Jowett is more Platonic in his own philosophical convictions. His reputation as a philologist authorizes the presumption that he has correctly rendered his author. It is plain to all that he has translated the original into lucid, forcible, unaffected English. Taylor, the old translator of Plato, was so great an admirer of the ancient philosophy that he made it his religion; but his knowledge of the Greek language was insufficient. The translations in Bohn's Library are unequal, being made by different hands; and some of them are detestable, so far as their English style is concerned. In many cases where they are not incorrect, they are as clumsy as the first attempts of a dull schoolboy upon the classical authors. It is refreshing, therefore, to meet the immortal philosopher in so comely an English dress;—the philosopher who has done more to stimulate the most gifted and spiritual minds than any other uninspired author; who has been the bridge over which so many thinkers, from Augustine to Neander, have passed into the kingdom of God. We observe that Mr. Jowett stands mid-way between Mr. Grote and the skeptical school of German critics, on the point of the genuineness of disputed dialogues. He does not go so far in believing, on the testimony of the ancients, as Grote, nor so far in the opposite direction as Schaar-schmidt.

DR. MARTYN PAINE'S *PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SOUL AND INSTINCT** is the third and greatly enlarged edition of his physiological treatise on the Soul and Instinct (1848). The additions are largely physiological, and bring down to the present time the results of the author's own reading, which seems to have been liberal and pains-

* *Physiology of the Soul and Instinct, as distinguished from Materialism.* With Supplementary Demonstrations of the Divine Communication of the Narratives of Creation and the Flood. By MARTYN PAINE, A.M., M.D., LL.D., etc. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1872.

taking in most of the works accessible in the English language. From these writers he makes abundant and extended quotations, and he subjects their doctrines to a rigid but not unfair criticism. While we agree with the author in most of these criticisms and in the positions which he adopts, we do not sympathize altogether with the decidedly polemical spirit with which he inveighs against the materialistic theories. The volume is, however, very valuable as containing a tolerably complete collection of modern physiological theories on these subjects, with many acute and earnest protests against them. As a book of reference it will claim for itself a place in all libraries.

The "supplementary demonstrations," etc., in the Appendix, are regarded by the author with a fond and fervent interest, which seem to us entirely misplaced. The attempt to account for all the changes in the crust of the earth by a single catastrophe like the Noachian deluge, seems to us so utterly preposterous as to be unworthy of serious criticism. We can only regret that a physiologist of such industry and ability, and a Christian philosopher of such devout purposes, should imagine that he has the knowledge or insight which qualify him to succeed in so hopeless an enterprise.

MR. C. G. DAVID'S *POSITIVIST PRIMER** is dedicated "to the only Supreme Being man can ever know, the Great but imperfect God, Humanity, in whose image all other Gods were made, and for whose service all other Gods exist and to whom all the children of men owe labor, love, and worship." It is a little volume of 141 pages, in a series of fourteen conversations, and exhibits with great clearness and without reserve the principal doctrines of the Positivist Faith, with a conciseness and point which are decidedly refreshing by contrast with the dreary sand-wastes of Comte's expanse of dogmatism and dullness. Those who are not repelled by the bald and inane blasphemy of the dedication may find much instruction in brief compass concerning the practical teachings of this much noised system, of which we are not forced to deny that it contains some instruction, in order to be justified in asserting that some of the noise which it makes is owing to the rattle of dry dogmas in the empty heads of many of its adherents.

* *A Positivist Primer*: Being a Series of Familiar Conversations on the Religion of Humanity. By C. G. DAVID. New York: David, Wesley & Co. 1871.

To read "THE INFINITE AND THE FINITE,"* by the excellent Theophilus Parsons, after attempting to read the Positivist Primer, is to pass from an arid sand-waste to a green and quiet valley by the side of a rippling stream. The style is lucid, the sentiments are elevated, the thought is weighty, and yet falling as quietly, noiselessly as snowflakes. The very slight tincture of Swedenborgian doctrine and the exaggerated estimate of the claims of Swedenborg as a discernor and revealer of spiritual truth, do not greatly detract from the value of the greater portion of the contents of this volume, nor do they weaken our recommendation of it to all those who are attracted by thoughtful and meditative essays on themes of Christian philosophy.

RELIGIOUS AND THEOLOGICAL.

HODGE'S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY† (Vol. II.)—The second volume of Dr. Hodge covers the topics of Anthropology and Soteriology. We have already referred to the learning, perspicuity, and ability of his discussions. In this volume he enters on a field where he has often appeared before as a polemic; but, wisely, as we judge, he abstains from special controversy with Dr. Taylor and his other former antagonists. Dr. Hodge's system is that form of Calvinism which founds the whole doctrine of human sin and condemnation on an alleged covenant of the Creator with Adam, who represents vicariously the human race. It is not the Augustinian conception, but the subsequent Federal theory that was devised in the seventeenth century. Dr. Hodge, in our judgment, fails to represent correctly the historical aspects of this doctrine of original sin. All that he says of Placæus, Rivetus, and "Mediate Imputation," needs revision and essential qualification, in order to conform it to historical fact. What a precarious foundation for Christian theology, for the great doctrines of sin and redemption, to rest upon, is this theory of a covenant! It is not surprising that Dr. Hodge should expend so much time in confuting Darwin, Huxley, and other physicists, when Adam is compelled to bear such a tremendous weight on his shoulders,—a weight compared with which the burden sustained by Atlas is a feather.

* *The Infinite and the Finite.* By THEOPHILUS PARSONS. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1872.

† *Systematic Theology.* By CHARLES HODGE, D.D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Princeton, New Jersey. Vol. II. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1872.

The Augustinian doctrine is free from several unanswerable objections which lie against the nominalistic, representative hypothesis, which is presented in the volume before us. This hypothesis involves the proposition—which no euphemisms can veil—that the sinfulness of all mankind, after the first man, is inflicted upon them as the penalty of an act in which they took no real part. It is something not less inevitable than their existence, something which involves the desert of eternal death, yet something which they had no agency in bringing upon themselves. But we do not design in this place to revive an old controversy. Although we are not able to accept the Federal explication of original sin, as that is propounded in this volume, we can accord with a great portion of its contents. It is a signal merit of the work that it states and considers the various hypotheses which have been proposed for the solution of theological problems. For example, on the Person of Christ, the views of Liebner, Gess, and other recent writers, are subjected to a full examination. It is not necessary to agree in opinion with the author in all points, in order to receive benefit from his elaborate discussions. He is always distinct, always outspoken and sincere.

MANNING'S HALF TRUTHS AND THE TRUTH.*—The title of this volume is itself a sign and proof of the altered spirit of Apologetics. Unmitigated condemnation, unqualified denunciation, gives way to the attempt to find in the adversary some part of truth, some honorable motive, a partial and imperfectly defined conception. The effort is to lift him out of his error, rather than to beat him down. Dr. Manning, who is one of the ministers who find time, in the midst of assiduous parish work, to prosecute philosophical studies, has well carried out the idea suggested by his title. Pantheism and Positivism, the two poles of unbelief, are analyzed and their defects are set forth, in comparison with the full and rounded doctrine of Christianity. The parts of the volume which deal with Spinoza and Mr. Emerson have struck us as being especially valuable; but the whole work is worthy of high commendation.

* *Half Truths and the Truth.* Lectures on the origin and development of prevailing forms of unbelief, considered in relation to the nature and claims of the Christian System. By J. M. MANNING, D.D., Pastor of the Old South Church, Boston. Boston: Lee & Shepard. 1872.

MODERN SCEPTICISM.*—The Christian Evidence Society was established in England, in 1870, for the purpose of meeting, in fair argument, the current scepticism. Both churchmen and non-conformists are active in it. Its methods thus far have been three: lectures addressed to the educated; the formation of classes for the instruction of those in the lower grades of society, to save them from infidelity; the circulation of tracts, and the offer of prizes to those willing that their private study be tested by competitive examination.

This volume contains the first course of lectures, delivered by dignitaries of the Church of England, Oxford professors, and non-conformist clergymen. The subjects were assigned to the lecturers, in order to give unity to the series. The three first are introductory and treat of difficulties in the sphere of Natural Religion; the subjects are: Design in Nature; Pantheism; Positivism. The next two deal with the supposed conflict between science and the Scriptures; the subjects are: Science and Revelation; The Nature and value of the Miraculous Testimony to Christianity. The next five treat directly of the Holy Scriptures; the subjects are: The Gradual Development of Revelation—a title which the lecturer very properly rejects, and treats simply the fact that revelation has been gradual; The Alleged Historical Difficulties of the Old and New Testaments, and the Light thrown on them by Modern Discoveries; Mythical Theories of Christianity; The Evidential Value of St. Paul's Epistles; Christ's Teaching and Influence on the World. The closing lecture is on the Completeness and Adequacy of the Evidences of Christianity.

While a unity is thus attained, the difficulties inherent in the treatment of such subjects, in a series of lectures by different persons, are apparent. The limits of the lecture, and the exigencies of popular address, are adverse to a thorough and scholarly discussion. Some of these lectures lack conciseness and terseness of style and vigor, incisiveness, and suggestiveness of thought. The work as a whole is, however, well adapted to its design to counteract the arguments and expose the errors, sophistries, and hasty generalizations of current scepticism. The most valuable lecture is that of Prof. Rawlinson on the alleged historical difficulties, in which, with great clearness and conciseness, he notes every historical difficulty alleged against the Bible, which he thinks of any

* *Modern Scepticism.* A Course of Lectures delivered at the request of the Christian Evidence Society. New York: A. D. F. Randolph & Co. 1871. pp. 544.

importance, and answers each in the light of the most recent historical criticism and investigation. It would be an excellent tract for general circulation.

THE BREMEN LECTURES.*—These lectures were delivered in Bremen early in 1869, before large assemblies. They are designed as popular vindications of Christianity against existing scepticism. The particular occasion was the bold and undisguised tendency inimical to the fundamental doctrines and facts of Biblical Christianity, represented and propagated by servants of the Church in Bremen. The lectures are as follows: "The Biblical account of the Creation, and Natural Science," by Prof. Zöckler; "Reason, Conscience, and Revelation," by Pastor Cremer; "Miracles," by Pastor Fuchs; "The Person of Jesus Christ," by Prof. Luthardt; "The Resurrection of Christ as a Soteriological Fact," by Rev. Dr. Uhlhorn; "The Scriptural Doctrine of Atonement," by Prof. Gess; "The Authenticity of our Gospels," by Prof. Tischendorf; "The Idea of the Kingdom of God as perfected, and its significance for historical Christianity," by Prof. Lange; "Christianity and Culture," by Pastor Disselhoff.

These lectures evince great ability. Several of them are rich in quickening and suggestive thought, and all of them are valuable. Prof. Lange, however, presents his thoughts so abstractly and in so difficult a style, that his lecture could hardly pass for a "popular lecture" on this side of the Atlantic. The other lectures are easy to be read. The translator has been successful for the most part in giving easy and perspicuous English.

THE DUKE OF SOMERSET'S CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY AND MODERN SCEPTICISM† does not conclusively show that he is not an able statesman, and in regard to many subjects a well informed man; but it conclusively proves that he is not well informed in respect either to Christian Theology or Modern Scepticism, or else that he wrote this book at odd hours very early after dinner. No man will be much the wiser for reading this book, in respect to the topics of which it professes to treat, and no wise man will be greatly in-

* *The Bremen Lectures*, on fundamental, living, religious questions. By various eminent European divines. Translated from the original German by Rev. D. HEAGLE. With an Introduction by Prof. ALVAN HOVEY, D.D. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1871. pp. 308.

† *Christian Theology and Modern Scepticism*. By the DUKE OF SOMERSET, K. G. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1872.

fluenced by it. The man whom it brings to a more decided unbelief will have already brought to the reading of it a sufficient share of unbelief and credulity to show that he is beyond the reach of sound or earnest criticism and argument. There is nothing about the book that gives it any significance except that it purports to have been written by a duke.

THE VATICAN COUNCIL.*—MR. BACON has done much more than republish in English the noted speech of Archbishop Kenrick, in the Vatican Council, against the infallibility dogma. He has connected with it other valuable documents which explain the preparations, doings, and consequences of the Council, and he has added acute and valuable remarks of his own; so that this little volume comprises an interesting and faithful description of one of the important events of the day. Although Father Gratry, who wrote so earnestly and even vehemently against the obnoxious dogma before it was proclaimed, and on the heterodoxy of Pope Honorius, has given in his adhesion, Hyacinthe, the eloquent preacher, remains firm, and so does Döllinger, the principal Catholic theologian of Germany. Hefele, now a bishop, the author of the learned History of Councils, had committed himself to the theory that the concurrence of Pope and Council assures infallibility, and, with many others who had taken the same position, has acquiesced in the new definition. Döllinger denies the validity of the declaration of the Council, on the ground that the rights of the minority were violated, and that where a considerable minority exists, the proposition for a dogmatic decree must be dropped. Unanimity, or substantial unanimity, is requisite for a doctrinal definition. Döllinger describes impressively the enormous implications of the dogma of infallibility. It makes the Pope the keeper of the consciences of all men. The unrepealed assertions of Innocent III and Boniface VIII, on the subjection of rulers to priests and to the Pope, their head, are clothed with an authority which on any convenient occasion may be practically affirmed. We may observe that Archbishop Kenrick's speech contains honorable concessions to historical truth and to the demands of a just and candid criticism. For example, he gives up the usual Roman Catholic interpretation of the passage in Irenæus relative to the preëminence of the Roman Church.

* *An Inside View of the Vatican Council*, in the speech of the most Reverend Archbishop Kenrick, of St. Louis. Edited by LEONARD WOOLSEY BACON, with notes and additional documents. American Tract Soc. 1872.

LANGE'S LIFE OF THE LORD JESUS CHRIST.*—The Philadelphia publishers have done a good service in giving to the public the entire English edition of this work in a more portable compass and at little more than half the price. It is, in fact, an English book, bearing an American publisher's imprint.

Lange's Life of Christ is one of the most complete and elaborate that has been written. It is composed after the true German method of dealing with every related question. Before reaching the life, two hundred and fifty pages are devoted to discussions of the Fundamental Ideas of the Gospel History, the more General Records of the Life of the Lord Jesus, the Historic Records, Criticism of the Testimonies, the Authenticity of the Four Gospels, the Origin of the Four Gospels, the Relation of the Four Gospels to the Gospel History, and other topics, including the Relations of Time and Place among which Christ appeared, and the Scene of his Life, the Promised Land. Everything proceeds on this long-and-broad scale. Scarcely a related topic of history, interpretation, theology, or criticism, passes unnoticed. In particular, the author endeavors fully and fairly to refute the negative criticism of Germany, in the phases it had assumed at the time of writing, and to establish the truth and consistency of the gospel history.

Though some years have elapsed since the composition of this work, the main forms of assault were nearly as well defined then as now; and nothing has appeared which would supersede or substantially invalidate its discussions. Strauss has indeed changed his base. Some additional efforts have been made to impeach the authenticity of the gospels; counter-balanced, however, by additional defences and means of defence. The criticism of the text has made some progress, but still lacks settlement. These and some other kindred facts do not detract from the value of this as a learned, able, and elaborate treatise on a great theme. If it lacks sprightliness, it avoids the danger of sacrificing a fact to an epigram or a rhetorical flourish. It makes upon the reader the steady impression of a fair-minded writer, fully discerning the strength of his position, and maintaining it by honest methods. The style is for the most part heavy—after the German type—though occasionally, as in the narrative of the anointing and the scenes following the

* *The Life of the Lord Jesus Christ*: a complete examination of the origin, contents, and connection of the gospels. By J. P. LANGE, D.D. Translated and edited, with notes, by REV. MARCUS DODS, A.M. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 4 vols. 8vo, pp. 544, 504, 512, 502.

resurrection, rising into life and vigor. The discussions would bear compression and sharpness of statement; but they are full and thoughtful. They introduce the English reader to a mode of viewing many of the topics to which he is unaccustomed, and to which, though the writer is thoroughly reverent in manner and evangelical in spirit, he will sometimes fail to give assent. Lange's conception of the "fulfillment" of an Old Testament quotation, though in advance of that which Barnes and others drew from Kuinoel and Tittmann, is looser than that of Ellicott or Lee. His theory of miracles will seem, perhaps, the most defective portion of the work,—an undue desire to attribute to Christ's humanity what properly belongs to his Divinity. Thus, the reference of his walking on the water to "his pure vital courage in the water connected with the vital feeling of his organism which is the crown of all other organisms"; and the still more startling explanation of the miracle at Cana, according to which "the drink they quaff *in this state of mind*, being blessed to them by the presence of Christ, is *to their taste* the choicest wine." Even the raising of the dead receives a quasi-explanation of the process. These things indicate too distinctly the atmosphere around him.

On the other hand, there are many unusual interpretations which it is well for us to contemplate. Thus among the theories concerning the mode of the Temptation, not the least ingenious is found here: that the Tempter, Satan, approached him by the agency of the deputation sent by the hierarchy to John (John i, 28, 29), whose return from the Jordan coincided with Christ's return from the wilderness; that these men, being put on the track of the Messiah by John, make their way to his presence in all the eagerness of Messianic expectations, urge him to begin by transforming the wilderness and the world into a scene of creature comfort by his magic power, instead of that transformation of the world which lay within the scope of his ministry; to cast himself down from the pinnacle of the temple, in the sense of entrusting himself and his cause to the priesthood, as the embodiment of their false notions of the Messiah, and so ride on to victory; and finally to lend himself to a grand hierarchical plan for the conquest of the world. We do not mention this to commend or to condemn, but to show the thoughtful character of the book. There are many points to which we would gladly call attention, or on which we might offer criticism, were it within the compass of this notice. The work is comprehensive, learned, and important,—a valuable addition to the student's Biblical apparatus.

PRESENSÉ'S LIFE OF CHRIST.*—M. de Pressensé has eliminated from his able and learned "Life of Jesus," one of the best of the modern works on this subject, all the scientific and purely controversial matter, and has thus made a brief, clear, interesting biography of the Saviour, in a form adapted to the generality of non-theological readers.

THE TRAINING OF THE TWELVE.†—The idea of this work, which is fairly described in the title, we do not remember to have seen elsewhere made the subject of a separate treatise, while it has the suggestive interest that merits so full a treatment. From the materials furnished in the Gospels, the writer would show how the Saviour dealt with his chosen attendants, during his brief ministry, so as to fit them for the service they were to render after his departure. And this design he has executed most judiciously and pleasantly. There are thirty one chapters in the course, from the "Beginnings," when some of the apostles were called, to the "Waiting," where they all expected the "power from on high." The chapters are really lectures suitable for delivery in respect to length, occupying no more time than should be given at once either to a sermon or to devotional and instructive reading, and being prepared from the author's addresses to his own congregation. The Scriptures in view are expounded with care in the light of recent criticism, and thoughtfully and candidly applied for the purpose in hand. The writer thinks for himself without affecting originality, and treats of familiar passages so as to give them fresh significance and interest, avoiding pedantry and excess of subtlety, showing moreover a devout spirit, and proposing practical benefit. Hence the book may be cordially recommended both to ministers and laymen. The style is clear and pleasing. We notice the Scotticism "thereanent" (p. 444), and what we ascribe to the same provincial use, the word "take" for draught or haul of fishes (p. 15), and also a supposed Americanism, "their midst" (p. 342).

* *Jesus Christ; his Life and Work.* By E. DE PRESENSÉ, D.D. Translated by Annie Harwood. New York: Carlton & Lanahan. 1871.

† *The Training of the Twelve, or Passages out of the Gospels, exhibiting the Twelve Disciples of Jesus under discipline for the Apostleship.* By the Rev. ALEXANDER BALMAIN BRUCE, Broughty Ferry. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George street. 1871. 12mo, pp. 548. C. Scribner & Co., New York.

PARK STREET PULPIT.*—Some little time since a favorable notice was given in this Review of Mr. Murray's "Music Hall Sermons"; we are glad to receive a second volume from the same source, and recognize in it the same characteristics, with a decided improvement in tone and a modification of some outstanding faults. There is more of the practical element shown in this second series of discourses than in the first. The hand is steadier, the aim is clearer, the style is more simple and direct. The preacher has gone fairly to work in his field, and smaller things engage his attention less. The eloquence is less young-mannish, less irregular and wild, while the real vigor remains. There are fewer "purple-patches" and more passages of sustained power. In the sermons on "Divine Justice" and "The Judicial Element in Human Nature and Practice," no fault can be found with the earnest seriousness with which such a truth is treated, while there is much independence and originality in the method of discussion; and it is to Mr. Murray's credit, that with every temptation to swerve from the old moorings, and to shoot off into the side-currents of more attractive doctrine, he keeps steadily to the old truth, however humbling to human nature and painful to a corrupted nature. There is too, no doubt, where Mr. Murray places the central truth, the all-impelling principle of his Christianity, to him who reads the last sermon in the book entitled "Love the Source of Obedience."

"Now, when Christ, the greatest and wisest of all teachers, came, He understood this. He knew the use of passion, for it was His own child. He created man with it. He knew, too, its potency; for when man was begotten, He supplied it to him in due measure and force. When He began to teach, He claimed His child. He did not go to the conscience, and say, 'convict;' He did not go to the reverential faculty, and say, 'adore;' He did not go to the reason, and say, 'argue, speculate.' No: he did not go to these weaker, these outlying, these marginal forces: He went straight and at once to the great central force in nature,—to that engine-like power in man, which has power not merely to propel itself, but to start all the long train of faculties that are behind it, and dependent upon it, into motion. He went directly to this, I say, and said, 'Love.' In all His teachings He never forgot this. It runs through all His words and acts, clinging to them, and making

* *Park Street Pulpit*: Sermons preached by WILLIAM H. H. MURRAY. Boston: James R. Osgood and Company. 1871.

itself prominent, as a minor chord in music makes itself heard amid the rush of contending sounds by its clear quietness, and, when the crash of the chorus has ceased, still clings to the atmosphere, as if unwilling to leave it; and you feel that that clear, quiet strain has dominated by its very sweetness over all the other parts" (p. 360).

We notice the same bold imagery and word-painting that are noticeable in the other works of this young preacher coming up out of the wilderness to preach repentance to the city. He lives in close intimacy with nature. He has been soaked by her rains and browned by her suns. He has evidently seen a hurricane—a seventy-five-mile-wind-storm—that tears up the roots and rocks. He is used to broad horizons, not limited to patches of blue seen between brick walls only large enough to make a pair of Dutchman's breeches. There is a fresh tone in his illustrations that have not the least musty atmosphere of books about them. But sometimes his prose runs into poetry, not of idea but style—a bad fault—as when he talks about "the white terror of underlying cliffs."

His style is, as a general rule, chaste, simple, moderate, and sometimes very compact in its precision of statement where it would be least anticipated, in points of doctrinal theology, as, for example, in the following sentence in the sermon on the "Relation of Sanctification to the Will." "Abstractly considered, God, in his sovereignty, is absolute. There is no bound, no limitation to it. But, relatively considered, it is otherwise. God, as regards man, limits his sovereignty. He withholds it from its ultimate expression. He puts bounds to its exercise. As it relates to man, I say, there is a sphere in which it works, and there is a point beyond which it does not go. He does not work *irresistibly* in us: for, were it so, none could 'resist' him; which we know is possible. He does not carry his efficiency so far as to mar our authorship in our own acts; else would there be no virtue in our own obedience and no guilt in our transgression. When it is said, therefore, that 'God worketh in us both to will and to do of his own good pleasure,' it is meant that he gives us that strength, works in us those abilities, requisite to our willing and working. He pushes His 'working' so far as *prepare* us and *assist* us to will and to work. The fact fully stated, as I conceive, is this—that we can do nothing without God, and He will do nothing without us. We need His help; and He will do nothing without the concurrence of

our endeavors. He does not will for us; He does not act for us; we will and act for ourselves" (p. 123).

There is a racy use of old Saxon bordering on the homely, perhaps coarse, but in his strongest invective he does not grow bitter, sarcastic, unloving. He gives the opposer and the old Pharisee, with his sour visage and long robes, a headlong fall, that must make their bones ache, but he helps them up again with all kindness and puts salve on their wounds, not forgetting human brotherhood, not forgetting that even the mean man, and the vile man, has a soul that Christ loves, and that he should love. Mr. Murray believes in preaching, and seems to be filled with the spirit and power of the truth he preaches.

To compare him as a preacher with Henry Ward Beecher, as is sometimes done, is getting on rather too fast, and is slightly significant of Bostonian self-consciousness of impossible inferiority in any thing; but that, somewhat in the same line of preaching as Mr. Beecher's, though without awakening suspicion of imitation, the young orator of "Park Street Pulpit" is manifesting a remarkable degree of popular power and genuine eloquence, cannot be denied. We wish him all success, and an increasing influence and sway in a community whose ear he seems to have caught, and where his loyalty to Biblical truth, and his positive faith, cannot but be greatly serviceable.

Carelessness sometimes in the use of inelegant words and phrases is a fault of Mr. Murray's style. Such expressions as "directly he was convicted," p. 109; "capable to advise," p. 113; "off of him," p. 117; "Adam was ejected Eden," p. 169; "vast a remove," p. 170; "all hail to Christianity, who came," p. 149; and the use of such common colloquialisms as "well," "I say," and of words like "betterment," "contestant," "professor," in the sense of a Church-member, these are inexcusable faults because so easily remedied.

We would commend for beauty of style and thought the two sermons on "Death a Gain," and the last of them for its exquisite conclusion; while, at the same time, these two sermons contain some of the most pronounced illustrations of an ambitious style of poetic and over-brilliant prose writing.

THE BIBLE A MIRACLE.*—This volume handles two general topics, the supernatural origin of the Bible as indicated by its unapproachable excellence, and the infidel doctrine of the incredi-

* *The Bible a Miracle; or the Word of God its own witness*: by DAVID MARDILL. Philadelphia: Wm. S. Rentine.

bility of miracles, which is met by the proposition that the Bible itself is a production which can be explained only on the hypothesis of a miracle, or a miraculous origin. There are five parts or divisions in the book, viz: the literary excellence of the Bible, the theological excellence of the Bible, the moral excellence of the Bible, the political excellence of the Bible, and the modes of accounting for the origin of the Bible. Neither in the arrangement of the work, nor in its propositions and arguments, has the author slavishly followed previous writers on these old themes; but he has evinced a more than common originality in his treatment of them, both in the positive part of his discussion and in his negative confutation of skeptical and infidel positions. There is a sincerity throughout, as if the author were writing from a full conviction of the truth of his statements. There is, also, a commendable vigor in the style, which in some other respects may be occasionally open to criticism. We meet in his pages, now and then, an instance of overstatement; but, on the whole, his work is a meritorious and useful one, and is adapted to the times.

A RATIONALE OF THE CHURCH'S LITURGIC WORSHIP.*—An elegant little volume, the first thirty pages (after the preface) filled with a sermon from 1 Cor. 14: 15, and the rest with notes in smaller type. The design is to foster reverent esteem for the Book of Common Prayer now used in the Protestant Episcopal Church, and guard against radical, factious, or hasty changes. A more Saxon title might have comported better with the subject. The sermon is considerate and in good temper, on the origin and nature of public Christian worship, as springing from the emotions and the understanding, traced to the instincts of humanity and social life, and shaped and directed by revealed truth. We agree with the writer when he insists on the importance of Christian doctrine in true and acceptable worship, and also on such worship as being the highest form of the doctrine. He makes much account also of the historic and organic quality of the forms of worship, holding that a true liturgy grows instead of being manufactured at once, and alleging the failures of various attempts to supplant received forms. There is a truth here, but it holds not of prescribed or written forms exclusively. All forms of worship

* *A Rationale of the Church's Liturgic Worship.* By the Rev. WILLIAM RUDDER, D.D., Rector of St. Stephen's Church, Philadelphia. Philadelphia; J. B. Lipincott & Co. 1871. 12mo, pp. 65.

recoil from sudden reckless innovations. In a Presbyterian congregation in Scotland, the English liturgy can no more be planted to-day and take root and thrive, than the usages of the Scotch Kirk in an Episcopal congregation in England. The writer admits that the most ancient liturgies (as he calls the forms used in the first ages) were not "any of them committed to writing" "until the end of the second century" (p. 26). It does not appear how far they were fixed forms. Still less can they be traced, as he assumes, to apostolic authorship. Of course the author commends warmly the liturgy used in his communion; but holding as he does that it may be properly changed from time to time (under "authority"), he and others of his brethren would make their testimony worth more if they would openly acknowledge some of its imperfections and do what in them lies for its amendment.

To read DR. BARTOL'S *RADICAL PROBLEMS* * is like walking beneath an arcade of rainbows, or gazing on sky and earth when clad in the many colored lights which flash from a brilliant display of the weird Aurora. The eye is first stimulated and delighted. It passes alternately from rainbow or Aurora to the objects to which either lends its reflected coloring. Exclamations of wonder and surprise break from the lips of admiring lookers on—one calling to the other, "Lo here or Lo there! Wonderful, brilliant, beautifully entrancing." But the eye is soon wearied by the excess of brilliancy, and the mind is confused and sated with the varied disturbing and stimulating colors. Here and there a familiar object stands forth in unwonted relief as a stray beam of pure white light falls out upon it from the magic spectrum. Not unfrequently an object that is homely and offensive is gilded and glorified with its aureole of many colors. Perhaps a splendid tree, a lofty precipice, a varied meadow, or a shorn lawn, is transfigured with celestial beauty. But the lights, though glorious and glorifying, are still unnatural, and the eye turns away from the scene, sated with the splendid vision, even before it is withdrawn from the gaze. Such is this brilliant volume when soberly estimated by the critic, who would be tolerant and sympathising even for moonshine, when its effects are glorious. It casts a splendid and impressive light upon many truths that are overlooked for their familiar triteness and their constant applications. Theism is worthily and impressively contrasted with Pantheism, the

* *Radical Problems*. By C. A. BARTOL. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1872.

spiritual capacities of our higher nature and its exhaustless resources, are made to stand forth in impressive relief and to glow with ethereal splendor, under the touch of this enchanter's wand. Other truths, none the less important, are wholly overlooked or strangely denied, under the bewildering brilliancy of his rainbow lights, such as the fact of sin, with the weakness and needs and degradation and hopelessness which sin involves. It is an easy thing to spirit the foul fiend out of notice and apparently out of existence by a holiday paper for a holiday session of the Radical Club, over which this nimble prestidigitator presides; but it is not so easy to deny its existence in the world of facts, or to drive it out from actual reality. We would not fail to recognize the ringing earnestness with which he attests many of the most important moral truths, nor the sharp and penetrating strokes which he deals at many of the superficial sophisms which many of his associates accept; but with all his moral energy and spiritual penetration, he seems to us to fail to do justice to the dimensions and the corruption of sin and the extremity of man's consequent need.

The foul and fetid swamp becomes an object of special brilliancy under the rainbow that spans it with its glowing arch; but the beauty of the rainbow can neither suck out nor transmute its miasms of death. Other truths, manifold and persistent, our imaginative and quickwitted illuminator thinks to dispose of by a brilliant analogy, or by the cool steadiness with which he declares that they are outgrown. The truthful narratives of the Evangelists, the development of Christian theology, the historic faith and love of believing souls, as circumspect, as sagacious, as wide-minded, as learned, and as critical as the score of accomplished dilettanti, who call themselves Radicals, are problems too real and serene to be disposed of for the present or coming generations by the decisive word of such a writer as Dr. Bartol, who, with all his genius, lays himself open to the charge of a certain flippancy of thought, which the splendor of his imagination can neither disguise nor excuse. The rainbow lights may by their brilliancy seem to wrap in illusion the solid earth; but when the rainbow lights are withdrawn the solid earth asserts its claims to faith and a potent reality. The Christian history, the Christian doctrine, and the Christian life will survive the splendid funeral eulogiums which are so often pronounced over their imagined demise by the author of *Radical Problems* and his associates.

LOUIS FIGUIER'S SPECULATIONS UPON DEATH,* and the condition into which it introduces man, purports to be founded upon the facts of science and the analogies which these facts suggest. The science is none of the soundest, and the analogies are most of them as fanciful as could easily be devised. A man must be at a loss for attractive or instructive reading who can find much amusement or instruction from a book like this.

THESE FOR THOSE.†—This work is designed to show the benefits to our people resulting from foreign missions. These benefits are grouped under six topics, viz., our indebtedness to foreign missions as a race; as a nation; as a government; as profitable pecuniarily; as aids to science and literature; as churches and Christians. The reactionary influence of foreign missions has been often alluded to, but this is the first attempt, so far as we know, to present the subject comprehensively and systematically. The treatment of each topic is mainly by the presentation of facts. These are gathered from a wide range of study of missionary enterprises and their results, are numerous and valuable, and many of them very striking. In illustrating the benefits of missions to us as a nation, the author narrates the action of Dr. Whitman of the Oregon Mission in securing that territory to this nation and Protestantism; and the facts cited prove that his action was decisive in the case. This work of Dr. Warren is one of great value, and must do excellent service for missions in convincing the doubtful and awakening the interest of the indifferent.

FRESH LEAVES IN THE BOOK AND ITS STORY.‡—The design and character of this book are properly set forth in the preface, where it is said to be "intended to convey information in a clear and simple way, which in these days every Bible reader should possess, and to lead to further search of the Holy Scriptures for

* *The To-morrow of Death*; or, the Future Life according to Science. By LOUIS FIGUIER, author of "Primitive Man," "Earth and Sea," etc. Translated from the French by S. R. CROCKER. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1872.

† *These for Those*. Our indebtedness to Foreign Missions; or, what we get for what we give. By WILLIAM WARREN. Hoyt, Fogg, & Breed, Portland, Maine. 16mo, pp. 417.

‡ *Fresh Leaves in the Book and its Story*. By L. N. R., Author of "The Book and its Story," "Missing Link," "Life Work," &c., with more than fifty illustrations. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1871. 12mo, pp. 500.

spiritual profit." It is meant for private reading in connection with the Scriptures, and for Sunday schools and Bible classes. The plan is to give, briefly yet clearly, such information about the different periods of sacred history, and the several books that compose the Bible, as will make the reading more intelligent and profitable, including maps and pictures of objects of historical and antiquarian interest relating to the Old Testament, to which seven-tenths of the volume are devoted. For example, the first chapter has twenty pages on "the Times before our Bible;" the second nineteen on "the Times before our Bible was written," or between the Flood and the call of Abraham; the third twenty, on "the Life of Abraham." The nineteenth chapter has twenty pages on "the Times between the Old and New Testaments." The illustrations stimulate the reader's interest in the places and events concerned. An index of eight leaves is appended. The author is not indicated except by initials, nor have we known the earlier books named as from the same hand, so as to judge by that means of his or her qualifications; but we have examined enough of the work to see that proper sources of information are consulted, and pains are taken to make it a valuable help to the understanding of the Scriptures in their connection. The style is clear and the spirit is devout.

THE PERSON OF CHRIST.*—Nearly half of this work is occupied with an exposition of the testimony of the writers of the New Testament, and of Jesus himself, in respect to his person. By this exposition of the New Testament Christology, the author claims to contribute incidentally to establish the propositions, that the Christ of the Synoptic gospels and of John presuppose each other; that the Christ of the fourth gospel and of the Apocalypse are in perfect harmony; and that the Christology of Paul's epistles presents an organic whole; and thus to settle all critical questions respecting the New Testament.

In the remainder of the work the author presents and vindicates his views respecting the relation of the Son to the Father, and of the Spirit to both, and the nature of Christ's humiliation and glorification. He advocates the doctrine of eternal generation as

* *The Scripture Doctrine of the Person of Christ.* Freely translated from the German of W. F. GESS, with many additions. By J. A. REUBELT, D.D., Professor in Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1870. 12mo. pp. 466.

"the eternal flow of the divine life from the Father into the Son."
"The Holy Ghost proceeds both from the Father and the Son, not only as to his coming from heaven into our hearts, but also as to the origin of his own life."

He teaches that "the eternal Logos underwent a change in his incarnation, divesting himself of his divine form of existence and of his divine attributes." "He laid aside his eternal divine self-consciousness, in order to awake one really human. This involved the suspension of omnipotence and eternal holiness. . . . With omniscience, the omnipotent government of the universe and omnipresence were laid aside." Jesus, therefore, began his earthly life without the knowledge that he was the Son of God. This he gradually acquired by his study of the Old Testament and meditating thereon; by the indwelling of the Father's fullness in him; and by occasional flashes of remembrance from his ante-mundane state. After his ascension, the Son of God receives or resumes his divine glory, retaining, however, his real humanity. The flow of the divine life from the Father, which had been interrupted by the humiliation of the Son, is resumed after the ascension. "As the glorified Son remains man, a man is thus received into the trinitarian life of the Deity, from and by the glorification of the Son."

The method adopted by the translator is censurable. He has translated and published the work to communicate his own views rather than the author's. He avows that he has sometimes modified the text; where he does not agree with the author, he substitutes his own views in the text, and refers to the author's in a note.

HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

CURTIS' HISTORY OF GREECE. Vol. II.*—The volume of this excellent work which we have now before us will probably be regarded by the generality of readers as the most interesting and attractive of the series. Its predecessor was mainly occupied with descriptions of Grecian lands, and with attempts to trace amid the haze of a remote antiquity the early movements and settlements of Grecian tribes. The leading subject of the present

* *The History of Greece.* By Professor Dr. ERNST CURTIUS. Translated by ADOLPHUS WILLIAM WARD, M.A., Fellow of St. Peter's College, Cambridge, Professor of History in Owens College, Manchester. Revised after the last German edition by W. A. Packard, Ph.D., Professor of Latin in the College of New Jersey. Vol. II. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1871. 12mo, pp. 675.

volume is that momentous hundred years' struggle with the Persian power, which not only rescued Hellenic freedom and culture from the overwhelming flood of barbarian conquest, but stimulated both to the fullest and most rapid development. The two volumes to come will be full of interest, but that interest will be mixed with much that is sombre and saddening; for the first will show how the best promise of political unity and strength for Greece was blasted by the complete overthrow of the Athenian power in the Peloponnesian war; and the second will show how the energies of the single states were exhausted in protracted conflicts with each other, till they became unable to resist the forces of a petty kingdom, wielded by an able and ambitious prince. Even in this volume the reader is continually and painfully impressed with the dangers and evils of the Greek political system: he is made to see how nearly the Greek cause was ruined, notwithstanding the courage and patriotism of its defenders, by the separate interests of the little states, their mutual suspicions, jealousies, and enmities,—how certainly it would have been ruined, but for the amazing fatuity with which the war was conducted on the Persian side. The American student of history may well rejoice that the secessionist theory, which maintained the separate independence of our states, and allowed only loose confederations subject to the continual danger of disruption, did not prevail in the trial by arms. He may justly feel that no sacrifices could be too great which were required to avert from our country the disastrous consequences of such a system.

The volume opens with a chapter on the causes and influences which kept up among the Hellenes, in spite of their political subdivision, a certain sense of national unity. Foremost among these he places the Delphic Amphictyony, with its oracle of Apollo on Mount Parnassus. Delphi, he holds, was the real centre and bond of union for the Hellenic races, the focus not of their religion only, but also of their civilization and their nationality. But the Delphic priesthood, by its selfishness and venality, had, even before the Persian wars, forfeited the respect of the Greeks, and lost the salutary influence which it formerly exercised.

The second chapter describes the conflicts of the Asiatic Greeks with the Lydian kings; their brief subjection to the power of Croesus; the sudden destruction of this power, which, though hostile to Greek independence, was a barrier against the far more dangerous onset of the Persians; the quickly following subjugation

tion of the coast cities by Harpagus; the restlessness of these cities under their new masters; and finally the disastrous revolt of the Ionians, with the barbarous destruction of their chief town Miletus. In the next chapter we see the flood of Asiatic invasion sweeping against Greece itself. Beaten back at Marathon, it returns with added force in the swarming hosts of Xerxes. Checked at Thermopylae and Artemisium, signally defeated at Salamis, it is at last utterly and irretrievably broken on the decisive field of Plataeæ. The narrative of these events given by Curtius is in a high degree distinct, rapid, and glowing. It does justice to the good qualities of the Persian invaders. The common impression, that the armies of Darius and Xerxes were composed of weaklings and cowards, finds no countenance here. The Persian soldiers fought with spirit and courage, and nothing but the enormous mistakes of their leaders—mistakes of every kind, military, political, religious—could have prevented their triumph. We say "religious;" for, as the author shows, one of the greatest blunders on the Persian side was that desecration of Greek temples, which was prompted by the fanaticism of the Magi, priests of the Zoroastrian faith, and which roused the religious feeling of the Greeks to the support of their often dormant patriotism.

The two chapters which remain are occupied with the history of Greece—which for this period is mainly the history of Athens—during the half century which separated the battle of Plataeæ from the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war. The first traces the external history, describing the advance of Athens to a dominant position as head of a consolidated naval and maritime empire. This advance Curtius treats, not as the product of Athenian ambition and selfishness, but rather as a natural outgrowth of the existing circumstances, especially the necessity of a common defence against the Persians, together with the matchless energy and self-sacrifice which the Athenians had shown during the invasions of Greece. The closing chapter shows us the internal history of the same period. The portrait of Pericles, its guiding and organizing genius, is drawn with almost unqualified admiration: the condemning judgment of Plato, founded on Quixotic ideas of the state and statesmanship, but repeated by modern writers under the influence of anti-democratic prejudice, finds no echo here. The relations of Athens with her subject allies, her system of finance, her colonial policy, her commerce and manufactures, and the like, are presented briefly, but with great sharp-

ness and clearness. Still more masterly, perhaps, are the sketches of the intellectual life of Athens, the progress of history, philosophy, astronomy, of oratory and poetry, of tragedy and comedy, of painting, sculpture, and architecture. The fine taste of the author, his love of art, his liberal spirit, his ready sympathy, his long familiarity with the monuments of ancient genius,—all fit him in a preëminent degree for this part of his work as a historian.

KILLEN'S HISTORY OF THE OLD CATHOLIC CHURCH.*—Dr. Killen has published before a history of the first three centuries. Hence, on the ante-Nicene period, he is brief, in the present volume; giving results rather than the arguments and evidence by which they are reached. On the remaining portion of the first seven centuries after the apostolic age, he is more full. His learning is respectable and his style perspicuous. The portion relating to British Church history, especially in relation to Saint Patrick and the old British Christianity, prior to the Saxon victories, is of interest and value. There is manifested in this work something of that ungenial tone which is frequently exhibited in books which are written from the stand-point of Scottish Calvinism. Pelagius is not only an errorist, but a "heresiarch"; the old British Christians might have settled their disputes about Easter, by giving up that observance as a remnant of Judaism, etc. The metaphysical talent outstrips the historical, generally, in the Scottish mind, although Scotland has furnished a number of notable historical writers.

MELINE'S MARY QUEEN OF SCOTS.†—The "some remarks on Mr. Froude's History," which are promised on the title page of this book, are a rancorous attack upon that work. The effect of the criticisms, which on some points are well-founded, for Froude is not a very trustworthy historian, is almost lost by the virulent partisan tone in which they are expressed, and by the fragmentary, disjointed way in which the discussion is carried for-

* *The Old Catholic Church, or the History, Doctrine, Worship, and Polity of the Christians*, traced from the apostolic age to the establishment of the Pope as a temporal sovereign. By W. D. KILLEN, D.D. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1871. New York: Scribner, Welford, & Armstrong.

† *Mary, Queen of Scots, and her latest English Historian*. A narrative of the principal events in the life of Mary Stuart, with some remarks on Mr. Froude's History of England. By JAMES F. MELINE. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1872.

ward. It would not be intelligible unless one were previously familiar with the subject; on p. 25, Mr. Meline quotes Froude as saying of Mary: She "was brought up amidst the political iniquities of the court of Catharine de Medici." On this Mr. Meline founds a diatribe upon Froude's ignorance of continental history, since Catharine only vegetated at the court of Henry II, and had no real power or influence until after the death of Mary's husband. To be sure; but three pages later, Mr. Meline quotes again from Froude: "Catharine, who in the reign of Francis had seen the honor of the throne given to the Queen of Scots and the power of the throne to the Duke of Guise and his brothers, had wrongs of her own to avenge." This proves that Froude *does* know the position which Catharine held. Mr. Meline himself calls this statement "very nearly correct." What becomes, then, of the previous declamation about Froude's *ignorance*? The fact is, the court of Henry II. was steeped in corruption, and was a school of duplicity, however subordinate Catharine's position and influence may have been; so that Froude's first statement is in its spirit and intent true. *Ex uno disce omnes*. Mr. Meline is carried away by a partisan partiality for his heroine. Whether Mary was privy to the murder of Darnley or not, she was infatuated with a passion for Bothwell, as everybody who has studied the evidence ought to know. Her behaviour was such toward the principal agent in the murder as to confirm and almost to authorize the suspicions and accusations against her. If the "casket letters" are genuine, she was a guilty accomplice. Their genuineness has been accepted by Hume, Makintosh, Robertson, Laing, Burton, and (substantially) by Ranke, not to speak of other historical critics of the highest ability and impartiality. But we cannot enter into this vexed question, farther than to say that Mr. Meline has contributed little, if anything, to the solution of it.

BELLES LETTRES.

THE DIVINE TRAGEDY.*—The name of this poem could hardly be justified by any other than its subject, the ministry, miracles, and sufferings of our Lord. It is a series of dramatic scenes, besides the "Introitus" and "Epilogue," distributed under the three heads of the First, Second, and Third Passovers. We cannot

* *The Divine Tragedy*. By HENRY WADESWORTH LONGFELLOW. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1871. 12mo, pp. 160.

but reckon it creditable to the literature of our day that the "old, old story," should now appear under this form, and from a poet so accomplished and in such deserved favor with the English-speaking world as Mr. Longfellow. It is creditable to his judgment also, and will meet with the approval of all devout readers, that he closely follows the phraseology of the narratives and discourses in the Gospels, instead of attempting to recast them anew, taking no liberties but that of adjusting them, with his marvelous rhythmical dexterity, to the forms of his verse. With these materials, which occupy most of the pages, he has introduced two or three incidents and descriptions (so as not to confound them with the authentic portions), in which, as in the opening and closing passages, we recognize his wonted charm of imagery and diction. His lyre, whatever may be the theme, is never out of tune. If only from the restraints he has properly imposed on himself in the treatment of so sacred a subject, the poem, as such, cannot be expected to add to his reputation, nor can any attractions of verse transcend or equal the charm of the Biblical narratives; yet the story of the cross is here told over again reverently and tunelessly to thousands of readers, and the poet's name and gifts will be the more hallowed by the altar on which he has laid this offering. The reader will notice the device, on the title page and the cover, of the Greek cross and the four Latin titles.

THE LAST TOURNAMENT.*—The delicacy and grace of imagery, and weird charm of versification, which have fixed Tennyson's place in the first rank of living poets, will be at once recognized in this as in his other Idyls. The prerogative of his class, to work with unpromising and even repugnant materials, is shown even the more plainly here in view of the story, which ill deserves the pains bestowed, and will be read for his sake, not its own. We are free to say of his productions generally, and certainly of this, that the permanence of their interest will suffer from the occasional obscurity of the narrative, and that his melody sometimes attracts as by a musical spell, when the reader neither understands nor so much as cares to understand the meaning, as for example, in the knight's song on p. 46, beginning, "Ay, ay, O ay—the winds that bend the brier!"

* *The Last Tournament.* By ALFRED TENNYSON, Post Laureate. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 12 mo., pp. 48. 1872.

SHAW'S SPECIMENS OF ENGLISH LITERATURE.*—This copious and various selection was carefully made to accompany Shaw's History of English Literature; and is arranged to correspond to it in the reading. It extends from the earliest to the latest period of English literature. The aim in view was twofold; first, to illustrate the style of each writer; and secondly, to furnish a choice selection of passages suitable to be read in schools or committed to memory. The second of these is an important object, and is judiciously accomplished, thereby greatly increasing the value of the volume for the first-mentioned purpose.

MISCELLANEOUS.

NEW AMERICAN EDITION OF NEANDER'S CHURCH HISTORY.†—Dr. Torrey did a great service to the cause of religion and learning when he submitted to the labor of rendering Neander's difficult German into English, and of presenting in a correct and readable translation the best history of the Church that has ever been written. The present edition contains important changes, as compared with the editions that have preceded it, since it embodies Neander's latest alterations and additions. These belong chiefly to the second volume. The entire translation, however, has been revised and improved. Ullman's Preface, a just tribute to the merits of Neander, is fitly prefixed to the present edition. Of the excellence of Neander as a man and a historian, there is no occasion that we should speak. Other writers have excelled him in the description of external phenomena, the outward movement and pageantry of the historic drama. Gieseler has equalled him in accuracy of investigation, and in researches upon special topics has no rival. But when we consider all the qualities of a historian of the Church, which were united in Neander,—depth of learning, penetration of character, sympathy with everything that partakes of the Christian spirit, profound, unassuming, unobtrusive piety,

* *Choice Specimens of English Literature*; selected from the chief English writers, and arranged by T. B. SHAW, M.A., and WM. SMITH, LL.D. Adapted to the use of American students by B. N. MARTIN, D.D., LL.D. New York: Sheldon & Co. Pp. 478, 12mo.

† *General History of the Christian Religion and Church*. From the German of Dr. AUGUSTUS NEANDER. Translated according to the latest edition, by JOSEPH TORREY, Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy in the Univ. of Vermont. Eleventh American Edition, Revised, Corrected, and Enlarged. Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1872.

we must place him at the very head of all those who have undertaken to describe the course of Christ's kingdom on earth. The study of Neander's History is not only a means of acquiring a vast fund of knowledge; it is not less a constant discipline in the exercise of catholic, Christian judgment upon men and things, and a most fructifying source of religious improvement. His Life of Jesus, his History of the Planting and Training of the Church, and his History of the Church, are a series of works which enable one to obtain a better acquaintance with the origin, diffusion, true character, and genius of the Christian religion than can be derived from any other quarter. No one can study these works in a candid spirit without becoming a better and wiser man.

KING'S MOUNTAINEERING IN THE SIERRA NEVADA.†—Mr. King carries into his style the vigorous and animated spirit which has made him so adventurous and successful an explorer in the mountainous regions of Western America. The opening chapter of his book is a vivid description of the Sierra Nevada range as it presented itself to his eyes and to those of his companion, Mr. Gardner, who is so honorably associated with Mr. King in expeditions of scientific discovery. The reader cannot but participate in the enjoyment which is drawn from these arduous and often hazardous journeys by gentlemen who, as in the present instance, combine an untiring zeal in scientific research with a keen appreciation of the beautiful and sublime aspects of nature. The chapters on the ascent and descent of Mt. Tyndall are admirable illustrations of the author's varied merits both as an explorer and a writer. It is an honor to American science that such a volume can be truthfully written,—such a record of courageous labors in behalf of scientific knowledge. Expeditions such as are described in this book, and such as Professors Brewer and Marsh have prosecuted with so much energy and with so valuable fruits to science, are among the strongest indications of the ardor that characterizes the young men in this country, who are devoted to the natural and physical sciences.

SCHLE DE VERE'S AMERICANISMS.*—It is said that Smollett, when he undertook his translation of Don Quixote, had but a

* *Mountaineering in the Sierra Nevada.* By CLARENCE KING. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1872.

† *Americanisms*; the English of the New World. By M. SCHLE DE VERE, LL.D., Professor of Modern Languages in the University of Virginia, author of "Studies in English," etc. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1872. 12mo, pp. 685.

scanty acquaintance with the Spanish language; but was not afraid to assume the task, because he could rely for his author's meaning on the careful and faithful version of Jarvis, while he hoped to give his own work a literary ease and brilliancy which were wanting to that of his predecessor. It is perhaps not uncharitable to suppose that Professor Schele De Vere entered on the preparation of this book with a similar reliance on Mr. John R. Bartlett's well-known Dictionary of Americanisms. In that excellent work he had a copious stock of material, which he could draw upon at pleasure, arrange according to his fancy (see the headings of his chapters—the Indian—Immigrants from abroad—the Great West—the Church—Politics—Trade of all Kinds—Afloat—On the Rail—Natural History—Old Friends with New Faces—Cant and Slang—New Words and Nicknames)—and make attractive to the reader by a series of light, easy, amusing remarks and disquisitions. That in doing this he has shown no small amount of literary power, and has said many interesting things in a lively and piquant way, will be apparent to every one who dips into the book. As plainly, we fear, will the observant reader see the marks of that mingled incoherence and inexactness which we were obliged to speak of in our notice four years ago of his "Studies in English." Numerous inaccuracies have been pointed out in it by unsparing critics; and though it would not be difficult, it is perhaps hardly necessary, that we should bring our contributions to the catalogue. His want of capacity for historic criticism is evinced in the undoubting confidence with which he speaks of "that paragon of romantic [qu., romancing?] adventurers, John Smith," whom he qualifies as "unmatched in fame by knights of Arthur's Table Round;" he ought to have added that they are pretty equally matched in the credibility of their adventures. A more glaring instance of the same defect is his reproduction of Dr. Samuel Peters' exploded fiction of the Connecticut Blue Laws. He refers, indeed, to a clearly written exposure of their baselessness; but holds on to them, nevertheless,—*first*, because they are quoted by the author of *Sam Slick*, and—*second*, because "the identical provisions may be found in the *Abstract of the Laws of New England*," printed in London, in 1685. This work was not an abstract of existing laws, but a scheme or project of a code for the colony of *Massachusetts Bay*. With Connecticut it had nothing to do; in Massachusetts it was not adopted without material changes: while of the forty-five blue

laws given by Peters, it hardly contains more than a half dozen in all, and none of those which are commonly cited as characteristic specimens of blue legislation. A writer who can appeal to such evidence as conclusive may still be a quick observer and a lively reporter of linguistic oddities; but he has not the sound judgment and the logical power which are essential to success in linguistic studies.

LIDDELL & SCOTT'S GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON.*—Few books so good have been made so much better as the *Lexicon* of Liddell and Scott. Twenty-five years ago it was an excellent compend of Passow's great work. Its compilers, however, have steadily extended their personal researches, incorporating the labors of other lexicographers like Rost and Palm, of grammarians like Veitch, and of philologists like Curtius, till even in the fourth edition they were entitled to drop the name of Passow from their title-page, and in the sixth edition may still more fittingly place there their names alone.

The improvements extend in every direction: in the range of authors examined, a vast army; the exhaustive array of grammatical forms; the more careful etymologies; the later and wider exhibition of philological relations; and the considerable and often great simplification and yet expansion of the definitions. This last improvement is the one most valuable to the mass of students. It shows itself, first, in the greater care to give the fundamental meaning; secondly, in the more copious exhibition of the various applications; and thirdly, the better subordination of those various significations to certain broader classes, and of those to the primary meaning. One or two examples will illustrate as well as many. Under the word *λαλέω* we find twice the amount of matter that was in the early editions. The general definition, to "talk, chat, babble, prattle," conveys a truer notion of the general force of the word than the former, "talk, chatter, babble;" while two additional meanings are given, viz: "to talk of," and "in later writers just like *λέγω*, to speak,"—the last a very important addition. The word *ἔχω* after an elaborate statement of its various forms, is treated in three broad classes of significations (instead of two formerly): A, the radical meaning, "to have or

* *A Greek-English Lexicon*. Compiled by H. G. LIDDELL, D.D., and ROBERT SCOTT, D.D. Sixth Edition, revised and augmented. Oxford, 1871. Sold by Ginn Brothers, Boston and Chicago. Pp. 1865.

hold;" B, "to hold oneself;" C, "to hold oneself fast, cling closely." The class A is divided into 3 divisions, with 12, 11, and 2 subdivisions, respectively; B into 4 divisions, with 3, 3, 4, 3 subdivisions; and C into 5 divisions and 10 subdivisions. Numerous examples, with exact references, support the various cases. These instances show the elaborateness of the present edition. To claim ideal perfection for it, even now, would be going further than its authors go. Sometimes one raises the question of a still greater simplification by further classification and combination; although the ideal perfection might be a practical inconvenience to ordinary students. We are also occasionally reminded that the system of development might be still more rigidly adhered to. Thus in *λαλέω*, already referred to, the second main division gives "the proper sense, *to chatter*, sometimes opposed to articulate speech." But this, if correct, as probably it is, should be given as the radical and first meaning, afterwards extended and expanded. There are occasional instances of this kind, showing the vastness and minuteness of labor requisite in making a great lexicon, to carry out perfectly its own fundamental principles.

All things considered, this sixth edition is a noble monument of learning and labor. It contains in the most condensed form almost everything that even the advanced student could ask in a lexicon of the Greek language in the present state of Greek philology. This is high but merited commendation. Whatever errors the work may contain, it also furnishes the means of correcting, in its abundant quotations and exact references.

PROF. HENRY N. DAY'S LOGICAL PRAXIS * is an attractive volume of 148 pages, and has been carefully condensed by him for use in the class-room. The author has had the advantage of previously publishing two volumes on the subject, one abridged from Hamilton and another carefully thought out by himself. His well known acuteness of mind, extensive reading, and patient labor warrant us in recommending this volume to the careful consideration of teachers. We regret not to have found time to examine it in detail.

* *Logical Praxis*; comprising a summary of the principles of Logical Science and copious exercises for practical application. By HENRY N. DAY, author of *Elements of Logic, Rhetoric, Rhetoric Praxis, Aesthetics*, etc. New Haven, Conn., Charles C. Chatfield & Co. 1872.

· PROF. H. N. DAY'S SCIENCE OF *ÆSTHETICS*.*—In this work Prof. Day applies the philosophical views which he has so carefully elaborated in his previous works on logic and rhetoric to the arts in general. Correct ideas with regard to "the philosophy of form"—so necessary in "the art of constructing discourse"—are equally necessary in architecture, in painting, in sculpture, in musical composition. The line of discussion which he follows leads him to consider the "nature of beauty"—"the kinds of beauty"—"the laws of beauty"—and "the relations of beauty." The book is illustrated with fine steel engravings, among which are the Madonna di San Sisto—the Cathedral at Cologne—and the Laocœon.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on The Book of Leviticus, with a New Translation. By James G. Murphy, LL. D., T. C. D., Prof. of Hebrew, Belfast; Author of Commentaries on Genesis and Exodus. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1872. 8vo, pp. 318.

The Scripture Doctrine in Reference to The Seat of Sin in the Regenerate Man. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 16mo, pp. 125.

Lectures On Satan. By Rev. Thaddeus McRae, Pastor of Pres. Church, McVeytown, Pa. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1871. 16mo, pp. 173.

The Jewish Temple, and The Christian Church. A series of discourses on the Epistle to the Hebrews. By R. W. Dale, M. A. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1871. 12mo, pp. 314.

The Christian Marriage Ceremony. Its History, Significance, and Curiosities. By J. Foote Bingham, D. D. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1871. 12mo, pp. 322.

A Critical Greek and English Concordance of The New Testament. Prepared by Chas. F. Hudson, under the direction of Horace L. Hastings, editor of "The Christian." Revised and completed by Ezra Abbot, LL. D., Assistant Librarian of Harvard University. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1871. 12mo, pp. 502.

The Footsteps of Christ. Translated from the German of A. Caspers, Church Provost and Chief Pastor at Husum, By Adelaide E. Rodham. Edited with a preface by Rev. Chas. H. H. Wright, M. A. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1871. 12mo, pp. 434.

God With Us; or the Person and Work of Christ. With an examination of "The Vicarious Sacrifice" of Dr. Bushnell. By Alvah Hovey, D. D., Pres. of Newton Theol. Institution. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1872. 12mo, pp. 275.

Critical History and Defence of the Old Testament Canon. By Moses Stuart, Prof. of Sacred Literature in the Theol. Sem., Andover, Mass. Revised edition. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1872. 12mo, pp. 422.

Legends of the Patriarchs and Prophets, and other Old Testament Characters from various sources. By the Rev. S. Baring-Gould, M. A. New York: Holt & Williams. 1872. 12mo, pp. 366.

Christ in Modern Life. Sermons preached in St. James's Chapel, York St., St. James Square, London. By the Rev. Stopford A. Brooke, M. A., Honorary

* *The Science of Æsthetics; or, The nature, kinds, laws, and uses of Beauty.* By HENRY N. DAY, author of *Logic, Art of Discourse, English Literature, &c.* New Haven: C. C. Chatfield & Co., 1872. 12 mo, pp. 434.

Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1872. 12mo pp. 408.

Bible Music. Being Variations in Many Keys on Musical Themes from Scripture. By Francis Jacox, B. A. Boston: Roberts Bros. 1872. 12mo, pp. 330.

A Treatise on Early Confirmation and Communion. Addressed and dedicated to Parents. By the Rev. S. M. Haskins, D. D., Rector of St. Mark's Church, Brooklyn. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1872. 16mo, pp. 48.

Prophetic Imperialism; or the Prophetic Entail of Imperial Power. By Joseph L. Lord of the Boston Bar. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1871. 16mo. pp. 96.

The Character of Christ. Does it supply an adequate basis for a religion? By T. W. Fowle. New York: Published by Hurd & Houghton. 1872. 12mo, pp. 29.

Light on the Pathway of Holiness. By Rev. L. D. McCabe, D. D. New York: Carlton & Lanahan. 1871. 16mo, pp. 114.

The Power of the Church. A Quarter Centennial Discourse. By Burdett Hart. Delivered Oct. 1st, 1871, on the 25th Anniversary of his Ordination as Pastor of the First Congregational Church in (Fair Haven) New Haven. 1871. 8vo, pp. 20.

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ARTICLE I.—THE PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY OF TURKEY.

IN the following notes on the physical geography of the Turkish Empire, we shall have main reference to Asia Minor, and shall not attempt more than to present a sketch of that geography as it now appears to the eye of a traveler. We shall call attention to some of the prominent features of the country, leaving the reader to seek for scientific details in the valuable works that have been prepared by eminent travelers in ancient and modern times.

In looking at a map of Turkey, one of the first things to attract our attention is the fact that the territory of the Turkish Empire lies directly in the highway that joins the western to the eastern world. It is practically impossible to reach India by a direct route from Europe without crossing that territory. The deserts of Africa on the south, and the cold climate and high mountains of Russia on the north, force travelers to the east across the soil of Turkey. This fact alone gives to all Turkish geographical questions an interest which, otherwise, it would not be possible for them to have.

In the "cipher" which is stamped upon the coinage and all the public documents of the Empire, the Sultan is called the "*Lord of two Seas.*" The reference, of course, is to the Black and the Mediterranean seas. There was a time when this title was more exactly correct than it is now, when the northern shores of the Black sea and the southern shores of the Mediterranean were under the absolute authority of the Turkish Empire. Even now, however, no one ruler can lay so good a claim to that title as the Sovereign of Turkey. If we apply the title to the Empire itself, nothing can be more true or more appropriate. A glance at an ordinary map of Europe shows how large a part of Turkish territory lies between these great inland oceans. This fact must be steadily kept in mind in treating of the physical geography of Turkey. The salubrious climate, the rich pasture lands, the noble forests, the multitudes of fountains and streams in many parts of the country, are due in great measure, if not entirely, to the presence of these large bodies of water. Even the elevated regions of Armenia and Kurdistan are undoubtedly affected by the sea breezes that strike their lofty mountains; those breezes are transformed into copious showers or frozen into snow, in either case falling in great abundance to enrich the earth. Some of the best natural pasture lands in the world are in that region, made so, to a great extent, by the cause we have mentioned.

But these are not the only seas that wash the shores and affect the climate and vegetation of Turkey. The sea of Marmora, the Archipelago, the Adriatic gulf, the Red sea, and the Persian gulf, all contribute their share of influence. Few countries in the world have so much and such a varied sea-coast line as the Turkish Empire. The coast of European Turkey for two hundred miles is washed by the Adriatic gulf, for one hundred miles by the Ionian, for six hundred miles by the Ægean, and for four hundred miles by the Black sea, making a total sea-coast line of thirteen hundred miles in European Turkey alone. The sea-coast line of Asiatic Turkey has not been so accurately measured, but it cannot be less than three thousand miles. Without including the African provinces of Turkey, the Red sea, and the Persian gulf, the Turkish Empire has a sea-coast line of nearly four thousand five hundred miles. This simple

fact, in its relations to the commerce of the world, is one of special significance. Even now these inland waters are traversed by an immense number of steamers and by thousands of sailing vessels. When these are supplemented on land by complete systems of railways, what can prevent a great development of the resources of the country?

The amount of territory included within these seas is doubtless larger than is generally supposed. The extent of Asiatic Turkey, in its greatest length from north-west to south-east, is over thirteen hundred miles, while the extent from east to west, in a direct line, is about one thousand miles. The area of Asiatic Turkey is over 490,000 square miles; if we add 194,000 square miles comprised by Turkish Arabia, we have as the entire area of Asiatic Turkey 684,000 square miles. European Turkey is six hundred and eighty miles in length, five hundred and forty at its greatest breadth, and has an area of over 200,000 square miles. The entire area, therefore, of the Turkish Empire is nearly 900,000 square miles. In round numbers, that of France before the late war was 205,000 square miles; that of Austria 257,000; of Spain and Portugal 219,000; that of Italy 120,000. Turkey, therefore, has a larger area than the united kingdoms of France, Austria, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. This area is about as large as one third of the entire area of the United States, and somewhat larger than that of all the States that lie east of the Mississippi river.

This territory embraces almost every variety of soil and climate to be found in the world; the surface of the country is as varied as it can be made by hills, mountains, plains, rivers, forests, deserts, and cultivated fields. When we leave the coasts, and advance into the interior, the natural scenery of the country everywhere fixes the attention of the traveler. Let us first notice the mountains.

The mountains of Asia Minor are worthy of special study; in ancient times they formed the natural and impregnable fortifications of the country, and in our day they present the most serious obstacles to the construction of a general system of Turkish railroads.

We may say in general that the lofty ranges that skirt the southern shores of the Black and the northern shores of the

Mediterranean seas, form the basis and hold up, as it were, the great elevated plateau of the interior of the country. At the northeastern corner of that plateau are a range of mountains that now go by the name of *Bin Geol Dagħ*, or Mountains of the Thousand Lakes; these mountains are south and south-west of the city of Erzroom, and form the highest part of Asiatic Turkey. The name seems very inappropriate when we consider that there are no lakes at all in that part of Turkey; the number of springs and fountains however is very great, and possibly the mountains have taken their names from these. These mountains and the elevated region about them are the source of some of the largest rivers in Turkey. They are not far from the center of ancient Armenia; they are not distinguished so much for height above the surrounding region as for forming the summit or crown of the ascending ranges of Asia Minor. From whatever direction Armenia is approached, whether from the Red, the Black, the Caspian, or the Mediterranean sea; whether we follow up the Euphrates, the *Aras* (Araxes), the *Jihan* (Pyramus), the *Kizil Irmak* (Halys), or the *Yeshil Irmak* (Iris), the traveler finds himself at last on the Bin Geol mountains.* There is something about the appearance of nature in this region of Turkey, it may be the purity of the atmosphere and the elasticity of the air, that gives a traveler the impression that he has really reached the top of that part of the world, and that it is impossible to go higher. There are not many lofty peaks, yet these are not altogether wanting. Snow is found throughout the year by the roads or paths by which caravans cross the mountains; it remains in large quantities on the summits, where the foot of man has never trod.

* Since the above was written, we have met a confirmation of this opinion in a work by Major James Rennel (London, 1831), on the "Comparative Geography of Western Asia." He says, vol. i, p. 351: "It would appear that the tract which contains the sources of the Western Euphrates, the Aras, the Iria, and Eastern Halys, is altogether the highest part of this region, since it separates the eastern and western waters, the whole way across from Cilicia to Moschica." Is the last mentioned name the same as the modern Moosh? And is not "*Moschica*" the same as "*Mesheck*" of Gen. x, 2? i. e., did not *Mesheck* give the name to the region *Moschica*, and is not this name preserved in the name *Moosh*? The objection to this supposition is that *Moosh* is too far south; yet the resemblance between the names is so striking that we cannot help observing it.

Tens of thousands of sheep and goats are pastured in the valleys and high plains about these mountains; in the summer months the flocks are driven from a more southern climate, and early in the fall they start on the return journey. The grass that grows in the nooks and valleys of the mountains has a special attraction for these flocks, while the salubrious climate secures their health. The pure, cold water of the mountain springs is not among the least attractions of this interesting region. The general impression made upon the mind by these mountains is that of desolation; the utter absence of forest trees, the rough, bleak appearance of the mountains, the perfect silence that everywhere reigns, the fact that you may ride days without seeing a human being, except an occasional muleteer or a wandering shepherd, all these things combine to produce the feeling that you are alone with nature as she came from her Creator's hand.

The Bin Geol mountains are really but a continuation of the Taurus range. That range begins a little north of the gulf of Atalia; after running nearly parallel with the coast of the Mediterranean sea until opposite its eastern end, the Taurus mountains gradually turn toward the north, until they join the mountains of Armenia Major. The Turkish name of the Taurus mountains is *Bin Bougha Daglar*, literally the "Thousand-bull mountains," or mountains of a thousand bulls. Thus it appears that the Turks have given them the same name that they have always had in other languages. The Turkish name is even more expressive than the English, and raises the enquiry whether there is not something in the mountains themselves that suggests this name. It is a fact that one of the distinguishing characteristics of this range of mountains is a constant succession of distinct peaks and mountains that are separated from all others. One cannot ride among them without remarking their resemblance to bold and dangerous animals. Sometimes six or eight of these lofty mountains are found so near each other that, from one, all can be plainly seen. In one instance we counted twenty separate peaks. When among them, it does not require a very strong imagination to make them seem like a group of wild bulls, standing ready to toss their enemies or each other into the heavens. One mountain stands alone, of a shape to

suggest a crouching lion, ready to spring on his prey; another lifts his snowy head, like an old patriarch, far above his fellows; another rises with a perpendicular face hundreds of feet, like a solid wall, as if it had been built with line and plummet by giants of past ages.

These remarks are confirmed by the fact that each one of these mountains has its own name, and some of the names are evidently given because of a fancied resemblance to animals. One of the most prominent between Albustan and Marash is called *Koch Dag*, or Ram mountain; another is *Sakali-tantan Dag*, or Beard-holder mountain; another is *Geoksun Dag*, or Breast mountain; several mountains in one group are called *Yédi Karndash*, or "The seven brothers;" other names are *Atlas Dag*, *Beirut Dag*, *Bulgar Dag*, *Ala Dag*, *Kozan Dag*, *Ak Dag*, *Akhé Dag*, *Engerek Dag*, *Daz Dag*, *Shar Dag*. So far as known, the principal iron mines of the Taurus mountains are in Beirut Dag, directly north of Marash.

The impression made by the Taurus mountains on the mind of a traveler is very different from that made by the mountains of ancient Armenia and Kurdistan. There, as we have remarked, the feeling is one of desolation; in the Taurus it is one of awe. The most unlettered man cannot travel in that region without stopping to gaze in silence at the evidence there presented of the Creator's power. "What hath God wrought?" is the language of all men as they wind around and among these mountains. Of course there are mountains in the world of greater height than these, for the highest peaks are only about ten thousand feet above the sea; it is their boldness that arrests attention. In this respect there is probably very little mountain scenery in the world that makes a deeper or more lasting impression.

The modern Turkish name of the ancient Amanus range is *Giaour Dag*, or Infidel mountains. The origin of the name is uncertain, but it seems probable that the Turks gave the range this name from the fact that the Christian populations of those mountains were very stubborn in resisting the Turkish arms. In fact, the *Giaour Dag*, the *Kozan Dag*, and the region about *Zeitoun*, were never subdued by the Turks until about the year 1864. This fact is due partly to the inefficiency of the Turks,

partly to the bold, determined character of the inhabitants, but mainly to the physical structure of the country; the rough mountains have formed natural fortifications, and rendered the approach of hostile troops very difficult.

The Giaour Dagh range is really a continuation of the great Lebanon range of Syria; this range strikes the Taurus range at nearly a right angle, a little southwest of Marash; at the point of juncture the Taurus range is running east and west, and the Giaour Dagh range almost directly north and south. The Giaour Dagh mountains extend from the Taurus south to and somewhat beyond the Beilan pass, a distance of about one hundred miles. In appearance these mountains differ greatly from the Taurus mountains; instead of isolated mountains of great size and height, we find a succession of thickly wooded hills; the oak, pine, spruce, hemlock, sycamore, and cedar, are found in abundance upon them. The rounded tops of the mountains, covered as they are with trees and a thick undergrowth of shrubbery, present to the eye of the traveler an ever changing and most beautiful panorama. There are two main passes across these mountains, one at Beilan, near Alexandretta, the other the old Amanus pass, at the N.E. corner of the Adana plain. It is worthy of note that the inhabitants of these mountains have had, from the earliest times, the same rough, lawless character that they have now. When Cicero was Governor of Cilicia, about 50 B. C., he was compelled to march in force against the rebels of *Giaour Dagh* (Amanus); in his contests with them he displayed no small amount of military talent. Even in the most prosperous days of the Roman empire these rebels were kept in subjection only with great difficulty. At present they are so thoroughly subdued that a traveler can go unarmed anywhere in the mountains with perfect safety. The complete subjugation of these mountaineers is one evidence of the reviving power of the Turkish government.

The Giaour Dagh mountains are but little cultivated; detached villages are poor and squalid; the people submit with reluctance to the restraints of regular authority, and long for the freedom they once enjoyed under their independent chiefs. They are guilty of one act of barbarism, from which they should be compelled to desist by the Turkish government, that

of destroying the forests that cover the mountains adjoining their places of residence. Knowing nothing of the value of forests as related to the climatology of a country, and caring nothing for the future, they persist in burning over large sections of the mountains, for the purpose of sowing wheat amid the ashes on the new soil; for a year or two these fields produce good crops, but in a short time they become useless as arable lands, while the valuable trees have been utterly destroyed. We have seen thousands of acres of mountain forests thus wasted. The method of destruction is as follows: the brush and smaller trees are cut down and all the branches are cut from the large trees; these branches and small trees cover the ground sometimes to the height of three or four feet; after drying one or two months, they are set on fire and burn with the greatest fury; of course every tree and every green thing is destroyed. The tall, burnt trunks of the oaks and pines that are left standing, are a sad proof of the ignorance of the people and of the inefficiency of the Turkish government. This species of vandalism, for it is nothing less, is found especially in the Giaour Dagh mountains, but it exists also in the Taurus and in other parts of Turkey.

There is no other mountain range in Asiatic Turkey that deserves especial notice, except perhaps the Olympian range, in the western part of Asia Minor. The mountains of that section of the country, however, are not so much a regular "range" as an irregular collection of hills on the southern side of the sea of Marmora; these hills culminate in Mount Olympus. European travelers have often visited this mountain, as it is easily reached from Constantinople. It has been described so frequently that details in regard to it are within the reach of all travelers. Those who go to Constantinople, and who wish to obtain an extended and beautiful view of that part of Asia Minor, should make the ascent of Olympus. The entire trip can be made from Constantinople in four days.

One other single mountain deserves mention, Mount Argæus, near Cesarea. This is the highest mountain in Asia Minor, being thirteen thousand feet in height above the level of the sea; it is reported to be sixty miles in circumference at its base, and to contain an area of three hundred square miles. It is

isolated except on the southeastern side, where it is connected with a spur of the Taurus chain; the highest point of the mountain is inaccessible; the lowest snow-line is eleven thousand seven hundred feet in height. The regions about Smyrna and in the southwestern portion of Asia Minor are very mountainous, but the mountains are not known by any general name, and are not especially remarkable.

The common impression in regard to Asia Minor is that mountains and rough hills occupy the greater part of the earth's surface. Although we cannot give the exact proportions, we are confident that this impression is not correct. The mountains are numerous, almost always in sight, and add immensely to the natural beauty of the scenery. They form, however, the borders of great terraces, and enclose immense plains that are not unlike the prairies of the Mississippi valley. Even in the heart of Armenia these plains are found, especially along the upper waters of both the eastern and western branches of the Euphrates and in the vicinity of Lake Van.

There are several peculiarities about the plains of Turkey that deserve notice; one is their extent. The traveler is surprised to find himself on plains that it takes him days to cross. Some of them, however, are only wide, extended valleys. The plain between Marash and Antioch is of this sort; it is about one hundred and twenty miles in length, and, until within twenty-five miles of Antioch, not more than five or six miles wide. As it approaches Antioch, it spreads out into a broad tract of country of great extent. This plain appears to be but an extension of the valley of the Jordan up between Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon, down the valley of the Orontes to the neighborhood of Antioch, and thence running N.N.E. in almost a direct line until it reaches the base of the Taurus mountains at Akhîr Dagh, at the very foot of which Marash is situated.

Other plains lie along the courses of the large rivers. Such is that of Mooshi, on the eastern branch of the Euphrates; this plain we have crossed in both directions; it is about eighty miles long and twenty miles wide; the soil is a rich, black loam and capable of producing most abundant crops.

Other plains are the high plateaus that lie between the mountain ranges; of this sort are those of Konia (Iconium), Angora, Cesarea, Sivas (Sebaste), Erzroom, Kharpoot, and Van. The plain of Pasin, stretching far to the N.E. of Erzroom, is similar; so also is the great plain of Adana, though in this case there is but a slight elevation above the sea; there are mountains on the north, east, and west of the Adana plain, and the Mediterranean on the south. These plains vary in length from fifty to two hundred miles, and in breadth from twenty-five to fifty miles; this is a general estimate, made from observations on passing over them.

There is still another kind of plains in Turkey, whose area is probably greater than that of any other particular kind. These are the plains that lie on the border of the Arabian desert and in the northern parts of Mesopotamia. The plain about Aleppo is of this sort; it embraces the whole country for hundreds of miles in almost all directions; such also is the plain of Diarbekir (Amida) on the Tigris and that of Mardin on the borders of the desert.

When the traveler has struck out for two or three days into one of these immense plains, and sometimes, owing to the undulations of the surface of the ground, loses sight of the mountains, he feels his own insignificance; the impression is much the same as that produced by the ocean in a calm; the eye stretches on and on and on, and there is still the same boundless waste.

Another peculiarity of the plains in Turkey is that they are generally very level till they reach the adjoining mountains; this peculiarity has often attracted our attention; it is mentioned also by Mr. Wm. Martin Leake, who traveled extensively in Asia Minor in the year 1800. He says: "One characteristic of the Asiatic plains is the exactness of the level, and the peculiarity of their extending, without any previous slope, to the foot of the mountains, which rise from them like lofty islands out of the surface of the ocean." A beautiful illustration of this remark is the small plain of Boondook, which lies between Marash and Hadjin. It is only about ten miles in diameter, and is surrounded by high mountains that rise, on every side,

almost like walls; the plain is as level as a house floor and it is difficult to find a stone of any sort or size on its surface.

Another peculiarity of the plains in Turkey is their natural fertility. The soil is deep, generally dark and rich. Even with the poor cultivation which they now receive, and although a rotation of crops is almost unknown, and the common American practice of seeding down fields to clover and grass is unheard of, yet the land is so good that abundant harvests are gathered from it from year to year. In the summer of 1871 we had occasion to pass over the great plain of Adana; we are confident that no prairie in Illinois could present a better display of wheat than we there saw. The entire plain seemed to be sown to wheat, which stood about even with the backs of our horses and as thick as it could possibly grow. As there are no fences in Turkey, the fields are not separated one from another; as far almost as the eye could reach the whole plain seemed one immense wheat-field. It is a question for agricultural chemists to consider, why does not the soil of these plains become entirely exhausted? The same process of ploughing, sowing, and reaping, that we now see, has been going on for ages. True, in many cases, owing to the sparseness of the population, the whole plain is not under cultivation; but wherever there is cultivation, even in the slovenly style of the East and without the use of manures, the result is as above stated. The plain at the head of the gulf of Nicomedia, called the Adabazar plain, and the plain of Kharpoot, are also examples of the great fertility of Turkish plains; they are mentioned here only because we have happened to see them just before harvest, when their fields were dropping "fatness."

The population on many of these plains is too small to work them properly. Millions of acres of as good land as can be found in the world are lying waste to-day in Turkey simply for want of cultivators. Where there is proximity to the sea, as in the case of the Adana plain, the greater part of the land is cultivated; but in Armenia and Mesopotamia probably not one half is used. Even if the inhabitants succeed in raising large amounts of grain, what can they do with it? There are no railroads and no other facilities for carrying it to market; the result is that it often happens that wheat is very low in one

part of the country. What would the best wheat be worth in Wisconsin if it had to be carried to New York on the backs of horses? The consequence of this want of cultivation is a wasted, desolate appearance, which is not relieved by the few squalid villages that are scattered here and there over the plains. These villages are made of mud; there are no windows in the houses; the people sleep on the ground in one corner of the house or on a platform raised a few inches above the ground, while the remainder of the house is given up to the use of their flocks and herds. In Armenia and Kurdistan the villages are often nearly under ground, somewhat like the villages of the prairie dogs in the far West, though the houses are on a large scale, and not so much above the surface of the earth. A new civilization will make the plains of Turkey what they were in ancient times, the grain-producing region for all the countries bordering on the Mediterranean sea, and even for other and more distant lands.

In passing over these plains the attention of the traveler is everywhere arrested by a great number of artificial mounds or tumuli; they vary in size and shape, but are generally from about seventy-five to one hundred feet high, and cover from two to three acres of ground. Some are much larger; others are smaller. That they are artificial appears from their smooth, rounded shape, and from the fact that they differ entirely from the surface of the earth in the regions immediately adjoining them. We have noticed that in all cases they are located by or near a spring of living water; generally they are from three to five or six miles apart. From an elevated position we have sometimes counted fifteen or twenty of them in view at once. They are found on all the plains in Turkey, but are especially numerous in Armenia, in Mesopotamia, in the region of Antioch and Aleppo, and on the great plains of European Turkey. When, how, and for what purpose were they made? There has been no little speculation on the subject, but as yet no satisfactory answer has been given; the present population can give no information in regard to them; they have a tradition that, in ancient times, these mounds were "*kalés*" or fortifications, erected near towns and villages, and that what we now see is all that remains of the ruins of such places. One author sug-

gests that they were built by the ancients for signaling by bonfires. This is disproved by the fact that often they stand on the edge of a plain, near high hills, that would form much better signal stations, and were ready for use without any labor or expense. This is the case with several that are seen from the roads that connect Adana with Aintab, and Antioch with Killis. They seem at least to furnish some evidence that, in former times, these plains supported a far greater population than they do now. That such was the case is abundantly proved also from other sources. It seems strange that these tumuli have not been thoroughly examined by laying them open; so far as we can ascertain, no such examinations have been made, except on the sites of some of the famous cities of antiquity.

In these days, when the nations of the earth are being knit together by lines of railways, one of the first thoughts of a traveler on passing through Turkey is, "What a grand bed these plains would make for railroads, and how easy it would be to construct such roads across them!" Thousands of miles of railway might be laid down in Turkey with no more expense for grading than has to be incurred on the prairies of the far West. True, these plains are crossed and hemmed in by ranges of mountains, but the engineering difficulties that will be met in Turkey, as regards railroads, are small as compared with those that have already been surmounted in other parts of the world. The time cannot be far distant when these natural facilities for the construction of railroads in Turkey will be seized by the government and by European capital and turned to good account.

The rivers of Asia Minor, although not to be compared with the great rivers of the world, are worthy of more attention than they have received in modern times. The most important of them take their rise in the eastern part of the great plateau already mentioned; the four largest are the Kizzil Ismak (Halys), the Arax (Araxes), the Tigris, and the Euphrates. These rivers flow in four different directions, and all cut their way through high mountain ranges to the sea. Their currents are very rapid, and in the spring of the year, when the snows on the mountains are melting, the waters rush over their rocky

beds with irresistible fury. Nothing can better illustrate the low state of scientific investigation in the country than the fact that almost nothing is really known in regard to its rivers; their sources, length, breadth, the possibility of navigating them, the water power which they furnish—all these and all similar questions are virtually still unanswered by the scientific men of Turkey. We cannot learn that any reliable efforts have been made for many years to ascertain the simplest facts in regard to these rivers. With the progress of education and civilization, of course they will be carefully explored, and many interesting scientific facts will be brought to light. For example, take the source of the Jihan (Pyramus); perhaps no modern traveler has visited it, yet the natural phenomena there presented are very singular and interesting. The source of the stream is a little lakelet by the side of a limestone rock, about two miles N.E. of the town of Albustan; at first sight this lakelet presents nothing remarkable in appearance. On a closer examination, you find that the ground at the bottom of the water is full of little boiling springs; these cover the ground, throwing up the sand and water, presenting an appearance like that of a pot of boiling water. This lakelet is about sixty rods long and fifteen or twenty rods wide. After having been around it and studied it for an hour, you are impressed with the vast amount of water thus brought to the surface. That water runs with great force in a stream which is several rods wide, and too deep, even at its passage out of the lakelet, to be forded on horseback. No finer trout can be found in the world than abound in the cold water of that mountain lakelet. The Jihan runs in a southwesterly direction, cuts its way square through the Taurus, passes Missis (Mopsuestia), and empties into the Mediterranean sea between the gulf of Issus and the mouth of the Sihan (Cydnus). The Jihan is only about one hundred and eighty miles long, but it is a broad and powerful stream; at Missis we judged it to be about one hundred and fifty yards wide; it is there crossed by an old Roman bridge of nine arches, which is nearly as substantial now as when built, many centuries ago. The main tributary of the Jihan is the Aksu or "white water," which rises east of Marash, and joins the Jihan just where the Amanus range intersects

the Taurus; it thus forms the dividing line between the two ranges of mountains.

The largest river in the northern part of Asia Minor is the Kizzil Ismak, the ancient Halys. It rises in the mountains east of Sivas, in Armenia Minor, flows W., then S.W., then turns N.W., then to the N.E., and finally empties into the Black sea, near Sinope; its entire length is about six hundred miles.

The "Great River" of the Scriptures and of the Turkish Empire is the Euphrates. It is truly a "great" river, not only in its history, but in its physical characteristics. Much might be said in regard to it, but the limits of this Article forbid more than a brief notice.

The Euphrates is formed by the confluence of the Kara Su (Black Water), which rises about twenty-five miles N.E. of Erzroom, with the Murad Chai, which rises N.N.E. of Lake Van; these two branches flow directly out of the mountains of ancient Armenia, and unite near Keban Maden, about thirty miles west of Kharpoot; flowing thence S.W. past Samosat (Samosata), its course is toward the Mediterranean sea, but a range of mountains turns it to the S.E., in which direction it continues to the Persian gulf, having united with the Tigris at Kurnah. Its length is eighteen hundred miles, which is six hundred and fifty miles longer than the Tigris, and only two hundred less than the Indus; its average width below Birijik (Bir), about twelve hundred miles from its mouth, is two hundred yards; below that city it is from twelve to thirty feet deep.

The old geographers state that in ancient times the waters of the Euphrates did not reach the sea at all, but were absorbed by marshes or drawn off for purposes of irrigation. When we look at the volume of water in the river opposite Birijik, for example, this seems incredible. Mr. Rawlinson, however, states that even now the river is four hundred yards wide seven hundred miles from its mouth, while afterward it is reduced to one hundred and twenty yards in width, and its average depth is, at the same time, diminished from eighteen to twelve feet. It is also stated that the Tigris and the Euphrates formerly reached the sea by separate channels, and were only united about two thousand years ago. This is not improbable, as the two rivers run parallel and near to each other for a long distance; as they were

separated toward the Persian gulf only by low, flat plains, their union was easy and not unnatural.

The Tigris rises in the Armenian Taurus mountains, on their southern slope, at lat. $38^{\circ} 10'$ and long. $39^{\circ} 20'$; its source is not more than ten, Mr. Rawlinson thinks not more than three, miles distant from the Murad or eastern branch of the Euphrates. At Diarbekir, one hundred and fifty miles from its source, it is one hundred yards wide in the dry season; this width is increased to two hundred and fifty yards during the spring floods; its average width between Mosul and Bagdad is two hundred yards; its current flows at the rate of four and a half miles per hour. The Tigris has been navigated by small steamers as far as to Mosul; its principal tributaries are the Great and the Lesser Zab and the Khabour; these flow from the east, and have their sources in the mountains of Kurdistan.

The Orontes is famous in history, and has been so often described that a passing notice is all that is needed here. It rises in North Syria, near Baalbec, runs almost due north between Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon, until near Antioch; it then turns west and empties into the Mediterranean, near the ruins of Selucia. Its length is about two hundred miles; its modern name is the Asi or Rebel river. The origin of this name is uncertain; the various conjectures that have been made on the subject do not appear to correspond with facts and with the character of the river. As it flows through the plain of Antioch it lies very low under its banks, its waters are dirty, and there seems to be nothing poetical or beautiful about it. It is interesting only on account of its historical associations. The Sakarius (Sangarius), one branch of this river, rises in the Olympian mountains, and the other near Angora. It runs north past the city of Adabazar, and empties into the Black sea. This river deserves notice from the fact that the founders of the present race and dynasty of Ottoman Turks made their first settlement on its banks, at the modern village of Suyud; the current is very rapid and strong; the river is about three hundred miles in length; that it has entirely changed its bed is proved by a noble Roman bridge, ten arches of which are still standing on the open plain several miles west of Adabazar, while the river now flows on the east side of that city.

All the rivers in Turkey are subject to a great periodical rise, in consequence of the melting of the snow on the mountains, in which they have their sources. This rise begins generally about the last of April, and reaches its greatest height about the first of June. As bridges are scarce and frequently carried away, this annual increase of the waters is a great hindrance to travel and commercial intercourse. At that season of the year not the large rivers alone, but the smaller streams, that are insignificant in August and September, become dangerous obstacles to travelers. Torrents are often found rushing through gorges and valleys, where not a drop of water can be found in the dry season. A great increase in the number and quality of the bridges is one of the most pressing wants of Turkey, especially in the wild regions of Armenia and Kurdistan.

A notice of the Physical Geography of the Turkish Empire would not be complete without mentioning the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. These straits have well been called the "Gates of Constantinople;" if properly defended, it would seem impossible for an enemy to pass them. Admiral Farragut, however, remarked, when he was at Constantinople, not long before his death, that he would not hesitate to run through either strait in the night, even with wooden ships, whatever might be the amount and force of the opposition. It may be that Farragut was somewhat peculiar in his views on such subjects! We are sure that nature has done her share in making the approaches to Constantinople very peculiar and very beautiful, yet capable of being made immensely strong by the wit of the engineer.

The Bosphorus runs from the Black sea to the Sea of Marmora, a distance of sixteen miles. The width of the strait varies not a little, the narrowest place being between the two old "Castles of Asia and Europe." The distance here from shore to shore is one hundred rods; the water in the strait is very deep, pure, and cold; the current is rapid and powerful, especially when assisted by a north wind. The beauty of the natural scenery on the shores of the Bosphorus is probably unsurpassed in the world.

The Dardanelles are sixty miles in length, and in some places three in breadth, yet at the narrowest point the distance is

about the same as that of the narrowest place in the Bosphorus; the shores are more receding than those of the Bosphorus, and there is less variety and beauty in the natural scenery.

Both of these straits greatly hinder navigation by sailing vessels when the wind is from the north. It not unfrequently happens that a fleet of two or three hundred vessels collects at the mouth of the Dardanelles, waiting, it may be for weeks, for a south wind to carry them through. When at last it comes and the vessels pass up into the Sea of Marmora, the scene there presented is very beautiful.

The lakes of Turkey are few and small, and merit but little attention; the largest is Lake Van, in ancient Armenia; the water of this lake is very salt and disagreeable to the taste, closely resembling that of the Dead sea. We were assured by the inhabitants on the shores of the lake that the water never freezes, although the climate is intensely cold in winter. The level of the lake is over five thousand feet above the level of the sea; it has no considerable inlet and no outlet; its length is about one hundred and its greatest breadth about seventy miles. The region about its shores is mountainous and mostly uncultivated, except at the eastern end; wild fowl, especially wild geese, abound on its waters. There are also some small lakes in the central part of Asia Minor whose waters are reported to be salt or brackish, but these we have not visited. The absence of lakes in Turkey is not to be wondered at when we consider the terrace-like configuration of the country.

The question is often asked, "Does Turkey abound in minerals?" Here we have to reply, as on so many other points of its physical geography, that a full answer cannot be given without more thorough and scientific examination. We can only report what we know from personal observation, and from the scattered notices found in the works of travelers who have passed hastily through the country. Copper, iron, and silver mines exist, and are worked in the style that might be expected in a semi-civilized country. The principal copper mines are at Tocat, the silver mines at Gumush Maden (silver ore), and the iron mines near Zeitoon, in the Taurus mountains. The supply of iron ore is reported to be very large. Deposits of coal have been often reported in various places, yet but little

is really known as to whether coal is found in the country or not. The restrictions placed by the government on all attempts to develop the mineral resources of the country operate as an effectual barrier to all progress in this direction. At Erzroom we were shown a beautiful specimen of native copper by an Armenian merchant; he said it came from the mountains near the city, but he assured us that the government had earnestly opposed even an examination of the mine, from a fear that the profits might, in some way, go into the hands of individuals rather than into the Imperial treasury. The same merchant informed us that deposits of coal exist in the neighborhood of Erzroom; the alleged reason for not working the coal mine was that the use of coal would destroy the business of the poor men who obtain their living by bringing wood into the city for sale.

Flowers are found in the greatest abundance in all parts of the country; this is due to the good soil, the genial climate, and the great supply of rain in the winter and spring. During the months of May and June, wherever you go in Turkey, the ground is sure to be covered with flowers. We have seen them in profusion amid the mountains of Armenia, on the plains of Mesopotamia, in the passes of the Giaour Dagh and Taurus mountains, and throughout the provinces of Bithynia and Cilicia. An eminent botanist some years ago traveled through Asia Minor, and made an immense collection of plants and flowers. He frequently expressed his astonishment at the great number and variety of the flowers.

The trees that are now commonly seen in Turkey are the oak, of which there are several varieties, pine, cedar, sycamore, beech, willow, spruce, hemlock, walnut, a species of ash, chestnut, mulberry, olive; and, on the borders of Syria, the orange, lemon, and palm.

Fruit abounds in almost all parts of the country, except in the higher portions of Armenia; the following are the most common varieties: Apples, pears, peaches, plums, apricots, grapes, figs, olives, pomegranates, and, in the more southern districts, dates, lemons, and oranges. These fruits are not only found, but in many parts of the country the supply is so great that the price at which they are sold is very small. Grapes of the most delicious quality can often be purchased in the interior at the rate of one cent for two and a half pounds!

The grains commonly raised are wheat, barley, and Indian corn. Cotton, tobacco, and silk are produced in large quantities in some parts of the country, but on account of the heavy export duties levied on such articles, are mostly used in home consumption. The domestic animals now found in Turkey are, sheep; of these the numbers are immense; among them are found the big-tailed sheep; goats, including the famous Angora goats; camels, in all parts of the country. The common impression, that the camel cannot be used in a cold climate, is incorrect. Great numbers of them are employed in the carrying trade between the Black sea and Persia; large caravans of them may be seen entering Erzroom from Persia in the coldest weather in the dead of winter. We were told, however, that the camels that can bear the cold weather of Armenia are of a peculiar and very hardy breed. The huge, eastern buffalo, so famous for strength, is found in all parts of Turkey. The horses of Asia Minor have always been known for their capacity of endurance; bordering the desert many noble specimens of the horse may be often seen. The beautiful description of the war-horse found in Job, xxxix, 19-25, was doubtless suggested by the actual presence of a full-blooded Arab, possibly one owned by the patriarch himself. In these days the best Arab horses are owned by officers of the Turkish government and army. A beautiful horse is not an unusual present to a local governor, always, of course, as a silent acknowledgment for "favors received."

The common cattle are of a poor quality. Some handsome white cattle are raised in Bulgaria; in the region of Erzroom also some fair cattle are found. Near Aleppo and Damascus occasionally a regular "bull of Bashan" may be seen, such as would delight the eyes of the best cattle grower in Dutchess county, New York. Cattle are seldom used for beef; hence little effort is made to improve the breed.

Of wild animals there are many varieties in Turkey. The common deer, the antelope, the ibex or mountain goat, bears, wolves, foxes, jackals, hares, the mink, are found in various parts of the country. Leopards are still occasionally met with in Mesopotamia and even west of the Euphrates. Wild boars

are very numerous in nearly all the hills and mountains of Turkey. Some of them become very large and savage.

Wild birds also are found in great numbers. The eagle, vulture, common hawks, storks, wild geese, ducks, quails, partridges, pheasants, great varieties of beautiful cranes, wild swans, are the birds not uncommonly met with by an ordinary traveler. The silver crane of Armenia is a noble bird. Turkey is a good country for the sportsman; but he must be willing to forsake civilized life, go to the mountain villages, and adapt himself to the habits of the people. Wild boars, bears, and deer will be his most common game of large size. Turkish waters have ever been celebrated for the quantity and quality of their fish. This is especially true of the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmora. In the interior of the country the people pay very little attention to fishing. Streams that are full of the most beautiful trout and other varieties of fish are seldom disturbed by the fisherman's rod, never by a net.

Probably there is no better climate in the world than that of Asia Minor; the atmosphere is soft, yet, for the greater part of the year, fresh and bracing. The stars shine with a bright luster; in Mesopotamia a star-lit night is one of the most magnificent sights to be seen in the world; little wonder that the ancients of those regions made a special study of astronomy; how could they help studying it? There can be little doubt that their minds were drawn to that study by the peculiar luster of the stars and the splendor of the starry heavens.

In some parts of the country fevers abound, as at Alexandretta and Samsoun, but these are due to local causes. The uplands of Armenia are unsurpassed for a pure and healthy atmosphere. The native people of Armenia, especially those of the Armenian race, are persons of great physical strength, such men and such women as grow only in a healthy climate. It is from that region that the Hamals (burden-bearers) of Constantinople come. These Hamals are celebrated for their enormous strength.

We have thus attempted briefly to sketch the most noticeable points in the Physical Geography of Asia Minor. Scientific details have purposely been avoided as not of special interest to the general reader. To many persons, what we have written

will contain nothing new ; others, we trust, will be glad to see within the compass of a single Article the information we have tried to give. Having traveled many thousands of miles, on horseback, in Turkey, we have had abundant opportunity to see the rivers, mountains, plains, forests, plants, and animals of which we have spoken.

The peculiarities of the Physical Geography of the country have always deeply interested us. In some respects physical geography is the basis of everything. Looking to the future, and believing that Turkey is shut up to a course of great material, intellectual, and moral progress, we have studied the physical features of the country with great pleasure. From quite an extensive personal survey, we are convinced that there is a solid basis for unlimited advancement. The desired progress will really begin when a railroad is built from Constantinople through the heart of Asia Minor to the river Tigris, and thence down the valley of the Euphrates to Bagdad.

The wealth of the East, the arts, the sciences, the energy of the West, will soon meet,—they are even now meeting,—on the soil of Turkey.

When man begins to appreciate Nature in Turkey, Nature will show that she has prepared a magnificent country for the residence and healthy development of millions of men. In the good time for which all hope, her rivers, mountains, plains, fountains, her iron, silver, copper, and marble, her noble forests, her pure climate, all will be found answering the wise ends for which they were designed by their Creator. That good time is sure to come ; the stars in their courses fight for it. We predict that when it has really come, mother Earth will not be able to show a more beautiful spot than the very regions that were chosen as the birth-place of the human race.

ARTICLE II.—ROTHE ON REVELATION AND INSPIRATION.

PART II.—INSPIRATION, OR, THE DOCTRINE OF HOLY SCRIPTURE.

TRANSLATED AND CONDENSED BY MR. E. JAMES.

[Concluded.]

THE constant experience of every evangelical Christian testifies that in the Bible he possesses a means of grace, and one which is indispensable to his being an evangelical Christian. In the origin and development of his Christian life, he becomes experimentally conscious of the fact, that the holy Scripture is the chief agent and medium of God's redeeming power; that in it supernatural and divine powers exist and work with an adaptation to every religious susceptibility, in a soundness, purity, and fullness, in a fragrant freshness of life, in an unearthly, radiant beauty, and in a redeeming efficacy, which can be found nowhere else. It is an unparalleled phenomenon in literature.

The devout Christian seeks for an explanation of these unquestioned facts, and finds it in the assumption of God's coöperation in the formation of the Bible, and calls this by the name—*inspiration*. And how could he do otherwise? Does not logic itself demand a peculiarly divine origin for the peculiarly divine quality of the Bible? The only question can be, whether that divine coöperation which is expressed by the term "*inspiration*," as used in our dogmatics, gives a true explanation of that religious experience which it attempts to render comprehensible. I must deny that it does so. For the dogma referred to derives the holy Scripture from the divine causality exclusively; but the Scriptures impress us as not only divine, but also perfectly and naturally human, neither quality abridging or overshadowing the other. Through its humanity the Bible has a freshness and a charm which lay hold upon us most deeply; and the pious reader finds the inter-working of the divine and human to be its most characteristic and peculiar quality. In this two-sidedness lies the explanation of the facts of religious experience to which we have referred.

Whoever believes the Bible to be a *Holy* Scripture, must have observed that it is the divine-human in it which comes into play in all religious experience.

God can effectively reveal himself to men only in men, in human events, and human destiny; and the completed revelation cannot be conceived of otherwise than as an incarnation. The old dogmatics took a partial and one-sided view of the facts. It left the chief element of the problem in the background, and gave over the phenomena to be explained, entirely into the realm of the strange and inexplicable. And this was not done by chance, or mere neglect, but followed naturally and necessarily from an unsatisfactory view of revelation itself. So long as it held that revelation is the direct impartation from God himself of religious doctrine, and that the Bible is this revelation, in the concrete, it could not help holding to a mechanical theory of the origin of the Bible. For only on such a theory could the Bible bear the burden which the system laid upon its shoulders. The belief that inspiration was passive and mechanical was not an excrescence, but a proper out-growth of the system; and it is a useless labor to attempt to take away this doctrine from our older dogmatics, and yet retain the Bible in the same position which was assigned to it by the early Protestant Church. There are only two ways in which writings can be infallible: either the writers must be absolutely infallible individuals, or they must be, not the real authors, but the mechanical instruments of the Holy Spirit. The first supposition is inconceivable; according to it, the writers would be, not apostles and prophets, but Christs. The second flies in the face of all psychology and the plainest facts of history. For we do not find the actual Bible answering to this theory, or corresponding to human needs in any such way as it presupposes. It cannot possibly do so, as may be seen from two facts;—first, the text of the Bible is not given to us with absolute certainty, but has to be ascertained through a scientific process of investigation, through approximative criticism, and hence no one can be certain that the holy Scripture which he holds in his hand is verbally inspired; and, second, there are differences of interpretation which can never be completely reconciled.

The untenable nature of this theory having begun to be generally recognized, an attempt was made, naturally enough, to improve it. Calixtus opened the way, making a distinction between revelation and assistance or direction. Pfaff distinguished between a revelation of things unknown, and direction in things known, and permission to introduce the writer's own notions. Baumgarten and Töllner laid aside the idea of inspiration as a passive condition. Since their time inspiration has been more and more considered as standing in direct connection with the purpose of revelation, and as consisting chiefly in a preservation of the biblical writers from error, at least such error as would defeat the end of revelation. The inspiration of the letter has generally been permitted to drop. But such a distinction is untenable and entirely arbitrary and subjective. Who shall decide what is in direct relation with divine revelation, or who place the boundary between the religious and non-religious elements? Nor is the distinction often made between the contents and the form of the sacred book any more available. It is the form which first of all gives an impression of its divinity. It is not so much that it tells us about divine things, as that it tells of divine things in a really divine way, which makes the deepest impression upon us. And if the truth revealed by God is to be made known through the Scripture, it cannot, without danger of corruption, be entrusted, as to its expression in words, to sinful and defective men. One carelessly false expression might alter the whole contents. In general, too, words and thoughts are inseparable. There is no such thing as thought without words.

In more recent times the inadequacy of this first attempt to improve upon the doctrine has been generally acknowledged. The idea of a direct inspiration of the biblical writings has been given up, and we have fallen back upon the idea of the inspiration of men, of the writers, in which the writings partake only indirectly; yet this inspiration of the writers as such has been held to be a very different one from that which accompanied them in their ordinary gospel labors. But in fact, the inspiration of persons, which once was so lightly dismissed, is amply sufficient to explain the facts which the dogma of the inspiration of the Scriptures has brought into view, and to justify the

trust which we repose in the Scriptures as normative authority. If this is rightly understood, the supposition of a specific activity of the Holy Spirit in writing will be seen to be superfluous, at least in reference to the New Testament, to which the theory we oppose is almost wholly confined. The sacred writers, especially those of the New Testament, are distinguished from all others by the fact that they were persons who bore a part in the historical realization of divine revelation, and were, at the same time, its organs. But they were this previous to, and apart from, all their employment as writers. In consequence of their historical position, their religious consciousness was normative, in its specific peculiarities, for all later times. But they not only belonged to the historical circle in which divine revelation came to pass, but belonged to it in such a way that the most essential element of revelation, the subjective and interior one, inspiration, resided in them; whilst, at the same time, they were persons who had to do with the other element, the objective and external one, that is, divine manifestation. As men entrusted with this inspiration, they were the possessors of a right understanding of the divine manifestation, and therefore the authentic exponents of revelation, hence the only ones. But this limitation (which was dwelt upon in the second essay) must not be lost sight of; that absolute, perfect inspiration belongs to Christ alone, as the only bearer of the divine manifestation, so that the Apostles received their inspiration through him.

It is remarkable that the Redeemer admitted into the most intimate personal communion with himself, men who had so little share in the culture peculiar to their age, and who were thus able to receive from his personal presence, more sound and complete impressions than any other men could have received. And just because there floated in their souls so clear, distinct, and living an image, was it possible for the Holy Spirit to supply what was lacking in their knowledge, through their recollections of Christ and what he had told them, and to restrain them from the misleading influences of the world. So that we cannot be surprised to find a peculiar purity and power in the historical picture which these men drew, and an ideal Christian piety, which makes them shine forth among all their

surroundings. And while we recognize the originality and purity of the religious consciousness of the apostles, and are mindful of our own historical relation to them, as deriving our Christian consciousness from theirs, we cannot help assigning to their Christian consciousness a normative authority for our own, and for that of all Christians of all times. And their descriptions of their own Christian piety are, as such, the classic passages on that subject; and the same is true of their entire preaching, which remains to us only in their writings. Now, if the apostles were inspired men, their writings would naturally partake in their inspiration, as well as all their other activities, and would have to be looked upon as inspired books. The only question is, did the inspiration which dwelt in them reach its relative maximum, compared with their other spiritual functions, in this one, of writing? Any specific difference is out of the question. Not only is there no ground for assuming any distinction between the influence of the Holy Spirit upon them throughout their entire mission, and that which belongs especially to their work of writing, but to assume this distinction would render it impossible to form any clear and connected view of the life of these men of God. They claim no such distinction, but rather give the impression that they were in a condition of sober productivity as writers. Moreover, according to our conception of inspiration, it cannot accompany a continuous act of writing. It is a momentary, fleeting state. It is a sudden gleam of something essentially new, outside of all traceable connection with a producing mental activity. To receive inspiration and to compose a writing are things which cannot exist in the same person at the same time. The impulse to write presupposes something in the consciousness, to be imparted to others. The act of writing follows after that of meditation. The inspiration must occur first, before it can be committed to writing, and the mechanical labor of writing is incompatible with the state of inspiration, which is, in a measure, an ecstatic one. The biblical writers had inspirations, and owed their religious knowledge to them, but neither were they habitually in a condition of being inspired, nor did they compose their books at the exact moment of the inspiration.

Yet, though their writings could not share in their inspiration

in any way specifically different from any other part of their spiritual work, it is quite probable that they may have partaken of it in a higher degree. For the composition of doctrinal writings was a definite part of the mission assigned to some of the prophets and apostles. Such writings, especially in the case of the apostles, formed an appropriate and peculiar part of their labors. This written preaching concerning the Saviour, indeed, took a subordinate place in comparison with their oral preaching, and the apostolic writers had no distinct reference to the needs of future ages (except in the historical books and the Apocalypse); yet the written setting forth of our thoughts proceeds from a more intense activity of the mind than does the oral, from a more careful and precise deliberation, and has greater precision. Therefore we may assume in the case of the official writings of the apostles and their assistants, an exceptionally large measure of the influence of the Holy Spirit which dwelt in them.

If the inspiration of the Bible is of this nature, it cannot belong in equal degree to all its parts. It will stand in relation with the whole Bible rather than with all its parts equally. There will be different degrees of the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, according to the varying nature of the biblical books and their contents, and to the nearer or more distant relation of the contents of each book to the prophetic and apostolic teaching. This view of the inspiration of the Bible is clearly expelling all others; but its relation to the inspiration doctrine of the old dogmatics needs some explanation. There are some who think that they must hold it as a modification of the old doctrine, leaving the essential peculiarities of the latter untouched, removing from it simply some adventitious notions, which dogmatic pendency had unnecessarily piled upon it. This is not well done, and must lead to confusion of ideas. In truth this modern view differs *toto genere* from the old doctrine of the Church. The latter teaches the direct inspiration of the writings, that is, their suggestion or impartation through the exclusive operation of the Holy Spirit, without any enlightenment of their authors. The modern theory, on the other hand, considers the inspiration of the writings as the natural consequence of that of their authors. The writings are inspired because and in so far as they emanated

from persons who were enlightened by the Holy Spirit through redemption and sanctification, and who received special inspirations, as actors in the events of revelation. The enlightenment of individuals and the suggestion of writings are two very different things, and must be sharply distinguished. Enlightenment is an habitual condition, inspiration a momentary one. The unconditional infallibility of the Scripture follows from the old theory, on the new it is denied, on the ground that the inspiration of men must be coördinate with sanctification, which can never be perfect in this life.

Those who now maintain the unconditional infallibility of the Scriptures, generally do so on the assumption that the prophets and apostles were personally made perfect on the theoretical and intellectual side of their nature, though not on the practical side, the will. It is said that the Lord promised to his apostles, for their mission of teaching, a perfection of spiritual life following their regeneration, a complete inspiration, an organic union of the Holy Spirit with their spiritual apprehension, as a complete equipment for their mission as witnesses of revelation, so that all truth was disclosed to them, and came to them as the pure testimony of the Spirit. Thus Peter, in the practical matter of the relations of the Jewish and the Gentile converts, could act contrary to his own knowledge and teaching. His infallibility was in but one sphere. Even with us, our knowledge of the truth outstrips the will; why not so in the case of Peter, even when perfectly enlightened?

This is no improvement on the old inspiration doctrine of the church dogmatics, which must be either entirely given up or retained complete. The absolute infallibility of Scripture can only be held at this sacrifice, and this sacrifice cannot be made. The attempt to maintain it by confining inspiration to the intellectual side of the person who is inspired, is nothing less than a return to the obsolete theory of mechanical inspiration. The impartation of divine truth cannot be a mere introducing of it into the memory, but is a morally conditioned process, a planting in the individual, personal life-center itself, depending as much on the will as on the understanding. Such a personal illumination being assumed, it will follow that the infallibility of the Bible is relative, not absolute. As for the

distinction which some make, between the inspiration of the word and of the words, this will not relieve the difficulties of the inspiration of *writings*; for surely the words in which God conveyed his revelation to apostles and prophets, would be the fittest of all to be given in the sacred text.

One who holds, *bona fide*, to the old theory in its full strength, without seeking to explain it away, is a consistent and true man. But he who tries to dress it up in modern rags before he will accept it, stands on slippery ground. The latest attempt to justify the old theory has been made by Mehring, who holds that the "contents of revelation" were imparted to the authors of the Bible by inspiration from God, which they, on their part, received correctly and truly, and committed to writing without any mixture of what was their own. He makes inspiration to be a direct speaking of the personal God in the soul of a human individual, as God spoke to Moses; not as he did to other prophets, in dreams and visions, but face to face, as a man to his friend. But how shall this word, so received, be infallibly transmitted? Men do not, of themselves, attain to such freedom from error. To this Mehring replies, that God would not give a revelation without providing for keeping its contents free from error; for if he did not, it must be doubtful whether there be any revelation, or else what parts of it are given correctly and what erroneously. Now this does not save the Church-doctrine of inspiration. It leaves it entirely in the lurch. Moreover it does not save the absolute infallibility of the Bible. It is a theory which identifies revelation with inspiration as completely as the old one, and which is entirely outside of the facts which it should explain. It leaves important forms of inspiration out of the account, such as dreams and visions; it makes revelation consist in nothing but a series of inspirations; it takes no notice of great supernatural, historical facts, as a part of revelation; it makes revelation something given by God to men, rather than something transacted by God before their eyes, among them. It assumes that our Bible contains nothing but "the contents of revelation, imparted by God through inspiration," a position plainly false, for the greater part of the Bible is taken up with every-day things. And what security is there for the inspiration of

those things which do not belong to the substance of revelation, or for even the possibility of it? And how about their infallibility? Till some provision is made in the theory for these points, it is not necessary to discuss it any further, most of what it involves having been already considered. The more we examine these modern reproductions of the old doctrine of the holy Scripture, the more clearly does it appear that that doctrine was the product of a scientific fiction growing out of a dogmatic interest, out of an hypothesis concerning the origin of the Bible, which was assumed as an axiom, but which is, nevertheless, insufficient to explain the phenomena it was meant to meet. The attempt was made to infer what God has done, from what our needs were supposed to be. We have learned, now, how fallacious such an argument is.

What, then, is to be done? Shall we return to the so-called freer position of the early Church? The Church fathers were far from being consistent. There was no lack, on their part, of the strongest expressions of belief in the divine origin of the Holy Scriptures; but they did not hesitate to recognize defects, inaccuracies, and contradictions in it. When we compare the utterances of their religious fervor concerning the full inspiration of the sacred books, with the way in which they used them, practically, we must conclude that their position respecting them was really a very free one. Indeed, we cannot trace a strict and accurately defined doctrine on the subject farther back than the latter part of the 16th century. No, we cannot remain in a confused, unsettled position, nor return to it from a well-defined one.

Among those theologians who recognize the impossibility of upholding all the old theories on this subject, it is pretty generally agreed to consider the Scriptures as "divine-human." I regret that I cannot adopt this term, for it was invented to explain and justify what is imperfect, and humanly imperfect, in the Bible. But its use leads inevitably to the denial or omission of all that imperfection. The idea of the divine-human is that of the pure, absolute co-existence and interpenetration of the divine and human. This took place in Christ, but in him alone; his being and life are the only divine-human. To place the Bible on the same level with him in this respect, is out of the question. And to attempt to draw a dividing line

between the human and the divine elements or sides of the Bible, is fruitless and misleading. The Bible is a product of that divine light which has streamed through the world, whose source is revelation. I hold that the subjective element of revelation was inspiration, even wholly apart from, and previous to, any sacred writings. Entirely apart from the Scriptures, man possesses a real and actual supernatural revelation. Revelation is the sure light given from above to lead our race to the heavenly goal for which it was designed by its creator. The great characteristic revolution in religious doctrine, of the modern time, consists in making the corner-stone and central point of Christianity no longer a book, but a person; not a collection of doctrines, but facts and influences which are historical.

We come now to the subject of the absolute freedom from error, or infallibility, of the Scriptures. Nothing could have been further from the intention of the Redeemer, than to place in our hands, through his Apostles, a complete written system of religious belief, to serve as an unerring compendium of religious truth; nor did the Apostles have any such design in their writings. The tone in which they address their readers cannot be reconciled with any such supposition. That tone is not at all one of instruction, claiming for itself infallibility and unconditioned authority. 2 Cor. i, 24. "Not that we have dominion over your faith, but are helpers of your joy." (See also James iii, 18.) But our old Protestant theology, because it considered revelation to be nothing but an immediate divine impartation of a complete system of religious doctrine, was obliged to claim for it, that is for the Bible, the attribute of infallibility; and because it was seeking for an indisputable external authority for faith to rest upon with undisturbed certainty, it was obliged to deny therein every possibility of error, even in the most trifling things. On that stand-point the infallibility of the Scriptures is a necessary postulate. But it is a postulate which conflicts with the facts. In such a condition of biblical hermeneutics and historical criticism as that which prevailed through the first centuries of the Protestant Church, it was possible to hush up this contradiction between the theory and the facts; to-day, we cannot any longer conceal that there

are errors in our sacred writings. Nor can we any longer put the matter off, by saying that the Scripture is infallible in what relates to the Christian faith and life, but not in reference to matters of knowledge which are of no religious importance. For it is not possible to draw a line of demarcation between religious things and non-religious things, where everything must have, of necessity, some religious importance. Moreover, the advocates of this distinction generally apply it to the New Testament alone, leaving the Old Testament out of the account entirely, though in it the greatest difficulties occur. An omission which shows the weakness of the theory. For who, at the present day, would think of such a thing as vindicating the Old Testament from all error?

The more deeply the Old Testament is studied, the more its immeasurable importance and unequalled power become apparent, the purity, power, and elevation of its religious ideas, and its inestimable historical value, which, like that of Herodotus, is constantly receiving new proofs. But it is equally manifest that the Old Testament is a different thing from the miraculous or magical product which the dogmatizing imagination of the old theology made it out to be; that it is a literary product and historical monument of the time when the religious horizon was first partially brightened with clear light, when many places still lay in complete shadow; that it shares the imperfections which are inseparable from the beginnings of the art of writing.

In reference to the New Testament, the first thing to be noticed is the way in which the Old Testament is treated in the apostolic writings. They refer to passages as direct Messianic predictions, which our exegesis can only consider as indirect prophecies; hence these passages of the New Testament, in the sense in which their authors intended them, contain error. They quote, too, as proof-texts, passages of the Old Testament which really do not prove that for which they are quoted. But most important of all, in the New Testament, is the representation which it gives of Christ. Is this free from every error? Let not this question be misunderstood. We do not ask whether it is possible for us to construct from the New Testament accounts of the Saviour, a sufficiently accurate historical view and repre-

sentation of him; but whether that which is there written about him, taken in the sense in which its authors intended it, contains nothing incorrect. The practical impossibility of constructing a perfectly satisfactory harmony of the four gospels is sufficient reply. We find, too, occasionally, apparent slips of memory, as Matt. xxiii, 35, and xxvii, 9, Mark ii, 26, 1 Cor. x, 8. On one subject, too, that of eschatology, we cannot but think that the synoptic gospels bring together the Saviour's words in regard to his earthly kingdom, in a way which hides the meaning they were spoken with. The most important point of all, however, is whether the description of the Saviour's person and work is absolutely free from all wrong impression. We do not doubt that it is possible, by the right use of the New Testament, to obtain a correct impression of Christ. The question is, whether there is absolutely nothing incorrect in the representations of the New Testament writers, taken in their direct sense. The New Testament contains several representations of the life of Jesus, running side by side, and varying somewhat from each other. The christology of the synoptics is not exactly the same as that of John, though they do not exclude or contradict each other, and that of Paul differs somewhat from both.

To understand Christ perfectly was a problem too deep for even the apostles; a fact of which they themselves were fully conscious. (Jno. i, 14; 1 Jno. i, 1; 1 Cor. ii, 7-13; Eph. iii, 18, etc.) And the fact that they received inspiration, and were led by the Holy Spirit into all truth, could not overcome every difficulty. Why should God have divided up his inspiration among several men, if not because one person could not receive a perfectly adequate understanding of the Divine Manifestation? No single man could understand the manifestation of God in Christ in an absolutely adequate manner, from the very limitations of his individuality, the peculiarities which are grounded there. Therefore God called a number of individuals to this work, in order that, through their joint descriptions, a completely correct understanding might be constructed, and divided His inspiration among them. The manifestation of God in Christ required, indeed, to be *rightly* understood, by those who were in contact with it, but could be *completely* un-

derstood by no individual among them. The entire result of all their impressions was necessary for this, the accounts of all the witnesses, in their mutual interworking. Even twelve were not enough ; Paul had to be added to the number, and to be inspired, in order to bring about a truly satisfactory understanding of the manifestation of God in Christ. We can find this in the doctrine and preaching of no single apostle, taken by themselves, nor in the writings of any one New Testament author, taken alone. The teaching of no single apostle is absolutely infallible, but the combined teaching of them all contains the complete conditions for an absolutely unerring impression and comprehension of Christ.

The same reasoning applies to the teaching of the prophets, and to the oral as well as the written teaching of prophets and apostles. The attribute of infallibility, then, in the Bible, is not absolute but relative. The Bible is the sufficient means and instrument for obtaining an unerring knowledge of divine revelation, and contains the means within itself of correcting all its errors, testing itself by itself. This is the *actual* infallibility of the Bible, and herein lies its sufficiency. Infallibility belongs to it as a whole, not to its individual parts and sections as such. We have, in the Scriptures, an unerring account of divine revelation, but we must first make it infallible and unerring by our use of it, through historical criticism ; for only thus can its complete sense be ascertained. The normative authority of the Bible, however, remains unimpaired.

Now as a matter of fact, our Protestant theology has always gone to work in this way, which is only a more exact mode of expressing its favorite principle, of interpreting the Bible by the analogy of faith. But the assumption was made that the canon of the Scriptures was fixed beyond all questioning, and thus all real historical criticism was virtually excluded ; though, in the nature of the case, this criticism is the first thing to be undertaken, and without which the foundations of the true normative authority of the Scriptures cannot be properly established.

The kind of infallibility which we uphold, though very different from that of the old theology, is the one which corresponds best to the experience of every devout Christian. For

if he use the Bible rightly, it makes upon him the impression that in it he possesses a complete instrument for the origination, development, and completion of his Christian life, a guide to salvation, in which he can confide with unconditioned trust; in a word, he experiences what is described in 2 Tim. iii, 16, 17. But he will feel in this use of the Bible, that these qualities of it do not belong to all its parts in an equal measure. He is, thus, conscious that the Bible, in the coöperation of all its individual parts, is such an incarnation of religious truth as is powerful unto salvation, whilst its individual elements will often limit and modify each other, so that he has to join them together in a living union. It is no more possible to conceive of the apostles as absolutely infallible than as absolutely holy. They themselves were far from claiming the one or the other, as their modes of action and of discourse show plainly; the history shows us several moral delinquencies of the apostles during the time of their apostolic work. They themselves were conscious that infallibility was dependent on personal moral perfection, and always place freedom from error at the very summit of personal attainments. (James iii, 2.) And the "hypocrisy" of Peter, the apostle-prince, at Antioch, seems certainly to have had some reference to the true doctrine of justification. (Gal. ii, 11-18.)

I hold with the utmost earnestness to that relative infallibility of the Bible which I have described. The holy Scripture is, I repeat, the perfectly sufficient instrument for obtaining, without any error, a knowledge of the divine revelation, especially that made in Christ, and, in this sense, it is essentially infallible. Whoever believes in divine revelation, and is in the circle of its influence, in the enjoyment of redemption through Christ, *must* believe in this infallibility, apart from that direct testimony of his experience which we have referred to. For, if there is such a revelation, and it is not a traceless meteor through the world, but a real divine causality, redeeming and renewing men, there must be a true and sufficient witness to it, an actual record, going beside it and belonging to it as an essential element. And if the Bible is not this, we must give up our faith, not only that we know and enjoy the divine revelation, that we have a share in

redemption, and actually possess the genuine Christianity, but also that the divine revelation and redemption have ever come into real existence, that there ever was any genuine Christianity. The New Testament demonstrably contains the original Christian teaching, the apostolic preaching; and if this account which the apostles gave of the divine revelation in Christ is incorrect, then redemption itself cannot have become operative among men, we are not in the circle of redemption, there is no real Christianity in the world, and never was any. The moment we believe in revelation, we *must* also believe the teaching of prophets and apostles to contain an essentially correct description of it, and therefore, in the sense described, without error and infallible.

I consider the Bible, then, as the original and authoritative document concerning revelation, but not as the revelation itself. It is an historical product of revelation and a part of its activity. Revelation I believe to be a complete and massive reality, a fact in the strongest sense supernatural, in the midst of the natural world. Let a sharp and clear distinction be made between "revelation" and "the Bible," let the latter be looked upon, not as the revelation itself, but as the instrument by which the fact of revelation is authenticated, and through which it comes, in its original correctness and vividness, to impart itself to us, and bring us, with our consciousness, under its most immediate influence—and we shall have no difficulty in setting ourselves right. There was a theocratic people of Israel before there was any Holy Scripture of the Old Testament; and there was a congregation of believers in Christ earlier than the New. The final end in the use of the Bible, not only theological but practical, is not simply to understand it, but to understand the divine revelation by means of it. The purpose for which it was given us is to make us also eye-and-ear witnesses of revelation. And the sole office of the theologian in reference to it is, to make it, by his historical-critical expositions, that true reflection of revelation which we seek and need.

The New Testament is in fact an original, historical, authentic document concerning that historical fact, the person and life of Jesus Christ; it is approximatively a photograph of the historical Christ, impressed directly on the consciousness which was

sensitive toward him. But it is not a photograph for us; *we* are obliged to establish it to be such through historical criticism. Yet it is impossible that a true, complete reflection of the Redeemer, in his many-sidedness, should be given in any one picture. The complete Christ could be given only by a number of pictures. To blend these together into one is a weary labor of criticism, and one that can be only accomplished by a series of approximations at best; but much is gained when the problem is once clearly stated, and properly recognized by theology. If revelation stands before our eyes in all its majesty as a powerful, living, historical reality, there will be abundant courage for the most thorough and impartial examination, assuming a free, *believing* position, without any narrowness. God gives us nothing ready-made. All His gifts are of such a nature as to require us to do something. Thus it is with the holy Scriptures. If we will undertake the labor God has thrown upon us and subject them to historical analysis, we shall find what He intended us to know. We need not place ourselves above them; we ought rather to strive to learn to use them rightly, to know what they really are. Protestant theology, in order to be true to its own formal principle of making the Bible the only rule of faith, must encourage a thorough historical-critical treatment of the Bible.

Since the rise of the historical criticism this formal principle has somewhat changed its meaning. Its authority, however, is as complete as 300 years ago; for the grounds on which it rests have not been changed. It stands forth yet more clearly as a necessary principle of the life of the Church, having the elasticity of life, and being the very principle by which the Church may yet come into harmony and understanding with the never-resting progress of worldly science. Our older theology did not entirely overlook the problem of historical criticism, indeed, but went at it wrongly. The question concerning the canon is one which comes strictly under this head, yet in its investigation the old theology arrived at nothing. For by assuming beforehand that the books of the Bible had God for their author, it excluded all human testimony and all real inquiry on the subject. The canonicity of the books was a foregone conclusion.

The church-dogmatics maintained that the Bible is the *κανών*, the norm; but a truly evangelical theology will ask, rather, what that quality is which constitutes its normative authority. We claim that this quality is its character as an original document. It could not be regulative for our idea of divine revelation, if it were not thus an original, historical document, and only in so far as it is such can it well claim normative, or canonical authority. Its origin must be intimately connected with the facts which it narrates; and the question must be asked,—in what historical relation did the author of any of its books stand to the facts of which the book treats? Thus there may be different degrees of authority, or canonicity, and of originality, in proportion to the varying degree of closeness of causal connection between the facts and the book. The Church gives us the Bible as the canon, that is, as the only authoritative rule for the formation of our ideas of revelation. The question whether we shall accept it as being in fact what it is thus claimed to be, is a purely historical one, to be solved by historical criticism alone; though, of course, the judgment of the Church is to be taken into the account, as of great weight, being that of an especially qualified judge; and the testimony of the Holy Spirit, as seen in the results of the right use of any book, will be another important element. This last point was emphasized, and rightly so, by the older theology, but at the expense of the external elements of the proof. Historical criticism cannot rest satisfied until both elements, the internal and the external, coincide in the same results.

In deciding on the canonicity of any book, the inquiry must be made, whether, in the historical relations of its origin, it can be considered as really an original, contemporary document, on the subject of revelation. The problem of the canon is thus one constantly in process of solution, by a never resting process of historical investigation. The mistake of the Church has been, that it has not recognized the need of an investigation of such a nature, and has proceeded in everything as though the canon had been settled from time immemorial. As a matter of fact, it was not determined on purely historical grounds, and there were long waverings with regard to particular books.

Our older theologians of the Church did not distinguish between religion and theology. Holding revelation to be a direct impartation from God of a system of doctrines, using revelation and Bible as identical terms, they had but one answer for all dogmatic, that is, religious questionings, and could not see how their views of the Bible violated the decorum of the divine kingdom, and especially the free, unlegal spirit of the New Testament, and how far our actual Bible is from corresponding to their demands upon it. It is not at all certain that it possesses the attributes of *sufficientia*, *perspicuitas*, and *auctoritas judicialis* in the sense in which they used these terms. For by *sufficientia* they meant that it contains everything which is necessary to be known in order to attain to eternal salvation; and by *perspicuitas*, that all things necessary for salvation are expressed in it as clearly as possible. But when we find that they held the knowledge necessary to salvation to be the whole circle of dogmas, and held that there is no article of faith which is not declared in at least one passage of the holy Scripture in plain, appropriate, and accurate words, we must admit that such a representation of the Bible ill corresponds to the actual facts of the case. The whole history of interpretation is opposed to it, beginning with the New Testament itself. (1 Cor. i, 10; 2 Peter iii, 16.) As for the *auctoritas judicialis*, or sole right of deciding controversies, the entire history of dogmas and dogmatics is a proof that the Scriptures alone cannot put an end to the contests of those who dispute about religion. As little qualified is our Bible to serve as a compendium, authorized by Heaven, of religious doctrine, like a catechism or a system of dogmas.

The true loftiness, magnificence, and divinity of the Bible *do not* lie in what recalls and stands in analogy with scientific theorems and dogmatic formulas. Yet such was the character given to it by our older Church theology, by means of its peculiar view of revelation. The Bible necessarily acquired a theological character, was considered as the complete expression of revelation, made and prepared once for all. Thus theological doctrine, at least in theory, was placed in such a direct dependence on the holy Scriptures, that a truly scientific development of it was impossible. The Roman Catholic

Church secured a certain freedom for itself by its traditions, but no relief was afforded to scientific theology by the doctrine of tradition.

It was not the fault of the fundamental principle of Protestantism that theological freedom was so often fettered by this erroneous view of revelation, as directly imparted *knowledge*. The Bible is, not the only source of religious knowledge, but the *norm* of it. It is the only authentic and original source of knowledge concerning revelation which we have, but not the only one. We read in the Bible of many prophetic and historical books now lost, the book of Jasher (or the Upright), a third letter of Paul to the Corinthians, a letter of the same apostle to the Laodiceans,—books whose immediate connection with the divine revelation, and therefore whose canonical dignity, would not be denied if we possessed them. It is well known what a difficulty our older theologians found in any inspired book being permitted to perish, and how they tried to evade the difficulty by assuming that the books lost were not really lost, but were inserted in the canon under other names, or that those really lost were not inspired, holy books. Hence they invented an attribute of the Bible, called *integritas*, which meant that no canonical books had been permitted to perish, and another called *sinceritas*, which meant that no text was so corrupted that it could not be restored by critical art,—two imaginary qualities which for a long time seriously restricted the scientific study of the holy Scriptures.

The New Testament nowhere makes any claim to be the only source of knowledge on the subject of the Christian revelation. The purpose of our gospels plainly is, to render permanent the oral apostolic preaching on the facts of the Christian revelation, by fixing them in writing. It declares that the apostolic teaching is the only human source of knowledge concerning the revelation of God in Christ. (See Luke i, 2. Acts xx, 26. 2 Pet. ii, 1. 1 John i, 1; ii, 18–27; iv, 1–3. 2 John 6–11. Jude 3. 1 Cor. xv, 1. Gal. i, 7. Col. ii, 6. 1 Thesa. iv, 1. 2 Thesa. ii, 15; iii, 6. 1 Tim. iv, 6; vi, 3, 20. 2 Tim. i, 13; ii, 2; iii, 14.) It does not even claim to be an absolutely complete account of the apostles' preaching and doctrine, which, indeed, it could not be, for not one of its writers

had any thought, when he wrote, that what he was writing would be collected, together with other writings, into a collection of sacred books. Still further, our New Testament writings presuppose in the persons to whom they are addressed a previous oral communication of the teaching of the apostles, and in some cases this is expressly referred to by the authors. (See 1 Cor. xi, 2, 34; xv, 1. Col. ii, 6. 1 Thea. iv. 1. 2 Thea. ii, 15; iii, 6. 1 Tim. vi, 20. 2 Tim. i, 13; ii, 3, 14. 1 John ii, 24. 2 Peter iii, 1.) But though the possibility cannot be denied, there were other witnesses of the same kind, outside of our New Testament, yet since none of them have come down to us, it remains certain that the holy Scriptures are the only source of our knowledge concerning the revelation of God in Christ. But this is not the same as to say, with our older theology, that they are absolutely the only source of all Christian and religious truth. This could be truly said only if the devout Christian had within his horizon, not the whole world, but revelation only, and if he were isolated from the circle of events in which God, nevertheless, placed him, or else if it were not possible for him to know all things in a Christian way, but only religious things.

If all religious truth is exclusively to be found in the Bible, then we must there seek and find our answer to every question which forces itself upon the thinking Christian. But that would be to return to the so-called "Scripture learning" of centuries gone by, which is so nearly related to the much-derided methods of the Jewish rabbis. For a like cause produces like results; and if one believes that he must find in the Bible what he needs, or thinks he needs, for every Christian necessity, he will find it there, at any cost, whether it really exists there or not. He will certainly, and in the best faith, be driven to an arbitrary and fanciful exegesis, which he will glorify as the only Christian gnosis. The tendency of Protestant Christianity is, not to limit Christian knowledge to the Bible, but to find its sources in the whole world of nature and history, and to consider the Bible, not as an isolated world by itself, but in connection with the whole of the history with which it is in fact interlocked, and from whose hand it has been received by Christianity. And if it be asked how the great

problem of our day, which is, how to free the mass of educated men from their estrangement to the holy Scripture, can be solved,—the reply must be, by placing the Bible before them in contact and organic union with the great world in the midst of which we dwell; that is, by means of the proof of its continuity with the history of the world, even in its innermost mechanism. Every earnest attempt in this direction has a claim to the warmest thanks of those of our contemporaries who consider Christ the Palladium of humanity, however much or little they find themselves in agreement with the principles which underlie that attempt.

I thoroughly believe that there is a real, fruitful development of the truth planted in the world by revelation, through the influence of revelation itself. Revelation has really entered into history, is really in the world as a world-historical power, not merely because it is written upon paper. Its complete understanding is only attainable by means of the completest apparatus of knowledge. The apostolic setting forth of revelation and of the Redeemer, as we have it in the New Testament, is thus perfectible, capable of advancement to the end of time; but in one direction it cannot be improved, its purity, and truth, and the living freshness of its coloring. If any one, in contemplating our Lord and Saviour, has any true perception of the exceeding glory of his spiritual beauty and grandeur, he will be convinced that the absolute understanding and appreciation of the revelation of God in Him can only be the last and highest flower of that knowledge which humanity, renewed through him, can attain to. Whoever decides otherwise forms an impious judgment, his Saviour is not really great to him, not really the holy one of God in his heart. The first witnesses *could not*, as he walked through the earth, a wonder and a mystery alike to friends and foes, construct a complete picture of him, though they alone could receive into themselves a *correct* image of him, and offer it for others to use.

The whole Christian history is the only commentary adequate for the complete exposition of the Grace and Truth that entered into our world; and we, if we truly believe in the Lord Jesus, may understand him more completely than the twelve who ate and drank with him. The highest and most

wonderful mystery, that hidden in God through the ages, has come into the world, and become audible and openly known in it. (See Matt. xi, 25; xiii, 11. John i, 14, 18; iii, 11; xiv, 9, 16, 17; xv, 15, 26; xvi, 13. 1 John i, 1; ii, 27. Rom. xi, 25; xvi, 25. 1 Cor. ii, 6-16; iv, 1; xv, 51. Eph. i, 9; iii, 3, 9. Col. i, 26; ii, 2; iv, 3. 1 Tim. iii, 16.) Divine revelation opens to us a whole new field of vision, deep into the invisible world, places before our eyes facts which the limitations of our natural horizon have placed beyond our reach, and takes away our previous ideas, as childish prejudices. Far from limiting human reason, the Scriptures rather remove its limitations, and give it a new and free outlook.

The description of the holy Scriptures which we have given is certainly different from the picture drawn by the orthodox theology; but the position of heart toward the Bible of him who believes thus in divine revelation, does not differ by a hair's breadth from that of the orthodox believer in the Scriptures. His reverence for it as a sacred thing and his worship in its temple are no less sincere, deep, and warm than those of the simple, child-like devout person who, without reflection, looks upon the holy Scriptures as verbally dictated by the Holy Spirit himself. The holiness and the entire uniqueness of the Scriptures rest upon what they really are, not on qualities which dogmatics imposes upon them, and arbitrarily assigns to them. The more divine the Bible actually is, the more profitable will it be to place its high quality where it actually exists, and not in what has been foisted upon it from foreign theological necessities. It is of no advantage to it to place it in a role for which it was not made. But let us not make the term "holy," when applied to revelation or to Christianity or to the Bible, mean something contrary to nature, something fantastic, in order to put their supernaturalness in a clearer light. Let us take it as it is, without the preliminary assistance of any dogmatic mystagogue, and it will testify of its own greatness and divinity. The signs of its inspiration are, according to its own declaration (2 Tim. iii, 16), that it is useful for reproof, for doctrine, for instruction. We imagine that our religious necessities cannot be satisfied without an externally authorized book of doctrine, a hand-book imparted by God himself, in which

we can find ready, infallible answers to all the religious questions which we can ever ask. Well, then, let us find such a book, if we can; but the Bible is not it, is not any such book. Let us not make it an oracle, which can be made to speak to suit us, and let us not overlook in how many ways it is rather given to us as a problem.

This discussion, now brought to an end, has contained very little that is new, or that will be controverted by many readers. I have, in all essential matters, only expressed the general testimony of our modern, believing German theologians, with this difference, that they strive to keep as close as possible to the modes of expression found in our old dogmatic ecclesiastic formulas, while I have rather been anxious to express myself as clearly as possible, not as though my object were to differ from the traditional formulas of the Church theology as little as possible. The theology now dominant declares very plainly that it has given up the old mechanical doctrine of the inspiration of the Scriptures, but it cannot easily be got to say in what sense it holds them to be inspired, what conception it would substitute for the one thrown aside. This reluctance has a very honorable side, for it is grounded on a perception of the extraordinary practical difficulties which attend all dogmatic improvements in this doctrine.

Whoever contends that the historical-critical investigation of the Bible ought to precede its dogmatic use, teaches that this criticism may find that not everything it contains is susceptible of proof, that many of its books do not belong to the writers to whom they have been ascribed, that parts of its historical narratives, on purely historical grounds, cannot be accepted,—whoever holds to these and such as these openly, will certainly give a shock to a large part of what is called the believing portion of any Christian community. But the question arises, whether it is right, in accordance with Christian duty, to give way to this feeling. At any rate the present condition of the matter is one which cannot continue. It is impossible and thoroughly unevangelical to permit a state of things to continue, in which, on the one side, theology treats the Bible critically, and, therefore, holds a view of it quite at variance with the conception of the Church dogmatics, and, on the other hand, Christian be-

lievers in general adhere to the latter without being at all perplexed or disturbed on the part of theology. It cannot and ought not to remain thus. Truth and honor must be reached by both parties, but the problem of how this can be done naturally devolves entirely upon theology. The necessity of the historical-critical treatment of the Scriptures must be brought to recognition in the very bosom of the Church. The problem is doubtless a difficult one, but it cannot be insoluble. It is more difficult because so long neglected, so that there is no foundation to build upon. It is our duty to show to the non-theological part of the Church, that the application of the historical criticism to the Bible is not the child of unbelief nor of a rationalism which rejects revelation, but a procedure which the evangelical Church cannot reject, so long as it remains true to its fundamental principle. To conceal from the laity the difficulties which an unprejudiced criticism discovers, especially in the Old Testament, would be an unjust and unlovely deed, as well as a foolish. The result would be that many who now have doubts, would come to a total disbelief, and reject the Bible, as a book in which no secure ground could be found.

Though what I have written may seem cold, it comes from a warm heart, and is the word of one who, for his own part, bows before the Bible, and well knows that in it he possesses a sanctuary, of which he can say, "Here is none other than the house of God and here is the gate of heaven."

ARTICLE III.—ASPECTS OF THEISM.

It is but a little while since, in the popular conception, the earth was the sum of creation, and 6000 years the total of past time. The stars were points of light, fixed in a blue vault just overhead, or holes in the floor of heaven through which beamed the upper glory. The conception of natural law was almost unknown; and events were thought to come and go at the changeful wills of invisible beings behind them.

Now, all this has changed. The blue vault has gone. The stars have receded into space, and expanded into orbs, small indeed through distance, yet blazing, many of them, with the force of thousands of suns like ours. The limit of telescopic vision now describes a sphere, whose diameter is over seven millions of years, as flies the light. Forty-six years ago, the rays started from the pole star, by which the sailor and fugitive shall steer their course to-night; but the pole star is a near neighbor, compared with the outlying pickets of the celestial host. Taking even solar systems as the unit, the imagination is bewildered at the multitude of the starry hosts that encamp, or maneuver, within the present sphere of telescopic vision. And yet no one is narrow enough to imagine that the frontiers of being have been reached. On the contrary, every astronomer rather believes that when the magnifier of twenty, or fifty, thousand power shall come, it will only bring, so to speak, new universes into view.

The same is true in time. The idea of a creation instantaneously perfected, is fading from the minds of men; much more the thought that creation took place but 6000 years ago. It is coming to be viewed as an evolving rather than an event; as a process, demanding the roll of almost infinite years; as being, what the Bible calls it, a *genesis*, that is, a birth, with the necessarily accompanying idea of long time, and deferred perfection. The magnificent chronometry of geology, and astronomy, gives a mushroom air to the oldest human monuments, and furnishes us with time units, to which the whole of recorded history is

but a simple beat of the clock. Yet stupendous as this chronometry is, it brings us not to a lonely God. At the farthest point we reach, we find nature's forces toiling as busily then as now.

Yet in all this vast space and time the profoundest order is seen. The drove of invisibles has been relieved from duty, and their places have been assumed by the steady laws; laws whose rule the atom cannot escape, nor the mightiest system defy. Nowhere in space a lawless planet, or an atom beyond control. Nowhere in time a disconnected event. To-day is everywhere the child of yesterday, and the parent of to-morrow. In geology, the struggling forces seem ever working toward a goal, which is never out of sight. At times, indeed, fire and flood seem about to visit the earth with universal destruction; but when their work is done, apparent disaster appears as the birth-throe of something higher. The once disorderly mob of organic phenomena has disclosed its uniformities too, and the wonder grows every day. What power is seen in space! What patience, what constancy of purpose in time! What marvellous mechanism and foresight in organic structures! Surely, if the argument from the universe to God were ever true, it must be truer than ever now.

But was it ever true? Unquestionably, if the little, childish heavens of the earlier times declared the glory of God, much more does the boundless Kosmos of to-day. But has not a deeper knowledge of matter and its laws rendered less imperative the need of a superintending God? and is it not possible that the end of science will be to formulate all phenomena of the universe, alike material and spiritual, in terms of matter and force? These are questions which are haunting many minds, and those not the worst. For it cannot be denied, that there has been an increase of atheism in the last fifty years. But the strange thing about it is, that this revival of atheism is due to the advance of the natural sciences. It would seem, at first sight, as if Theism ought to find its strongest advocates among the students of nature; but it is a fact, that, from the time of Anaxagoras, scientific study has tended to embarrass belief. Atheism might seem excusable in the student of his-

tory, or social science; for to him, as to Macbeth, life must often seem like

“——— a tale

Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.”

But atheism begins not with him. Indeed, belief, and trust, in God are generally strongest among those best acquainted with the despair-provoking facts of human history. It is the student of science, the man best acquainted with nature's calm uniformity, with its stupendous powers, and the ineffable perfection of its mechanism; it is this man, who, though surrounded with the plainest, and choicest tokens of Divine Wisdom, first learns to suspect the absence of the Eternal Mind.

The fundamental reason of this strange fact will appear hereafter. Meanwhile, a partial reason is found in the radical change in our conceptions of the Divine method, which science has made imperative. As against an instantaneous obedience to the creative fiat, it affirms infinite time, and infinitesimal gradation. As against a distinct creation of the several varieties of living things, it has become very probable that this complex harmony of life is but a variation on a single string. How a discovery of the Creator's method should prove that there is no Creator, is not entirely clear; yet with many minds such seems to be the conclusion.

The effect upon the natural theologian's argument has been to render obsolete many of the earlier modes of statement and conception. Yet nervous and short-sighted minds never fail to identify the form of an argument with the principle that underlies it. Hence we have, on the one hand, religious people, who are tormented with a nightmare fear, a feverish dread, lest the advancing tide of physical knowledge should rob them both of their souls and of their God; and, on the other hand, a kind of scientific bush-whacker, who, on every new extension of the reign of law, hastens to announce his conviction that God cannot last much longer; that, after one or two more efforts, science will drive Him clean over the brink of the solid world, and leave Him in the abysses.

But, although the overthrow of the design argument is so loudly proclaimed, it seems to us to be as valid as ever. The

various development hypotheses would, if true, change our conception of the method of the Divine working; but they would in no wise enable the reason to dispense with a Divine Worker as the only tenable explanation of the universe. What then is the design argument? and what is essential to it?

As has been acutely said, the ordinary statement of the argument, namely, that design proves a designer, involves a begging of the question. Of course, design proves a designer; but how is it known that any given adaptation is really the work of design? why might it not have been the product of chance?

To this it is replied, that the adaptations are too many, too complex, and too accurate, to admit of such an explanation. A few adaptations, it is true, would not warrant the conclusion; but, when the world is full of them, and those of the most various and complex nature, the only theory that can at all account for them is a Presiding Intelligence, realizing in these adaptations, and purpose-like functions, His own predetermined plan and purpose. The design argument is best summed, and, indeed, most forcibly presented, in the words of Scripture: He that made the eye, shall He not see? He that formed the ear, shall He not hear? He that giveth man knowledge, shall not He know?

Now upon this argument we observe

1. The question of the Divine method is entirely foreign to it. It leaves the method of nature to science; and seeks only to determine its cause.

2. It neither assumes, nor denies, that God has used natural agencies in working His will. This is partially coincident with the previous statement, but has a different bearing.

3. Whatever the method, and whatever the means, of the Divine working, all accomplished thereby is as truly His work, as if He had come in immediate contact with each result. The pattern in a damask web is the work of the weaver, even though he uses a loom.

4. The argument does not assume that the purpose, on which it is based, is final; but only that it is purpose. Whether immediate, or final, does not affect the conclusion. Neglect of this distinction has betrayed teleology into many puerilities; and has partly justified the contempt with which the doctrine

has been visited. In the highest sense we are ignorant of the final purpose of anything. The organ exists for the organism; the organism for the species, and so on, in ever widening cycles of purpose, up to that Ultimate Purpose, "to which the whole creation moves;" and in which, even pain, and fang, and venom find their reason and justification.

The truth of the first position is obvious. Hence there is no need to notice those who insist that every teleologist must believe in a "mechanical Deity," a "carpenter theory," &c. He need not, unless he chooses, believe that God first provided a heap of bones, muscles, tendons, and tubes, of various sizes; and then, by skillfully splicing these together, produced a first organism. Nor is he required, by his principles, to believe that God is a clay modeller, which, according to some, is the leading idea in the "cosmogony of the semi-barbarous Hebrew." These caricatures, stale as they are silly, may well be allowed to take care of themselves. We repeat it: the argument from design does not concern itself with the Divine method.

The truth of the second position, that the argument neither assumes, nor denies, that God has worked by natural agencies, is equally obvious. The idea that God has employed nature in working His will, was, in a measure, foreign to modern thought, until it was made prominent by physical investigations. And even yet there is a feeling with many, that it would be more fitting for God to work without instruments than with them. To this we can only say: who knows what is fitting for God? Indeed the more one thinks of it, the more fitting does it seem that God should work through the nature He has made. What grander view can we have of nature than that all its toiling powers, gravitation, chemical affinity, heat, magnetism, electricity, all are even now but subject forces "fulfilling His word?" In what is His dignity lowered if He make the winds His angels, and flaming fire His minister?

The last question recalls the fact that to the earlier, oriental thought, the idea of nature, as active in creation, was most familiar. Nowhere is there bolder naturalism than in the Bible; and nowhere in the Bible, than in the much-reviled "cosmogony of the semi-barbarous Hebrew." There the com-

mand is: "Let the earth bring forth (give birth to) grass," etc. Let the waters bring forth (give birth to) the moving creature," etc. "Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind," etc.: and it was so. The plain teaching here is, that the earth and water were real, producing causes; that there was first a going forth of the creative word; and then nature was left to itself to work out by slow, natural process the Divine command. Had Moses intended to teach an immediate creation, words were not wanting to do so. The strange commands to the earth and ocean, the constant use of words of birth, and natural process, to describe their operations, must strike the candid mind as strong proof that Moses intended to teach the natural in creation.

But we are wandering from the point. Whether science, in insisting that natural agencies are always employed in producing effects, is, or is not, reviving a thought of the earlier time, is a matter of indifference. The Theist asks for the cause of nature, not the subordinate agencies by which it has been modified.

Hence the various development theories do not at all affect the fact of design in nature, but only the way in which it has been accomplished. The fact of adaptation, complex, accurate, universal adaptation, is admitted by all; nature is full of what can be interpreted only as the result of purpose. Take the function of reproduction, running as it does through all organic nature; it is inconceivable that this is the work of chance. That a living thing should be the product of a chance meeting of chemical elements, involves improbabilities of a very high order; but that such a chance production should also possess an apparatus for transmitting its existence involves improbabilities of an infinitely higher order. This function looks to the future; to the preservation of the species; its purpose is evident; and it is evidently purpose. Take the eye, with its complex and accurate adjustment of lenses, focal distances, etc. It furnishes the only example of that great desideratum of optics, the perfectly achromatic lens; it is the most perfect camera ever made; and is in addition self-adjusting. Now can any one doubt that the eye was intended to see with? It is needless to multiply illustrations. Here are results stamped with foresight and purpose. We ask how came these things so; and the evolutionist

begins to disclose the machinery of natural causes by which they were wrought out. But then the machinery needs explanation : we care not one fig for this machinery ; who thinks the web explained by referring it, not to the weaver, but to the loom ?

“ God is law, say the wise, O Soul, and let us rejoice,
For if He thunder by law, the thunder is still His voice.”

Yet it must be admitted, that, with most minds, the result of establishing such a theory as that of Mr. Darwin, would be to deprive the argument from design of very much of its force. When we look at the world as it is, Mind seems apparent everywhere ; but, when we turn to the long time, and fine gradation, through which the present perfection has been reached, the distinctness of the impression is lost. A purpose instantaneously executed would indicate the existence of Mind ; but a purpose accomplishing itself only in the roll of ages hardly seems purpose at all. Children of a day ourselves, we forget that “ a thousand years in His sight are but as yesterday when it is past, and as a watch in the night.” The long time and slow progress bewilder us ; and the thought arises, that, possibly, time can do the work of intelligence. We should blush to the eyebrows to say that chance could produce a perfect animal in a month or a year ; but it seems quite credible that it should do so in infinite time. To steal the work of intelligence outright, is not to be thought of ; but to steal it by infinitesimals, is not so bad after all. Only give us something to start with, some atom of protoplasm, struck into life by electricity ; the merest speck of organization, so small that it would be mean to begrudge it ; and let this have an infinitesimal increment : it is all we ask. Time works wonders. That which was nothing in the beginning, might become everything in the end ; and even the intelligence, which nature seems to manifest, might prove a function of time.

Now to a scepticism of this kind it is useless to present instances of design. “ I admit,” the sceptic says, “ that these things look as if designed ; but you have not proved that they are designed. I more than suspect that matter and its forces afford an exhaustive explanation of the phenomena.” The teleologist might object that design is shown in the prepara-

tions for life. If water were as unstable as many of the nitrogen compounds, constant explosions would devastate the earth and life would be impossible. If, on the other hand, the carbon, hydrogen, and nitrogen compounds were as stable as the inorganic compounds, life would also be impossible. Many arguments of this kind might be offered; but the answer is obvious. These elements were not made as they are that there might be life; but there is life because they are as they are. To cut the roots of scepticism like this, one must use keener arguments than those drawn from design.

But let us first get the case clearly before us. Nature *seems* to be the abode and manifestation of a superintending Mind. The laws of nature and of mind are identical. Take the myriad applications of mathematics to physics. Mathematical truths are products not of nature but of reason; they are home-born; and yet they agree with the external facts, what reason says ought to be, observation says is. Reason says the planets ought to obey the law of the inverse square; observation shows that they do. Reason gives the law of uniformly accelerated forces; observation verifies it. Now if nature is not informed with a Reason other than our own, how is it that our reason can discover its laws? Or consider the higher classifications of science; they are not the products of nature but of reason. Nature presents us only with a multitude of disconnected individuals; the intellect is the crucible in which the many are fused into one. The order of nature is a thought-order. It was first born in the mind as an hypothesis, and was then tested by experiment.

Now how is it that no scientific man ever dreams of proposing a system which is clearly seen to be unreasonable? How is it that of two systems that which is more in accordance with reason is at once preferred to the other? And how is it that of many systems that which is most in accordance with the laws of thought is always most accordant with the laws of nature? Who could accept the cumbrous Ptolemaic system after the more simple one of Newton had been discovered, even though the former were so aided by cycle and epicycle that it would account for all the motions of the planets? Why this, if it be not an implicit postulate of all science that the reason-

able and the natural are one? Again, the assumption of purpose as a fact in nature has often led to the most important discoveries. Scientific men assume it as an axiom that every organ has its purpose, and whole sciences, as comparative anatomy, are built upon it. It is admitted, too, that nature cannot be described without assuming the reality of contrivance therein. Even the most sceptical as to final causes allow that the most cautious naturalist cannot always avoid using the language of contrivance. The sum is this: here are the laws of nature like the edicts of an eternal Reason: here are the scientific systems, which express at once the order of human thought, and the order of external nature; here is the fact, that assuming contrivance and purpose in nature, it becomes luminous and harmonious, and denying them, nature becomes an incomprehensible enigma: yet all this we are told proves no Divine Intelligence. The forces of matter, in their countless turnings and twistings, have produced all this order and beauty. It is indeed true that nature's harmony outruns our highest reason, but it is equally true that this harmony is the product of no reason.

It might seem needless to go further; but there is a deep-rooted scepticism, which, haunted by the thought that intelligence may correlate with time, finds no impossibility even in this. Commonly, the theory which best explains the facts is accepted at once. The vibratory theory of light and heat explains more facts than the emission theory, and hence is received as a scientific truth. If any other theory should ever be framed which would better explain the facts, that would in turn be received. But on this subject we reason differently. The hypothesis of a Living God is admitted by everyone to be all-sufficient to explain the universe, but it is the last one to be accepted. Every other hypothesis is full of breaks, which, in the present state of science, are utterly impassable; but instead of rejecting them, as is the rule in every other scientific question, the proper method is to retreat into the past eternity, and fall to romancing upon possibilities. And these creations of fancy, supported mainly by the possible unknown, but contradicted by positive knowledge, these are brought forth as scientific doctrines, while the belief in a Living God is looked upon as an indication of mental weakness.

But let us examine the claims of the rivals of Jehovah. Let us admit, too, far more than their adherents have ever proved, and see if they have any warrant whatever for laying claim to the throne of the Living God.

There are two applicants for the throne; on the one hand, Law, and on the other, Matter and Force. We will examine their claims in order.

We must ask pardon of our readers for offering another explanation of this trite term, Law. The amount of wretched conjuring with it, in the interests of atheism, must be our excuse. What now is a scientific law?

Without stopping to explain the method of discovery, this is admitted by all scientific men, that the laws of strictly inductive science are but generalizations from observed facts, and, even when correct, express only orders of coëxistence and orders of succession; that is, they tell the order in which things exist and the order in which changes flow. It must be observed that such a law is but the summation of the observations, and hence gives no new knowledge. It is only an epitome, a short-hand expression, of the observed facts; and being such, must ever be held subservient to the fact. It not infrequently happens that the so-called scientific law stands in the way of knowledge, because investigators, forgetting how the law was discovered, tend to bend the fact to the law, instead of the law to the fact. To make the law anything more than an expression of coëxistence or sequence, science must draw upon the *à priori* conceptions of the mind; but everyone knows that it is the boast and glory of science that it eschews *à priori* principles.

But if this is the gist of the scientific idea of law, it is needless to point out how incapable law is of explaining anything. For, suppose the law correct, which it seldom is; suppose the whole universe arranged in lines of coëxistence and succession; then when science had done its work, all the work it can ever do, still nothing would be explained. We should have the *how* of the universe, but not the *why*; and the *why* would demand solution more strongly than ever, after the discovery of the universal order. It is a matter for profoundest wonder that any one should ever have been deluded, for a moment, by this empty gabble about "creation by law," "result of law," etc., etc.

The tendency of the human mind to personify its abstractions is indeed remarkable, but the whole history of metaphysics cannot furnish a more striking illustration of it than this one furnished by "exact science." The schoolmen have supplied many a frightful example of this metaphysical tendency, where-with to point a scientific moral, or adorn a scientific tale. But as long as scientific men hold up this most inane conception of law as the rival of the Living God, they have little cause to rail at any set of opinions under heaven. The laws of nature are the methods of nature, and themselves need explanation. Why does nature move along these lines which seem such transcripts of the Supreme Reason? Why not along lines of confusion and chaos? The latter are infinite; the former are few. How does it happen that the former are chosen, and the latter avoided? The law, instead of explaining the fact, is the very fact to be explained.

Comte's philosophy furnishes excellent examples of this false elevation of laws, which are but generalized phenomena, into real, causal agencies. Causes, he insists, are beyond the reach of the mind. Laws have nothing causal in them, but are only expressions of coëxistence and succession. Even gravitation is no real, causative agency, but a generalized phenomenon. These features constitute his philosophy "positive." Yet, when he comes to treat of final causes, then, in the name of gravitation as a real force, he attempts, to use his own language, to "conduct God to the border, and bow Him out with thanks for His provisional services." It is needless to point out the contradictions of the position.

Matter and Force, or matter and its forces, form the only real rival to Jehovah. As the claims of Law, when translated into exact expression, prove to be arrant nonsense, so we shall find the claims of this usurper to rest upon, either incomplete analysis of scientific teaching, or confused and contradictory notions of force and causation. We are now nearing the root of the long-standing quarrel between science and religion. But to get the case clearly before us, some preliminary statement is necessary.

When it was believed that the members of the solar system were formed, in the first instance, as they are now, and planted

in their present orbits by the Divine Hand, natural theologians saw evidence of wise design in the relative arrangement of its parts. The existence of the sun in the center of the system; the small eccentricity of the planets' orbits, whereby any great variation of light and heat is prevented; the exact balance of central and tangential forces, by which the planet is kept in its orbit; all these things told of an adapting intelligence. On our own planet, they found marks of mind in the alternation of the seasons, and of day and night. The relative adjustments of land and water, and a thousand other things, told the same story of a superintending Mind.

But if the nebular theory be true, and very few astronomers doubt it, how can such a claim be maintained? The nebulous matter of which the system was built up began to condense by virtue of attraction; and the chances were infinite that it would begin to revolve also. This revolution called the inertia of matter into play, producing a centrifugal force. By further condensation, the rate of revolution was necessarily increased, and the centrifugal force increased also. Finally, at the orbit of Neptune, over the equator of the revolving mass, the centrifugal force became equal to the attraction, and on further condensation, a ring of matter was left behind, which afterward collected into the planet Neptune. This planet would have an orbit of small eccentricity, that is, nearly circular; it would revolve on its axis, which would produce day and night; and, the shock at collecting into one mass almost inevitably shifting the plane of the orbit, it would have seasons. In the same way the other planets would be formed.

Again, in condensation heat would be produced. This would call into action electric, magnetic, and chemical forces, and these by their interactions would finally bring the earth to its present form and condition. Hence it might be claimed, and probably with justice, that the present condition of the solar system, together with all those aspects which once seemed the work of purpose, are an exact, though undetermined, function of gravitation and inertia. How then can they be expressive of intelligence? Gravitation and inertia give an exhaustive explanation of the facts; why seek further? We may shrink from the conclusion, but the reason is satisfied. A physical

explanation of the facts is found, and honor binds us to accept it.

Here then, in a most conspicuous case, matter seems to be doing the work of mind. Now the radical scientific position is, that if our analysis were more subtle, and our faculties more acute, we could explain the most complex organization in the same way; that we could begin with the simple properties of matter, and mount, by an unbroken chain of cause and effect, to the highest forms of life. Already molecular mechanics are claiming control of chemistry; chemistry is pushing its frontiers far over into physiology; and physiology is heir prospective to the mental and moral sciences.

Here is the real root of the inveterate quarrel between science and religion; here is the fundamental cause of the strange fact, before noticed, that scientific study has always tended to embarrass belief. It is the thought that what is the product of physical necessity cannot at the same time be expressive of purpose; that the realm of nature and the realm of God are mutually exclusive. For matter itself bears no traceable tokens of origination; whatever, therefore, can be referred to its forces demands no further explanation. But the belief in an unbroken chain of cause and effect throughout all nature, is growing every day. Science is disclosing, as never before, the continuity of nature, from the lowest to the highest forms. Many breaks have been insisted upon; but, one by one, these are filling up, and grassing over. The situation is this: matter and its inherent forces already explain much, and are daily explaining more. Every fact ranged under a physical law is so much wrested from the government of God. The goal is evident. Natural laws are able to administer themselves. God is only a provisional hypothesis to explain outstanding facts, and is sure to be displaced by advancing knowledge.

No wonder that religion, prompted by an unerring instinct, has looked with suspicion on all attempts to formulate nature. Not that order is incompatible with will, because the Theist has always taught, that with Him is no variableness, neither shadow of turning; but because this necessary working of matter seems to exclude both the action and the need of intelligence; science at once puts on a fixed and fate-like aspect, at

which every high faith of the soul silently withers, and every high emotion cries out in mortal anguish. Hence the pertinacity with which Theists have sought for breaks in the physical chain; and hence it is, that, as chasm after chasm has filled up, they have felt as if the ground were slipping from under their feet, and the end of physical inquiry must be to elevate matter to the throne of God. But we must confess that we feel rather suspicious of an argument for the Divine existence, based on nature's disorder and breaks, rather than on its order and continuity. For if the disorder should ever be reduced, and the breaks mended, which is not at all unlikely, what then would become of the conclusion?

But let us return to the argument. The position of the objector is briefly this. From the original nebulous condition of matter we can satisfactorily argue to the striking physical aspects of the solar system, and its members. A deeper knowledge would doubtless trace results into the more minute and specific. A complete knowledge of the powers at work in the original *nebulæ*, would show that even the most specific and complex forms of existence are, in the same way, but the mathematical resultant of the forces originally in collision. If it be so, God would be an unnecessary hypothesis.

At first sight, the supposition seems too monstrously absurd to be entertained for a moment. It is certain that our present knowledge is very far from warranting it. Still science is looking in that direction; and some men venture to support the proposition. Let it then, for argument's sake, stand as proved; the atheistic conclusion would still be untenable. Mechanical atheism is not only incredible, but impossible; as we shall prove.

Reserving for the present the more decisive considerations, it may be said that physical necessity does not necessarily exclude the action of intelligence. If God chose to use natural agencies, then He would use them. If He chose to employ a nature, then He would observe the laws of that nature. To work without means is credible; to work by means is also credible; but to work by means, and at the same time disregard the law, or nature, of the means, is a contradiction. If, we repeat, God chose to work through nature, then He would work

according to the laws of nature. If He should commission attraction to build up the solar system, the work would be done in accordance with the laws of attraction. Hence if we could in any way possess ourselves of a knowledge of nature's laws, and could find the course of the Divine thought, then we could, by reason, deduce the result which God was seeking to accomplish. That result would be the product of necessity, and at the same time the product of Intelligence. So far indeed is this fixity of nature from excluding Mind, that it is the very fact which fits it to be the servant of Mind. Imagine the result if its laws were fluctuating and uncertain. Foresight and calculation would be impossible; and all dependence on nature would be at an end. Man can use a fixed nature to accomplish his plans; why cannot God do the same?

But the atheistic objection is, not that Mind cannot use a fixed nature, but that matter working according to fixed laws accounts for the facts. Now the considerations just offered do not meet this objection. Still less is it met by that miserable parody of an argument, that there is no necessity in nature, only invariability. The laws of nature have, indeed, always been as they are, and always will be as they are, but there is no necessity in the case. A stone when unsupported has always fallen to the ground, and always will; but the necessity, says Mr. Huxley, "is a shadow of the mind's own throwing." If any one can find refuge from atheism in the distinction between absolute invariability and necessity, he is welcome to it; but to most minds the distinction is a wretched quibble. A consideration of the doctrine of force is the only thing that can prevent matter from putting on independent airs, and reduce it to its true, subordinate position.

The great discovery of recent times is said to be the unity of the forces. Toiling muscle and busy brain, nestling grass and flower, climbing vine and tree, the earthquake's convulsive throes and the volcano's thunder shout, the circling system and the glowing sun, all these manifest but one force. So the wise men say. Well, grant it. Grant too that this force inheres in matter; still such a force cannot be eternal in its operations.

The scientific language concerning force is exceedingly confused, and often, when translated into exact expression, mean-

ingless. But science cannot complain, if we use its own language.

Material forces cannot be eternal in their operations, unless reinforced by forces not material, because they are constantly suffering diminution, both by direct loss and by equilibration. The centers of heat, as the sun and fixed stars, are constantly throwing off heat into space. Some of this is intercepted by the planets, and by each other; but the most of it is forever lost in the "void and formless infinite" of space. This process cannot be eternal. Already we have computations to determine how much longer the sun can burn. It is admitted that the sun must go out. What a loss of force is here?

Equilibration, too, is disposing of the forces of affinity, whether chemical or electric. In an electrically-excited body, the two electricities tend to rush together, and when this is accomplished, they are dynamically dead, until reëxcited by external power. In chemistry, every chemical seeks its affinity; and when this is found, a certain amount of force becomes dynamically extinct, that is, incapable of producing sensible motion. To a great extent this has been done already. The ocean is a vast bed of hydrogen ashes. The crust of the earth is made up of oxides, chlorides, sulphides, etc., in all of which chemical affinity has established equilibrium, and sunk to rest. It might be said that in reaching this condition an equivalent amount of force was released, since chemical combination is always attended by the emission of heat. But the principle of the persistence of force forbids such an assumption. For if they released an equivalent amount of force, their whole power would have been expended in such release, and there would be no force left to hold the chemicals in combination. But they are held together by a force with which no mechanical power can come into comparison. Professor Tyndall, speaking of the mechanical equivalent of the power developed in combining oxygen and hydrogen to form water, says :

"I have seen the wild stone-avalanches of the Alps smoke and thunder down the declivities with a vehemence almost sufficient to stun the observer. I have also seen snow flakes descending so gently as not to hurt the fragile spangles of which they were composed; yet to produce, from aqueous vapor, a quantity of that tender material which a child could carry, demands the exertion of an energy competent to gather up the shattered blocks of the largest stone-avalanche I have

ever seen, and hurl them to twice the height from which they fell."—(*Heat as Mode of Motion*, p. 164.)

Such is the power that must be overcome in raising a few pounds of snow to the gaseous condition. How inconceivable then the power that lies dead in the waters of the ocean and the crust of the earth. But why dead? Because, by the principle of persistence of force, to release these affinities from equilibrium, would require the equilibration of an equal amount of force. An equal amount indeed could not release them; for, the combination representing a certain force, a new and equal force would already be in equilibrium with it; and no motion could result. These forces, then, when once in equilibrium, are like a strong man bound, and cannot be released, except by a stronger than they. Hence, as, whenever one force is released, another must go into bondage, every equilibrated force is a direct subtraction from the working power of the whole. It is not, indeed, dead, but sleeping; and is lost to the *dunamis* of the universe.

What must the end be? What must be the final result of this constant equilibration of chemical and electric affinities; together with the incalculable loss of force by the radiation of heat? The goal is evident. Nature hastens to her grave. Heat fails. The warring electricities lie at last, slain of each other. Affinity is satisfied; and then, no light, no heat, no life, no motion; the end is death and darkness. The dream of Byron was, in very truth, "not all a dream."

" ——— The world was void,
The populous and the powerful was a lump.
Seasonless, herbless, treeless, manless, lifeless,
A lump of death, a chaos of hard clay.
The rivers, lakes, and ocean, all stood still,
And nothing stirred within their silent depths.
* * * * *

The waves were dead, the tides were in their grave,
The moon, their mistress, had expired before,
The winds were withered in the stagnant air,
And the clouds perished."

Many of the most eminent scientific men hold a theory similar to this. Some, however, while admitting that such a condition will be reached, insist that it will be only temporary.

For not only the earth with its hills, called everlasting, but the heavens themselves, grow old; and the great star-clock is running down. Both from reasoning and observation the conclusion is irresistible, that planets must finally reach their primaries, and the primaries themselves must rush together. In such collision great heat will be developed, and the nebulous condition regained. Then the freed forces begin their round of development and decay over again; and so on forever.

Of this position it may be said,

1. It denies the unity of the forces; for if gravity is really one with the other forces, then the previous considerations prove that the working power of the universe is lessening, and must at last reduce to zero.

2. It assumes the creation of force. For it teaches that gravitation, after having produced an indefinite amount of force, is still as strong as ever.

3. It assumes that the force lost by radiated heat is, in some way, to be made up; which cannot be without a creation of force.

These considerations, then, prove that material forces, if there be such, cannot be eternal in their working. If such are the only forces of the universe, in infinite past time they must have run down, and come to rest. The conclusion, then, cannot be avoided, that a self-determining force, that is, mind, volition, alone renders the universe possible.

But the active forces of the universe do not inhere in matter. Take gravitation as the great force of nature; it coördinates matter, but is not a force of matter. This is evident from an examination of the leading article in a scientific creed, the impossibility of creating force. The attraction of a mass is but the sum of attractions of the atoms; and hence, if gravitation inheres in matter at all, it must be in the individual atoms. Suppose then, that the force of attraction is inherent in the atom; the atom is constantly exerting, and hence constantly expanding force. Now, either the atom is originating power, that is, creating it; or it is losing it. The first supposition is at variance with the most elementary scientific ideas; and the second is scarcely less so. But, if it is losing power, unless the atom contains an infinite store of force, a supposition too irra-

tional to be entertained, a finite time would be sufficient to reduce its attraction to zero; and now, there ought to be no gravitation. Gravitation then cannot be the force of the atom, and we must conclude that there is a power in matter which is not of matter; that this universal force of attraction, the bond of the material universe, is not a force of that universe. But of what then is it a force? For force must inhere in something. Pure force is a pure abstraction, a nonentity; just as pure will, or pure thought, apart from a being who wills, or thinks, has no meaning and no existence. The conception of force, which many scientific writers seem to have formed, represents, when analyzed, only a highly rarefied form of matter; but this is no more the true conception of force, than a very thin gas is the true image of a soul. Force is power, but whose power? A force inhering in matter is intelligible; a force inhering in spirit is also intelligible; but a force inhering in nothing is utter nonsense. Force, no more than thought, can be conceived of as floating free. Admitted scientific dogmas, then, enforce the admission of an extra material force, coördinating the matter of the universe; and reason is forced by its own law to affirm a Spiritual Being, to whom that force belongs. Here we come again to the same conclusion as before; a Spiritual Being alone renders the universe possible.

Thus by a dialectical examination of the scientific doctrines of the unity and persistence of force, and the impossibility of creating force, we have found, that, when thoroughly analyzed, they lead to God. If these doctrines be true, God is as much the absolute, and necessary postulate of science, as He is of religion. We care not whether they be true or false. If science is false, its atheistic teachings are worthless; if it is true, they are condemned out of its own mouth.

We allowed the atheist to conjure with material forces, but proved that they can never do the work of God. We close the discussion by showing that he has no warrant for believing in material force at all; that this force, with which he conjures so mightily, means a great deal more than he admits; or it means nothing. The great medicine-man's charm has been stolen by him; it must be restored to its rightful owners.

It is the glory of science to be inductive; it deals only with

observed facts. The miserable metaphysician, with his pack of moonshine fancies, is an abomination to your genuine scientist, who prides himself on standing on the sure footing of observation and experience. But then, like the good man, who talked prose all his life without knowing it, he is forever dealing with poor metaphysics; and fancies that he is dealing only with observed facts. Who ever observed a force? Is that an inductive fact?

The moon is seen to go around the earth, and the earth around the sun; but is any force seen impelling them? A stone falls to the ground; observation can detect this; but the keenest observation cannot detect any force drawing it. In every case the idea of force is something added to the observation. Where, then, do we get it? It is one of the original conceptions of the mind, a part of its *a priori* furniture. It is carried into nature by the observing mind, not derived from it. And yet hyperphysical, and metaphysical, as this conception is, it is indispensable to the explanation of nature. Some of the more rigorous Baconians, as Comte and Mill, have attempted to exclude the conception, as without warrant. But it is curious to note the logical inconsequence into which they are constantly betrayed. This has already been illustrated in the case of Comte, by reference to his doctrine of gravitation; which he first, in order to be "positive," denounces as an abstraction; and then, to be atheistic, makes a real force capable of displacing God. Mr. Mill fills half of his *Logic* with attempts to prove that there is no active power in matter; and then, in a chapter on fallacies, he insists, not only that matter can act, but that it can act through absolutely void space, and without any media whatever. To deny this, he says, is sufficient to convict one of mental incompetency. This logic has, at least, the merit of impartiality. Like the beast of Daniel's vision, it pushes equally in all directions; or, like a penny with two heads and no tail, it always falls lucky side up. *Mill vs. Mill* might be made a very interesting case.

But, if physics must have this metaphysical idea, it is important to know exactly what is contained in it. Now force is directly known by us, only as the result or expression of our volitions. Not gravitation, nor electricity, nor magnetism, nor

chemical affinity, but will, is the typical idea of force. The conception is born in the mind, and born of our conscious effort. Regiment after regiment of phenomena might sweep by us in time-succession, but could never give birth to the idea of power. Will, then, is the sum-total of the dynamic idea; it either stands for that, or for nothing. The only force we know directly, is dependent upon our wills; and any forces which we assume to exist externally, can be known only by assimilating them to this. Indeed, they cannot be rationally affirmed without assimilating them to this; for what propriety is there in affirming the existence of something in matter, which the keenest observation cannot detect, and which is totally unlike anything of which we can form a conception? You, who object, admit that matter cannot move itself; you express the fact in the law of inertia, and consider this an axiomatic truth; yet, while it has no power to move itself, you insist that it is able to move everything else. One free atom cannot move itself, neither can another; this is the law of inertia; but each can move the other, and between them both can get under way. The two positions seem hardly compatible. The sum is this. It is competent for science to reject this idea of force, if it chooses; but if it accepts it, it must be in its simplicity. The idea cannot be taken, and clipped, like a stolen horse, to prevent recognition. Either, then, science must restrict itself to a lifeless registration of coëxistence and sequence, assuming no tie nor dependence between facts, and denying the existence of power, either in nature or behind it; or else, it must admit that this universal force, said to underlie the phenomenal universe, is the direct, or indirect, manifestation of the Ever-Living Will. One force, one will, as the foundation of the universe, is the conclusion that emerges here.

Every one acquainted with the history of metaphysics, will at once perceive that the argument reducing all force to a dependence upon will is identical in principle with that of Hume against physical causation. For a long time that argument was deemed atheistic; Hume himself thought so. But, as Dr. Thomas Brown, who afterward elaborated the argument, acutely observed, it is the truly Theistic one. For, denying physical causation, the only alternative is that moral or volitional causation of which we are directly conscious. It was

the false alternative of physical causation, or none, that gave it its atheistic aspect, and made it apparently so repugnant to the laws of thought.

In the early time, every phenomenon was viewed as a manifestation of will. But the phenomena were varied, and a will was assumed for every phenomenon. The principle was right, but the application was most pernicious. Science came, and discrediting the fact of many wills by the unity it began to trace, substituted impersonal forces for the personal agents of the earlier superstition. This was a necessary step, though not itself the truth. Still the forces were many; different classes of phenomena, requiring a separate power for each. But the sharpness of division began at length to fade, and the frontiers of each department became debatable ground. What if these various forces should be one! So it proved. At last science announced that force is the real Proteus, infinite in his disguises, but yet forever the same. Scientific polytheism has received its deathblow. If there be a God, the demonstration is absolute that He is One. But is there a God? Cannot this force administer itself? A dialectical examination of the doctrine of an impersonal force proves it an irrationality, and reduces this one force either to nothing, or to dependence on the Divine Will. The circle is complete. The men of the primitive time looked upon the universe as instinct with will; and we return again to that early doctrine, but with a transfigured, a glorified interpretation.

Thus by three different roads we have reached identical conclusions: a Self-determining Force, or Free Mind; a Spiritual Being; an Ever-Living Will; alone render the universe possible. God is, not the probable, but the absolute necessity of science, as well as of religion. Back of all material powers must be placed the primal force, whose throne no secondary power can ever usurp. This is the only proposition we care to establish. Then let matter work; it works only with borrowed power. Extend the reign of the laws throughout all space and time; they are still the servants of God. Let "creation by law" be established, it is still His work. Tennyson's beautiful lines deserve a second quotation

"God is law, say the wise, O Soul, and let us rejoice,
For if He thunder by law, the thunder is still His voice."

ARTICLE IV.—THE FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

THE foundation of moral obligation is one of the points in moral science where philosophers have always differed. These differences have greatly weakened the practical power of moral ideas, and strengthened the hostile position of opposers to truth.

Obligation has its peculiar characteristics. It can be clearly stated and accurately defined as a fact in human experience. Not, however, as some affirm, by synonymous terms merely. As a state of being obligated, it is a movement in the sensibility, a feeling preceded by a judgment of the intellect. This prior judgment is a pure decision of the reason, which affirms that the choice we feel obligated to make, or the course of action to pursue, is the right thing to be done—that which is fitted to secure the end. The feeling which we call obligation is a necessary consequent upon this judgment, and is a movement in the sensibility, under certain conditions, and, as the *feeling* of obligation simply, is well known to all. It is peculiar to itself, having characteristics which distinguish it from all others within the experiences of moral beings. It is wholly unlike the feeling of mere awakened desire of pleasure, which pleads to be admitted and cherished. This feeling is of the nature of the *imperative*. It assumes the control of the will by authority. It demands admission to the exclusion of everything else. It gives the clearest intimations and the brightest promises of happiness when admitted and cherished, but a sad reverse of woe, if rejected. These are some of the characteristics of this feeling of obligation. It prescribes duty, something to be done, and when done the action is known by all to be right, and its rejection wrong.

In seeking after the foundation of obligation, we enquire for the origin of this feeling. What is it that issues this imperative, which of itself assumes this high authority to bind the moral being to duty, and to hold him fast to blessedness or woe, on condition of being admitted or rejected? This is the point where philosophers diverge in their statements one from

another, some assigning one cause of this feeling as ultimate and some another. Apparently there is a wide difference among them on this fundamental point. Still this difference is more apparent than real: for nearly all the things affirmed by one to be true are admitted to be such by the others; except the single affirmation that the thing in question is the ultimate originating cause of obligation—is its foundation.

What is that which in itself imposes obligation? We say in itself, and not by or through any representative. A rightful ruler is the source of authority. His will imposes duty on subjects. His minister or messenger who bears his commands is simply his representative, not the primary source of authority. So we seek not for the proximate representative, or any representative of the source of obligation, but for the ultimate source itself, that which in and by its own nature imposes it.

By some the free moral being with all his known faculties, or the power of free choice simply, is made the foundation of obligation. The thing intended by this affirmation is true, that there can be no obligation without a being capable of it; which is a condition of obligation, but nothing more. It gives no rational account of the foundation of duty. Our inquiry is for the ultimate reason for the existence of this feeling in the minds of moral beings, admitting such beings to be in existence with all their acknowledged capacities to feel obligation. What is it that comes down with this peculiar imperative on such beings?

The nature or fitness of things is assigned by other philosophers as the ground of obligation; and not without some measure of truth in it. All things have their peculiar nature and fitness one to another. That which imposes obligation has a nature which fits it to do this. So too the moral being on whom this force is exerted has a nature fitting him to be thus moved. These are fitnesses of things as God made them. But to ascertain the ultimate ground of obligation we should be shown what these things are, that we may examine them, to know whether their nature really fits them to be or to do what is claimed for them. Many things may have a nature fitting them to impose obligation, or fitting them to be the necessary elements of its existence. A physician is summoned to attend

a sick and suffering patient—he has an able-bodied horse fitted, if rightly guided, to bring him to the side of his patient. The nature of the horse may be in these circumstances as valuable as the life of the man. The physician is obligated to go, and the horse is a necessary means to the existence of this obligation, but does the horse impose it? Again, the skill of the physician is necessary to the existence of this obligation. But this skill no more imposes obligation than the horse, one being as necessary to its existence as the other; but the welfare of the patient, his valuable life to be saved, or his sufferings to be relieved constitutes the good which binds to duty.

It is also asserted that there is a necessity to the performance of certain actions which has a binding influence. This is very true; but what is this necessity? and what is the ultimate ground of it? What object creates it? Is it such as to originate obligation? These are important questions, and must have an answer, before the ground of obligation is reached.

By others it is affirmed that right is the basis of obligation, an abstract idea which no one can define; and that right must be chosen for the sake of the right. This is using words without any definite ideas, except the popular one that a thing must be done because it is duty, which is begging the whole question at issue. It is simply affirming that obligation is obligation, or duty is right, and therefore must be yielded to. But we wish to know what is right, and what makes it so, as an ultimate end or object; then we shall have reached something definite; but this theory spends itself in words only.

Next comes the theory of worthiness of being;—spiritual worthiness claiming to be the source of obligation. If by this be meant the natural capabilities of moral beings, then it will be admitted by all that these capabilities are fitted for high and worthy ends which stamp them with dignity, and that every moral being is obligated to act in accordance with these fitnesses and to choose the ends which will meet these demands. These high and worthy capabilities are sure finger marks that point the way to the end which, when properly studied, will give the law of his being. There is really no difference of opinion here among philosophers. But what are the ends which meet and satisfy these fitnesses? This is the very ques-

tion to be settled, and no answer to our inquiry is obtained till it is settled. But the authors of this theory contribute little toward settling it. These capabilities, elevated as they may be, are only necessary conditions or faculties fitted to some worthy ends, and cannot of themselves furnish the ultimate ground of obligation. Besides, these capabilities are fitted to act differently under different circumstances and in varying relations; but what we seek is some ultimate end which will bind the moral being under all circumstances and in all relations. Nothing else will give the ultimate rule of duty or unfold the ground of obligation. To say that we are bound to act worthy of these high powers in accordance with the law they dictate, is simply affirming the truism that we are bound to meet obligation. Again, to say that I am bound to act so as "to stand in my own sight as worthy of my own spiritual approbation," is simply affirming a truism in another form, viz: that I am bound to obey the dictates of my conscience. For my own spiritual approbation can be nothing but conscience approving my action. This gives no ground of obligation. Similar to this system of spiritual worthiness is that propounded by Jouffroy, that order is the chief good. "Universal order," he tells us, "is the accomplishment of all particular destinies," but the destiny of a moral being can only mean the ultimate end for which he was made. This end, whatever it may be, is the absolute good and not the "order" or peculiar fitness found in all beings pointing out the way and leading to the end. This is good only as a means to the end. But what is the end?

What then is the foundation of moral obligation? We answer unhesitatingly, the highest good, by which we mean the highest happiness.

In physics the only two things about which our investigations are employed are matter and force; force inherent in matter, subjective to it, and force without. In like manner in our investigations of morals we treat of free moral beings and of the forces which move them. These forces are good and evil, happiness and misery pure and absolute, the one attractive, the other repellent. They both may truly be said to impose obligation; the one to secure and promote it, and the other to avoid or remove it. But as misery is a destruction of happi-

ness, or the production of its opposite, the source and foundation of obligation may be accurately described as the highest good, the diminution or removal of evil being always a relative good. We propose to establish this proposition, if possible, beyond any reasonable doubt.

The first argument which we adduce in support of this proposition is this universally admitted fact, that happiness is good, the only good *per se*.

Happiness wherever found is good, the only absolute good. This is a simple and universal idea, revealed in every one's sensibility, and is an axiom in moral reasoning. How can all men thus unite in giving to happiness the name of good, unless there is in it this binding force? Do not all recognize the fact, that the free moral being is bound to secure the good? A modified form of this argument, yet the same in essence, is the fact that the highest happiness always imposes obligation. There is no necessity of adding "of the greatest number," for the highest happiness involves that of the greatest number. It has been found in the experience of every one that two or more objects of good—each one seen to contribute a measure of happiness to himself or to others, are presented to his choice—where one only can be secured by him, but either may. The intelligence reveals the fact that one of several conflicting objects is the highest good, fitted to secure the greatest amount of blessedness. This one is found to impose obligation—draws the moral being to itself, binds him to secure it to the rejection of the others. This one alone possesses the authority of the imperative. The others have no such binding force. They are so far as creating obligation is concerned as if they had no existence. We need not affirm that this is the experience of all moral beings. It is a fact universally recognized in the consciousness of men. But how is this universal fact to be accounted for? In the case supposed, there is no essential difference in the objects presented except this, that this one gathers into itself, or appears to, the highest happiness. Why then does this invariably impose obligation? and so completely that the choice of either one of the others inevitably rouses conscience to pass condemnation? Why does the choice of this inferior good always degrade the being who makes it? as is

evinced by the ever downward and degrading course of the miser and the sensualist? Why does it render these inferior objects, otherwise good in themselves, to be despised, so that the very name of happiness gets the stamp of degradation and is often excluded as an element from the system of ethics? Why is all this, except that the highest good is sacrificed. With these facts before us it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that happiness the absolute good is the imposing power, the ground of obligation, and the choice of it by the moral being the thing to which he is bound; thus giving clearly and decisively the choice of the highest good as the ultimate rule of action.

A further modification of this argument is found in the obligations imposed on individuals by their own personal happiness. There is a large class of obligations felt by every one which are imposed by a view of his own happiness simply, having no relation whatever to the welfare of others. Take as an illustration a young man alone in the world, with no family relatives dependent upon him—none in any way to be affected by his conduct. Place him if you please upon a desolate island and take from him all hope of escape, and banish from his mind the belief of a Supreme Being. Now is he free from all obligation? Can he help feeling it? His life is a good to him even in this lonely condition. He values it and necessarily feels an obligation to preserve it. He cannot avoid feeling a sense of guilt if he were to determine deliberately to take his own life. And whence comes this feeling of obligation? He knows that in this life, lonely as it is, there is wrapped up a measure of happiness which by the continuance of his life he may secure and which he is not at liberty to sacrifice. This is the thing, and the only thing which imposes obligation to preserve his life.

We will still further suppose that two courses of action are open to him, one of them is the possible course of civilized refinement. To some extent he finds himself able by forethought and vigorous effort to surround himself with objects of taste by a culture of nature and with some enlarged comforts of living. He is also able by a study of his own being and by a study of nature around him to secure the enjoyment of men-

tal effort and of the acquisition of knowledge. The other course is simply that of lazy existence, to eat, drink, and sleep like the brutes around him. The former course is seen to contribute much more than the other to his personal happiness. In these conditions with no belief of a future state of existence he will still feel obligation, of a low degree it may be, but it is positive obligation, to adopt the course in which it is known the highest happiness is found. This binds him to itself and to the rejection of the other. These are not merely prudential courses of action, either of which he is of equal liberty to pursue. The highest good seen or apprehended, though temporary, has in it the binding force. It imposes obligation. This is the nature of happiness brought to the individual being under such conditions. Thus it is that any moral being becomes a law unto himself; is under law to himself and growing out of himself, has its basis in the happiness of which his being is capable.

Thus, too, when this lonely person comes in contact with mere animals; sentient creatures, capable of a low degree of enjoyment, obligation is imposed upon him. Why is it that he most certainly, unless hardened by disregard, feels obligation not wantonly to sacrifice their lives, nor needlessly torture them? And why is it that all feeling of obligation is removed, and life is sacrificed without any sense of wrong when the higher good of himself, or of others demand it? Here is obligation measured and conditioned by happiness merely, and that of the lowest order.

A *second argument* in support of our proposition is drawn from the known origin of the idea of obligation. In the belief of some this idea is either innate or comes into being nobody knows how, without cause—without circumstances or conditions, only that it is found in the mind and universally known. It is not surprising that such should fail to define obligation, or to seek for it any solid foundation. Still the origin of this idea can be analyzed, accurately traced, and satisfactorily described. Let then any thinking free being, however young—so young as never before to have experienced the feeling of obligation—find now the happiness of his brother, or sister, his father or mother, or any one coming distinctly in his view—while the happiness of no other person is known to conflict with

this. It is simply the good, the enjoyment of his relative or associate that is now presented. It is the highest good therefore now to be secured. He knows that it is within his power to make that friend happy. This happiness is solely dependent on his choice to secure it. What follows? The feeling of obligation binding upon him to do the thing that will make this friend happy. This feeling follows necessarily on the first coming together of these three conditions: the happiness to be secured; the highest and best apprehended at the time; and which is known to be within his power to secure. The feeling of obligation can in no manner be avoided under these conditions. This is the origin in every case of the idea of obligation. Universal consciousness affirms this. Now what originates this feeling and consequently the idea of obligation in the mind of this youth? We say it is the good presented—the happiness to be secured. Nothing else does it, nothing else can do it. Substitute any other object not involving happiness, something to be obtained by choice while all the other conditions remain, and no feeling of obligation would arise in the mind, unless there is something that stands as the representative of happiness. This may do it, which brings us to the

Third argument in support of this proposition. This is the obligation which is imposed by representative objects of good. These are usually called relative good, being good only as they are the means of happiness. In the argument just closed, happiness is intuitively seen—directly presented, and obligation is immediately affirmed by the intuitive conscience. But not so with these representative objects. They are seen to be means of happiness by a process of reasoning only, more or less extended. In some cases the process is very slight, so slight that they are invested with the characteristic of relative good almost by intuition. We will take the felt obligation to speak the truth. It may be a question whether this particular obligation is universally felt. It is however so common—so nearly universal, that many philosophers affirm with confidence that this is an instance of obligation based on abstract right—right seen by a moral faculty or sense unconnected with happiness imposing the obligation or constituting it right. Now in reply we say that this statement is unphilosophical. It is made without any proof

that the obligation to speak the truth is universal, and without any attempt to show that no object of good exists, either intuitively seen, or by reason obtained, to create the obligation so as to render it nearly universal. That this obligation to speak the truth is not quite universal, is clearly proved by the fact that some at least have maintained the duty as well as the right to utter falsehoods. While others have maintained that truth should be spoken when and only when the generic principle of benevolence is seen to require it. Now without assenting fully to either of these opinions, we affirm that the utterance of truth contributes to the good and this gives the obligation. Hence the generic principle of benevolence requires the observance of this general law—and not merely that truth is to be spoken only when the moral being apprehends by other evidence than the law itself, that the general welfare requires it. This general law or obligation to speak the truth is not reached in its wide extension at once by the young mind or by any mind without a process of reasoning concluding with a judgment; but in its specified and particular obligation it is obtained by the simplest process of reasoning imaginable, so simple that it is well nigh intuition. So soon as any one, however young, comes to know what the speaking of truth is in distinction from falsehood—he is so made—such is his nature that he will have a pleasurable happy feeling in view of the one and the opposite feeling in view of the other. This as well as many other moral ideas reveal themselves in the sensibility as truly and perhaps as fully as objects of beauty or their opposites. This feeling is at once transferred to others as belonging to their experiences as well as his own. He knows without a word of teaching, except by his own experience, that his mother whose happiness he has learned to value will be pleased and made happy by his utterance of truth, and be pained by his utterance of falsehood; and he comes speedily to feel the obligation to speak the truth in a general sense, and this obligation is thus traced directly to happiness as its foundation, both in the simple and generic forms. The speaking of truth becomes the representative of happiness, the necessary means of securing it. But the means; the bare utterance of truth is not the foundation of the obligation, separate from its relations to the good of himself and

others. It is the inherent and necessary relation of truth to happiness that gives it any value or any motive power over any being. It has, it is true, a nature or tendency peculiar to itself, which is only the fitting condition; but it is the good inseparably connected with it which imparts its value and imposes the obligation, and is therefore the ground of it. If any thing else in its stead would secure the good results it would at once be invested with value, and become obligatory as a means. These representative objects are called good. All unite in giving to many of them without hesitation this appellation of good. By some they are declared to be good in themselves. But this is only where they have, or are believed to have, inherent qualities, essential natures, which in their general relations impart to them tendencies to good. In respect to all these representative objects, a process of reason is necessary, more or less extensive, to apprehend and determine these essential natures. In most minds this process has been gone through with and the tendencies of most of them to some end have been settled. And thus these representatives come to be regarded by many, as themselves the foundation of obligation. All minds and moral natures have been more or less familiar with them. Now we ask, what is the end which stamps these representative objects with the impress of good? And here we appeal to the consciousness of men. We do not propose to settle this question by mere assertion, but by facts recognized by general consciousness. We do not hesitate to affirm that these facts point directly to the highest good, the happiness or welfare of being in general. It is a tendency to this one thing, the absolute good, which determines this question and gives to these objects the impress of good. Universal consciousness recognizes the highest good to be the impressing power, thus imposing obligation. What other thing is ever recognized as giving these objects the stamp of good? Is there any thing else in the wide range of thought, not having this apprehended tendency to this ultimate end the highest blessedness, which is universally pronounced good and imposes obligation?

It is said that tendencies to the right are universally called good. This is admitted. But right is itself only a representative term. It is not itself the ultimate end, not even an object

with tendencies to good. It is only or at best the ultimate rule of duty—made so only because it leads directly to the highest blessedness. This is but another confirmation of the truth of our proposition—that the highest happiness imposes obligation, and lies at the basis of every rule of right. It is plausibly affirmed, however, that happiness or absolute good is only the invariable result of the performance of duty—but is not the ground of obligation, that duty gives happiness and not happiness duty. Now this admitted invariable result, happiness, proves tendency of duty performed to secure happiness, and establishes the attractive force of that one thing called happiness imposing on the moral being obligation as truly as the falling of an apple to the earth or any other unsupported material substance proves the existence of the gravitating force in nature. The tendency is admitted—the binding force therefore lies in the thing.

Another illustration of the truth of our proposition, is found in the changeable nature of these representative objects of good. Not being themselves absolute good, circumstances often change their representative character in the mind, sometimes being obligatory and at other times not. So long as happiness or the highest general good continues to result from them, or is believed to do so, so long they are found invariably to impose obligation; but the instant they are seen to fail to do this, the obligation ceases to be imposed. As an illustration of this change take the civil government, presided over and directed by a single head; it is believed to contribute to the highest welfare of its subjects. The rights of all, even of the humblest, are supposed to be scrupulously guarded and protected by this single arm of power. Measures are devised and vigorously pushed, in which the highest interests of subjects are clearly involved and general prosperity flows on in a steady stream. The good intention of the sovereign is undoubted. This government is felt. It gains the conscious approval of men at home and abroad. It binds subjects to duty. Loyalty springs up in their hearts spontaneously and lives are cheerfully offered in its defense. The form of government is now regarded of little account, so long as the end, the highest welfare of subjects is secured. But let these results be changed; let rights be

left unprotected, and the best interest of the whole become neglected and sacrificed, and the good intention of the sovereign converted into that of self-aggrandizement, and what becomes of the feeling of obligation to sustain him? Loyalty has fled. And instead of offering lives to support his government his subjects rise *en masse*, moved by a sense of duty, and hurl down this ruling head from his high position. Here the mighty moving force which once sustained and now overturns this government is the welfare, the highest happiness of its subjects. These facts are fully recognized in every one's consciousness which is proof beyond a question that in the law of human consciousness the highest happiness is the ultimate ground of obligation. Again where there is doubt concerning the appropriate tendencies of two or more objects, what is found to be the testimony of consciousness? When no clearly apprehended balance of evidence is found in favor of either, no obligation is felt; but so soon as evidence in the reason clearly preponderates in favor of one above the other in this simple respect of tending to secure happiness—then obligation is invariably felt if action is at once demanded, which still further confirms our proposition.

Another form of representation nearly allied to that just treated is where mere words or forms of statement are used to represent obligation. They are not like those already dwelt upon which are seen to be the necessary means of producing happiness, but they are mere abstract forms representing obligation. They are such words as right, ought, duty, virtue, holiness, and the like. Many have maintained that these words convey to the mind the idea of abstract right, a necessary and universal idea; when the fact is they are simply synonyms of the idea of obligation. The whole meaning of such words is exhausted when we say that the thing described by them is obligatory. When it is asked, must not this thing or that thing be done because it is right? Must not God be loved and obeyed because it is right? The answer must always be, Yes. That is, it should be done because it is obligatory. But this answer does not even approach to an explanation, or a statement of the foundation of obligation. Nor does it in the slightest degree invalidate the doctrine that happiness is the founda-

tion. For a binding force should be found for the things represented by these abstract statements—something which renders them obligatory. This thing, when found, will show itself to be the highest good. These words are used as representatives of obligation in order to meet a necessity. That necessity arises when finite beings cannot trace the tendencies of different courses of action, between which they are obliged to choose. In such cases they must act by the light of others who are believed to know. These words become the necessary representatives of their ideas of obligation, and are used to communicate these ideas to others. Such is the case with children. The very first idea of duty or obligation is probably obtained by the child from the parent—from his expressed pleasure or displeasure. The idea of ought, duty, or obligation, is planted in the mind of the child by the very words, looks, or gestures, of the parent. These representative words become the decisive expressions of authority—of the pleasure of the parent, and furnish to the child the highest evidence in the circumstances of what is obligatory. He takes these representative expressions of the parent as law for him, as he should do. But these statements themselves have in them no binding force. Back of them there must be an objective reality, a foundation of some kind to sustain the statement and to make the thing represented obligatory. Now what is this basis? We have philosophically accounted for nothing in obligation till we have reached this basis, and we only deceive ourselves by supposing we have, in the use of these terms, synonyms of obligation. To test this basis, let it be distinctly made known to the child that the thing required by the parent is evil, does no good, contributes to no happiness, but produces positive misery, and the feeling of obligation vanishes so far as this particular requirement is concerned, even though it has been supported by authority which the child has been accustomed to regard as absolute. Repeated instances of such erroneous representation will soon destroy these authoritative expressions of obligation. The customary words may be used and fear may be awakened, but the feeling of obligation will be absent because the thing is seen not to be good. This seems to furnish proof that the basis lying back of these words representing obligation is the highest

happiness. This process of reasoning is equally applicable to civil government. When its accustomed representative of obligation, though framed into the forms and sustained by the solemn sanctions of law, become generally known to be adverse to the best interests, the happiness of subjects, the obligation to sustain or to yield obedience to it vanishes, and the noble duty of loyalty to the government ceases.

This line of argument is equally valid in its application to God and his government. That all his moral creatures ought to love and obey him is admitted by all who believe in his infinite attributes. But the ought in this case is simply the expression of obligation—an abstract form. The basis of this obligation must be found in the being of God, and in the results of loving and obeying him. To test this basis let us take his justice, the severest attribute, perhaps, of his being; one, which we are taught to revere, and also to love him for the exercise of it. We know and feel that this attribute is something very different from mere good wishes for the pleasure or the happiness of his creatures irrespective of their character. Such an attribute could not be loved. Let it once be known that it is not based on the highest blessedness of himself and of his creatures, not dictated by his purpose to secure this good end, but tramples upon their welfare—and obligation to regard his justice ceases. His government becomes in the minds of loving subjects an oppressive tyranny. Even this sternest of attributes is entitled to be called just or right solely because of its tendencies to good. Thus we see that the highest good is at the basis of all obligation. It is the one idea that gives the should, the obligation, the duty. Dr. McCosh, on page 262 of "Intuitions," enquires, "Why should I seek the happiness of any other being than myself? Why the happiness of a great number, or of the greatest number? Why the happiness of any one individual beyond the unit of self? Let the advocates of the happiness theory answer." We do answer by saying that happiness is good, the only good *per se* wherever found; and such being its essential nature, it imposes every obligation on moral beings both human and divine whenever the requisite conditions are present, whether the happiness be that of self or of others, of few or many. Thus correctly and thoroughly does

this theory account for every "ought," every "should," every "duty." Nor do we "take refuge," as Dr. M'Cosh says, "in a system against which our whole nature rebels," nor "in a theory which says that we are not required to do more than look after our own gratification," unless the Scripture promise of eternal life "rendered to them who by patient continuance in well doing seek for glory, honor, and immortality" be such gratification.

The fourth argument in support of this doctrine is the formation and operation of the generic obligation. By the generic obligation in the highest sense, we mean the obligation to choose the ultimate end of life which is imposed on all moral beings. That all should feel obligation to adopt and prosecute some end of their being is inseparable from their natures. They can no more be without this generic obligation revealed in the sensibility, than they can be without the feeling of obligation in a particular case. Every one has met this generic obligation in his conscious experiences. But the question here is, what is that ultimate end or object which originates this obligation, which summons every one with the highest authority to pursue it through the entire course of his being? Many generic obligations may be imposed for a long period of time, and then cease to be obligatory by a change of circumstances. These though generic are not ultimate. But what is that end which possesses an unchangeable binding force and imposes the ultimate obligation, which continues for time and eternity? The universal consciousness of men pronounces this to be the highest good; the highest blessedness of himself and other sentient beings, the highest of which he, in the varying circumstances of his being, will be able to secure. Good in the particular he has known, and felt the obligation to secure it. With equal distinctness has he known the general good the highest blessedness, depending upon his choice and pursuit of it, in the generic sense, and has felt the obligation thus to choose it. Also when he has known himself to be destitute of this generic choice, his conscience has pronounced him a violator of obligation. So too, whenever this generic choice has been formed or brought into renewed activity, his consciousness has recognized the fact that the highest good was the thing chosen,

the end which imposed the obligation. Nothing else possesses this power of being the ultimate source of obligation. It is the one universal binding force either direct by its own intuitively seen value, or through some known representative. This is the universal ground of obligation, not only for creatures, but for the Creator. It gives the universal law of moral action, the law of love, binding on every moral being to seek and to secure the highest good or blessedness within the reach of his capabilities. This generic obligation is met in the only way in which it can be met, by a free choice of the end which imposes obligation. It is necessarily a generic choice, calling for specific subordinate volitions to secure the end; and in meeting this highest generic obligation all other generic obligations are met. In this generic choice or the refusal of it lies all character good or bad, holy or sinful, which is found nowhere else.

Now this is the right thing to be done, the way to the ultimate end. It puts one in the attitude necessary to secure the end—controlling and directing all his powers and specific volitions to reach it; which constitutes it right or holy. It is a necessity that can in no manner be avoided, and the end be reached or obligation be met, and as such it has essential and necessary tendency to secure the end, as every choice of an end must have. This is order, but whether it shall be called means or not, is of no account so long as these controlling and directing qualities and this unavoidable necessity are in it. Dr. Hopkins, on the 54th page of his "Law of Love," remarks: "This holiness is not a means of happiness, but the cause." This is a statement the correctness of which the author will find it difficult to establish; we say this with all due deference to this eminent philosopher. The actions of voluntary beings are not causes, but effects. They are produced by the self-active being, who is properly termed the cause. But why call this right action, holiness? It is a choice and generic in its character, and like all other generic choices it has in it a tendency to secure its end. But this quality as choice merely, cannot constitute it holy; for many generic choices may be formed, as is admitted, without approaching the character of holiness. Is not this quality of holiness stamped upon it by the end which is chosen, whatever that may be? If the highest happiness is

not the end, what is it? Dr. Hopkins fully admits that holiness is fitted to produce happiness, when he says, "that each new choice of God, both in augmenting his glory and increasing the good of others, augments the joy of those who have already thus chosen him" (page 57). "The happiness from this is no happening." "It is the infallible outgrowth of our innermost being when we act according to our law. This with all joys of complacency in others or in ourselves incident to it is holy happiness, or blessedness. It is the happiness that comes from holy activity." What language could more decisively describe tendency to blessedness? The infallible outgrowth as the limbs, leaves, and fruit of a tree, are its outgrowth. This tendency constitutes the act right and fixes its character. It should not be called means in the sense of mere things—in distinction from action; still it is not cause, but the work of the causing agent; and its whole value lies in its essential nature, its tendency to reach its end, to secure that which is chosen, and thus becomes as valuable as the end itself. The ultimate end, therefore, stamps its character. But what is its ultimate end? The ultimate good to be chosen? Dr. Hopkins, in his "Law of Love," page 57, answers: "Objectively God is his end and good;" again, on page 58, he says, "Whether we regard ourselves as active or passive, God is our good." This seems to imply that God as a being to be loved, and his friendship to be enjoyed, in distinction from the good that he enjoys and produces, is to man at least the ultimate end of all obligation, the ultimate good. But can no obligation exist on the mind of any human being till he comes to have a knowledge of God, not only of existence but also of his friendship—a being to be loved? Is it not a fact that obligation is imposed on multitudes of our race who have no certain knowledge that there is a God, much less of his attributes? If so, what imposes this obligation, if God is the ultimate good? Is this choice of God as the chief good the only thing that constitutes holiness? This is not giving a philosophical statement of the ultimate and universal ground of obligation, that end which binds all moral beings, both creatures and Creator, as moral philosophy should do. The ultimate and universal ground of obligation must be the same to all agents. If the creatures of God are like him, made in his image, then

the same ultimate ground of obligation exists for them as for him. But how can God as a being be the ultimate end to himself? His happiness or his blessedness may be such an end as the Scriptures affirm. "For thy pleasure they are and were created." But this is distinct from his being. The simple fact that he is a being of infinite natural attributes does not constitute him the chief good, nor any good at all. These attributes may be highly valued because of their fitness to produce good, to give existence to happiness in himself and in creatures. But they are also fitted to produce mischief—to work infinite woe. Why then is he the chief good? Is it because he is infinitely good himself, perfectly holy in character as well as infinite in attributes. But in what does his goodness or holiness consist? This question must be answered before we have reached the foundation of obligation. Universal consciousness answers as well as his works and declarations, in the voluntary production of good, of blessedness. In the production of happiness to himself and to his-creatures. Thus the divine holiness has its basis in happiness. With his infinite attributes controlled and directed by holiness, by a heart unchangeable to secure the highest good to all, to himself, and to creatures, He becomes the highest source of blessedness, and for this reason, and for this alone, can he be loved. This being true of him, it is sufficient to constitute him the chief good. But this obligation to love him is imposed upon creatures, not by his being simply—by his exalted attributes alone, but by the infinite blessedness which is wrapped up in his being, and flows out of it, so that the Infinite One becomes the chief good, the highest source of good, and receives the name of the good to all creatures. This, and this only, makes his will impose obligation on them. This is the highest proof that happiness is the ultimate good, that which imposes all obligation, even the obligation of holiness, and of obedience to God. But as objective good—good to be sought as an end, or to be enjoyed as such, God is not the only good. He is indeed the highest source of good—as compared with all others, the original source; but he has opened other sources of good beside himself, beings made in his own image who should be loved, whose happiness is an absolute good, and should be sought and promoted as well as

his. This, says Dr. Hopkins, is virtue, "the love of God and our neighbor as well as ourselves," an accurate definition of all virtue.

This analysis unfolds to us the truth that there is something back of mere being, both of the being of God and of creatures, which places upon beings the stamp of good; which gives to them all the value they possess. This is the blessedness they are capable of receiving and producing. This is the one ultimate and universal end to all, that which imposes duty on every one, high or low, created and uncreated.

This ultimate end as we have found it to be is happiness, settled upon in the reason as the chief good; not the happiness of this or that individual, not necessarily, and only of the person on whom the obligation rests, which is imposed by it, but wherever found under the necessary conditions to impose obligation to whomsoever it may come on that obligation being met, whether to friend or enemy. Indeed to secure it to a friend who can repay it by a like return may not be even virtuous, or if it is, may not bring to the acting being so large a subjective good as to procure the same for an enemy. This latter is the offspring of a pure love to the good of being in general, in adverse circumstances, with no hope of reward except the blessedness of doing it. This is Godlike. It is in a very important sense the choice of good for its own sake, for what it is in itself, irrespective of any circumstances in which it may be found, or of any relations it may sustain, except the relation of being itself an object of further happiness which increases its value. It is therefore the simple force of what we call happiness, the highest happiness objectively seen which under all circumstances imposes obligation. This is the moving power.

But the subjective movements in the sensibility of the objective good, should be carefully and accurately distinguished from the objective good itself, and also from ordinary movements in the sensibility. Happiness itself objectively viewed is a force fitted to move the moral being, whether it is seen to be coming to him or to some one else. He is so made that he can not avoid the approving pleasurable feeling in view of it. The simple presentation of any object of good not only moves the sensibility, but awakens more or less desire for this good

to be put into actual existence unless repressed by a state of sin. But this movement in the sensibility does not constitute the objective motive—is not the thing to be chosen. It is not the motive power. It is the movement itself. It is often called the subjective motive, but it is only the result of the motive power. It is an essential, necessary, and involuntary condition of any choice, but never the thing chosen. Much of the language of Edwards seems to imply that these various and opposing desires, moving or being moved, with greater or less strength, are the objects of choice, and that the will is determined by the one of the greatest strength and can only be so determined. Many have interpreted Edwards as teaching that the movement of the sensibility which has the greatest strength fixes the choice by necessity; and hence they have charged him with teaching fatalism. Now it may be true that those particular objects of happiness which do not originate the feeling of obligation may lie together in the mind in greater or less strength of desire and be objects of the mind's contemplation, and comparison, and judgment, and of choice, as mere subjective good or present happiness. Indeed we are disposed to believe this to be a true account of them, for they are kindred one to another, all possessing similar qualities. They are all awakened desires for happiness; personal happiness in different degrees. They are movements in the sensibility which may be compared and fix choice. They all lie mainly outside of the domain of reason, and consequently by some philosophers are called passions in distinction from good in the reason. But when the objective good comes to the mind under the three conditions requisite to impose obligation, the movement in the sensibility is peculiar. It is unlike any feeling or desire awakened by objects which do not impose obligation. There is doubtless more or less desire in all cases to meet the conditions of the obligation and to secure, not only the good thus presented, but also the satisfaction, the blessedness it will bring. This satisfaction is known to be real, solid, seen in the reason to be the best thing, and is a subjective motive and a condition of choice. There can be no choice without it. But this feeling of obligation is peculiar to itself, unlike all the movements of desire produced by happiness which does not impose obligation.

It has the imperative in it which no other movements in the sensibility have, and as such it precludes or forbids a comparison with a view of an exchange of the one for the other, as is true of other desires. Its commanding force is simply to be yielded to, or rejected. This is the alternative. There is no comparison of the greater or the less formed in the mind. When rejected by the voluntary being, there is undoubtedly some object, some awakened desire which secures the rejection; but it is wholly unlike this imperative, and can not be compared with it as greater or less. When this imperative is yielded to, and obligation fully met, the resultant is a high degree of satisfaction, an exalted blessedness. But it is peculiar to itself, unlike the result of yielding to other movements of the sensibility. It brings complacency in character an attendant upon conscious right action in one's self or in others, a feeling of blessedness both in degree and kind which no other voluntary action ever produced. So that there is indeed some valid reason for calling it as Dr. Hopkins does, "holy happiness"—the result of meeting the generic obligation; a blessedness peculiar to itself. It is certainly a blessedness distinct from all others.

We have aimed, thus, to analyze obligation, and ascertain its basis purely on philosophical grounds without any reference to the Scriptures. But this view, we believe, is fully sustained by Scripture statements which are confessedly not designed to be scientific, but popular. In this philosophical discussion we have found happiness, blessedness, to be the one thing good, and the highest blessedness of which any moral being is capable of securing, the highest good to him, the chief object or end of his being—that which imposes upon him the ultimate generic obligation, and is the supreme law of being. The voluntary choice of this end, the meeting of this generic obligation by the free capabilities of his being, is the only thing fitted to secure the highest good to him and to all. In this voluntary controlling aim is found his character for goodness—or uprightness; a conformity to the law. The rejection of this generic obligation, the refusal to meet it, is sinful or wrong action, and the only thing that is. Here lies the whole of moral guilt. No one can fail to see how exactly this philosophical deduction cor-

responds with the Scripture statements which divide the whole world into two classes only, the righteous and the wicked—the holy and the unholy. In whatever words the holy or the upright are described, whether, as applied to God or creatures, they mean the willing of good or love which is the fulfilling of all law. The opposite is described as the failure to do this: "To him that knoweth to do good and doeth it not, to him it is sin," an exact philosophical definition in perfect accordance with what we have described wrong doing to be—a failure to meet obligation. Here the obligation which is not met, and which failure is by the infallible Word termed sin—is fully recognized to be founded in the good; the good known to be the highest good, and known by the free being to be within his power. What could furnish us a clearer description of the foundation of obligation? given, too, in a plain common sense definition of sin?

From the subject as now presented it is a manifest inference that one obligation can never conflict with any other. Duty is revealed or made known by obligation. It is often thought that duties conflict, but the truth is far otherwise. Though there is a seeming conflict when objects stand opposed to each other, both partially claiming during contemplation the binding force of obligation. Both cannot be met, if there is opposition, being alternatives to each other. In all such cases one, under clearer light, is made to give way to the other. Preponderating evidence in favor of the one causes the other to cease to be obligatory, and gives clear predominance to one, so that all conflict ceases. This is the necessary result of the principle that the highest good always imposes obligation. There are many subordinate obligations essential to the complete fulfillment of any generic obligation. Among these there is and can be no conflict. Being known to be essential to the ultimate end, they become thereby distinct obligations, and are embraced in the generic obligation just as a part is included in the whole. These subordinate obligations may be, as they usually are, mere means to the general end, receiving all their binding force as obligations from the end itself.

But there is another class of obligations distinct from these subordinates. They are independent obligations, each having

a distinct basis of good in itself. They are in no sense means one of the other, nor are they in any sense opposed to each other—can never come into conflict, but each remains in full force. The son is obligated to love both father and mother, and brothers and sisters. These are separate, independent obligations. The good of each is distinct, not dependent the one upon the other, and in no sense opposed to each other. To meet the one obligation, does not involve the neglect of the other. They can all be met. Nor do we institute any comparison between them, as higher or lower, as we do in cases where one object of good stands opposed to another, and must be relinquished if the other is met. They are all parts of the one generic obligation to secure the highest good, all being wrapped up in this one general good. The same is true of the obligation to love God, the father of this great human family; and the obligation to love all the members of this family whom he has created. These are independent and generic obligations, in no sense conflicting with each other, because the goodness and will of God require creatures to be loved as well as himself. To meet the one does in no sense involve a release from the other. They both stand in full binding force, and both can be met. They are but parts of the one ultimate obligation of universal benevolence—the voluntary aim to promote the highest good of being both of God and creatures. This same law of happiness, the chief good imposing obligation, applies equally to God as to creatures. He brings his character and conduct down to the inspection and judgment of his creatures, inviting them to examine and be convinced of his uprightness, as in the passage “Are not my ways equal?” But by what rule or law of equality or integrity can his creatures know his character unless the chief good, the highest blessedness, is taken as the ultimate end of action, the same for him as for them. This points us at once, before any sentient beings had existence, to his own highest blessedness to be secured by his infinite capabilities as the moving spring of his action. To meet this obligation of filling his own being with blessedness, he creates the worlds and fills them with sentient beings, as before stated: “For thy pleasure they are and were created.” Here the possible blessedness of created

existences is made essential to the highest blessedness of Deity as a means of securing it. But not simply as means; for their blessedness is a positive good, and imposes obligation by its own force and is chosen as an absolute good. The two generic objects of good exist together, and cannot be separated, and the obligation they impose are in perfect harmony in the Divine Being.

This is equally true of the obligation resting on every created intelligence to secure his own highest blessedness, and the obligation to secure to the utmost of his abilities the highest good of others. These are distinct and independent obligations, each having a distinct basis in itself. The highest happiness or blessedness of each individual is a great and positive good, and as such imposes obligation—an obligation to secure this chief end to himself. He can no more rightfully throw off this obligation, than he can disregard the highest welfare of others. Both are binding obligations, and are enforced by the command of God. For any one to fail to secure his highest well being is to commit the crime of self murder, not only of the body, but of the soul. These obligations, though thus distinct and independent, can never conflict with each other. If they could they would not both have a binding force. One would of necessity yield to the other, and thus become subordinate. Being thus distinct and independent, having each a distinct basis of its own, in absolute good they can never come into comparison the one with the other, as greater or smaller, higher or lower. It can never be ascertained whether the highest good one may secure to others than himself, will ever be greater or less than his own highest blessedness, his eternal well being. They can both be met. Indeed they are so inseparably connected that one cannot be met without the other any more than the obligation to love God can be met without meeting the obligation to love his neighbor, or the obligation to love his neighbor be met, without meeting at the same time the obligation to love God. These two objects of good are generic ends, and can be made distinct objects of choice and pursuit, for the good involved in each. The choice of one necessarily involves the choice of the others, not as *mere means* to the other which is ultimate, though the only method of securing one's own highest

blessedness is to promote the highest good of all. Hence the choice to secure the chief end of one's own being, his complete and endless blessedness is in no sense selfish—no more so than the choice to secure the highest blessedness of others. There is a sense in which the good or happiness of the individual may and does become selfishness. But this is when some specific good or course of action leading to good conflicts with his highest good, or with the highest good of others, in other words when it conflicts with obligation. In all such cases it is some inferior good—awakening, it may be, strong desire—even rising into strong passion—but such an object of good never imposes obligation; for nothing but the highest good can impose obligation, and the choice in such a case is never that of choosing between mere good of greater or less, but it is the choice of yielding to the imperative of obligation, or of rejecting obligation for this object of desire which imposes no obligation. This rejection of obligation, and yielding to desire which imposes no obligation, is selfishness—and the only thing that is. It is the whole of sin. The opposite of benevolence. But the highest good of the individual imposes obligation as truly and fully as the highest well being of others, and can never come into conflict, the one with the other. They are in harmony with each other—lie in the same line—the same road must be traveled over to reach either. The generic obligation in the highest sense, that which is ultimate for all moral beings, is that which is imposed by the highest blessedness of being in general. This includes all other generic obligations, and is in perfect harmony with them.

ARTICLE V.—MISSIONARY WORK IN HAWAII.

A Heathen Nation Evangelized. History of the Sandwich Islands Mission. By RUFUS ANDERSON, D.D., LL.D. Third Edition. Congregational Publishing Society, Boston. 1872.

Five Years' Church Work in the Kingdom of Hawaii. By the BISHOP OF HONOLULU. Rivingtons; London, Oxford, and Cambridge: 1868.

DR. RUFUS ANDERSON is a remarkable instance of what it is to be, in the best sense, a man of one idea. From his early youth, the one idea of foreign missions, and especially of the great institution known as the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, has dominated in his mind. The conduct of foreign missions has been his one employment; the history and theory of foreign missions have been with him the one study to which all other studies have been subsidiary.

Nearly six years ago, having completed the seventieth year of his age, he retired from his secretaryship at the Missionary House in Boston; and since that time he has contributed, from his accumulated knowledge and his large experience, several volumes to the literature of missions. The great work with which he is occupying the last years of a laborious life, is a series of historical volumes on the "Missions of the American Board." First in the series was published the *History of the Sandwich Islands Mission*, less than two years ago. Simultaneously with the third edition of that work, we have now one of the two volumes in which the author proposes to tell the story of those which he denominates the "Oriental Missions," namely, the missions of the Board in Syria, Turkey, and Persia. Missions in British India, in China, in Africa, and among the American Indians, remain to be the themes of subsequent volumes. Few men could wisely attempt so great a work after passing the date of "threescore years and ten," but what Dr. Anderson has done gives promise that "if by reason of strength" his life shall reach to "fourscore years," the work will be complete.

The history of the American Mission in the Sandwich Islands is in some respects one of the most important chapters in the ecclesiastical history of our century. It is the story of the labors and the methods by which a nation of barbarians has been changed, in the life-time of a single generation, and in the presence of many adverse and destructive influences, into a civilized and Christian people. The story of such a change—apart from the consideration of its connection with the churches of the United States, or with possible results not yet developed—has a charm and a value of its own, in the bearing of the recorded phenomena on the great science of human nature, and on the adaptedness of the Christian religion to the capabilities and the need of universal humanity.

It is not yet a hundred years since Cook's discovery of the islands to which he gave the name of his chief patron, the Earl of Sandwich. The "children of nature" whom he found there—though they were living in a climate of perpetual summer; though the influences of a vicious civilization had never infected them; though they were as effectually excluded from the agitations of the great world as if they had always dwelt in the happy valley of Rasselas—were by no means in a state of paradisaical innocence. Let poetry portray as it will the "dusky maids" and "feather-cinctured chiefs" of islands and wildernesses not yet invaded by the conventionalities of factitious life, the plain prose of history tells us that the human beings in those islands, as Cook found them, were degraded and miserable creatures. Unfortunately for the poetic conception, those children of nature were children of human nature, which (marvel as we may, and argue as we may) is a very unnatural thing. Whether for want of time or for some other reason, the great law of evolution, as well as that of the survival of the fittest, had done but little for them. They were actually living in the stone age; and if, instead of being found alive in the year 1778 of the Christian era, they, or some faint traces of them, had been discovered in limestone caverns or anywhere under ground, they might have been referred to some very remote geological period. In the matter of clothing they were nearer to Paradise than in anything else; their few and scanty garments, though ingeniously manufactured from the bark of trees and from

feathers, being worn more for ornament than for decency. Their dwellings were grass-thatched huts, mean and filthy—such as an American beggar would scorn to sleep in. Their principal food—as bread is the principal food of civilized men—was *po-i*, or the roots of the *arum esculentum*, roasted, pounded, made into a paste, and permitted to ferment till it was more fit for swine's food than for any other use, and more disgusting to human senses than “the husks which the swine did eat;”—though the *po-i* diet was diversified with sweet potatoes, with a few indigenous fruits, with fish eaten raw, and with the flesh of swine and of dogs, which, with a sort of rat, were the only indigenous quadrupeds. By the discoverers they were reported to be cannibals; but those who have had better opportunities of knowing them have not confirmed the report. As for their morals, nothing can be said in their favor. They had the idea of property; but they were thieves, dextrous and daring. They valued their own lives; but they were unscrupulous murderers. The domestic relations were not unknown among them; but, beside their polygamy in the double form of men with a plurality of wives and women with a plurality of husbands, there was the utmost dissoluteness in the relations of the sexes. The people were slaves to the chiefs—no man could call anything his own which his chief might choose to demand of him, and the ordinary relation of the chiefs to each other was war rather than peace. Men have been found in a lower depth of degradation from the normal condition of humanity, more ignorant, more stupid in their brutishness, more wretched in their relations to material nature; but, morally, the inhabitants of those islands, at the date of their discovery, were just about as bad as human nature is capable of becoming. Every vice possible in their circumstances was commonly practiced among them without shame. They did not commit forgery, for they could not write, and any symbolic evidence of debt was to them simply inconceivable; and for the same reason they did not cheat each other with canards in the stock-market, nor with fraudulent joint-stock companies. There were not opium-eaters, for the poppy did not grow there. They were not drunkards, for they knew not how to make alcoholic drinks. They did not stupefy themselves with tobacco, for they had none; but they did what they

could by the use of a narcotic root which answered the purpose of intoxication.

After the death of Captain Cook, the Sandwich Islands had a very bad reputation throughout the civilized world, their chief distinction being that there the great navigator was killed by ferocious savages, from whom his bones, stripped of their flesh, had been with difficulty recovered. Seven years passed before another vessel ventured to visit them. But from the year 1786 they began to be recognized as a convenient station first for the increasing fur-trade, and afterwards for whalers in the Pacific ocean. For more than thirty years the people who had been shut up in those islands as in a little world of their own, through uncounted generations, were subjected to the civilizing influence of commercial intercourse with Christendom, before any attempt was made to give them the Christian religion. The mission sent out from the United States in the autumn of 1819, arrived in March, 1820, forty-two years after Cook's discovery of the islands, forty-one years after his death. What progress had the people then made toward civilization?

One important change had taken place, tending in that direction, and attributable indirectly to the intercourse between the islands and vessels from the civilized world. In the fight in which Captain Cook was killed, one of the wounded natives was a young warrior named Kamehameha, a nephew of the old chief who then ruled the great island of Hawaii, and whom Cook was attempting to seize and hold as a hostage when he fell. The old king at his death, a few months afterward, divided his dominion between his son and that nephew. War between the two young kings was a matter of course, and Kamehameha was victor, his rival having fallen in battle. That war, however, gave him no extension of his kingdom; he had only repelled an invasion. After strengthening himself for a while, he renewed the conflict, and becoming in his turn the invader, he was in his turn defeated. Then, with the instinct of a savage conqueror, having found his neighbors on the south too strong for him, he looked in another direction. Crossing the channel with a fleet of canoes, he invaded the island of Maui, the king of that island (who was the most powerful chief in the group) being then absent. He overran

Maui with great slaughter, and passed on to the next island. But while he was thus overrunning the dominions of an absent king, his enemies nearer home were in like manner taking advantage of his absence, and he was compelled to return. Again the invaders were repulsed; and Kamehameha, though as yet unsuccessful in his own schemes of conquest, remained king of Northern Hawaii and nothing more. Very soon he had another war on his hands. By his invasion of Maui he had proved himself dangerous to his neighbors in that direction, and the two other kings whose father had reigned over all the islands save Hawaii, and who had divided the empire which he left them, united their strength to punish the adventurer. From Kauai and Oahu they came with their armada of war-canoes, receiving accessions from Molokai and Maui; but, in a great sea-fight near the northernmost point of Hawaii, the armada was defeated without aid of a tempest, for Kamehameha was lord of a swivel which he had obtained from an Englishman in the China trade, and which he had been mounted on one of his canoes. European civilization was beginning to affect the history of those newly discovered savages. New instruments of slaughter—iron daggers and fire-arms—had already been found more effective than clubs and stones or spears pointed with sharks teeth; but what were a few daggers and muskets against the swivel in a sea-fight? Victory must needs perch on the banner of the chief who had such artillery. The destiny of Hawaii turned on that pivot. But the aspiring chief had also two English sailors in his service—a much more important advantage. There had been a treacherous massacre of natives by an American shipmaster; and in return there had been the capture of a little schooner, with the murder of all on board save one, by a Hawaiian chief whom that shipmaster in his reckless cruelty had flogged. In consequence of those massacres John Young and Isaac Davis had been left helpless on that island, had been taken into favor by Kamehameha, who was sagacious enough to see that they might be useful to him, and having found life on shore among the native aristocracy more satisfactory than “life on the ocean-wave,” had concluded to remain there. There is no need of telling the story in detail. In brief, the king with a swivel, and with

two English sailors among his chiefs, soon conquered the entire island, and after a few years and much fighting, he was the recognized sovereign of all the islands. From Young, and perhaps from the British navigator Vancouver and other visitors, he seems to have gained some rude notions of a feudal system. As William the Conqueror divided England and the Saxons among his Norman followers, so the Hawaiian conqueror divided the land and the people among his chiefs,—though he retained a part in his immediate possession. The absolute ownership of the soil and of everything else was his, and it was in his power to make and to abrogate all regulations. What he distributed among the chiefs was theirs only at his pleasure, and on condition of services and payments to be rendered in war or in peace. The chiefs in turn distributed their lands among their favorites on similar conditions, and those underlings had yet others under them. Every man, the king only excepted, was under a superior against whom he could call nothing his own; and every man, down to the lowest rank, had somebody subject to his will. The people were slaves to their chiefs, and the chiefs were slaves to their king.

Such was the one important change tending toward civilization—the only one—which had resulted, even indirectly, from more than thirty years of commercial intercourse with the civilized world. The chiefs in the various islands had been compelled to acknowledge one of themselves, a little more sagacious but not less a savage than the rest, as their sovereign; and thus war was no longer their normal relation to each other. Rebellion was indeed possible to any chief bold enough for so perilous an enterprise; but till the empire of the conqueror should fall to pieces like that of Alexander, war in any other form was out of the question. But had the conqueror done anything for the people? Had the people gained anything from their intercourse with foreigners? A trade had been opened in sandal wood for the Chinese market; but that trade was the king's monopoly. It might have been a stimulus to industry and to thrift, and so might have tended toward civilization; but the enslaved people had no more to gain from it than the negroes on a Georgia plantation from the cotton trade in the time of their slavery. Under the system of that savage

despot, no first step toward the civilization of his subjects was possible.

Yet the lapse of forty years from the date of the discovery had wrought some less important changes there. Certain animals which in the civilized world are domesticated had been introduced—goats, sheep, neat cattle, and even horses were beginning to be numerous. Some fruits, also, and edible plants, had been added to the productions of the soil; and to that extent the means of subsistence for human beings had been enlarged and diversified. Consequently when ships touched for refreshment, or for the purchase of sandal wood from the king, the natives had more and better supplies which they could barter for bits of iron, for gewgaws, for intoxicating liquors, for tobacco, and for firearms and gunpowder. But their condition, even in relation to animal wants and bodily comforts, was, on the whole, no better at the arrival of the mission from the United States, than when Cook first descried the mountains of Kauai. The king was richer than any of his predecessors had been, but his wealth was nothing to them by whose unpaid labor he had gained it. He could purchase boats, guns, ammunition, ships; but their huts, their clothing, their food were no better, or not appreciably better, than of old. He might barter tons of sandal wood for goods which he knew not how to use, and which lay piled up and going to waste in worthless store-houses, but that was of no benefit to them,—he could not sell anything to them for the reason that they had nothing which was not already his, and could render no service which he was not accustomed to exact without compensation. The king (as he was sometimes called) of Kauai, while he acknowledged Kamehameha as his superior, had on his distant island a sort of independence, and was acquiring wealth in a similar way, with as little benefit to his people. There were other chiefs who held property under the king, and whose possessions were increased by intercourse with foreigners;—one might be the owner of a ruffled shirt to be worn on great occasions in lieu of all other drapery, and one might glory in a scarlet coat with gilt buttons—one might have a carpet in his grass hovel, and one might view his own features in a gorgeous mirror—some of them, we believe, had small

vessels of European build and rigging. All the chiefs had better food, and more of it, than fell to the lot of the wretched plebeians, but none of them were civilized enough in their habits and notions to know in what way their gains could be made subsidiary even to their physical enjoyment. Much less had they ever entertained a thought of improving in any way the condition of the people under them.

Meanwhile, through all those years, the population of the islands had been rapidly diminished. The wars of Kamehameha, till he had subdued all his rivals, were terribly destructive—the more so for the new implements obtained from foreigners. Rum, too—so universally the bane of savages in contact with civilization—had its share in the work of destruction. But more fatal than war and drunkenness together, among the causes of depopulation, was the disease which was introduced by the first English sailors that visited the islands, and of which every ship that touched there for supplies communicated a new infection. In the prodigious dissoluteness of all ranks and the brutish promiscuousness of intercourse, a few years were enough to poison the blood of the entire people. Even this was not all. As if war and the many diseases produced by drunkenness and licentiousness were too slow in their destroying work, an immemorial practice of infanticide seems to have had, in those few years, a most portentous growth. The nefarious art of murdering children not yet born was perhaps as well understood, and as effectively practised, there, in those days, as it is to-day, in the most dissolute cities—the Sodoms of modern civilization—in Europe and America; and of the children that were permitted to be born alive, only a few were permitted to live. Foreigners residing there at that period were not eminently intelligent, and could hardly be expected to cultivate a statistical accuracy of judgment; but their opinion was that two-thirds of the children born on the islands perished by the hands of their parents. The population when the islands were discovered was estimated by the scientific men of the expedition—probably overestimated—at 400,000. Fourteen years later, Vancouver observed an evident diminution of numbers. Soon after the beginning of the present century, a memorable pestilence “swept away one half of the popula-

tion, leaving the dead unburied for want of those able to perform the rites of sepulture." In 1823, the population was estimated at only 142,000. An official census in 1832 made report of 130,315; and successive enumerations, at various times down to 1860, have shown a rapid though not uniform decrease. But the census of 1860—the latest of which we find any notice—shows that, in seven years preceding that date, the annual excess of deaths over births had been much less than in earlier years. There is now some reason to hope that the race which had seemed to be doomed may outlive the poison in its blood, may overcome the causes that have been working its destruction, and may at last begin to increase and multiply.

These statements concerning the depopulation of the islands make it almost needless to inquire whether forty years of communication with the civilized world had contributed anything to the moral elevation of the people. If there had been any change it was a change from bad to worse. We find no evidence that in all their intercourse with mariners and traders from Christian countries, they had acquired any one thought or sentiment of distinctively Christian morality. They were no more ashamed of the vilest impurity, no less dishonest and treacherous, no less ferocious and cruel, no less "without natural affection," in 1820, than when they first saw "the meteor flag" on the ships of Cook's squadron. How could any such thing be expected of them? How could their intercourse with the ships that entered their ports teach them lessons of purity, of disinterestedness, of pity for misfortune, of patriotism, or of philanthropy? Of the foreigners who were content to remain among them, some—especially Young and Davis—were English sailors of the better sort, as English sailors were in those days; but others were the worst of outcasts, fugitives from the restraints of civilized life, escaped convicts from Botany Bay, men who brought with them nothing of civilization but its vices and the arts that minister to vice. Under such teachers the natives had learned to distil rum from the indigenous cane, but not to make sugar—to know all the symbols in a pack of cards, but not to know the value of an alphabet. Drunkenness and gambling have an almost irresistible fascination for sav-

ages; and it is not strange that, with rum obtained from ships in exchange for supplies and rum distilled on the islands, and in the absence of all motives to steady industry, those vices had become universal. As drunkenness and gambling, even in civilized populations, are naturally associated with extreme selfishness and the decay or death of "natural affection," so, with the growth of those vices, the cruelty of savages becomes more ruthless. A savage father or mother, if addicted to drunkenness and cards, is for that reason the more likely to strangle a little child or to bury it alive rather than have the trouble of it. Nor could such barbarians have more pity for the helplessness of age than for the helplessness of infancy. The same cruel parents who could dig a hole under the hovel that sheltered them, and stifle the cries of a troublesome child by stamping down the earth upon it, could get rid of a decrepit father or mother by the same process, or by throwing the burthensome relative down a precipice. "The distressed were objects of ridicule and abuse. If one had lost an eye, or an arm, or was otherwise maimed—he became to others an object of sport, especially to the children who were not slow to make his misfortune the subject of boisterous mirth." "Instead of looking with pity on maniacs, it was a common practice to put them to death by stoning."

The religion of the islands—a dark and cowering superstition, propitiating its hideous gods with the blood of human sacrifices—had been partially overthrown before the arrival of the first missionaries. Its most characteristic institution was the *tabu*—a system of arbitrary prohibitions guarded at every point by the penalty of death. The unmeaning *tabu* was no restraint on licentiousness, or on anything at which the moral sense of humanity revolts; it guarded no personal rights, no domestic duties or enjoyments, no public interest; but it prohibited the sexes, even husbands and wives, from eating together. The family table, where husband and wife, with their children, eat together, is what makes a human household; and in a Christian home, where all God's gifts are holy, the family meal is a family sacrament. But where a superstitious prohibition, enforced by the fear of malignant demons and of cruel priests whose word was death, made it a crime for men and women to

eat together, the family table, with all the joys and natural sanctities that cluster around it, was impossible. With the same arbitrariness certain sorts of food, lawful for men, were made unlawful for women. Men and women alike might eat the flesh of dogs; but the flesh of swine, and some kinds of fish and fruits, were forbidden to women even of the highest rank. These prohibitions, with others equally senseless and vexatious, appear to have been almost the only restraint imposed upon the natives by their religion; and such restraint could not but become increasingly irksome to them in the increase of their intercourse with foreigners. The old king, Kamehameha the conqueror, retained his devotion to his gods and his regard for all the restrictions of the *tabu*, so long as he lived; and at his death, while he associated his favorite wife, the queenly Kaahumanu, with his son Liholiho in the secular government of the kingdom, he was careful to associate another person with him in the care and support of the national religion, as if he had some distrust of the young man's—and perhaps of the queen's—fidelity to the gods and the *tabu*. The precaution was ineffectual. In the public mourning after the king's death, when, according to an ancient theory, the people, in the supposed frenzy of their grief, rushed into unusual depths of licentiousness and drunkenness, and into deeds of outrageous violence to the extent of mutilation and of murder, it came to pass that some women broke the *tabu* by eating forbidden food and by eating with men, and did so with impunity. The young king's mother, after awhile, deliberately followed the example, probably not without the advice and approval of Kaahumanu, who proposed to the king, after she had presided at his inauguration, that all restrictions of that sort should be disregarded. But he, influenced on the other side by his constituted adviser and colleague in religious affairs, hesitated. The traditional superstition had not lost its hold upon his fears. At last, full three months after his father's death, he was induced, when drunk and not more than half aware of what he was doing, to compromise himself by eating dog's flesh with women, by drinking rum with the female chiefs, and by smoking from the same pipes with them. The consequences—*si licet magna componere parvis*—were as when bluff king Harry broke the Roman *tabu*,

and ensured the Anglican reformation, by discarding Catharine of Arragon and openly taking for his queen the golden-haired Anna Boleyn. Royalty had defied the reigning superstition. Messengers carried the news to every island. Even in far off Kauai the vassal-king Kaumuaulii threw off the irksome restraints, and there, as everywhere else, chiefs and people were free in eating and drinking and smoking.

But as Henry VIII had his Sir Thomas More to protest against the innovation and to stimulate opposition, so Kamehameha II had his Kekuaokelani whom his father had associated with him "in the care of the gods and of the *tabu*." That chief (he might be described as a prince of the blood royal) was a conservative, and put himself at the head of opposition to the king's revolutionary movement. The high priest of the old superstition, like the Archbishop of Canterbury under Henry VIII, adhered to the king and was zealous for the great innovation; but Kekuaokelani, more zealous than Sir Thomas More, took up arms for the old religion, and fell in the battle which annihilated the conservative party. The revolution was completely successful. With the abolition of the *tabu* the hideous idols and their rude temples were given to the flames. But the old superstition remained in the minds of the people, and, by the laws of human nature, must remain till displaced by new ideas and sentiments. All that the reformers (if we may so name them) had desired was freedom from certain inconvenient restraints; and to obtain that freedom they had attempted the leap from superstition to atheism, or to that absolute irreligion which is what the "absolute religion" of some philosophers amounts to.

While these events were yet in progress, the American missionaries, having embarked at Boston, October 23rd, 1819—before the old king's death was known in the civilized world—were on their six months voyage around Cape Horn. On the 30th of March, 1820, early in the morning, they saw the chief mountain of Hawaii, about eighty miles distant,—“the lofty Mauna Kea, lifting its snow-crowned summit above the dark and heavy clouds that begirt its waist.” “As we approached,” says one of them,* “we had a fine view of about sixty miles of

* Bingham, Residence of Twenty-one Years in the Sandwich Islands.

the northeast coast of the island . . and as the sun shining in his strength dissipated the clouds, we had a more impressive view of the stupendous pyramidal Mauna Kea, having a base of some thirty miles and a height of nearly three miles. Its several peaks rise so near each other, as scarcely to be distinguished at a distance. These, resting on the shoulders of this vast Atlas of the Pacific, prove their great elevation by having their bases environed with ice, and their summits covered with snow, in this tropical region, and heighten the grandeur and beauty of the scene by exhibiting in miniature a northern winter in contrast with the perpetual summer of the temperate and torrid zones below the snow and ice." Sailing around the northern extremity of the island to gain the leeward or western side, they could see in outline some prominent features of the country which they had undertaken to evangelize—green hills, deep ravines, woods, streams, cascades, traces of volcanic agency, rude dwellings of the natives, and, with the aid of glasses, the natives themselves moving along the shore. It was not till near the close of the day that they were able to open communication with the land. A boat, with two young Hawaiians who had been in America, and were returning as *attachés* of the mission, was sent to inquire respecting the state of the islands and the residence of the king. The tropical sunset came, with its sudden rush of night, before the messengers returned; but, when they came, their report was as "the voice of one crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord." The report was, "Kamehameha is dead; his son Liholiho is king; the *tabus* are abolished; the images are destroyed; the *heiaus* of idolatrous worship are burned; and the party that attempted to restore them by force of arms has recently been vanquished." It was impossible for men who had sailed half-way round the world on an enterprise of Christian zeal, and who were accustomed to recognize a Divine providence in the ordering of events, not to accept that preparation of their field for their work as God's answer to their prayers and the prayers of those who had sent them forth.

Much need had they of such encouragement. The next day, (Mar. 31), they began to see what the people were with whom they were to deal. A considerable number of the natives came

alongside, in their canoes, to trade and to see the strangers. The missionaries—two ordained ministers of the gospel (Hiram Bingham and Asa Thurston), a physician, two schoolmasters, a printer, and a farmer, all accompanied by their wives—looked down from the deck with a wondering gaze to see (if they could see in such specimens) what the material was on which they were to work. They found a momentary gratification in the sight of the canoes, curiously constructed and skillfully managed with short paddles or with little sails; “but,” says one of them, “the appearance of destitution, degradation, and barbarism, among the chattering and almost naked savages, whose heads and feet, and much of their sunburnt swarthy skins, were bare—was appalling. Some of our number, with gushing tears, turned away from the spectacle. Others, with firmer nerve, continued their gaze, but were ready to exclaim, ‘Can these be human beings! Can such beings be civilized? Can they be Christianized? Can we throw ourselves upon these rude shores, and take up our abode, for life, among such a people, for the purpose of training them for heaven?’”

On the next day (April 1), having passed a little farther south along the leeward shore of the island, they received a visit from certain distinguished personages. A high chief, Kalanimoku—who had long been a principal adviser and officer of the old Kamehameha, and whom, in consideration of his being “prime minister,” English sailors had called Billy Pitt—came, with his wives and two of the late king’s widows, in a double canoe, shaded by a huge Chinese umbrella, and in the majesty of the nodding *kahilis* or plumed rods which indicated their rank; and with them came, beside the crew of athletic rowers or paddlers, a throng of loquacious attendants. It was easy to see that these visitors were *great*, at least in bulk; for the average weight of chiefs, male and female, in all the islands is—or was then—more than two hundred and fifty pounds. Kalanimoku was distinguished from all the rest (and, as it appeared afterward from almost the whole nation) by being decently clothed in a civilized style. One of the barefooted princesses, soon after the introduction of the parties to each other, threw off the unaccustomed restraint of her printed cotton gown, and exhibited her gigantic proportions in the *dishabille* of a ging-

ham *shirt* (let not that word be taken as an American euphemism for *chemise*), and a broad girdle or flounce of native cloth wound several times around the middle of her body and secured by a sort of loop over the hip. The native cloth or *kapa* is more like paper than like any woven fabric; and the reader may get an idea of that remarkable *cestus* by imagining ten thicknesses of paper, one over another, about thirty inches wide and three or four yards long, slightly tacked together by a stitch here and there along the upper edges. Such attire, *minus* the shirt, was, and always had been, full dress for ladies of the highest rank. Perhaps the lord bishop who, a few years ago, was telling, at one place and another in England, how happy the Sandwich Islanders were before they had been invaded by Puritan Christianity, and describing them as "children of nature, children of the air, children of the light, children of the sun, children of beauty, disporting themselves for the most part in the open air, living in the utmost conceivable freedom, taking their greatest pleasure in the dance, dancing many times a day, dancing almost every evening"—might have been delighted with the simplicity of that custom; but those Puritan missionaries from New England, less sentimental than his worship, and less dignified, were thinking (we dare say) of how much that half-naked savage needed the gospel, and how soon the gospel, if it should take effect upon her, would invest her with a petticoat and teach her to wear shoes and stockings. On the whole, with due deference to his lordship's learning and refinement, we are of opinion that their view of the case was more sensible than his.

Just as the day was closing, the visitors returned to the shore. "The sun sank to his western ocean bed, and the full-orbed moon rose majestically from the east over the dark Pagan mountains of Hawaii." It was the first of April, and that full moon, following the vernal equinox, was the passover moon; but those Puritan missionaries (we must make the confession) did not know—or seem not to have known—that the Saturday evening which they were keeping with the exultant hymn, "Head of the Church triumphant," as their ship gently floated southward on the smooth silent sea, was the eve of Easter. So thoroughly Puritan had their training been, that, we dare say, not one of them knew the coincidence of their arrival with the anni-

versaries that make the "Holy Week," and of that bright Sunday with the most ancient and most sacred of church-festivals. Our High-Church friends, we fear—if any such shall happen to read what we are writing—will conclude, without going any farther in the story, that a mission so utterly devoid of "church principles," and unobservant of "days and months and times and years," could never contribute anything to the progress of a kingdom which is "righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost."

But ignorant as those New England missionaries were of principles and methods which are by some deemed indispensable in the evangelization of savages, they were not ignorant of Christ and the religion of the New Testament; nor were they destitute of common sense. Knowing what the work was which they had undertaken, and longing to enter upon it, they knew they could do nothing without conciliating the natives, both chiefs and people, and winning their confidence. In the morning, while the ship was passing near the residence of Billy Pitt, one of the missionaries had the opportunity of calling on him, at his thatched hut in a most uninviting village; and the same distinguished party which had visited the ship on the preceding day, embarked to accompany the missionaries in their visit to the king, without whose sovereign permission nothing could be done. It being the day of the Christian Sabbath, a service of public worship was held on the deck; and if the preacher had known that he was preaching an Easter sermon, his text could hardly have been more appropriate, "He shall not fail nor be discouraged till he have set judgment in the earth: and the isles shall wait for his law." After the service, Kalakua, one of the late king's widows, with a woman's eye for new fashions, requested the missionary ladies to make her a gown such as they wore. Just at that point the civilizing work which the mission was to perform, and its relation to their evangelizing work, began to open. The worship of the missionaries with the ship's crew, in the English language, had of course produced only the slightest impression on the tawny savages, for it was the simplest style of Puritanism in worship—no image or picture, nor even a cross for a visible object of veneration—no lighted candles—no priestly costume—no rubrical

responses. But the request for a new dress, though prompted, doubtless, by a desire to find out whether the white women could be made serviceable, gave occasion for a first lesson in the Christian religion. Her Royal Highness was informed that in obedience to the law of God, given for all mankind, the missionaries rested from all such labor on that day, and that her request must therefore be postponed till the morrow. When the next day came, the request was remembered; and, by the ready skill and labor of the ladies, the "rude giantess" was soon provided with a white cambric dress—the first contribution of the mission to the civilization of the Hawaiian people. Those true sisters of mercy, before they had landed, before the ship had dropped its anchor, were already beginning to win favor for the mission by sisterly kindness and practical usefulness.

It was not till Wednesday that the missionaries found themselves at anchor near Kailua, a large village of grass tents which was then the place of the king's residence. Between the anchorage and the shore, a promiscuous multitude of the natives, men, women, and children—among them the king and his mother—were bathing and enjoying themselves, like so many ducks or porpoises. "As we proceeded to the shore," says Bingham, "the multitudinous shouting and almost naked natives, of every age, sex, and rank, swimming, floating on surf-boards, sailing in canoes,—or, on shore, sitting, lounging, standing, running like sheep, dancing, or laboring,—attracted our earnest attention." They soon obtained an interview with the king "at his dingy, unfurnished, thatched habitation;" and communicating to him the salutations of the good people in America who had sent them, they "asked permission to settle in his country, for the purpose of teaching the nation Christianity, literature, and the arts." A difficult and critical negotiation was thus begun. The king had just got rid of one religion; and, naturally, the proposal to introduce another was not altogether welcome. But he consented to consider the matter; and it was for them to be thankful for so much, and to wait, anxiously indeed, but in patience and in prayer, till he should arrive at a decision. Returning the next day to renew their effort, they presented to his illiterate Majesty an elegant copy

of the English Bible, which had been sent out for that purpose by the American Bible Society, and—what was doubtless more highly appreciated—“a good optical instrument,” a gift from the American Board of Missions. They also presented copies of the English Bible (gifts from friends in America) to the daughters of Kamehameha. At that time the royal family consisted of the king and his four mothers, his five wives, and his little brother and sister. Two of his wives were his father's daughters: and another of them, a half-sister of those two, had been his father's wife. A shallow sentimentalism, without the sustaining force of a Christian purpose, might have been discouraged, not only by the repulsiveness of domestic relations so hideously jumbled, but even more by the impression which the royal personages themselves made on their visitors at the first interview. “They sat, like Turks or tailors, on mats spread on the ground, dipped their fingers in the dish to eat their fish, po-i, and dog-flesh, without knife, fork, or spoon. They stretched themselves, at full length, on the mats, to play cards or otherwise kill time. Their water they drank from a gourd shell; and *awa*, the juice of a narcotic root chewed by others and mixed with water in the chewers' mouths, they drank, as their fathers had done, from a cocoanut shell.”

While the negotiations were in progress, the king, and the royal family, as just described, were invited to dine with their visitors, on shipboard; and they graciously accepted the invitation. Missionary Bingham tells us about the dinner-party and the royal guests. “They came off in their double canoe with waving *kahilis* and a retinue of attendants. His Majesty, —having a *malo* or narrow girdle around his waist,—a green silken scarf over his shoulders instead of coat, vest, and linen,—a string of large beads on his otherwise naked neck,—and a feather wreath or corona on his head—to say nothing of his being destitute of hat, gloves, shoes, stockings, and pants—was introduced to the first company of white women whom he ever saw. Happy to show civilities to this company at our own table, we placed the king at the head of it, and implored the blessing of the King of kings on our food and on the interview.” After dinner, the entertainment was prolonged on the quarter-deck, the missionaries and the captain and officers of

the brig singing Christian hymns, and one of the returned natives performing an accompaniment on the bass-viol. The visitors were evidently gratified; and with a friendly "aloha" or farewell they returned to the shore. But the great question was still in suspense.

Thus, one day after another passed away—one interview after another was held with the king and chiefs; and the missionaries, at the end of a week from their arrival at the seat of government, had not obtained permission to establish themselves on the islands. John Young, who was afterward a good friend of theirs, told them they might think themselves fortunate if they should obtain a favorable answer in six months. The king and chiefs, not having seen the sort of Christianity which an Anglican bishop, years afterward, attempted to organize among the Zulus in his diocese of Natal, were suspicious that their polygamy would be interfered with by the missionaries. Objection was made that the government of Great Britain might be displeased, if the liberty which these Americans were asking for should be granted. Wearied with such delays, and with objections which seemed to be simply dilatory, the missionaries at last resorted to the expedient of asking to remain a year by way of experiment and probation. To their great joy that request was granted; and on the 12th of April, fourteen days after their arrival, a detachment of the force with which they were invading the immemorial darkness and wickedness of that savage people was stationed for a year at what was then the royal residence, Kailua. The king's decree had been that the physician, one of the two preachers, and two of the three native helpers who had received an imperfect education in America, should remain near him; that the others should proceed to Honolulu on Oahu; and that no reinforcement of the mission should be sent for till the experiment they were to make should have resulted in obtaining his approbation. In the evening of that day, Mr. Thurston and Dr. Holman, with their wives, left their companions on the brig which had been for half a year their floating home, and went to the quarters provided for them by royal hospitality in a convenient proximity to the seat of royalty itself. "A small thatched hut was by the king's order appropriated for their

accommodation,—if such a frail hut, three and a half feet high at the foot of the rafters, without flooring, ceiling, windows, or furniture, infested with vermin, in the midst of a noisy, filthy, heathen village, can be said to be for the *accommodation* of two families just exiled from one of the happiest countries in the world." In such circumstances, and under such conditions, those adventurous evangelists gained their first station. Say if you will that they had no valid ordination, and were in no legitimate succession from the apostles; it is nevertheless too plain to be disputed that there was something apostolic in their enterprise.

That same night the brig proceeded on her voyage toward Oahu; and on the morning of April 14, the remaining missionaries found themselves in the harbor of what is now the city of Honolulu. The governor of Oahu, at that time, was Boki, a brother of the so-called Billy Pitt. He was absent in a distant part of the island, and his return must be waited for. On the 16th he returned, but was too drunk for any business. The next day they had an interview with that dignitary, and obtained permission for their vessel to enter the harbor; but he was in no haste to obey the order from the king that they should be provided with houses to live in—such as had been assigned to Mr. Thurston and Dr. Holman at Kailua. While the governor was doing what he dared to discourage them, they found a temporary shelter in three native huts, offered for their accommodation by friendly foreigners whom they found there. So, on the 19th of April, they commenced their housekeeping, "with little furniture of any sort,"—"with neither floor nor ceiling, neither chimney nor fireplace in their habitations." Comforting themselves with the thought that in their work "everything in the way of civilization as well as of religion was to be taught both by example and precept," they addressed themselves first to the task of making as near an approach to a civilized way of living as was possible in their circumstances. They had brought with them from Boston an American cooking-stove. This they set up in the open air within a little enclosure near one of their huts; and a great wonder it was to the natives, of whom fifty or a hundred might be seen peering through the fence to watch the housework of the missionary women, and so taking a first lesson in civilization.

We have seen, in part, "what manner of entering in" those pioneers of Christianity and of social and political renovation had among the barbarous people of the Sandwich Islands. On Wednesday they landed, and at night lay down for the first time in the native huts offered for their accommodation. Thursday, Friday, and Saturday saw them at work with versatile dexterity, converting their rude shelter into some semblance of a civilized home, and attracting the attention of the barbarians to new ideas of life and comfort. Sunday came—"the first day of the week,"—the Puritan Sabbath, and the natives "saw another sight." They saw the new comers keeping a day of rest and worship. Instead of the diversified activity which had filled the foregoing days, there was stillness but not idleness. No washing or drying of clothes—no heating of sad-irons at the stove—no sound of hatchet or hammer—no opening of boxes or setting up of furniture—but, instead of all that, a cheerful quiet, the white men and their wives, more neatly and carefully attired than on other days, reading, praying, singing, and, at an appointed hour, holding a public assembly to which foreigners and natives alike had been invited. In that assembly, after prayer and song in English, the missionaries attempted to tell, through the imperfect medium of an unskilled interpreter, why they had come and what message they bore, and so the first sermon was preached in what is now the capital of the Hawaiian kingdom. Now, at last, the mission was fairly at work. Its civilizing work began with the setting up of a cooking-stove on Thursday; its evangelizing work began with the public assembly for worship on Sunday.

For reasons which will appear in the sequel, we call attention particularly to the civilizing influence of the mission. Father Bingham tells the story in its details, though without any remarkable fascination of style. He says, "Having assured the rulers, from the beginning of our intercourse with them, that if permitted we could teach them and their people Christianity and the arts, we now made it a daily object to gain their confidence, to make ourselves acquainted with their language, habits, and modes of thinking, and the best means of access to their minds and hearts, and, if possible, adapt our instructions to their capacities and most urgent wants." Schools were com-

menced, in which adults as well as children might be taught with the help of books in English to be interpreted in Hawaiian. Even the King, indolent, capricious, and often drunk, made so much proficiency that at the end of three months he could read a little from the New Testament in English. The subordinate king of Kauai, who had taken a detachment of the mission under his protection, was manlier and more persistent in learning, and, after three months of instruction, was able to write a letter of a few sprawling lines in broken English. At Honolulu, though some special obstacles were in the way, a school was in operation only a month after the arrival of the missionaries. Mrs. Bingham—a truly noble woman—had been, before her marriage, the successful and honored principal of a seminary for young ladies in her native country; and now to her domestic cares and labors (with no servant) she added the care and labor of teaching the rudiments of knowledge to savages who (like the famous hare in the cookery book) must first be caught, whose attention must be held by all sorts of devices, and between whom and the teacher there was no common language. At the same time her ready needle was in requisition, not only to keep her own and her husband's clothing in repair, but to execute orders from grandees beginning to covet shirts and other articles of civilized apparel. Let her husband tell how it was.

"Soon after Mrs. Bingham had got her school in operation, the King sent Hopu to Honolulu with a piece of fine shirting to have Mrs. B. make for his Hawaiian majesty five ruffled shirts with plaited bosoms, to be sent back to him at Kailua by the vessel returning in a few days. Such demands from the King, his wives, and other chiefs, male and female, in our destitution of not a few of the daily comforts once enjoyed, and an anxious desire to give full satisfaction, required some sacrifices, and caused, during the first years, some expenditure of health and strength on the part of those who were willing thus to toil in connection with their more important labors for the moral and intellectual improvement of the people. Before the people could appreciate the latter, and before their language was familiar to us, a courteous welcome given in season and out of season, the making or fitting a new garment, or the offer of a seat at table to those who sought our acquaintance, had its appropriate influence, as well as our more direct labors in teaching letters and inculcating the doctrines of Christianity. Our female helpers, by conscientiously doing both in the midst of infirmities and family cares, doubly proved their interest in the well-being of the natives, and showed a steady and loyal desire to deserve their approbation."

Another passage, quoted by Dr. Anderson from the same author, illustrates the gradual efficiency of such kindness and patience, not only in winning the confidence of the natives, but also in lifting them up toward civilization.

"Just look into the straw palace of a Hawaiian queen, the first or second year of our sojourn among them, and see a missionary's wife waiting an hour to get her to turn from her cards to try on a new dress for which she had asked. Then, on trial, hear her laconic and supercilious remarks, '*pilikia—hemo—hama-hou*' (too tight—off with it—do it over); then see her resume her cards, leaving the lady, tired and grieved, but patient, to try again; and, when successful, to be called on again and again for more. Look again, as another year passes on, and you may see the same woman at her writing desk, her maidens around her, under the superintendence of the same teacher, learning to ply the scissors and needle, making silk dresses for her majesty; and a pet hog, like a puppy, shaking the folds of the silk for sport, and demonstrating how civilization and barbarism could walk hand in hand, or lie down together in queen's palaces. Within another year, Kamamalu, Kapiolani, Kaahumanu, Kekauluohi, Kinau, Keopuolani, Kalakua, Kekauonohi, Liliha, Keoua, Kapule, Namahana, and others, threw around them an air of rising consequence, by the increase not only of foreign articles of clothing, but of furniture—a chair, a table, a workstand, a writing desk, a bedstead, a glass window, partitions, curtains, etc., noticing and attempting to imitate what in the mission families attracted their attention, or appeared sufficiently pleasing, useful, and available to induce them to copy."

The "palace of a Hawaiian queen," in the first year of the Mission, was far enough from palatial dignity of architecture or of furniture. Such words as "king," "queen," "majesty," "palace," when used by American writers in describing barbarous conditions of society, have a slightly ironical tone,—as indeed they might have on the lips of an English tory in a similar connection. Perhaps such use of them by an American implies even something of irreverence toward the grandeur which the words in their literal meaning stand for. Missionary Bingham was really, though with the gravity of unconsciousness, expressing a Puritan Vermonter's contempt for royalty and its surroundings, when he wrote about kings and queens, palaces and majesty, in the Sandwich Islands as he first saw them fifty-two years ago. In literal English, the so-called "king" was only a savage chieftain, more than half naked, habitually drunk, careless of everything but his brutish pleasures, and so ignorant that the rudest American or British sailor might have taught him many important lessons in king-craft. The so-called "queens" were not less savage than he in their mental and

moral development or in the range of their wants and aspirations;—"strong minded women" some of them were in a coarse way, but not one of them resembled at all what we call a lady. The "palace" where Liholiho deigned to receive the missionaries, and which was his only audience chamber, was a "dingy and unfurnished habitation,"—a slight, low framework of poles thatched with glass. Three years later, when the first reinforcement of the mission arrived at Honolulu, the new missionaries were formally presented to Liholiho, and were received with many expressions of gratification. The reception took place in a house which had been recently built for the King's residence at his new capital, and which, though of native architecture, seems to have been very unlike the dingy and unfurnished palace of 1820. Dr. Anderson says, on the authority of Rev. C. S. Stuart, who was one of those new missionaries, and who has since had a long and honorable term of service as a chaplain in the Navy of the United States, that it was "a large thatched building—with a door at each end, windows in the sides, and Venetian shutters, but no glass. The interior formed one apartment. The side-posts, the pillars supporting the ridge-pole, and the rafters, were fastened together by cords made from the husk of the cocoanut. The floor was of mats, and chandeliers hung suspended between the pillows. Mahogany tables, sofas, chairs from China, mirrors, and two full-length portraits of the king, completed the conveniences and decorations of the room." Some progress then had been made, in those three years, toward civilization—though, even on that important occasion, the King was not quite "sober."

But there were other and more significant indications of progress. Already the Hawaiian had become a written language. Its vocal elements had been ascertained by accurate analysis; the Roman alphabet, or so much of it as was found needful, had been applied to represent those elements,—each letter having invariably the same force, and each vocal element represented invariably by the same sign; it had been proved that every native who would learn the alphabet of only twelve letters could thenceforth read, and by learning to form the letters with a pen could also write; the printing press had begun its work, and readers were becoming numerous. Even the King,

with all his savage laziness, had learned the alphabet; and his progress in civilization was indicated not only by the furniture of his grass-thatched palace and the clothing which he and his wives wore at the reception of the new missionaries, but also by a brief letter to the captain of the brig that had brought them—a letter subscribed by the royal hand, and with graceful expressions of satisfaction remitting to him the customary port charges. The influence of the Mission had begun to register itself, unequivocally, in signs of advancing civilization.

Before the arrival of that reinforcement from their native country, the pioneer missionaries had already received from the mission of the London Society in Tahiti a temporary but most important addition to their working force. The Rev. William Ellis, whose services, first as missionary and afterward as Secretary of the London Society, have been rendered in so many parts of the world, had the privilege of giving efficient assistance to his American brethren in the Sandwich Islands while their work was in the earliest stage of its progress. He and his Tahitian helpers could give to the Hawaiian chiefs and people a convincing testimony as to what Christian teachers had done for a kindred nation. His practical counsels were of great value, for they were deduced from the experience of a mission which, after long diligence through many vicissitudes, had been eminently successful. More than once since his return to England, he has had occasion to vindicate the Sandwich Island missionaries against aspersions from malicious or blundering foreigners; and in his honored old age he has the satisfaction of knowing that both his earlier and his later services are remembered with grateful affection not only in those distant islands but in America.

From the beginning of the work, the relations of the Mission to foreign residents and to foreign visitors were often embarrassing. "In the first year," says Dr. A., "the Islands were regarded by not a few seamen and traders who visited them, and by the foreign residents viciously disposed, as so far out of the world that they felt it safe for them to act without regard to public sentiment in Britain or America. Whatever they might do that was abusive to the native government or people, or to the missionaries, or in violation of their duty to God, they

expected no report of it to reach their relatives and friends at home" (p. 64). The chapter which describes the outrages committed by officers and crews of British and American vessels is exceedingly suggestive in regard to the work of the Mission and in regard to its success. Even in those early years Christianity was beginning to affect the laws prescribed for the government of the Hawaiian people; and men who had thought that the Sandwich Islands were beyond the reach of all laws human or divine, became indignant at the invasion of their liberty. Among the measures adopted by the ruling chiefs, (after the death of Kamehameha II, and during the minority of his successor,) for the protection of their people, the most offensive was a law prohibiting the resort of women to ships in the harbors for prostitution. In one sense, the missionaries were the authors of that law, for, without the influence which they had brought with them, there would never have been any restraint on the ancient lawlessness. They had imparted to the chiefs, and were diffusing among the people, the idea of a great reformation; and the idea was beginning to be a fact, very odious to a certain class of the foreigners residing at the Islands or visiting there. Profligate commanders of profligate crews attempted to break down the law by violence directed against the dwellings and the persons of the missionaries, even threatening their lives. An officer in the navy of the United States, Lieut. Percival, commanding the schooner "Dolphin," (we write his name because it is worthy of immortal infamy,) disgraced his flag not only by conniving at outrages on the part of his crew, and refusing to protect the missionaries his countrymen, but by insolently denying the right of the chiefs to govern their subjects, and affecting to regard the restraint on prostitution as an insult to the United States. Of course these outrages were reported by the missionaries in their official correspondence with their society at home, and the result was, what the perpetrators seem not to have anticipated, a world-wide publication of the facts. The criminals (there is no need of using any softer word) found, after a few months, that what they had done in those remote islands among savages who, in their opinion, had no rights, was notorious wherever newspapers could find readers, and that they must encounter the reprobation

tion not merely of a missionary society about which they knew little and cared less, but of their own neighbors and acquaintance at home, and of public opinion everywhere. Lieut. Percival had the opportunity of defending himself before a court of inquiry ordered by the President of the United States, and did not escape without censure, though he was permitted to retain his commission. Thenceforth there were no more outrages of that kind. Dissolute foreigners had learned that their privileges were no greater in the harbors of the Sandwich Islands than in the ports of civilized nations.

From that attempt to restrain the licentiousness which had made their country one great brothel, and was threatening the annihilation of their people, the ruling chiefs proceeded to other measures in the same spirit. They saw that the reformation they had undertaken was impossible without some effective restraint on the supply of the means of intoxication. They saw that the Christian Sabbath, guarded by law, was essential to the civilization which they were endeavoring to introduce. On that subject the missionaries had taught them by precept and example the Puritan doctrine; for they had brought with them the New England Sabbath, which is the same with the Sabbath of Presbyterian Scotland,—and (notwithstanding adverse influences, in Church and State, from the day of the “Book of Sports” to the latest article in the Westminster Review against a weekly rest) of England too—so far as the English Sunday is better than the Continental. The efforts of the half Christianized chiefs for a moral reformation were commenced as early as April, 1824, not long after the departure of Kamehameha II. for England; but in October, 1829, there was the formal enactment of a criminal code, professedly framed in accordance with the law of God, and constituting a body of regulations “against murder, theft, licentiousness, retailing ardent spirits, Sabbath-breaking, and gambling,” and it was proclaimed that obedience to those laws would be exacted of foreigners as well as natives. “Englishmen and Americans,” says Dr. Anderson, “had habitually claimed to be independent of Hawaiian law, and had threatened the vengeance of their respective governments should they be punished for violating it.” The representative of the British government, Richard

Charlton, at that time Consul-general for the Society and Sandwich Islands, had been conspicuous among the enemies of the Mission and the opponents of its work; and on this occasion he "went so far as to warn the chiefs of the wrathful interposition of Great Britain, should they presume to proclaim laws without first obtaining for them the sanction of the British monarch."

It deserves to be mentioned as indicative of the feeling with which the missionaries were regarded by a majority of the sailors (masters and crews) who in those days touched at the Islands, that when the King in 1824, under some influence that seemed mysterious, suddenly determined on a visit to England, and when, by the advice of some of his chiefs, he desired that Mr. Ellis might accompany him as a competent interpreter and trusty counsellor, the captain of an English whaler who had already offered him and his suite a free passage, positively refused a passage on any terms to the English missionary. The King, with his favorite wife and four other natives, accepted the offer, and, in their ignorance, they entrusted themselves to the care and guidance of one who would not allow them to be accompanied by a friend through whom they could communicate their thoughts and wishes. Almost immediately after arriving in London, a party of savages just about as helpless as those whom Columbus brought with him when he returned from his discovery of a new world, they were taken ill with measles, and the disease proved fatal to the King and his sister-wife. Had that unfortunate chief been permitted to have in his suite an adviser so competent and a friend so watchful and faithful as Mr. Ellis would have been, all the sequel of Hawaiian history might have been different. The reign of Kamehameha II, a good-natured fellow like Charles II, caring for little else than the indulgence of his sensual appetites, and therefore, like that English Liholiho, a facile tool in the hands of any companion who would minister to his pleasures—really ended when he embarked on his ill-advised and disastrous voyage. He left the government in the hands of a regency which of course would be superseded in a few months at his return. That regency continued nine years, till Kamehameha III, who was only a child when his brother sailed away, had

become old enough to assume the power. It was under the regency of Queen Kaahumanu—a strong-minded and heroic woman who had been the favorite wife of Kamehameha I, and whose chief adviser and helper was Kalanimoku, the “Billy Pitt” of her husband’s reign—that the great revolution in the character and condition of the people was really effected. So completely did the scheme of separating the King from the missionaries by sending him to England on the fool’s errand of obtaining British protection for himself and his kingdom, “turn out for the furtherance of the gospel,” and for the protection of the Mission by the native government against the devices of ill-disposed foreigners.

It was during the regency of Kaahumanu that the above mentioned outrages were perpetrated by foreigners in resistance of the laws against prostitution. The visit of the British frigate *Blonde*, bringing home the remains of the deceased king and queen and the survivors of their suite, strengthened the hands of the missionaries and encouraged the chiefs to proceed in their work of national reformation. Her commander, Lord Byron, “a friendly and high-minded nobleman,” treated the missionaries as well as the native authorities with honorable courtesy. He was present with them at a great council in which the chiefs of the nation were assembled, and in which the policy to be pursued by the government was considered. In view of the opposition already encountered, some of the chiefs desired to know what he would advise respecting the continuance of the American Mission. He disclaimed all authority in the matter, but having inquired concerning the object and relations of the Mission, he gave in that public assembly his approval of the work which he had already commended in private. Two of the chiefs who had returned in the *Blonde* reported what they had heard from George IV (*Kini George*), to whom they had been formally presented, and who (being Defender of the Faith) had told them to give good attention to the missionaries, and had also promised to protect the Hawaiian kingdom against other powers without interfering in its internal affairs. The reforming chiefs therefore took courage. They had reason to believe that the British power, however invoked by dissolute or greedy foreigners who, in the name of liberality,

were opposing all efforts for the restraint of wickedness and for the moral reformation of the people, would offer no unfriendly interference. It was well for Hawaii that the visit of Byron in the *Blonde* preceded the visit of Percival in the *Dolphin*.

Thus it was that when Charlton, in 1829, denied the right of the chiefs to make laws which should have any force against foreigners, the Regent and her associates in the government were not terrified by his threat of British intervention. Just three years before, when the opposition to restraints on prostitution was venting itself in violence against the missionaries with threats of murder, a crisis which might have been disastrous was averted by the opportune arrival of an American man-of-war, the *Peacock*, commanded by Capt. Thomas Ap-Catesby Jones. To that officer, as representing the American government, the missionaries appealed against their persecutors, and he, after a fruitless endeavor to obtain from Charlton and other opposers some definite allegation against them in a meeting assembled for that purpose, gave a full and hearty testimony in their favor. "I own," said he, afterward, "I trembled for the cause of Christianity and for the poor benighted islanders, when I saw, on the one hand, the British consul backed by the most wealthy and hitherto influential residents and shipmasters in formidable array, and prepared, as I supposed, to testify against some half a dozen meek and humble servants of the Lord, calmly seated on the other, and ready to be tried by their "bitterest enemies."—"But what, in reality was the result of this portentous meeting, which was to overthrow the Mission and uproot the seeds of civilization and Christianity?"—"What, I again ask, was the issue of this great trial? The most perfect, full, complete, and triumphant victory for the missionaries that could have been asked by their most devoted friends. Not one iota derogatory to their character as men, as ministers of the gospel, or as missionaries, could be made to appear against them." Such was the defeat of the malignants, in 1826, by the timely arrival of the *Peacock* with a Christian gentleman for her commanding officer; equally opportune was the arrival of another national vessel from the United States in 1829, when Charlton was engaged

in a controversy with the native government, and the question whether foreigners residing in Hawaii were to do whatever might to them seem good, was at issue. The government, instead of being terrified by an intimation that the matter was to be laid before "his Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State," had responded by an edict to which the young King's name was subscribed, and which was printed for the information of all concerned. It was addressed in form to the English residents; and while it promised them "the protection of the laws," it demanded of them, in return, obedience to the laws. "This therefore," said the King, "is my proclamation which I make known to you, all people from foreign countries:—The laws of my country prohibit murder, theft, adultery, prostitution, retailing ardent spirits at houses for selling spirits, amusements on the Sabbath day, gambling and betting on the Sabbath day and at all times. If any man shall transgress any of these laws, he is liable to the penalty, the same for every foreigner and for all the people of these islands—*whoever shall violate any of these laws shall be punished.*" It was just after the date of this proclamation that the United States sloop-of-war Vincennes, commanded by Captain Finch, entered the harbor of Honolulu. Captain Finch was the bearer of an official letter, written under the direction of the President of the United States by the Secretary of the Navy, and accompanied by presents to the King and the highest chiefs. The letter to the King expressed, in behalf of the President, his strong desire for the advancement of the Hawaiian people in the arts of civilized life, and his admiration of the progress they had made "in acquiring a knowledge of letters and the true religion." It was an informal but unequivocal recognition of the King's government as a legitimate power having authority over foreigners within its jurisdiction no less than over natives. Without naming Lieut. Percival, it disavowed such outrages as he and his crew had committed, and it intimated that the American government had "sought to know and punish those who are guilty." It expressly commended the missionaries and their work to the favor of the King and the protection of his government. Mr. Stewart who had been one of the missionaries and had been compelled by his wife's illness to relinquish the work, was chap-

lain of the Vincennes; and his presence in that character was an additional testimony to the character and standing of the men whom dissolute foreigners hated and despised. "The chiefs were thus encouraged in the position they had taken, and soon gained resolution and strength for executing their laws on offending foreigners as well as on their own people."

But such outrages as have been mentioned were not the only methods in which resident foreigners of a certain class undertook to baffle the efforts of the Mission. From the beginning it seemed desirable to introduce, under the name of Christianity, a different sort of religion from that which the missionaries were introducing in the place of the abolished paganism. As early as 1823, almost as soon as the work at Honolulu has been fairly begun, two of the foreigners at that port, judging that Bingham and his colleagues were not "liberal" enough in doctrine and practice for a country so uncivilized, set up a conventicle of their own in which to "prophecy smooth things"—much smoother than the harsh Puritanism imported from New England. The experiment was not brilliantly successful. Some of the well disposed chiefs went to the new meeting once or twice, thinking that perhaps the two preachers or reformers, in beginning to conduct public worship, had begun to reform their own lives, and might have something to say that would show others how to become new creatures. But, not finding in the professedly religious service enough of the appearance of earnestness to win their confidence, they soon arrived at the conclusion that the preaching of the missionaries was more likely to be useful. The two Liberals—one an American of the sort known as "faded Yankees," the other a Frenchman—officiated by turns while the experiment lasted; but, on a certain Sunday, one of them, having been a little too liberal in his morning potations, was unable to perform his part; and, the meeting being adjourned without delay, that was the end of the enterprise. Liberalism in that form had been tried and had failed.

Perhaps another sort of Liberalism might be more successful. When Liholiho embarked on his ill-advised and ill-starred voyage, a certain Frenchman named John Rives, having attempted in vain to obtain a passage as one of the King's attendants, hid

himself on board the ship, and so went to England and thence to his native country. Whether he was the liberal Frenchman just mentioned or another, does not appear; but his heart seems to have been set upon obtaining for Hawaii some religion less austere than Puritanism. In France, he made such representations of his wealth at the Sandwich Islands, and of his influence with the government there, that he succeeded in persuading some credulous countrymen of his to go out for the purpose of being employed on his imaginary plantations, and in obtaining Roman Catholic missionaries who were to be the religious teachers of his people. Three priests were sent, one an Irishman, the others French; and the head of that Mission was dignified with a title which was more likely to alarm than to conciliate the native government, "Apostolic Prefect of the Sandwich Islands." One of the French priests died on the voyage; but the Apostolic Prefect and his Irish subaltern, with several artisans and an agricultural manager under the patronage of Rives, arrived at Honolulu in July, 1827. Rives, though the vessel was freighted with goods on his account, had sailed in another vessel for the western coast of America, and never came to look after his estates in the Sandwich Islands. At the arrival of the American missionaries, seven years before, they could not begin their work without obtaining permission from the government then existing, and even the qualified permission to remain for a year, on probation, was not granted till after long delay. The same question came up at the arrival of these new missionaries with their proposal to introduce a different system of religion. Kaahumanu who in 1820 was, by the will of her husband the late king, an authorized adviser of his son and successor, had become, in 1827, Queen regent. If the story is true which we have heard but do not vouch for, the government, on the appearance of a new sort of missionaries, appointed a commission to ascertain, by conference with them, what the system was which they proposed to teach; and that commission, after such conference as could be had through an interpreter, reported that, so far as they could understand it, the religion of the new missionaries bore some resemblance to the old religion which had been abolished and prohibited;—they could only make out that it had its images, its *tabu*, and

its veneration of dead men's bones. Whether the story is exactly historical or partly mythical, it is certain that the government of Queen Kaahumanu decided promptly against the Roman Catholic missionaries, and ordered the captain of the vessel in which they came to take them away with him. He refused to take them; and they remained for a time, favored by the self-styled Liberal party among the foreigners, and identifying their cause with the interest of an ambitious and reckless chief who was plotting against the Queen. At last, after more than four years, the government sent them, in a vessel of its own, to California (then a Mexican province), where they were sure of a hospitable welcome. They had made some converts; and it is to be mentioned with regret that the law which, in 1820, before the arrival of the American mission, had been proclaimed against idolatry, was put in force against the Roman Catholic worship. For this the missionaries have been blamed. Perhaps they ought to be blamed for not having more effectually taught the chiefs the broadest doctrine of religious liberty; but we find no evidence that the action of the government on that occasion was in any way guided or instigated by them. The King, in an official communication to the American consul, several years afterward, denied that he had acted in that affair under the advice of the missionaries, and affirmed, with distinct specifications, that several of them had remonstrated with the government against attempting to suppress the Roman Catholic worship by prohibition and penalty. He might have learned from them that the worship of Mary and other saints, as well as of pictures and images, is in violation of the Decalogue; but it was from British and American shipmasters that he learned to dread the political influence of Romanism.

It is not our purpose to rehearse the story of Roman Catholic propagandism in Hawaii—how the British consul, Charlton, maintained a correspondence with the banished priests while they remained in California—how under his patronage, one of them, being a British subject, returned to the Islands after several years of absence—how the commander of a French frigate in the harbor of Honolulu compelled the king, under the threat of an immediate bombardment of the town, to remove all restrictions on the importation of French brandies or on the

operations of Romish missionaries—by what methods the returning priests pursued their work among the natives—or what they and their successors have done to promote or to obstruct the progress of Christian civilization. While Romanism was introduced as an ally of the self-styled Liberalism against the rigorous morality inculcated by Puritan missionaries, the manner of its introduction (by intrigue and by violence) did not commend it either to the governing chiefs or to the better sort of their people. It has to some extent engaged in political agitation, contending, as in this country and elsewhere, against public schools not controlled by its priesthood; but it has not gained that political power which it is always and everywhere grasping at, and without which it always feels itself weak and complains of being persecuted. Yet the Roman Catholic church in the Sandwich Islands is a permanent fact. We are not aware that it has made many proselytes from among those whom the American missionaries had received into their churches. But it has baptized and brought under its teaching and authority large numbers of those who were not regarded as converts to Christ, in the evangelical meaning of that phrase. Thus it has absorbed, and in some sort abolished much of the residuary heathenism; and what might have been a heathen party in opposition to Christianity, so far as it now exists, is a Roman Catholic party in opposition to Protestantism. Of course there is no recognized coöperation or fellowship, more than in other countries, between the Roman Catholic priesthood and the Protestant ministry. The mutual relations of those opposite and irreconcilable forms of Christianity seem to be just what they are in other countries where religious freedom is complete. When the Hawaiian government was compelled to tolerate the propagation of a religious system which it regarded as dangerous to the commonwealth, it learned a lesson which governments are always slow to learn, but which they are learning everywhere. The result has been that Hawaii is like Great Britain, or Germany, or the United States, predominantly but not exclusively Protestant,—just as France is predominantly but not exclusively Roman Catholic. Since Sadowa and Sedan, and the consequent occupation of Rome as the capital of Italy, the difference between Roman Catholic

governments and Protestant governments has no existence save in South America.

The "Reformed Catholic Mission" is the latest attempt to introduce into the Sandwich Islands a religion more suited to liberal tastes than that of the American missionaries. In the little volume entitled "Five Years' Church Work in Hawaii," we have the story of that attempt, reported four years ago by the leader of the mission, who, in those days, styled himself "Thomas, Lord Bishop of Honolulu," but is now ex-Bishop Thomas N. Staley. His Lordship did not report how it happened that the desire of a few Episcopalians among the American and English residents at Honolulu to organize a congregation for worship according to the forms of their prayer-book, and the endeavor to obtain a minister for such a congregation who would be partly supported by the king, became the occasion of sending forth from England, not a chaplain under the Bishop of London to care for the spiritual comfort and welfare of English residents and visitors at that port, but a "Lord Bishop" and his suite, to propagate the Ritualistic sort of Church-of-Englandism among the Hawaiian people. But he tells us, in the sentimental style characteristic of his sect, how, when the Bishop of Oxford had announced "in the Upper House of Convocation" the desire of the King of the Sandwich Islands "to see a bishop of the English Church established in his dominions," a voluntary committee was formed, "consisting of church dignitaries, noblemen, and gentlemen"—how a statement was published and circulated, which he copies, but which gave to the Anglican readers of it no intimation that those islands had been for nearly half a century the seat of a most successful Protestant Christian mission—how, "on the 15th of December (1861) the consecration of an English bishop for the newly-created See of Honolulu took place in Lambeth Chapel"—how "a farewell service for the Mission party was held in Westminster Abbey, when the Bishop preached, and the Holy Communion was administered to a large number, chiefly the friends and supporters of the undertaking;" and "the celebrant was the Dean, the present Archbishop of Dublin"—how "the Mission party, consisting of the Bishop of Honolulu and family, the Rev. G. Mason, M. A., and the Rev. E.

Ibbotson, embarked at Southampton for the Isthmus of Panama, on the 17th of August, 1862," etc., etc.

Let us hasten from Southampton to Aspinwall, to Panama, to San Francisco, whence they embarked for Honolulu. There a painful disappointment was waiting for them. The bishop had left behind him his country and his kindred and his father's house, expecting to be, in the Sandwich Islands, not only a Lord Bishop, but preceptor to the heir-apparent of the throne, a bright little boy of three or four years, with a dash of English blood from his great-grandfather, John Young. How great then was the disappointment to the Bishop and his suite, when, as they were entering the port of Honolulu, "they were greeted with the sad tidings, brought on board by the pilot, 'The Prince of Hawaii is dead!'"

"Every member of the Mission felt this as an almost fatal blow. The baptism of the Prince had been anticipated as the inauguration, so to say, of the work. Her Majesty Queen Victoria had graciously consented to stand sponsor at the ceremony; and she had sent out by the hands of the newly-arrived British representative, Mr. W. W. F. Synge, an appropriate gift for her god-child, while Mrs. Synge was to act as her proxy. It was found on inquiry, that a Congregational minister had been summoned to baptize the little fellow privately, his distracted parents having first sent to the British man-of-war 'Termagant,' which had lately arrived in port, to see if there was a chaplain on board. Alas! there was none."

But the prospect was not yet entirely dark. The contrast between the "entering in" of this "Reformed Catholic Mission" in 1862, and the "entering in" of the American missionaries forty-two years before, cannot but impress the reader who will recollect what the Sandwich Islands were in 1820, what the king and royal family were, and what discouragements Bingham and Thurston and their companions encountered before they could begin their work.* Let the Lord Bishop tell his own story.

"No sooner had the vessel anchored, than Mr. Wyllie, the Foreign Minister [Minister of Foreign Affairs], and Mr. Gregg, Minister of Finance, an American, came on board to receive the Mission in the King's name. They were followed by a deputation of the Church Committee and other residents. The royal carriage was placed at the disposal of the Bishop, and everything done to show him respect and welcome. It happened to be Saturday; but by the next day a building, formerly used as a Wesleyan chapel, had been arranged for Divine service. After an early communion, English matins were celebrated at eleven o'clock, when there

* *Ante*, pp. 506-514.

was a full congregation, consisting chiefly of foreign residents, Hawaiians filling up all the vacant space, and thronging round the doors and windows. An eloquent and impressive sermon was preached by Mr. Mason. The King and Queen arrived at the palace the following week from the country, whether they had retired in the first outburst of their grief. Both were deeply moved when the Bishop was introduced to them by Mr. Wyllie. After a few touching words referring to his recent loss, yet bidding us a hearty welcome to the Islands, the King said he had already completed his translation of the Morning and Evening Prayers and Litany into the Hawaiian language, and that it was then in the hands of the printer. He recommended the immediate enlargement of the temporary church, which was accordingly at once undertaken. An aisle in wood was added. The building, as a whole, was made more suitable for the ritual of the English Church. The royal seat was draped in black, and immediately over the entrance was an illuminated legend. 'If we suffer, we shall also reign with Him.' The inaugural sermon of the Mission was preached on October 19th, by the Bishop, in English, before the King, Queen, and leading residents."

Such was the hopeful beginning of the "Reformed Catholic Mission." Instead of a savage and half-naked monarch, on whose caprices they must wait for leave to begin their intended work or even to reside in any part of his dominions, the Bishop and his attendant presbyters found (we take their word for it) a most Christian king and queen waiting to be the nursing father and the nursing mother of their church. We need not draw out the contrast which is already obvious to our reader; but we may ask, How was that great change effected? Would there have been a Christian king and queen in Honolulu—would there have been a king of Hawaii competent to translate the English Prayer Book into the Hawaiian language—would there have been a Hawaiian printer—would there have been a written language for the Hawaiian people, and a Hawaiian people able to read the King's translation of the Prayer Book—if other and humbler missionaries had not preceded his Lordship? A profound admiration of the King and Queen, of their religious intelligence, of their general culture, of all their princely qualities, breathes through whatever is said by the Bishop or his subordinates about those exalted personages; but, as we read, every such expression becomes an unintended tribute to the American missionaries by whom that king and queen were educated.

The early progress of the Reformed Catholic Mission is equally suggestive of the contrast between that and its predecessor, the evangelical Mission. On the Tuesday after the

inaugural sermon in "the temporary cathedral," the Queen "was baptized in the palace in the presence of all the leading chiefs and foreign residents in the kingdom." On Thursday, there was a meeting to organize the Hawaiian branch of the "Reformed Catholic Church." The meeting was held "in the court-house," and was presided over by "the Attorney-General" (when Bingham and Thurston began, court-houses and attorneys-general were unknown in the Sandwich Islands), and "the King was present." The presence of King Liholiho, as the first missionaries found him, would hardly have been agreeable in such a meeting. Measures were taken to obtain from the government a charter of incorporation, which we believe is more than either S. Peter or S. Paul thought of applying for to the government of Rome. The charter was obtained without difficulty, and it provided that "the Bishop, the clergy in priest's orders, and certain laymen nominated by the King," should be trustees of whatever funds might be sent from England and America for the enterprise or obtained in the islands; but the Bishop is careful to inform us that "by the terms of the charter, the voice of the laity is limited to matters of a purely secular kind." Only three weeks after the English inaugural, "the first Hawaiian service was celebrated, consisting of matins and sermon," the translation of the sermon having been corrected by the King and rehearsed several times in his hearing, "till the pronunciation was deemed satisfactory." Of course, "the delight of the natives was unbounded when they joined, for the first time, in their own language, in the grand and solemn offices of our Liturgy."

Meanwhile another and greater affair was impending. "Their Majesties were under preparation and instruction for the holy rite of confirmation;" and on Friday of the third week after the first Hawaiian service, that great event was consummated. The day was judiciously chosen, as it "happened" to be a national holiday commemorative of the recognition of the national independence. "One of the clergy" described "this memorable incident" in a letter to friends in England, and the Bishop kindly gives us the benefit of the description.

"The hour fixed for the ceremony was 10.30, but long before that time the temporary cathedral [i. e., the old Methodist meeting-house] was besieged by hundreds anxious to gain admittance. One-third of the church was reserved for members

of the Court, House of Nobles, and Consular body; another for the regular congregation, and the rest for the native population. The street was occupied by His Majesty's troops—viz: the cavalry, infantry, and rifle volunteers. Precisely at 10.30 the procession entered the church, consisting of the choir of native boys and men vested in surplices, and the Bishop and clergy. At the same moment the sounds of the National Anthem announced the approach of their Majesties; and the Bishop, attended by his chaplain, the Rev. G. Mason, received the King and Queen at the west door. Here the King and Queen knelt down, having begged the Bishop to give them his blessing. His Lordship immediately pronounced Episcopal benediction, and then conducted their Majesties to their seats. The service commenced with the Litany chanted in Hawaiian, the choir responding in harmony; from the musical nature of the language, it had a most solemn and beautiful effect, and the harmony of the responses was perfect. The Litany ended, we then left the church for the vestry, where we re-formed in the following order:—Major Kaauwai (the King's aide-de-camp) vested in surplice, and carrying the Bishop's banner; choristers (native boys and men, two and two), clergy, chaplain bearing pastoral staff, and the Bishop. The procession left the vestry and entered the church at the west door, chanting the 19th Psalm, to the 3d tone, and 2d ending. Their Majesties then left their seats, and stood in front of the altar. The address was read by the Rev. G. Mason. The Bishop having put the question, their Majesties replied in a clear, audible voice. All kneeling, the Bishop said the prayers. His Lordship then called upon the congregation to spend a few moments in silent prayer on behalf of those to be confirmed. The request was responded to in earnest. Those few moments were indeed silent and solemn; the congregation then rose and sang the *Veni Creator* over their Majesties, who remained kneeling. We sang it to the ancient Gregorian melody. The Bishop then confirmed the King and Queen, and afterward delivered an impressive address." * * * * After the service was over, the King and Queen returned to the Palace, the band playing as before, the guns firing a royal salute. The altar was vested in white, and decorated with flowers, offered by members of the congregation. The King wore his uniform, which is similar to that of an English field-marshal: the Queen was dressed in white, and wore a long white veil. We said Evensong, as usual, at 7.30, and Friday happening to be the evening for the Hawaiian service, the church was crowded with natives; after which we sang a *Te Deum* in the native language as the closing act of this happy and important day."

The "five years' church work in the kingdom of Hawaii" was thus begun. We will not attempt to trace its history nor to measure its success. It is rightly named "church-work," or, in the drawling pronunciation so common among Anglicans, "*chawch-work*." We do by no means imply that the work conducted by Dr. Staley was not Christian work, when we say that the name which he gives to it felicitously hits off the distinction between what he was trying to do and what the evangelical missionaries had been trying to do before he began to build on their foundations. Their work was simply Christian work; his was (to say the best of it) something more than

simply Christian. Their work was for Christ—only for Christ—for the progress of his gospel—for the building up of his kingdom, which is “righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost”—for the conversion of sinners to him, and their sanctification not by sacraments and priestly manipulations, but by the spiritual force of that gospel which is the power of God to salvation. But Dr. Staley’s work, in whatever sense it may have been for Christ, was also work for that sect which he distinguishes from the *Roman Catholic Church* by calling it the *Reformed Catholic Church*,—or, in the widest possible meaning of his phrase “Church-work,” it was work done or to be done for that mystic personage of the feminine gender (as men of that sort always speak, not only in poetry but in “unctuous” prose) **THE CHURCH**. His “church-work,” we think, was not altogether unsuccessful considered as Christian work. We trust that the agencies which he introduced have contributed something, and may hereafter contribute more, to the progress of Hawaiian Christianity. But considered as sectarian work, or in reference to the distinctive aims of the *Reformed Catholic Mission*, its success seems not to have been all that might have been expected from the grandeur of its beginning. The king (*Kamehameha IV.*) under whose patronage it began so hopefully, died at the end of the first year (Nov. 30, 1863). His brother and successor (*Kamehameha V.*, now reigning) continued to patronize it, making the same annual contribution of \$1,000 in aid of it, besides contributing liberally to the support of its boarding schools for boys and those for girls. He made the Bishop not only chaplain to the royal family and a member of the Board of Education for the kingdom, but also a member of the Privy Council, which last office, his Lordship, following English precedent, did not regard as inconsistent with his spiritual and missionary functions.

The political opinions and sympathies of the prelate who was one of the King’s Privy Council as well as royal chaplain, are intimated in the report of his “Church-work,” and are more frankly expressed in an earlier publication.* He talks about “the political reign of the Puritan missionaries,” which

* “A Pastoral Address, by the Right Reverend the Bishop of Honolulu, with Notes,” etc.

began, he says, when Mr. Richards, in 1838, withdrew from the Mission, with the approval of his colleagues and of the Prudential Committee at home, and entered the service of the government. Two years before that date, the chiefs, perceiving the necessity of a change in the government of their country, had requested the American Board of Foreign Missions to send them a teacher and adviser in civil affairs. That request having been declined, they invited Mr. Richards to become their chaplain, teacher, and interpreter,—or, as Dr. Staley puts it, “constitutional adviser to the crown.” But what followed upon that beginning? “The first Hawaiian constitution,” says the Bishop, “was granted by Kamehameha III. the next year.” Although the statement is deficient in respect to exactness of date, the American reader will observe that in the opinion of this Englishman “the political reign of the Puritan missionaries” gave to the Hawaiian nation a constitutional government in the place of absolute despotism. That, however, which was granted by Kamehameha III. “the next year,” was not the first Hawaiian constitution, but only a body of laws with a Bill of Rights prefixed. At that time some of the more intelligent natives, graduates and students of the High School which the missionaries had established at Lahainaluna for the education of teachers, had begun to discuss the principles of legislation in a Hawaiian newspaper. The young King, of his own motion, directed one of the graduates to draw up a code of laws, and, when that had been done, he and some of his chiefs examined the code deliberately, spending five days in the discussion of its details. Then the bill, as we may call it—for it was not yet law, was recommitted to its author that the errors which had been observed might be corrected and the defects supplied. Such deliberation in law-making would hardly have been thought of nineteen years before. One revision, however, was not enough in 1839. The new draught having been reported, there was a reconsideration of it with still more deliberation, new amendments were proposed, and the bill was again referred to its author with instructions. When the third draught had been reported, and the chiefs with whom the King was taking counsel had expressed their approbation, “the King said, ‘I also approve,’ and affixed his signature, June 7, 1839.” That

Bill of Rights, with the laws which accompanied it, has been rightly named "the *magna charta* of the Hawaiian Islands." It was not what Americans call a constitution,—it did not establish a frame of government; it was a charter of emancipation; it converted a nation of slaves into a free (though not yet self-governed) people.* So much for the first year of "the political reign of the Puritan missionaries."

The "first Hawaiian constitution was granted by Kamehameha III." on the 8th of October, 1840, when the King and his chiefs had been for two years under the teaching of the missionary William Richards. It was not a democratic constitution, for though it established a yearly parliament, it made no adequate provision for a representation of the people with powers analogous to those of the British House of Commons. Yet it made the government thenceforth a limited monarchy, limited by laws in the making of which a few plebeian representatives were to concur with the hereditary Nobles, and also by an independent judiciary. A constitutional government, then, imitating to some extent the government of Great Britain, and displacing forever the simple despotism of former ages, marks the second year of what this Cavalier missionary is pleased to call "the political reign of the Puritan missionaries."

The Bishop has severe censures for another constitution granted by the same king twelve years later. He denounces it (in the Notes to his Pastoral Address) as "the democratic constitution of 1852, with its universal suffrage, vote by ballot, no property qualification," and he laments "the complete destruction of all feudal relations in the tenure of land, in the rights of forced labor, and in the government." All this he imputes to the Puritan missionaries, who, inasmuch as they are reported to be liberally educated men, "must have known," he says, "that institutions so democratic, however admirably adapted for the people of the United States, could not be suitable for the Hawaiian, just released from the control of his chief, unprepared by education, requiring even sumptuary laws for the regulation of his diet." That second constitution differed from

* For a full account of that *Magna Charta*, the reader may be referred to Dr Anderson's volume, pp. 136-138.

the first in being more extended and elaborate, adapted to the needs of a people somewhat more advanced in civilization. It provided more distinctly for a House of Representatives coördinate with the House of Nobles, and claiming the right to check and control the government by granting or refusing supplies, and freely investigating all abuses and matters of grievance. Under that constitution the frame of government was assimilated more closely than before to its model, the British monarchy. But the universal suffrage, the ballot, and the absence of a property qualification as a condition of eligibility to represent the people, were (as Mr. Podsnap would say) "not English."

Only two years after the establishment of that second constitution, Kamehameha III. was succeeded by a nephew whom he had adopted as his heir, the young man whom Bishop Staley found so accomplished with all princely qualities. It was a just and graceful tribute which that young man, Alexander Liholiho, in his inaugural speech, paid to his immediate predecessor. "The age of Kamehameha III. was one of progress and of liberty, of schools and of civilization. He gave us a constitution and fixed laws, he secured the people in the title to their lands, and removed the last chain of oppression. He gave them a voice in his councils and in the making of the laws by which they are governed. He was a great national benefactor, and has left the impress of his mild and amiable disposition on the age for which he was born." None can doubt that those words were honestly spoken. Kamehameha IV. made no attempt to subvert or impair the work of his predecessor. The preference which he had for the ritual of the English Church was very natural. In company with his brother, and with Dr. Judd, then in the service of the Hawaiian government, he had visited England, and had formed there his conception of what Hawaiian royalty ought to be. "These young princes," says Bishop Staley, "met with kindly notice at our own court as well as elsewhere. They made a very favorable impression, and gathered new ideas, which were not lost upon them as regarded both the English State and the English Church. At Westminster Abbey they attended Divine service, with the beauty and solemnity of which they were

much struck." It may be added that in their visit to the United States (a part of their "grand tour") they had occasion to know that the American snobbishness toward princes, unlike the English, is—or was then—a great respecter of complexions. Here, instead of being recognized as royal personages, they were only colored persons, and instead of receiving the kindly deference which they received in England, or which Americans would have lavished upon them had they been scions of the pettiest principality in Europe, they were subjected to various indignities, one being the insult put upon them by the captain of a New Haven steamboat, who would not permit them to sit at the table with his passengers because they were in his view negroes. Such was the price which in those days we paid to conciliate the South and preserve the Union! A more effectual way of preserving the Union has been found out since then, necessity having been the mother of invention.

Kamehameha V, with an English bishop of the old Oxford or Tractarian sort for his chaplain and in his Privy Council, was "convinced that the constitution granted in 1852 by his uncle was far too democratic for a people so recently emancipated from feudalism and arbitrary government." Accordingly he summoned a convention to revise the constitution. The convention being intractable, he fell back on such principles as he might have learned from Archbishop Laud, and resorted to a *coup d'état*, like that which cost Charles X. of France his throne. He dissolved the convention, and, acting on the principle that "the same power which granted the constitution could take it away," he abolished the compact which Kamehameha III. had made with the nation, and proclaimed a new constitution, as if he was an absolute sovereign making a gift to his people. The democracy which the influence of Puritan missionaries had introduced into the old constitution was purged away. Instead of a parliament in two houses, a House of Nobles and a House of elected Representatives, it established a legislative assembly of only one House, including Representatives, Nobles and Cabinet ministers. At the same time it impaired the independence of the judges. The Lord Bishop thinks that this is as it should be; but the President of Oahu College, a son of a Puritan missionary, born in the Hawaiian kingdom, thinks

otherwise. Replying to the Bishop's pastoral pamphlet, Pres. Alexander says: "A constitution in which the representatives of the people have not the initiative of all money bills, nor even any separate existence as a House, and in which the independence of the judiciary is virtually destroyed, is practically an *absolutism* mitigated only by the character of the reigning monarch or by the power of the public opinion."

Why the now reigning King followed, in ecclesiastical affairs, the policy of his more earnestly religious brother, he explained in a letter commending his "friend and chaplain the Bishop of Honolulu" to the Protestant Episcopal prelates of this country. His words are, "The Liturgy, Constitution, and teaching of the Episcopal Church seems to me *more consistent with monarchy* than any other form of Christianity that I have met with; and the principles of education it inculcates seem to me, from practical evidence before my eye, to have the effect of making its members more moral, religious, and loyal citizens." Yet, notwithstanding all this royal patronage, notwithstanding the visit of the Queen dowager to England, and the \$80,000 which she gathered there for the cathedral and for other uses of the Anglican Mission, notwithstanding the recognized consistency of prelacy in church government and of the Anglican Liturgy and teaching with monarchy in civil government, the Bishop's success seems to have fallen short of his anticipations. In the volume before us, he insists on the sound principle that a missionary must hold on. "The harm done by men leaving a mission after a few years' work, however efficient it may have been, exceeds the benefit of their services. The difficulty of the language has been, perhaps, just surmounted when the post is abandoned, and a successor has to be found, who has again to go through the same process and encounter the same difficulties." Yet, for some reason not known in this country, Dr. Staley, only a few months after the publication of his volume, resigned his bishopric, and the Reformed Catholic Mission came to a stand-still.

The missionary history of the Sandwich Islands is a fresh illustration of what the last eighteen centuries have been teaching,—the relation of spiritual Christianity to the capabilities and the needs of universal human nature. Christianity, as it

announced itself in the beginning, is not for one nation only, nor for any one among the races or varieties of men, but for "every nation and kindred and tongue and people." The commission "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature," assumes the moral unity of mankind; and that gospel which is offered to Greek and Jew, to barbarian and Scythian, as indiscriminately as to bond and free, addresses itself to a common nature underlying all differences, not only of social rank, but of lineage, of language, and of civilization. As Christianity of old, emerging from among the Jews, took hold of the Greek and the Roman, the barbarous Briton and the German, the Celt and the Scandinavian, so in these days it takes hold not of Caucasians only, but of the Mongolian tribes, the American, the African, and the Malayan. Not only the Shemitic languages and those of the Aryan stock, but the Turanian and all other forms of human speech are made the vehicles of Christian sentiment and thought. Many an experiment has shown that the religion of the New Testament is in fact as well as in its own theory a religion for human nature, and is therefore capable of becoming the universal religion. This half-century experiment on the Hawaiian race is a signal repetition of the demonstration that Christianity takes hold of universal humanity, and that human nature therefore in all its varieties is one.

Some philosophers, with much profession of respect for Christianity, are always telling us that barbarians must be civilized before they can be Christianized; that the ploughman, the smith, the carpenter, the weaver, the schoolmaster, must precede the religious teacher and prepare his way. Experience, as in the Sandwich Islands, gives a different testimony. We do not say that a wild Polynesian or Indian can be Christianized and remain a savage; but we say that, in a most important sense, he ceases to be a savage and begins to be a civilized man the moment he begins to be truly a Christian. The theory which holds that civilization must necessarily precede Christianity, rests upon ignorance of human nature on the one hand and ignorance of Christianity on the other. Degraded as the wild man is by ignorance and by all savage vices, there are in him capabilities of intuition and of affection through which he

may become a new creature; and in the gospel of Christ there are elements of power by which that wild man's higher nature may be so quickened that he shall become conscious of his responsibility to God, convicted of sin, assured of forgiveness, and inspired with the hope of full redemption. When that change has been wrought, though imperfectly, in his religious nature, he is no longer a mere savage; he has begun to think; his affectionate instincts are beginning to be more human; he is entering on a new existence; behold, he is "sitting at the feet of Jesus, clothed, and in his right mind." Our "Puritan missionaries" among the Zulus tell us that when one of those black savages comes for a shirt, and after one or two experiments succeeds in putting it on, they know that the gospel is beginning to take effect upon him. Conversion from barbarism to Christ is conversion from barbarism to civilization.

The Christianity which works this change is a spiritual force, not form, but power—a gospel addressing itself to the simplest religious intuitions and changing the man by changing his mind. The dry formulas of theology cannot do this, for theology, be it ever so orthodox, is not "the power of God to salvation" as the gospel is. What has been called *Churchianity* cannot do it, though, doubtless the gospel enveloped in the forms of ecclesiastical pretension may sometimes work effectually notwithstanding the envelopment. Not vestments, and processions, and embroidery, and holy millinery, and priestly manipulations—not "the pomp that charms the eye and rites adorned with gold"—can change the savage into a Christian and initiate him into Christian civilization; but that old and all-subduing story of how God loved the world—that simple testimony, worthy of all acceptance, "Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners."

ARTICLE VI.—TAINE'S HISTORY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE.

History of English Literature. By H. A. TAINE. Translated by H. VAN LAUN, one of the Masters at the Edinburgh Academy. With a preface prepared expressly for this translation by the author. New York: Holt & Williams. Two volumes. 1871. 8vo, pp. x, 531, 550.

The Critical Theory and Writings of H. A. Taine. The Westminster Review. Article III. July, 1861.

THERE is a story somewhere of a Frenchman who set himself to work to master the English language, that he might be able to prove to his countrymen the inferiority of Shakespeare to the great Corneille. We do not remember to have met with any account of the result. Probably no very important contribution was made to the literature either of France or England under the inspiration of this Quixotic spirit.

The mentioning so trivial a story in connection with a work like the one whose title we have placed at the head of this Article, may seem to require an apology. The "History of English Literature" has undoubted merits. We think that we appreciate them sufficiently; and certainly have no intention of treating the book in any other than a respectful manner. Still, we have been reminded again and again, in spite of ourselves, as we have turned over its pages, of that vivacious countryman of M. Taine who showed, in so original and striking a way, his admiration for the illustrious author of the *Cid*. For whatever the excellencies that may be found here, and different persons will estimate them differently—it is very evident that the author, like the enthusiast of the story, has not been moved to undertake this great literary work by any special love of English literature. He has not written as one who has found a pearl of great price, which he feels constrained, caressingly and lovingly, to put in some fitting setting that all the world may be brought to share in the admiration which he

feels. Compare him in this respect with the great masters of English criticism. Look at De Quincey. He approaches his themes as it were on bended knee, as a worshiper at the shrine of some divinity. He remembers, to use his own words, that "he has the honor" to speak the language of Chaucer, Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Newton. He speaks of the "obligation of his allegiance" to the language of his country as something "awful." In its behalf, if necessary, he says, one who would aspire to make any worthy contribution to it "should be willing to pluck out a right eye," "to circumnavigate the globe." He declares: "It is the one thing in this world, next after the flag of his country and its spotless honor," that such a man should have "wholly in his eyes." But the brilliant French essayist approaches the thesaurus of the immortal productions of English genius with none of these feelings. He has a theory—an exceedingly ingenious theory—a wide embracing theory—one which can be applied to the illustration of anything and everything which has ever been accomplished by the human intellect. He has in fact already applied it himself to the history of painting as he has studied it in one and another of the cities of Italy and in the Netherlands. He has applied it to the history of sculpture as he has traced it in the works which have been rescued from the ruins of Greece. But this theory, as we have intimated, is one which can be applied equally well to literature; and looking around for a suitable body of literature on which to exercise his skill, he fixes, for reasons which we shall hereafter state, upon the literature of England; and forthwith proceeds to treat it according to the methods which he has marked out. Hence these fifteen hundred pages, which a few years ago delighted France, and now, in an admirable English translation, are read with avidity in England and in this country.

We have said that M. Taine has a theory. According to him, the mind of man, in all its activities, is ruled by forces, as material objects are. He claims that "there is a cause for ambition, for courage, for truth, as there is for digestion, for muscular movement, for animal heat." "Vice and virtue are products, like vitriol and sugar; and every complex pheno-

menon has its springs from other more simple phenomena on which it hangs." In fact, he says, in so many words—of the methods in which the mind manifests itself—the problem is a "mechanical" one, and the total effect is a result "depending on the magnitude and direction of the producing causes." The only difference which separates moral from physical problems is that the magnitude and direction of the producing causes cannot be valued or computed in the first as in the second. They cannot be measured like pressure or weight. His language is: "We cannot define them in an exact or approximative formula. We cannot have more, or give more, in respect of them, than a literary impression. We are limited to marking and quoting the salient points by which they are manifested, and which indicate approximately and roughly the part of the scale which is their position." But though the means of notation are not the same in the moral and physical sciences, he says: "In both the matter is the same, equally made up of forces, magnitudes, and directions, and in both the final result is produced after the same method. It is great or small, as the fundamental forces are great or small."

The theory of M. Taine, then, as we understand it, is that the actions of men being all the necessary result of law, the historian who would treat of the various manifestations of individual genius in art and literature, as they have been displayed in the successive epochs of human society, can and should proceed in the same way, and by the same methods, that the astronomer, the geologist, and the naturalist proceed in their several departments; and he will thus arrive at equally sure results. Following these methods, the historian, he says, "if his critical education suffice, can lay bare, under every detail of architecture, every stroke in a picture, every phrase in a writing, the special sensation whence detail, stroke, or phrase had issue. He is present at the drama which was enacted in the soul of artist or writer. The choice of a word, the brevity or length of a sentence, the nature of a metaphor, the accent of a verse, the development of an argument—everything is a symbol to him. While his eyes read the text, his soul and mind pursue the continuous development and the ever changing succession of the emotions and conceptions out of which the text has sprung. In short, he unveils a psychology."

As an illustration of what he means, and to show how the same methods are to be followed in accounting for moral qualities as in accounting for physical qualities, he takes "the religious music of a Protestant church." We transfer the whole paragraph, though it is somewhat long, to our pages.

"There is an inner cause which has turned the spirit of the faithful toward these grave and monotonous melodies, a cause broader than its effect; I mean the general idea of the true, external worship which man owes to God. It is this which has modeled the architecture of the temple, thrown down the statues, removed the pictures, destroyed the ornaments, curtailed the ceremonies, shut up the worshipers in high pews which prevent them from seeing anything, and regulated the thousand details of decoration, posture, and the general surroundings. This itself comes from another more general cause, the idea of human conduct in all its comprehensiveness, internal and external, prayers, actions, dispositions of every kind by which man is kept face to face with God; it is this which has enthroned doctrine and grace, lowered the clergy, transformed the sacraments, suppressed various practices, and changed religion from a discipline to a morality. This second idea in its turn depends upon a third still more general, that of moral perfection; such as is met with in the perfect God, the unerring judge, the stern watcher of souls, before whom every soul is sinful, worthy of punishment, incapable of virtue or salvation, except by the crisis of conscience which He provokes, and the renewal of heart which He produces. That is the master idea, which consists in erecting duty into an absolute king of human life, and in prostrating all ideal models before a moral model. Here we track the root of man; for to explain this conception it is necessary to consider race itself, that is, the German, the Northman, the structure of his character and intelligence, his general processes of thought and feeling, the sluggishness and coldness of sensation which prevent his falling easily and headlong under the sway of pleasure, the bluntness of his taste, the irregularity and revolutions of his conceptions, which arrest in him the birth of fair dispositions and harmonious forms, the disdain of appearances, the desire of truth, the attachment to bare and abstract ideas,

which develop in him conscience, at the expense of all else. There the search is at an end. We have arrived at a primitive disposition, at a trait proper to all sensations, to all the conceptions of a century or a race, at a particularity inseparable from all the motions of his intellect and his heart. Here lie the grand causes, for they are the universal and permanent causes, present at every moment and in every case, everywhere and always acting, indestructible, and in the end infallibly supreme, since the accidents which thwart them, being limited and partial, end by yielding to the dull and incessant repetition of their force; in such a manner that the general structure of things, and the grand features of events, are their work; and religions, philosophies, poetries, industries, the framework of society and of families, are in fact only the imprints stamped by their seal."

The claim, then, is that just as the character of the religious music of the worshipers in an English Protestant church is the necessary result of the peculiar character and intelligence, the sluggishness and coldness of sensation of their German ancestors, so all the activities of mind can be traced to their ultimate causes. Every detail of architecture, every peculiarity in the handling of a picture, every phrase in literature may be accounted for.

It is to be borne in mind, however, that M. Taine does not propose in this work to follow out his methods to their full length. He will not himself attempt to "lay bare the special sensation" whence has issued "every phrase" of the writers whose productions he examines. For all the purposes of such a general criticism of English literature as he undertakes, it is sufficient to point out a few of the most prominent sources of influence which have exercised control as "original main-springs" over them. He mentions three of these which "dominate" over the minds of men; and which are, according to the terminology of the translator—"race," "surroundings," and "epoch." In describing them we shall endeavor to use as far as possible the language of the author.

First, then, by "race," he means "the innate and hereditary dispositions which man brings with him to the light." These

vary with various people. "There is a natural variety of men, as of oxen and horses, some brave and intelligent, some timid and dependent, some capable of superior conceptions and creations, some reduced to rudimentary ideas and inventions; some more specially fitted to special works, and gifted more richly with particular instincts, as we meet with species of dogs better favored than others—these for hunting, these for fighting, these for the chase, these again for house-dogs or shepherds' dogs."

We have, then, in "race," a distinct force. He says that it is so distinct and powerful, that "amidst the vast deviations which the other two motive forces produce in man, one can recognize this one still; and a race, like the old Aryans, scattered from the Ganges as far as the Hebrides, settled in every clime, spread over every grade of civilization, transformed by thirty centuries of revolutions, nevertheless manifests in its tongues, religions, literatures, philosophies, the community of blood and of intellect which to this day binds its offshoots together. Different as they are, their parentage is not obliterated; barbarism, culture and grafting, differences of sky and soil, fortunes good and bad, have labored in vain; the great marks of the original model have remained, and we find again the two or three principal lineaments of the primitive imprint underneath the secondary imprints which time has stamped upon them."

The second of these "mainsprings" which exercise so controlling an influence over the minds of men is their "surroundings."

"Man is not alone in the world; nature surrounds him, and his fellow men surround him. Accidental and secondary tendencies come to place themselves on his primitive tendencies; and physical or social circumstances disturb or confirm the character committed to their charge."

From the illustrations which he gives of his meaning we select but a single one. "Climate in course of time has its effect. Though we can follow but obscurely the Aryan peoples from their common fatherland to their final countries, we can yet assert that the profound differences which are manifest between the German races on the one side, and the Greek and Latin on

the other, arise for the most part from the difference between the countries in which they are settled—some in cold moist lands, deep in black marshy forests or on the shores of a wild ocean, caged in by melancholy or violent sensations, prone to drunkenness and gluttony, bent on a fighting, blood-spilling life; others, again, within a lovely landscape, on a bright and laughing sea-coast, enticed to navigation and commerce, exempt from gross cravings of the stomach, inclined from the beginning to social ways, to a settled organization of the State, to feelings and dispositions such as develop the art of oratory, the talent for enjoyment, the inventions of science, letters, and arts." "Surroundings," then, are among the most efficacious of the visible causes which mould the mind of man. "They are to nations what education, career, condition, abode, are to individuals; and they seem to comprehend everything, since they comprehend all external powers which shape human matter, and by which the external acts on the internal."

The third of these "mainsprings," which is designated as "epoch," might, we should think, be classed with the second—with "surroundings"—but a distinct place is given to it in this system of classification. By "epoch" is meant those periods in the history of a people during which they are under the sway of some one class of dominant ideas, which constitute for the time being the sum of all their historical traditions. "It is with a people as with a plant. The same sap, under the same temperature, and in the same soil, produces, at different steps of its progressive development, different formations—buds, flowers, fruit, seed-vessels—in such a manner that the one which follows has always the first for its condition and grows from its death." Look at French tragedy in the times of Corneille and in the times of Voltaire. Corneille was the precursor, Voltaire and his contemporaries were the successors. The first had no model, the others had. The first saw objects face to face, the others saw them through the first. So, too, in the middle ages, the dominant ideal model of man was that of a knight or a monk; in the seventeenth century it was that of an accomplished courtier; in our own age it is "the unsatiated and melancholy Faust or Werther."

We have said that for all the purposes of such general criticism of English literature as M. Taine undertakes in the present work, he has deemed it sufficient to specify only these three controlling influences. But to understand all that he means, and to what length he really goes, it will be necessary to look beyond them, for after all in his philosophy these are not the real "original mainsprings."

Fortunately this is no difficult matter, for the versatile author of the book before us has also written a work "On Intelligence," of which we had occasion to make mention in the last number of the *New Englander*. From this work it appears that he accepts what is called the "development theory," and that he does not shrink from any of its consequences. He here declares his belief in "a profound evolution which extends from the formation of the solar system to that of modern man." He accepts the nebular hypothesis of La Place; and the teachings of Mr. Darwin with regard to the "origin of species." He says: "To form the planet, there was a fixed state, the gravitation of the gaseous molecules carried round the central nucleus, and a changing condition, the progressive cooling and consequent gradual condensation of these same molecules. To form the species there was a fixed condition, the transmission of an older general type, and changing conditions, the new circumstances which, selecting the subsequent ancestors, added to the type the characters of the species." "To construct each of our species, then, many generations of ancestors have successively labored. One of these generations, the primitive and most ancient of all, has established the most general type which is common to all animals of every sub-kingdom, articulate or vertebrate. The second, a later one, issuing from this last, has superimposed differences which constitute the class—that is to say, the bird, the fish, or the mammal. Then has come the third, which starting with the mammal, has elaborated the transmitted work, and formed families—that is to say, the cetacea, the cheiroptera, the ruminantia, the carnivora, the primates. Then, finally, have the descendants of the primates, by their distinct developments and increasing divergencies, constituted genera, the gorilla, the orang-outang and man, the latter being distinguished from the rest by a particular conformation of limbs, and a more delicate structure of the brain."

Here, at last, then, we have the explanation of the differences which are to be discovered in the "hereditary dispositions which man brings with him to the light," when he first appears in history. This accounts for the fact that "there is a natural variety of men, as of oxen, and horses, and dogs; as this species of dogs better favored for hunting, that for fighting, those for the chase, these again for house-dogs or shepherds' dogs." We have said that M. Taine shrinks from none of the consequences of his theory. He goes back even "to the womb of the primordial matter." If we understand him, he would account for all the differences which we observe in races by the different influences which were there at work—millions of ages ago. We suppose that he would not object to say—Here in some remote period are two molecules which are instinct with life. The one lies in the shade; upon the other the sun shines in his might. Now we have here "the whole of man in an abridgment." As we understand him, his theory is that "in this limited circle all human diversities meet. However minute in their elements, they are enormous in the aggregate; and the least alteration in the factors produces vast alterations in the results." According as the action of the sun's rays is direct and clear, or obstructed and faintly felt, according as these molecules are exposed to it for a longer or shorter time, according as the action of the sun is "violent and accompanied by impulses," or "quiet and surrounded by calm," all the operations and processes within them may perhaps be so transformed that this one may develop in the lapse of ages into an oyster, and that one into an Arnold von Winkelried, a Milton, a Shakespeare.

The reason that M. Taine attaches such importance to "race" is now apparent; and we are able to understand such utterances as these. "The character of man is so much the more stable as the external impression is made upon him by more numerous repetitions, and is transmitted to his progeny by a more ancient descent." This "descent," as we have seen, he traces back to "the primordial womb." But he proceeds: "At any moment we may consider the character of a people as an abridgment of all its preceding actions and sensations; that is as a quantity and as a weight, not infinite, since everything in

nature is finite, but disproportioned to the rest and almost impossible to lift, since every moment of an almost infinite past has contributed to increase it, and because, in order to raise the scale, one must place in the opposite scale a still greater number of actions and sensations." Once more: "Race is the first and richest source of these master-faculties, from which historical events take their rise; and one sees at the outset that if it be powerful, it is because it is no simple spring but a kind of lake, a deep reservoir, wherein other springs have for a multitude of centuries discharged their several streams."

The theory then in full is that just as "in mineralogy, the crystals, however diverse, spring from certain simple physical forms, so in history, civilizations, however diverse, are derived from certain simple spiritual forma. The one are explained by a primitive geometrical element, as the others are by a primitive psychological element. In order to master the classification of mineralogical systems, we must first consider a regular and general solid, its sides and angles, and observe in this the numberless transformations of which it is capable. So if we would realize the system of historical varieties, we must consider a human soul with its two or three fundamental faculties." The formula by which he would proceed is thus a simple one. By the combined influence of the former state—whatever it may have been, orang-outang, gorilla, chimpanzee,—and of the "consequent hereditary aptitudes and faculties" he would explain the social and moral state of the different varieties of people as they emerge into that state in which their actions become fit material for the scrutiny of the historian. Thenceforward, at each later moment in their history, he would explain their social and moral status by the action of the great "mainsprings" which, according to him, dominate over the human machine, viz: "race"—"surroundings"—"epoch."

We have already intimated that the theory of M. Taine is not one which he now announces for the first time. It was set forth as long ago as 1858, when he was only twenty-five years old, in an *Essay on the Fables of La Fontaine*, which he prepared on the occasion of his taking his degree as Doctor of Letters. His philosophy, his methods of criticism, and the manner in which

he applied them in his treatment of the life and poetry of the French *Æsop* at once attracted wide attention, and he has made them prominent in all his subsequent productions.

In his essay on La Fontaine he undertakes to point out the causes which operated to make him a poet, which induced him to choose his themes, and which determined his manner of treating them. He enters, first, into an examination of the "race" from which La Fontaine sprang. He maintains that it had received a special character from the influences of climate, soil, food, and the great transformations it had undergone; that the natives of Champagne, in which province La Fontaine was born, are purer Gauls than the natives of any other part of France. Hence the poet united in his person the most salient peculiarities of that race, and was naturally endowed with the acuteness, sobriety, gaiety, and malice which are the characteristics of the pure Gauls. He then shows how the "surroundings" of his early life were such as to mould and fit him for his career; how the climate, the soil, and the scenery of Champagne were adapted to develop and foster in him an easy morality and an Epicurean philosophy. The "epoch" was that of the seventeenth century, and he was brought under the influence of the dominant ideas which then had sway. But being "untainted by Latin blood," the influence of "race" was especially manifest in his case, so that in conduct he remained untrammelled by conventionalities, and in the style of his literary productions he kept himself unrestrained by classic rules. His favorite authors were Rabelais, Marot, and the Queen of Navarre. From their writings he gained a knowledge of, and stored his memory with, the racy words and natural phrases of the old French language, which he put afterward so effectively into the mouths of his peasants. And, so, La Fontaine became a truly national writer, the representative of his countrymen, and the epitome of his time.

Now all this was the result of natural law. He could not help it. There was no power to the contrary. All these results were "bound up with their causes, as a physical phenomenon with its conditions, as the dew with the fall of the variable temperature, as dilatation with heat. The cause given they appear; the cause withdrawn they vanish; the weakness

or intensity of the cause measures their weakness or intensity." The accidents of his being of the Gaulish "race," of his having been brought up in Champagne, of his having come within the sphere of the influence of the court of Louis XIV, determined that he should write, determined what he should write, and how he should write.

M. Taine's second work was a "Journey to the Pyrenees," which bears throughout the marks of that genius which makes everything he writes so attractive. But, as might be expected, the principal characteristic of the book is the attempt to assign a cause for everything and to explain everything. Of course he has a theory about the origin of the range itself, and the transformation it has been made to undergo. The soil, the aspects of the mountains, the beasts which inhabit, and the plants which cover them, are all shown to be in harmony, and to be "linked together by necessary relations." But he seeks, also, every occasion to enter into the domain of spiritual life, and to account for its phenomena. For example, he is reminded in the castle at Pau of the sturdy warriors who peopled its halls in the days of the Queen of Navarre, and at once sets himself to work to account for the "violent passions, the strong wills, the astounding excesses, and unbridled fanaticism of the sixteenth century;" and finds a reason for them in the open air life to which the men of that age were addicted, which made them more robust and intensified every feeling. He walks into the castle gardens, and the straight walks and the stiff rectangular figure impressed upon everything, so distasteful to the present generation, sets him to speculate upon the reason that in the time when these gardens were laid out such formal and trim places of recreation were admired, while the mountains and wild scenery for which we show such a craving were looked upon with abhorrence. The cause which he assigns is the fact that our lives are so uneventful, our houses so comfortable, and our streets so well lighted and commodious that we yearn for something, no matter how startling, which will break up the dull monotony with which we are wearied; while the knights and fair ladies of the sixteenth century were tired of the barbarism which confronted them on every side in their daily lives, and welcomed regularity and neatness wherever they could find it, though carried to excess.

The next work of M. Taine—an *Essay on Livy*—was written in 1854, for a prize which had been offered by the French Academy. It was declared to be superior to all the others which had been sent in, but the prize was withheld for the reason that in was “deficient in a proper degree of admiration for the splendid name and imposing genius of him whom he had to criticize.” He was, however, invited to rewrite his paper, and the next year was adjudged the successful competitor.

It is no part of our plan to analyse the essay. We wish only to call attention to the fact that once more in his criticism he is governed throughout by his theory. This demands, as will be remembered, that the historian shall inquire not only what are the natural characteristics which the subject of his studies has in common with the “race” to which he belongs, but also to what extent these have been influenced by his “surroundings” and “epoch.” He accordingly undertakes to show, in the case of Livy, that the place of his birth, the manner of his early life, his youthful tastes, all influenced him toward oratory. But harangues in the forum were not then allowed; and consequently there was no opportunity for him to exercise his natural gifts. Under the influence of such untoward “surroundings” he turned aside to write history. The dominating principle of eloquence, however, still had sway over him, and made him what M. Taine calls an “oratorical historian.” This explains all his merits, and all his defects. His oratorical genius begins to display itself in the very preface. “In its solemn periods, and the haughty accents of national pride, we hear the voice of the orator, who begins the recital of Roman victories by erecting a triumphal arch to the sovereign people.” So throughout the *History*, everywhere the “lettered orator” appears. “He avoids erudite researches, dwells on that only which furnishes matter for eloquence, and lauds his country and class before posterity. He does not employ original manuscripts; neglects contemporary accounts of the earlier centuries; displays little research in the annalists he consults, understands salient events better than slow and vast changes, has no notion of the ancient barbarism, does not, except accidentally, study anything except a battle, a dispute in the forum, or a decree of the Senate.”

Thus it is that the whole career of Livy is explained, in accordance with M. Taine's theory, by this "dominating principle of eloquence," which had its origin in the fact that he "was born in a city, that he was reared among men and business affairs, and that he was engaged in considering passions and interests rather than colors and forms."

M. Taine next applied his theory to the various systems of the "French philosophers of the Nineteenth Century"—Laromiguière, Royer-Collard, Maine de Biran, Cousin, and Jouffroy. Here again he avowedly imitates the methods of physical science, and proceeds on the principle that the critic is the "natural historian of the mind." He declares that just as the meteorologist would inquire what are the forces which "regulate successive states of temperature," he will inquire what are the forces which "regulate the successive states of a man's thoughts." From among these he selects the one which dominates over the others, and announces that the key is found which explains everything satisfactorily. This dominating force renders all the others subordinate to it, and determines what subjects the aspirant of literary fame shall select, and the particular way in which he shall treat them.

And now we find M. Taine with unabated enthusiasm, and with even a more assured confidence, entering upon a new field, and applying his theory to the criticism of the works of the great masters of painting, sculpture, music, and architecture. His choice of these themes was perhaps owing in part to the fact of his having been appointed a Professor in the School of the Fine Arts in Paris. Soon appeared those books which have been so widely read in this country: Italy, with its criticisms of the *chef d'œuvres* of Art in Rome, Naples, Florence, and Venice,—The Philosophy of Art in the Netherlands,—The Ideal in Art,—The Philosophy of Art in Greece. Of these works we have had occasion to speak in former numbers of this journal, and have borne ample testimony to the charm which invests them. But in each and all, it is to be observed that the inevitable theory stands prominent. The arts are products of the mind; consequently whatever is accomplished in any one of them is capable of being explained according to the rules which by this time have become so well known. See how it

lies in the mind of M. Taine as a problem to be solved. He says: "Given a groups of arts, what is the moral condition which produced it? What the conditions of race, epoch, circumstance, the most fitted to produce this moral condition?" And here is the solution: "There is a distinct moral condition for each of these formations, and for each of their branches; one for art in general, one for each kind of art—for architecture, painting, sculpture, music, poetry; each has its special germ in the wide field of human psychology; each has its law, and it is by virtue of this law that we see it raised, by chance, as it seems, wholly alone, amid the miscarriage of its neighbors, like painting in Flanders and Holland in the seventeenth century, poetry in England in the sixteenth, music in Germany in the eighteenth. At this moment, and in these countries, the conditions have been fulfilled for one art, not for others, and a single branch has budded in the general barrenness." He continues: "There is a particular inner system of impressions and operations which makes an artist, a believer, a musician, a painter, a wanderer, a man of society; and of each the affiliation, the depth, the independence of ideas and emotions, are different; each has its moral history and its special structure, with some governing disposition and some dominant feature."

These quotations sufficiently answer our purpose. We do not need to analyse afresh the methods according to which M. Taine proceeds. By inquiries concerning "race," "surroundings," and "epoch," he satisfies himself what is the "dominant mainspring" which controls all the subordinate faculties of an artist's mind, and his work as a critic is done. This "dominant mainspring," if only its action is unimpeded, operates with unerring exactitude, and the result is certain.

It thus appears that from the beginning of his career, M. Taine has shown himself to be always and everywhere an avowed, persistent necessitarian; a believer in "a profound evolution, which extends from the formation of the solar system to that of modern man." His entrance upon the field of history and literature may be regarded as that of an *avant courier* of modern materialism. In the series of brilliant works, which we have hastily sketched, he gave the world—and this

before he was forty years of age—an illustration of the manner in which these views may be applied to the whole round of literature, philosophy, society, religion, painting, sculpture, architecture, and music. And now, like Alexander, looking around for more worlds which he may conquer, he proposed to write the history of “a literature,” and “seek for the psychology of a people.” He tells us, however, with admirable frankness that he experienced a difficulty in finding one “grand” enough and “complete” enough for his purposes. “The Latin literature is worth nothing at the outset, and is then borrowed and imitative. German literature is almost wanting for two centuries. Italian literature and Spanish literature end at the middle of the seventeenth century. Only ancient Greece, modern France and England, offer a complete series of great significant monuments.” England, accordingly, had the distinguished honor of being selected for the purposes of the proposed experiment; because, “being yet alive, and subject to direct examination, it can be better studied than a destroyed civilization, of which we retain but the scraps, and because being different from France, it has in the eyes of a Frenchman a more distinct character.”

The result, there can be no question, is an exceedingly original and brilliant analysis of the different epochs of English literature, from its first dawn to the present time. A series of sketches of the great English writers is presented which display an acuteness of observation, an insight into character, and above all, an acquaintance with their productions, which, in one who has not spoken our language all his life as his mother tongue, is entirely unexampled. Descriptions of English society and English scenery abound, also, which show the eye and the hand of an artist. In particular, all that affects the material interests of England, all that pertains in any way to her prosperity and her grandeur is set forth with a particularity, a vividness, and a glow which captivate the reader, and hold his attention fast. There is not a dull page from beginning to end. We do not wonder at the enthusiasm with which the book has been received by a superficial public. Yet, for all this, the value of the *History of English Literature* depends upon the question whether this theory of M. Taine, which we have now attempted

to describe, is true. He professes to tell us, according to scientific methods, how it is that such men as Chaucer, and Spencer, and Milton, and Shakespeare, and Tennyson, and Dickens have been developed by the causes which have been operating through the ages; how their appearance is "bound up" with these causes, "as a physical phenomenon with its condition, as the dew with the fall of the variable temperature." Not only this, but he even goes so far as to arrogate the power of prophecy. He tells us that in the same way that such phenomena "have been produced" in the past, so they "will continue to be produced" in the future. His language is: "As soon as we know the sufficient and necessary condition of one of these vast occurrences [as, for instance, the appearance of a Shakespeare], our understanding grasps the future as well as the past. We can say with confidence in what circumstances it [he] will reappear; foresee without rashness many portions of its [his] future history, and sketch with care some features of its [his] ulterior developments." Such is the theory which is unfolded in the History. We do not propose to describe the way in which it has been developed. The space at our command will not allow of it. Neither is it necessary. We will only indicate in a single paragraph the course which he pursues, now so familiar to our readers. First, there is an examination of the characteristics of the two races which combined to form the present English nation. Of these, the one which has exerted the greatest influence is the Saxon. Among "the hereditary dispositions" which the Saxons "brought with them to the light" when they first appeared in history, there is said to be "a certain earnestness which leads them out of idle sentiments to noble ones." Perhaps it is worthy of notice that M. Taine makes no attempt to account for the manner in which these hereditary dispositions were developed in the prehistoric times. It is enough for his purpose that such were their "dispositions" when the Romans first made their acquaintance in the forests of Germany. Their manners were severe. Their inclinations were grave. There was a manly dignity about them, in all their proceedings. They loved independence. They had no taste for voluptuousness. They were continent. They were faithful to their marriage vows. Above all, duty was ever a

ruling principle among them. Next, their "surroundings" in their German homes, and afterward in England, are shown to have all combined to intensify these characteristics. The "hereditary dispositions" of the Normans are then portrayed in the same way; and the modifications which these underwent in consequence of their "surroundings" in their various migrations, and afterward when they had established themselves on English soil, and had intermarried with the Saxons. The result is a new people and a "new tongue," and Chaucer appears. This is sufficient. We have said that it is not our purpose to trace the development of the successive epochs as they are described. Facts are everywhere marshalled with very great skill in illustration and defence of his positions. Yet, after all, the value of the book depends upon the theory which underlies the discussion. This theory is nowhere proved, and it still remains true that the mind of man is not a machine which is necessarily moved this way or that way just as material forces are brought to bear upon it. Man has a power of freely willing. He has what has been called "a power to the contrary." The workings of his mind cannot be calculated beforehand like the movements of a clock or a steam-engine. The historian cannot proceed in his inquiries respecting the phenomena of the mind as the meteorologist and the chemist proceed in their inquiries respecting physical phenomena. It follows, accordingly, that this book, with all its originality, its sprightliness, and splendor of diction, for the purposes for which M. Taine has written it, must be declared to be a failure.

We now call attention to the fact that M. Taine, notwithstanding the faith which he has so persistently manifested in his theory, does yet show at times misgivings as to the possibility of drawing conclusions in all cases in rigid accordance with these methods. The manner in which the great historical currents have been formed, he claims, is a "mechanical problem;" yet he is forced to admit that there is a difference between moral and physical problems, and that the magnitude and direction of a "need" or a "faculty" cannot be valued or computed like that of a "pressure" or a "weight." He says: "We cannot define it [a need or a faculty] in an exact or approxima-

tive formula. We cannot have more or give more in respect of it than a literary impression. We are limited to marking and quoting the salient points by which it is manifested, and which indicate approximately and roughly the part of the scale which is its position."

It would then seem that, for all the purposes of historical or literary criticism, M. Taine is no whit better off than ordinary mortals who do not possess the advantage of his famous theory. Whatever may be true of the various activities of the mind—even though all its phenomena are the necessary results of the operation of mechanical causes—M. Taine, like the rest of mankind, when he expresses an opinion about them, is only able to offer a "literary impression." We may then perhaps be excused if we refuse to consider the estimates which he has presented in these volumes of the historic characters of English literature as either infallibly correct, or established on a "scientific basis," and regard them henceforth only as the literary impressions of a very accomplished and exceptionally learned Frenchman. As such, we feel an interest in them. We know how to appreciate them. We accept them as a valuable addition to our critical apparatus, even though we should find that he disparages those whom we have been accustomed to consider the most gifted of the writers of our language; for it may be that the very considerations which draw forth his animadversions may heighten our estimate of their excellencies.

We remember to have read in the *Memoirs of the Marquis de Chastellux*—one of the French officers who served in this country during the Revolutionary war—an account of the distinguished characters whose acquaintance he made. The Marquis was a very accomplished and genial man, an admirer of our institutions, and disposed to speak favorably of all he saw. Among those whom he describes is Governor Trumbull of Connecticut, whom he saw in Hartford, and for whom he seems to have conceived genuine respect. Yet he adds: "He has all the simplicity in his dress, all the importance, and even pedantry, becoming the chief magistrate of a small republic. He brought to my mind the burgomasters of Holland in the time of the Barneveldts." Now these "impressions" which the Marquis gives us, notwithstanding the somewhat depreciatory

criticism with which he closes, have a real value for those who know anything of that distinguished statesman of the Revolution, and do not in the least lessen the high appreciation in which they hold him. To them, or to anyone who has ever looked upon the noble painting of Governor Trumbull which hangs on the walls of the Street Art School of Yale College, it may even be a means of increasing their respect for him. They can understand how such a man as is there presented to view, in an ordinary citizen's dress, with none of the insignia of office, might fail to make any marked impression upon a young French nobleman whose ideas of what is becoming in a ruler of a State have been formed by the model which he has seen in the court of his sovereign at Versailles. The unaffected dignity of that erect figure, the high intelligence and the exalted character which are manifested in those calm, finely cut, scholarly features, are things which he would not be likely to appreciate in one or two brief interviews. We should expect, beforehand, that in dashing off his comments he might spice them with some witticism about "pedantry" or "Dutch burgomasters." Besides, we entirely distrust the ability of any mere courtier of the monarch who was then upon the French throne to appreciate such a man. But a ruler of a State is now judged by a somewhat different standard even in European courts; and to day whoever will look upon the painting of which we have spoken and compare the American Governor with the most flattering of the portraits of the French King, Louis XVI, to be found anywhere in the splendid galleries of Versailles or the Louvre, will not hesitate for one moment to say which comes nearest his ideal—we will not say of a statesman—of a dignified, cultivated, high-minded gentleman.

What is true of these criticisms of the Marquis de Chastellux is true of M. Taine's History. "His impressions" undoubtedly have a certain value; certainly they have to all who wish to know how English literature is now estimated by the most cultivated readers on the other side of the channel. These "impressions," also, as we have already said, are presented with a vivacity, a cleverness, and we may add a self-confidence, which are calculated to produce an impression on many readers. Yet it is nevertheless a fact to which we wish to call attention that,

from the beginning to the end of these volumes, there is a manifest want of sympathy with the themes which he makes the occasion of his splendid criticisms, and the author seems to us by nature and education to be entirely incapable of being warmed into heart-felt enthusiasm by anything that is distinctive in English literature.

In illustration of our views we may perhaps be permitted to follow M. Taine's own methods—for these methods when separated from his philosophy have a certain kind of convenience and are not objectionable.

We remind our readers, then, of the "race" to which he belongs. He is a Gaul of the Gauls. He is a native of that province of Champagne which is so famed for its sunny fields and vine-clad hills; where the people, as he himself tells us in his essay on his distinguished countryman La Fontaine, display in all their mental characteristics the most marked peculiarities of that race—acuteness, gaiety, a disposition to go counter to all conventionalities and to everything that is established, and a willingness to be satisfied with an easy morality. His "surroundings" have been from his earliest years such as to strengthen in him all these characteristics. He enjoyed the advantages of education in the best literary institutions, and made such good use of them that, after receiving his final degree, he achieved at a bound a wide reputation as a scholar and an essayist. He traveled in foreign lands. He visited the countries about the Mediterranean, and was fascinated by the sight of that sea, "blue," he says, "and lustrous as a silken tunic," and of those "islands which rose from it like masses of marble." He carefully explored the countries that bordered upon it, especially Greece and Italy—and in all their great cities made himself master of whatever in art or story is most valuable and most interesting. On returning to Paris, he found the doors of society thrown wide open to him, and he was received everywhere in the most flattering manner as one of the rising lights of French literature.

And, now, what M. Taine calls "epoch" is not to be forgotten; for it could not but have an influence in forming his taste. Some of the leading characteristics of French literature

in the nineteenth century—we think we do no injustice when we say it—may be stated to be exaggeration, insincerity, sensation, and immorality. Take some of the most honored of the writers of this period. Such a man as Lamartine is certainly not to be suspected of wilful departure from veracity, yet to show how the imagination of a Frenchman predominates over his judgment, read an extract from a recent criticism in the *London Quarterly* of his account of the battle of Waterloo in his “History of the Restoration.” This writer says: “M. Lamartine, in the course of a few pages, makes the Duke of Wellington, mounted on his eighth horse, after seven had been killed under him, gallop up to two of his regiments of dragoons, make them take off the curbs of their bridles to prevent them from checking their horses in the charge, and distribute brandy to the men, before launching them against the foe. He then orders his ‘intrepid Scotchmen,’ after allowing the approach of the French cavalry without firing, to slip under the horses and rip them up ‘with the short and broad sword of these children of the North.’ By way of episode, Ney figures in the front, flourishing his general’s hat in his left hand, his broken sword in his right, his dying horse at his feet; and General Lesourd dismounts, whilst his dragoons are rallying, to have his arm amputated, and then leads them to the charge.” If it is objected that M. Lamartine is a poet and therefore should not be selected as a representative writer—take M. Thiers. The same writer says of him: “M. Thiers’ account of the battle of Trafalgar is substantially as much at variance with both fact and probability, though not quite so extravagant on the face of it, as M. Lamartine’s ‘Waterloo.’ According to M. Thiers, hardly one of the French ships struck until assailed by an irresistible superiority of numbers—three or four to one—although, when the battle began, Nelson had four ships of the line and three frigates less than Villeneuve. To the same category belong the famous boast *La garde meurt et ne se rend pas*, attributed to Cambronne, who was actually taken prisoner at Waterloo: the dying words (never spoken) of Desaix: and the alleged self-immolation of the sailors of “*Le Vengeur*, who instead of sinking with the cry *Vive la République*, scrambled into the English boats, crying loudly for help.” The writer

proceeds to refer to the extraordinary fictions to which French ministers and generals habitually resorted during the late war to keep up the spirits of the people and the troops; and says: "There was not a pin to choose between the expiring Empire, the government of National Defence, or the government of the National Assembly, in this respect. No sooner had M. Thiers got together the semblance of an army than he declared it to be the finest army ever possessed by France; and when after days of desultory street fighting, he had worn out rather than conquered the armed rabble of the capital, he proclaimed that the whole world was lost in admiration of the splendor of his victory, and the irresistible prowess of French troops."

As an illustration of the immorality of the French literature of the same period we think it may be perhaps well, instead of making vague statements, to transfer directly to our pages from the same Review the following account of the plot of "Antony," one of the dramas of that prolific writer, Alexander Dumas.

"Antony is a man formed after the Byronic model, gloomy and saturnine, whose birth (illegitimate) and position are a mystery. He is in love with Adèle, a young lady of family and fortune, who returns his passion, but not venturing to propose to her, he suddenly disappears, and is absent for three years; at the end of which he returns to find her the wife of Colonel d'Hervey, with a daughter.

In the first Act an opportune accident causes him to be domiciled in her house whilst her husband is away. Explanations take place. He eloquently expatiates on his love, his heart-broken condition, his despair; and Adèle, distrusting her own powers of prolonged resistance, suddenly gives him the slip, orders post-horses, and makes the best of her way to join the Colonel at Frankfort. She is pursued by Antony, who passes her on the road, arrives first at the little inn at which she is compelled to sleep for want of post-horses, and makes arrangements as to rooms, which may be collected from the result.

'*Adèle.* Jamais il n'est arrivé d'accident dans cet hôtel?

L'Hôtess. Jamais . . . Si Madame veut, je ferai veiller quelqu'un?

Adèle. Non, non . . . au fait, pardon . . . laissez-moi . . . (Elle rentre dans le cabinet et ferme la porte).

Antony paraît sur le balcon, derrière la fenêtre, casse un carreau, passe son bras, ouvre l'espagnolette, entre vivement, et va mettre le verrou à la porte par laquelle est sortie l'hôtess.

Adèle (sortant du cabinet). Du bruit . . . un homme . . . ah! . . .

Antony. Silence! . . . (La prenant dans ses bras et lui mettant un mouchoir sur la bouche). C'est moi . . . moi, Antony . . . (Il l'entraîne dans le cabinet).'

This is the end of the third Act. In the fourth, the lovers are again in Paris and suffering tortures from the sarcasms and covert allusions of their social circle, in which their inn adventure has got wind. Antony, hearing that the Colonel will

arrive within the hour, has only just time to prepare Adèle for the meeting. We borrow Lord Dalling's translation of the catastrophe:—

Adèle. Oh! it's he . . . Oh! my God! my God! Have pity on me! pardon, pardon!

Antony. Come, it is over now!

Adèle. Somebody's coming upstairs . . . somebody rings. It's my husband—fly, fly!

Antony (fastening the door). Not I—I fly not . . . Listen! . . . You said just now that you did not fear death.

Adèle. No, no . . . Oh! kill me, for pity's sake.

Antony. A death that would save thy reputation, that of thy child?

Adèle. I'll beg for it on my knees.

(A voice from without, "Open, open! break open the door!")

Antony. And in thy last breath thou wilt not curse thy assassin?

Adèle. I'll bless him—but be quick . . . that door.

Antony. Fear nothing! death shall be here before any one. But reflect on it well—death!

Adèle. I beg it—wish it—implore it (throwing herself into his arms)—I come to seek it.

Antony (kissing her). Well then, die.

(He stabs her with a poniard.)

Adèle (falling into a fauteuil). Ah!

(At the same moment the door is forced open; Col. d'Hervey rushes on the stage.)

SCENE IV.

(Col. d'Hervey, Antony, Adèle, and different servants.)

Col. d'Hervey. Wretch!—What do I see?—Adèle!

Antony. Dead, yea, dead!—she resisted me, and I assassinated her.

(He throws his dagger at the Colonel's feet.) "

Now we wish to have it distinctly understood, that we would not intimate that in the writings of M. Taine himself there is the slightest shade of anything that is immoral or even indelicate; neither do we say that he is inclined to exaggeration. On the contrary we think, for a French writer, he is remarkably free from it. But we do say, that under the influence of what he calls "epoch"—or the combination of influences, or "dominant ideas," which in France for so long a time have permitted and even imperatively required, the exaggerated, the sensational, as well as the immoral—his tastes as a critic have been formed; and with such tastes, while it is possible for him to make our English literature the subject of a splendid analysis, it is also impossible—we emphasize the statement—it is impossible for him to feel any real sympathy with it, or love for it.

This impossibility is radical ; and we can, perhaps, best convey an idea of it, to those who have not yet read these volumes, if we show, as briefly as may be, how it extends to everything connected with England ; for there is on this point, throughout the book, what, in the language of Art, might be called complete harmony of expression.

We call attention, then, to the descriptions which M. Taine gives of the material side of English life. We have already intimated that these are remarkably full and minute and graphic. Take his picture of the London docks. A London merchant, as he reads it in the seclusion of his country home, might feel that he was back again in all the turmoil of business ; amid ships, and pulleys, and cranes, and drays, and piles of merchandize from every quarter of the globe. So vivid is the picture which he draws, that we feel as if we were almost able to see the mud, and smell the tar and the smoke, and hear the hum and the din of lading and unlading. "Always ships, still more ships, in a line, showing their heads ; their hollowed sides, their copper chests, like monstrous fishes under their breastplate of scales. Vessels in the distance by hundreds and thousands, fixed as if on the land ; their masts in a line, their slender rigging, make a spider-web which girdles the horizon." Take his description of the great manufacturing districts of England. He makes the reader feel that he has been transported to Manchester itself, and that he is looking upon innumerable chimneys "high as obelisks," lofty buildings in red, monotonous brick, blast furnaces blazing through the smoke, engines running like black ants, "iron pillars thick as tree trunks, cylinders as broad as a man, locomotive-shafts like vast oaks, notching machines which send up iron chips, rollers which bend sheet-iron like paste, fly-wheels which become invisible by the swiftness of their revolution." He is no less successful in painting the country. Hawthorn himself does not make more real before our eyes the green hedges and mossy turf which abound everywhere ; the roses, the honeysuckles, the well kept gardens, the ornamental trees, the white-washed cottages ; while, without an apparent effort, he dashes off a whole series of pictures of characteristic scenes, and makes the clean cottages stand out to view, with their porches covered with climbing plants ;

with their red floor-tiles carefully swept; their shining dressers, the plates with blue pattern regularly arranged upon them; order and neatness everywhere; "always a paper on the walls, one or two moral novels, and always the Bible." He shows us, too, the father and the mother seated on Sunday at the well scrubbed table, with tea and butter before them, enjoying the comfortable home which they have established. He describes the houses of people in the middle ranks, "filled with the hundred thousand baubles of quasi-luxury," with "inventions of comfort so multiplied that people are bored with them." "Too many kinds of carpets, washstands, matches, towels in your dressing-room; too many newspapers on your bed-table at night." He sketches also the people of wealth, the gentry, and the nobility, who are "magistrates, overseers, presidents of all kinds of societies, and this gratuitously. One has built a bridge at his own expense, another a church or a school. Many establish public libraries, with warmed and lighted rooms, in which the villagers in the evening find the papers, games, tea at low charges—in a word, simple amusements which may keep them from the gin shop. Many of them give lectures; their sisters or daughters teach in Sunday-schools; in fact, they give to the ignorant and poor, at their own expense, justice, administration, civilization. I have seen one having an enormous fortune, who on Sunday in his school taught singing to little girls. Lord Palmerston offered his park for archery meetings; the Duke of Marlborough opens his daily to the public, 'requesting (this is the word used) the public not to destroy the grass.' Queen Victoria discovers a cure for the turkey disease."

Now, these descriptions, with which the book is crowded, make it evident that M. Taine has, for a foreigner, an amount of information respecting everything which pertains to the material side of English life, which is exceptionally large. Yet, the whole time, the reader is involuntarily conscious that this accomplished theorist is looking upon all from an entirely different point of view from his own; and that the author, who is so astonishing him with his acquaintance with minute details, and fascinating him with the grace and sparkling vivacity of his style, is a very polite French gentleman, who cannot and

does not refrain from ever and anon shrugging his shoulders, and confessing, with a deprecatory look, that all these persons and scenes which he describes are not in the least according to his taste, and that he is interested in them only just so far, and no farther, as they have a bearing upon and serve to illustrate the—"psychology of a people!"

These descriptions of M. Taine make us think of some political economist, who, in the interests of his favorite science, visits a community of Shakers, for the purpose of examining into their system, and studying their "psychology." As the result, we can imagine such an one dilating on the excellence of their farms and the richness of their crops, the ruddy glow of health on the cheeks of the brethren, and the placid expression on the faces of the sisters, and the quiet and order that are every where to be observed; but even if his language is somewhat enthusiastic on these points, they do not mislead us as to what are his own personal feelings with regard to what he sees and hears. Neither does M. Taine allow us to remain in doubt as to what are his own personal feelings about England and the English people. He is very frank, and says: "When I saw in Hyde Park the rich young ladies, the gentlemen riding and driving, when I reflected on their country houses, their dress, their parks and stables, I said to myself that verily this people is constituted after the heart of economists: I mean that it is the greatest producer and the greatest consumer in the world; that none is more apt at squeezing out and absorbing the quintessence of things; that it has developed its wants at the same time as its resources,—and you involuntarily think of those insects which after their metamorphosis are suddenly provided with teeth, feelers, unwearying claws, admirable and terrible instruments, fitted to dig, saw, build, do everything, but furnished also with incessant hunger and four stomachs."

We have spoken of the feelings with which M. Taine regards the material side of English life; and we might ask how can it be reasonably expected that he should feel otherwise? He is a native of sunny France, and has learned to love the skies of Italy, the blue waters of the Mediterranean, and the isles of Greece. How can such a man endure a country whose only sun, for six months in the year, as some one has said, is the

coal-fire in the grate. His home has been for years in a city where the humblest shop-girl knows how to put on the dingiest dress in such a way as to make it look becoming ; where even the beggars are picturesque. What a constant offense to him must be the dowdy figures, male and female, who throng the streets of every British city, and who every day do constant violence to all his ideas of what is tasteful.

We need not pursue the theme. We have dwelt upon these things thus far, because, if his feelings are such with regard to what we may call the externals of English life and society, it is obvious that this French critic—with tastes formed under the influence of "race," "circumstances," and "epoch"—must find it still more impossible to feel any sympathy with, or love for, English literature.

Of course our limits will not allow us to attempt to prove this by following M. Taine in his criticism of individual authors. His feelings may be illustrated, perhaps, as readily as in any other way, by citing what he says of the writers of novels. It is evident that he looks upon the works of this whole class of authors in England very much as some such man as Aaron Burr might look upon "The Wide, Wide World," or "Stepping Heavenward," if, for some literary or other reason, he was obliged to wade through them. He complains, as we might expect, that the English novelist is limited in his range of subjects, and cramped in his methods of treating them, by the strict ideas of morality which are prevalent in England. Vice cannot be described with a free pen, and the depths of the wickedness which is in the heart of man cannot be unveiled. In his eyes, an English novel is an exceedingly tame affair. Take those of Mr. Dickens, for instance. He says, "In *Nicholas Nickleby* the novelist shows us two good young men, like all young men, marrying two good young women, like all young women. In *Martin Chuzzlewit*, the same novelist shows two more good young men, perfectly resembling the other two, marrying again two good young women, perfectly resembling the other two. In *Dombey and Son* there is only one good young man, and one good young woman ; otherwise, no difference. And so on." The number of marriages, he says, in

these novels, is marvellous. "Enough couples are married to people England. More curious still, they are all disinterested; and the young man and the young woman snap their fingers at money as sincerely as at the Opera Comique. The reader thinks he is beholding the innocent loves and virtuous attentions of a little boy and girl of ten. He would like to say to them 'Good little people, continue to be very proper.'"

In contrast to all such poor stuff, he points to George Sand, who makes love to be the hero of all her novels. "Married or not, she thinks it beautiful, holy, sublime in itself, and she says so." He points to Balzac, who is a true artist. He celebrates by turns in his novels each of the passions. "He considers them as forces; and, holding that force is beautiful, he has supported them by their causes, surrounded them by their circumstances, developed them in their effects, pushed them to an extreme, and magnified them so as to make them into sublime monsters, more systematic and more true than the truth." Art suffers in England. What can a novelist do? He is hopelessly cramped. Society stifles whatever of genius there may be in him. It says to him, "Be moral. All your novels must be such as may be read by young girls. We are practical people, and we would not have literature corrupt practical life. We are Protestants, and we have preserved something of the severity of our fathers against enjoyment and passions. George Sand paints impassioned women; paint you for us good women. George Sand makes us desire to be in love; do you make us desire to be married."

There can be scarcely any necessity of saying more. Yet there is one passage—the closing chapter of the book—in which M. Taine makes such a frank avowal of his own personal literary tastes, that we shall take the liberty of trespassing a little further on the patience of our readers, while we attempt to give a clear idea of what they are according to his own representation.

He commences with the statement that Tennyson is the favorite poet at the present time in England. "An Englishman, setting out on a journey, would put his works into his pocket; just as a Frenchman would put the works of Alfred de Musset into his." And, that we may the better understand the difference between these two poets, he compares the circles

of readers who are attracted by each. For this purpose he invites us to accompany him in a journey by rail from Dover to London. He points out the country houses which everywhere abound; "on the margin of lakes, on the edge of the bays, on the summit of the hill, in every picturesque point of view. London is but a business-place. Men of the world live, amuse themselves, visit each other, in the country." He describes one of these houses. "All round it is a lawn, fresh and smooth as velvet, rolled every morning. In front, great rhododendrons form a bright thicket in which murmur swarms of bees; festoons of exotics creep and curve over the short grass; honeysuckles clamber up the trees; hundreds of roses, drooping over the windows, shed their rain of petals on the patha. Fine elms, yew-trees, great oaks, jealously tended, everywhere combine their leafage or rear their heads. Fat oxen lie in the grass, sheep as white as if fresh from the washing, all kinds of happy and model animals, fit to delight the eyes of an amateur and a master." He invites us to enter the house. "We converse with our host. We very soon find that his mind and soul have always been well balanced. When he left college he found his career shaped out for him. He is married, has tenants, is a magistrate, becomes a politician. He improves and rules his parish, his estate, and his family. He founds societies, speaks at meetings, superintends schools, dispenses justice, introduces improvements. He employs his reading, his travels, his connections, his fortune, and his rank to lead his neighbors and dependants amicably to some work which profits themselves and the public. He is influential and respected. He has the pleasures of self esteem, and the satisfaction of conscience. He knows that he has authority, and that he uses it loyally, for the good of others. And this healthy state of mind is supported by a wholesome life. His mind is cultivated and occupied. He is well informed, knows several languages, has traveled, is fond of all precise information. He is kept by his newspaper conversant with all new ideas and discoveries." Now such a man as this will be satisfied with Tennyson; for "without being a pedant, he is moral. He may be read in the family circle by night. He does not rebel against society and life. He speaks of God and the soul,

nobly, tenderly, without ecclesiastical prejudices. There is no need to reproach him like Lord Byron. He has no violent and abrupt words, excessive and scandalous sentiments. He will pervert nobody. We shall not be troubled when we close the book. We may listen, when we quit him, without contrast, to the grave voice of the master of the house, who repeats the evening prayers before the kneeling servants." The ladies, also, in such a family, as might be expected, like such a poet." They are charmed by his portraits of women, they are so exquisite and so pure! He has laid such delicate blushes on those lovely cheeks! He has depicted so well the changing expression of those proud or candid eyes. They like him because they feel that he likes them. *Mora*. He honors them, and rises in his nobility to the height of their purity. Young girls weep in listening to him. Certainly, when, a while ago, we heard the legend of Elaine or Enid read, we saw the fair heads drooping under the flowers which adorned them, and white shoulders heaving with furtive emotion."

M. Taine now invites us to return with him to Calais, and to travel toward Paris. There is no need of pausing on the road. "On the way are plenty of noblemen's castles, and houses of rich men of business; but we do not find among them, as in England, the thinking, elegant world, which, by the refinement of its tastes and the superiority of its mind, becomes the guide of the nation and the arbiter of the beautiful." So he takes us at once to Paris. "We enter. It is evening. The streets are aflame. A luminous dust covers the busy, noisy crowd, which jostles, elbows, crushes, and swarms in front of the theaters, behind the windows of the cafés. Have you remarked how all these faces are wrinkled, frowning, or pale; how anxious are their looks, how nervous their gestures? A violent brightness falls on these shining heads; most are bald before thirty. To find pleasure here they must have plenty of excitement. The dust of the boulevard settles on the ice which they are eating, the smell of the gas, and the steam of the pavement, the perspiration left on the walls dried up by the fever of a Parisian day, the human air full of impure rattle—this is what they cheerfully breathe."—"All the enjoyments of these people are factitious, and as it were snatched hurriedly. They

have in them something unhealthy and vitiating. But, he says on the other hand: "How fine these people are, and how free is their mind! How this incessant rubbing has sharpened them! How ready they are to grasp and comprehend everything! How apt this studied and manifold culture has made them to feel and relish tendernesses and sadnesses unknown to their fathers, deep feelings, strange and sublime. This great city is cosmopolitan. Here all ideas may be born. No barrier checks the mind. The vast field of thought opens before them without a beaten or prescribed track!" Now this is the world for which Alfred de Musset wrote. "In Paris he must be read. Read? We all know him by heart. He is dead, and it seems as if we daily hear him speak."—"With what fire did he hurl onward love, jealousy, the thirst of pleasure, all the impetuous passions which rise with virgin blood from the depths of a young heart, and how did he make them clash together! Has anyone felt them more deeply? He was too full of them, he gave himself up to them, was intoxicated with them. He rushed through life like an eager race-horse in the country, whom the scent of plants, and the splendid novelty of the vast heavens, urge breast foremost in its mad career, which shatters all before him, and himself as well. He desired too much. He wished strongly and greedily to taste life in one draught, thoroughly. He did not glean or taste it. He tore it off like a bunch of grapes, pressed it, crushed it, twisted it, and he remains with stained hands as thirsty as before."—"He is as a man in a festive scene who drinks from a carven cup, standing up in front amidst applause and triumphal music, his eyes laughing, his heart full of joy, heated and excited by the generous wine descending in his breast, whom suddenly we see growing pale; there was poison in the cup; he falls, and the death-rattle is in his throat, his convulsed feet beat upon the silken carpet, and all the terrified guests look on. This is what we felt on the day when the most beloved, the most brilliant amongst us suddenly quivered from an unseen attack and was struck down with the death-rattle in his throat amidst the lying splendors and gaieties of our banquet."—"Well, such as he was, we love him for ever. We cannot listen to another. Beside him all seem cold or false."

Our object, it will be remembered, is to throw light upon the nature of M. Taine's literary tastes, in order that the standard may be understood by which he judges the productions of our English authors. A word or two, therefore, with regard to the man whom he lauds so enthusiastically, may not be out of place.

Alfred de Musset has been styled the French Byron; and in the wild recklessness with which he abandoned himself to the gratification of every passion, and in the "audacities of voluptuousness and impiety" which characterise his literary productions, holds even among French writers of the nineteenth century a bad preëminence. Possessed of undoubted genius, though of superficial education, without conscience, without self-respect, without faith in anything or anybody, his wretched life may be regarded as the legitimate offspring of those monstrous social and irreligious theories which were warmed into life by the French Revolution. There was nothing in heaven or earth to keep him from doing anything, from conceiving anything, from saying anything. As might have been expected, "dissipation burned into his brain, and soon burned it out." His first book was published in 1828; and fifteen years ago "he died at the age of forty-seven a very old man." Could there be a greater contrast between such a wild bacchanal and the refined English poet with whom M. Taine compares him.

Tennyson speaks everywhere of the author of the Christian religion with deep and unfeigned reverence. Alfred de Musset, with bold insolence, thus defies him.

O Christ! je ne suis pas de ceux que la prière
Dans les temples muets amène à pas tremblants;
Je ne suis pas de ceux qui vont à ton calvaire,
En se frappant le cœur, baiser tes pieds sanglants.
Je ne crois pas, O Christ! à ta parole sainte;
Je suis venu trop tard dans un monde trop vieux.
D'un siècle sans espoir naît un siècle sans crainte;
Les comètes du nôtre ont dépeuplé les cieux.
Maintenant le hasard promène au sein des ombres
De leurs illusions les mondes réveillés;
L'esprit des temps passés, errant sur leurs décombres,
Jette au gouffre éternel tes anges mutilés.

Les clous du Golgotha te soutiennent à peine;
 Sous ton divin tombeau le sol s'est dérobé:
 Ta gloire est morte, O Christ! et sur nos croix d'ébène
 Ton cadavre céleste en poussière est tombé.

Tennyson everywhere recognizes the bond which binds man to his fellow men, and expresses consideration and a kindly sympathy for the weaknesses which belong to human nature. The language of Alfred de Musset is cold and pityless.

O vieillards décrépits, têtes chauves et nues!
 Cœurs brisés dont le temps ferme les avenues!
 Centenaires voûtés, spectres à chef branlant,
 Qui, pâles au soleil, cheminez d'un pied lent,
 C'est vous qu'ici j'invoque et prends à témoignage.
 Vous n'avez pas toujours été sans vie, et l'âge
 N'a pas toujours plié de ses mains de géant
 Votre front à la terre et votre âme au néant!
 Vous avez eu des yeux, des bras et des entrailles!
 Dites-nous donc, avant que de vos funérailles
 L'heure vous vienne prendre, O vieillards! dites-nous
 Comme un cœur à vingt ans bondit au rendez-vous!

M. Taine himself speaks of the high moral tone which the writings of Tennyson invariably breathe. In a review of one of the works of Alfred de Musset we find this description of the plot. Frank, the hero, kills a man, and takes his mistress to himself. Becoming at last wearied of her, he spreads a report that he has himself been killed in a duel, and disguised in a mask he is represented as being present while the priests are praying by the side of what is supposed to be his own coffin.

C'est une jonglerie atroce, en vérité!
 O toi qui les entends, suprême intelligence!
 Quelle pagode ils font de leur Dieu de vengeance!
 Quel bourreau rancunier brûlant à petit feu!
 Toujours la peur du feu.—C'est bien l'esprit de Rome.
 Ils vous diront après que leur Dieu s'est fait homme.
 J'y reconnais plutôt l'homme qui s'est fait Dieu.

The priests leave, and his mistress draped in mourning comes in weeping.

..... Elle vient, la voilà.
 Voilà bien ce beau corps, cette épaule charnue,
 Cette gorge superbe et toujours demi-nue,
 Avec ces deux grands yeux qui sont d'un noir d'enfer.

Frank, still masked, addresses her. "Il sèche ses larmes au rayonnement de l'or et la rend infidèle sur son cercueil."

Here, then, are the two poets whom M. Taine contrasts as representative writers in the last, and what perhaps is the most remarkable chapter in his History. There can be no question with which one are his sympathies. There is a depth of tenderness in every line of this tribute to De Musset which we have not found anywhere in his description of any English writer. He goes further. He describes the wretched place where his impassioned poems were written under the influence of brandy: and where, as one of his biographers has said, "souvent, il se faisait amener, comme les peintres, un modèle vivant, dont les poses plastiques venaient en aide à ses inspirations." He describes the room, where, as we are told, "he burned out his brain" with *absinthe*, and the gloomy street, in that part of Paris, where, at night, "the restless shadows march past the doors and trail along their dresses of draggled silk to meet the passers by;" and he tells us in so many words that "it was these vilenesses and vulgarities of the stews which caused his divine eloquence to flow!"—"It was these which gathered in his bruised heart all the splendors of nature and history, to make them spring up in sparkling jets and shine under the most glowing poetic sun that ever rose. Then he turns to that "other poet," as he half contemptuously calls him, "away there in the Isle of Wight, who amuses himself by dressing up lost epics; and exclaims: "How happy he is amongst his fine books, his friends, his honeysuckles, and roses!" "But," he continues, "No matter! De Musset, in this very spot, in this filth and misery, rose higher. From the heights of his doubt and despair, he saw the infinite, as we see the sea from a storm-beaten promontory. Religions, their glory and their decay, the human race, its pangs and its destiny, all that is sublime in the world, appeared there to him in a flash of lightning. He felt, at least this once in his life, the inner tempest of deep sensations, giant dreams, and intense voluptuousness, whose desire enabled him to live, and whose lack forced him to die. He was no mere dilettante; he was not content to taste and enjoy; he left his mark on human thought; he told the world what was man, love, truth, happiness. He

suffered, but he invented ; he fainted, but he produced. He tore from his entrails with despair the idea which he had conceived, and showed it to the eyes of all, bloody but alive. That is harder and lovelier than to go fondling and gazing upon the ideas of others." The people who have listened to Tennyson are better than our aristocracy of towns-folk and bohemians ; but I prefer Alfred de Musset to Tennyson." With this frank confession the History of English Literature is closed.

And now we have endeavored, according to the methods of M. Taine himself, "to annihilate as far as possible whatever prevents us from seeing him with the eyes of our head." In his own words, we have imagined to ourselves an accomplished French gentleman "in a black coat and gloves," whose lodgings in Paris are "on the second floor;" who "is welcomed by the ladies ; who makes every evening his fifty bows, and his score of bon-mots in society ; who reads the papers in the morning ; who is not over gay, because he has nerves, and especially because the refinement of his feelings disposes him somewhat to believe himself a deity." This modern literary Crichton has mastered all knowledge, has travelled everywhere, knows everybody, has seen everything. Yet he is not *blasé*. He feels no ennui ; for he has the inestimable advantage of being carried away with a theory, and he has made it the business of his life to apply this wonderful theory to the whole round of activities of which the human mind is capable. He has at last taken up English literature, as the work which is to crown all that he has yet attempted. He has said some things that are valuable ; many things which we cannot but admire. He is always brilliant. He is never dull. Sometimes, it is true, we cannot understand exactly what he means. And, certainly, when he declaims about Alfred de Musset, "tearing from his entrails with despair the idea which he had conceived, and showing it to the eyes of all, bloody, but alive," we confess that we are a little inclined to doubt his sanity ! At all events, we are sure that if an Englishman should talk in this style the boys in the street would laugh at him. But of one thing we are quite confident, that his critical tastes are such that it is impossible for him to feel any sympathy with or love for English literature, and that, in

the preparation of this book, it has held in his eyes only a very subordinate position. He reminds us of some enthusiastic *savan* of the *École de Médecine*, who imagines that he has been successful in making some grand discovery with regard to the principle of life, and stands over the dissecting table, in the full tide of eloquence, while he uses the inanimate mass before him only for the purpose of illustrating his physiological speculations. So M. Taine seems to us to make use of the treasures of English literature. He shows prodigious learning, and wonderful powers of description and analysis, yet it is manifest all the time that it is the theory which is the most important thing in his eyes, and that he regards the literature only as the *corpus vile* which can be made to serve to illustrate it.

ARTICLE VII.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.*—We did not think it would come in our day, but here it is. Puritanism in the Church of England, persecuted under Elizabeth and her successors, victorious for a season under the Long Parliament, betrayed by the folly of its Presbyterian leaders into complicity with the restoration of the Stuarts, ignominiously expelled from the establishment by the reactionary government of Charles II, and seemingly annihilated under the reign of William and Mary by the Act of Toleration which converted Puritans into Dissenters, emerges into life again in these latter years of Victoria. The Rev. G. A. Jacob, D.D., late Head Master of Christ's Hospital, writing not as a Dissenter from the ecclesiastical establishment of England, but as a member of that establishment, has ventured to do what Thomas Cartwright did three centuries ago; he has carefully and learnedly investigated the Ecclesiastical Polity of the New Testament, has compared it with the system of the Church of England, and now, like Cartwright and the Puritans of old, he asks for a new reformation. The times are changed indeed since the reign of Elizabeth; it is not probable that Dr. Jacob will suffer for his theoretical Puritanism, so long as his conscience will permit him to wear the vestments and read the liturgy with strict observance of the rubrics; he has, as the old Puritans had not, full liberty to withdraw from the Established Church, and as a Dissenter to preach and pray, and to unite with others in worship, according to his own convictions; he need not fear that his afflictions will be like Cartwright's; the England of Victoria is in many things exceedingly unlike the England of Elizabeth; but the Church of England, in its government and discipline, and in its formularies both of doctrine and of worship, remains unchanged. Dr. Jacob thinks it is high time to reform that singularly composite institution which for three hundred years has been, of all things in the English-speaking world, most unreformable.

* *The Ecclesiastical Polity of the New Testament. A Study for the Present Crisis in the Church of England.* By Rev. G. A. JACOB, D.D., Late Head-Master of Christ's Hospital. New York: T. Whittaker.

Dr. Jacob's work is in the form of lectures (for some reason never delivered) on the following topics: "The Apostles and the Christian Church,"—"The First Organization of the Church,"—"A further consideration of the Christian Ministry"—proving that it is not a priesthood,—“The Laity, or Christian Body at Large,”—"Public Worship"—including the question of prescribed liturgies,—“Christian Baptism,”—"The Lord's Supper,"—with a concluding lecture in which the facts and principles of the New Testament polity are applied to the impending crisis in the Church of England. Learning, carefulness, candor, and moderation characterize the entire work. We commend it to our friends—clerical and laical—in the American Episcopal Church. Be they ever so High, or ever so narrow, if they will read it in the spirit in which it is written, they will find themselves brought out in a large place. We do not say that they will cease to be Episcopalians; but they will be conscious of a new freedom.

Perhaps there is no better treatise on the scriptural warrant for the Congregational theory of Church government than this book from an Evangelical Broad-Church Episcopalian.

NAEGELSBACH ON JEREMIAH AND LAMENTATIONS.*—The present volume of Lange's *Bibelwerk*, though far enough below the mark of the best German commentaries, is somewhat better than any we have hitherto had in English on this part of the Old Testament. Naegelsbach has a little more Hebrew scholarship and a little less disregard for the principles of historical criticism than are current among us. Of the poetical portions of the book of Jeremiah Mr. Asbury has given a new translation, "founded on a comparison of the German and English versions with the Hebrew." We assume that he has adhered substantially to Naegelsbach's interpretation, and is to be held responsible only for the language in which the ideas are clothed. In this he is not always happy. Such renderings as these will hardly strike any one as improvements on King James's Version: ii, 5, "followed vacuity and became vacuous;" v, 4, "stultified;" vi, 24 (and elsewhere frequently, both as a noun and adjective), "parturient;" xx, 10,

* *A Commentary on the Holy Scriptures*. By JOHN PETER LANGE, D.D. Vol. XIII. of the Old Testament, containing Jeremiah and Lamentations, theologically and homiletically expounded, by Dr. C. W. EDWARD NAEGELSBACH. Jeremiah translated, enlarged, and edited by SAMUEL RALPH ASBURY; Lamentations translated, enlarged, and edited by WM. H. HORNEBLOWER, D.D. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1871. 8vo, pp. 446, 196.

"obligated to be at peace;" l, 11, "for thou rejoicest, for thou exultedst, robber of my heritage, for thou skippedst like a thrashing calf, and neighedst like the strong steeds;" l, 13, "the ell of thy section;" the frequent use of *will* for *shall*, e. g., xiv, 18, "ye will not see the sword, and famine will not come to you." The phrase, "ground property" (xii, 10), we are afraid, was *not* compared either with the Hebrew, or with the English version; it is too unmistakably German. As an editor Mr. Asbury has contented himself, we are happy to say, with few additions to the work of Naegelsbach, an act of self-denial which we appreciate the more highly from the fact that the Commentary on Lamentations has been swollen by Dr. Hornblower's additions to double the size of the original. Especially Naegelsbach's opinion that Jeremiah was not the author of Lamentations, Dr. Hornblower has combated with great warmth and at great length. Naegelsbach's arguments are drawn from the differences in the style of the two books, differences partly of a general nature, especially the very artificial alphabetic structure of Lamentations, partly specific differences in the *usus loquendi*. Of the latter he gives a list founded on a comparison, word for word, of Lamentations with Jeremiah. The question cannot be regarded as settled, indeed it hardly admits of more than a probable solution, but toward such a solution Naegelsbach has made a contribution of some value. Dr. Hornblower meets the arguments of Naegelsbach by such as these. Admitting that "the modern acrostic is justly regarded as a species of literary trifling, pleasing only to a fanciful, finical, or puerile taste," he thinks it "not impossible that the Hebrew alphabetical acrostic may have belonged to the highest art of ancient Hebrew poetry." To show that the difference in language is not inconsistent with unity of authorship, he has taken the trouble to compare the poems and plays of Shakespeare, and finds, for example, in the first stanza of *Venus and Adonis*, the following expressions which do not occur in the plays; *purple-colored face*, *weeping morn*, *hied*, *sick-thoughted*, and two that occur only once in the plays; *rose-cheeked*, *bold-faced*. The parallel will satisfy one of the conditions of the mathematical definition; the things compared will certainly never come together, no matter how far the comparison is pushed. The relation which the vocabulary of poetry bears to that of prose is by no means the same in Hebrew as in English. One difference only, the facts that compounds are hardly to be found in Hebrew (except in proper names), will strike off perhaps the major part of Dr. Hornblower's

examples. Many of the points of divergence noted by Naegelsbach are it is true of little or no weight, and to insist on them rather weakens than strengthens his case. But all are not so easily disposed of. For example, *Adonai* occurs as a name of God in Jeremiah seven times, and always in the combination *Adonai Jehovah*; in Lamentations it occurs fourteen times and always alone. Dr. Hornblower charges Naegelsbach with a want of ingenuousness in not raising the question of the correctness of the reading, inasmuch as "many manuscripts, some early editions and some of the older versions, have *Jehovah* instead of *Adonai* in every one of the fourteen places referred to in the Lamentations." A moment's consideration will relieve Naegelsbach from this imputation, though we are sorry to say it leaves Dr. Hornblower under one hardly less grave. Of the 350 manuscripts of Lamentations collated by Kennicott, 30 on the average (17 being the lowest and 45 the highest number in any one instance) give the reading *Jehovah* in the place of *Adonai* in the fourteen cases above mentioned. These manuscripts are of no more than average authority, so that we may set down the evidence from this quarter in favor of *Adonai* as at least ten to one. And this evidence is strengthened a hundred fold by another consideration. The name *Jehovah* occurs in Lamentations forty times, and the manuscripts are so nearly unanimous that the reading *Adonai* is found on the average in hardly more than one manuscript. Now it is altogether impossible that in the fourteen instances above mentioned, *Adonai* can have been introduced in place of *Jehovah* by accident or carelessness so generally that the evidence is ten to one in its favor, while in the remaining forty cases the evidence is three hundred to one against it. Just as little can we suppose an intentional substitution. No reason can be assigned for the change in these cases which would not equally require a change in the other forty. Nor is Dr. Hornblower's case at all strengthened by the appeal to "early versions." None of the important ones at least lend it any support.

Not having the original German at hand, we cannot speak of the faithfulness of either Mr. Asbury's or Dr. Hornblower's translations. Dr. Hornblower's poor success in the attempt to correct a mistranslation of Bishop Wordsworth disturbs a little our confidence. It is found in a special note, p. 113. Wordsworth had translated *Gedenke, ja gedenke, dass meine Seele sich beruhige in mir*, "Remember, remember Thou, that my soul sinks within me;" Hornblower, "Remember, yea remember that my soul composes

itself in me." Wordsworth's error, in regard to the signification of *beruhige*, is quite venial compared to that of which both are guilty in taking it to be an indicative, in violation both of the form and the sense. Of course the translation should be, "Remember, yea remember, *in order that* my soul may be quieted within me."

BAERH ON THE BOOKS OF THE KINGS.*—This volume deserves the same qualified commendation which we gave to the one just noticed, and the translation is entitled to a somewhat warmer welcome, because the field which it covers was so nearly unoccupied. The author's previous publications on the symbolical character of the Mosaic worship, and of the Temple of Solomon, were hardly the best preparation for the present work; and it is not to be wondered at if the simple historical fact is not to him everywhere the object of the first importance. The translators, each in a different way, have performed their work well. There are, it seems to us, but two rational modes of procedure with such a book, either to confine oneself to a simple translation, without additions and corrections, or to keep up a pretty constant protest against the author's methods and conclusions. Dr. Harwood has chosen substantially the first of these methods, his remarks being very few and brief, and Mr. Sumner the last. Mr. Sumner's additions, which are very considerable, are not open to the objection which we have brought against some of the earlier volumes of this commentary, which have grown greatly in size, without increasing in value, under the hands of their editors. He has shown sound scholarship, and, what is no less important, the ability to enter into sympathy with the writer and to place himself at his point of view. In applying the results of recent Assyrian researches to the illustration of Jewish history, he has, it appears to us, proceeded with hardly sufficient caution. This is a quarter from which we shall no doubt in time gain assured and valuable results, but the want of agreement among the few scholars who are competent to express an opinion on the subject is still too great to warrant us in accepting the conclusions reached as more than provisional. Lenormant, of whose "Ancient History of the

* *A Commentary on the Holy Scriptures.* By JOHN PETER LANGE, D. D. Vol. xi. of the Old Testament; the Books of the Kings, by KARL CHR. W. F. BAERH, D. D. Translated, enlarged, and edited; Book I. by EDWIN HARWOOD, D. D.; Book II. by W. G. SUMNER, B. A. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1872. 8vo, pp. 260, 312.

East" Mr. Sumner has made frequent use, is too obviously weak in other parts of his work to be entitled to much weight here.

DELITZSCH'S COMMENTARY ON THE PSALMS* possesses some rare excellences. It is the work of a man of genius and great learning. The author is remarkably familiar with all the intricacies of Hebrew punctuation and accentuation, with Hebrew phraseology and syntax, and with Rabbinic literature. In this last respect his work is an important supplement to other modern commentaries. Meanwhile the author is equally conversant with the results of recent scholarship. A man of less originality would have been overborne by his learning. Indeed, we often feel that he magnifies the mechanics of the Psalms, finding abundantly "Sabbatic numbers," "heptatichs," "hexastichs," "sevens," "three-fold septiads," "threes," and even "the unmistakable strophe-schema 6, 6, 7, 6, 6, not without significance" (p. 67). We are also occasionally reminded that so far as he has a bias, it is toward Jewish interpretations. And we weary of the perpetual "Johoe," running all through this translation, as the substitute for our ineradicable *English* "Jehovah:" a weariness not diminished by once hearing a yearling Hebrew student affect the same barbarism. But when we approach the substantial excellencies of the Commentary, we find them very great: thorough knowledge of Hebrew philology, remarkable acquaintance with the Scriptures, a wide range of kindred scholarship, a deeply spiritual tone, an eminently fertile mind, abounding in pointed and poetic suggestion. The brilliancy of the exposition is partly concealed by the difficulties of a translation, and is somewhat obscured in the original by the unartistic commingling of cold grammatical remarks with sparkling gems of thought. In this, as in the previous volumes, there is scarcely a page which does not offer some characteristic mark of genius, however brief; while in some of the Psalms, e. g., the 84th, 132d, 138th, 148th, there is a sustained richness and beauty, dimmed only by the two influences already mentioned. This brightness of thought shows itself often in the titles: "Sabbath Thoughts" (Ps. xcii), "The harvest of joy after the sowing of tears" (cxxvi), "The vows of a king" (ci), "The Royal Throne above the sea of purple" (xciii), "An Gottes Segen ist alles gelegen" (cxxvii), etc. It breaks out not seldom in his descrip-

* *Biblical Commentary on the Psalms.* By FRANZ DELITZSCH. From the German, 2nd edition. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. For sale by Scribner, Welford & Armstrong, N. Y. Vol. III. Pp. 420, 8vo.

tions of the very movement of the Psalms: "The music is hushed; the song dies away with an iambic cadence into a waiting, expectant stillness" (lxxxiv). "The deeds of God at the time of the Exodus are here brought together to form a miniature as majestic as it is charming. There are four tetrastichs which pass by with the swiftness of a bird, as it were, with four flap-pings of its wings" (cxiv).

If we were to fix upon the most striking quality of all exhibited in this Commentary, we should incline perhaps to specify its poetic appreciation; a trait so indispensable and so commonly dispensed with in expositions of the Psalms. In this respect it is often admirable. We could cite illustrations by the page.

Considered strictly as an exposition, this Commentary deserves high praise. It is careful and judicious. We should not advise any student to consult it alone, but to compare it with others. The strong individuality of the author sometimes inclines him to doubtful views, which a writer even of less ability would avoid. Its value as a complement to the ordinary expositions, as well as its independent worth, is very great. It is, however, too learned for a popular Commentary.

THE FOURTH GOSPEL THE HEART OF CHRIST.*—This is one of the most valuable contributions to theology which the press of late has furnished. It is scholarly without being pedantic, argumentative but not dry, at the same time theological and critical, and marked throughout by an unaffected and elevated piety. The author begins with a discussion of miracles and the supernatural, and the immanence of God in nature. He shows that a miracle is no contradiction to nature, no violation of the divine attributes; in short, nothing monstrous, or, under the circumstances, presupposed in the Gospels and proved to be actual, unexpected. He then proceeds to "the Historical Argument," in which we have a clear, correct, and succinct statement of the proofs of the genuineness of the fourth Gospel which are afforded by ecclesiastical history. The objections and hypotheses of Baur, Scholten, and other disbelieving critics are dispassionately weighed, under the title of "Historical Memorials." Dr. Sears then takes up the organic unity of the Gospels, the mutual relation of the respective conceptions of Christ which are presented in them, and other topics, which, as they are treated, serve to corroborate the main proposition that

* *The Fourth Gospel the Heart of Christ.* By EDMUND H. SEARS. Boston: Noyes, Holmes & Co. 1872.

the fourth Gospel is from the pen of the beloved disciple. Part III. considers "the Private Ministry of Christ," and accounts for the distinctive peculiarities of the last of the Evangelists, the interpreter of "the Heart of Christ." This is followed by an exposition of "the Johannean Theology," which is treated from a substantially evangelical, though not technically orthodox, point of view. The Appendix takes up certain critical and theological problems, as "the Easter Controversy," "the Birth of Christ," "the Pre-existence." There are some opinions both in criticism and theology, in the course of this work, with which we are unable to concur; but even they are invariably propounded in a tone of candor and fairness, which disarms polemical hostility. The subject of the volume is of the highest interest as a branch of Christian evidences. It is treated in a manner at once satisfactory to the scholar and edifying to the ordinary disciple, who wishes to see the grounds of his faith and penetrate the profound meaning of that one of the sacred narratives which Luther called the "haupt-evangelium,"—"the chief Gospel."

MCCLINTOCK AND STRONG'S *ENCYCLOPÆDIA* (VOL IV).^{*}—Prefixed to this new volume of a work which has been already favorably noticed in these pages, is a suitable tribute to the worth of Dr. McClintock, whose death was lamented by all friends of learning in the country. Dr. Strong, with the aid of his corps of contributors, is carrying forward the work, on the same plan and in the same spirit in which it was commenced. The comprehensive plan of this Dictionary distinguishes it from most of the works which are in the market, and renders it especially convenient for such as have not access to special encyclopædias. The full references to authorities enable the reader to follow out the investigation of any of the topics which are handled.

DR. HICKOCK'S *CREATOR AND CREATION*[†] is another proof that the veteran philosopher and theologian does not relax in his zeal and his activity. It is easy to characterize the aim and the method of the work which is before us. It is also not difficult to recognize in it the comprehensive grasp, the penetrating analysis, and

^{*} *Cyclopædia of Biblical, Theological, and Ecclesiastical Literature*. Prepared by Rev. JOHN MCCLINTOCK, D.D. and JAMES STRONG, S.T.D. Vol IV. H. I. J. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1872.

[†] *Creator and Creation*; or, the Knowledge in the Reason of God and his Work. By LAURENS P. HICKOCK, D.D., LL.D. Boston: Lee and Shepard. 1872.

the fluent diction by which it is distinguished; but it is not easy to state its distinctive doctrines in terms intelligible to a laical understanding.

The doctrine, as we understand it, is that man by his reason knows the Creator as the necessary ground of created being, and, in knowing him as such, knows Him in the attributes and relations which are essential to Him as such a Creator. In knowing these he knows Him as Father, Word, and Spirit. In setting forth this doctrine the author reviews the several philosophies which have divided the world's suffrages, viz., the positive philosophy, the associational philosophy, the philosophy of common sense, the philosophy of correlated force, and the critical philosophy, in its several stages of development in Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The last, whatever else it does, fails to give us a positive and created universe. Here then the author starts by asserting that the Reason is competent to know an outer creation. This it cannot know by sense or by the understanding, for these give delusive phenomena and contradictory antinomies. The Reason only is competent to know the creation as it sees reality through phenomena, as it seizes the rational idea which reconciles and transfigures the varieties of sense appearances and the antinomies of the logical understanding. In knowing creation the finite Reason also knows the Creator as unconditioned—as personal and as triune—as the Universal Reason, as distinguished from the creation by which He manifests Himself.

The difficulty which we encounter in accepting this solution of the problems of philosophy and of faith which is proposed by the author, is that he seems to us to fail to show what sense and understanding are when severed from the Reason, and consequently to fail to find a separate office for this faculty, except that it does the work which sense and understanding in his view fail to achieve. We find no difficulty in translating the language of the author into a sound and comprehensive philosophy, but we cannot but wonder that he should retain the terminology of the Kantian system, when he so far departs from the gratuitous assumptions in respect to the reach and certainty of speculative knowledge, which alone give consistency to this terminology.

The second and longest part of the work is devoted to the metaphysics of inorganic, organic, and psychical existence as comprehending the creation. The author shows his wide reading and his comprehensive reflection upon the finite universe. We dare not

affirm that he has made out his thesis that these fundamental relations, which empirical science has been so slow to evolve and accept, are given to the insight of the finite Reason as the necessary conditions of its reflection upon its own essence.

THE TWO CONSCIENCES; OR, CONSCIENCE THE MORAL LAW AND CONSCIENCE THE WITNESS.*—The author of the *Essay on the Two Consciences* has, in this briefest possible of essays, been entirely successful in showing that the term conscience is used to designate two conceptions which are entirely different from one another, and that the confounding of the one with the other involves serious speculative and practical inconvenience. It is singular yet indisputably true that this ambiguity has too rarely been noticed, and has still more rarely been the stimulant to a more careful investigation into the nature and functions of this much discussed endowment of our being. The author has been moved to such an inquiry, but we cannot say that he has overcome all the difficulties, or answered all the questions which suggest themselves. We should have been delighted, if after having shown that conscience the witness supposes conscience the law, he had proceeded to inquire what conscience the law supposes, and by successive analyses he had discovered to himself and others the relations of moral truth and moral feeling to the necessary experiences of a being who is at once voluntary and reflective and rational. When he writes another essay we hope he will push his analysis further.

HENGSTENBERG'S HISTORY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD.†—It was fitting that one who had spent such an amount of intellectual toil upon separate portions of the one central theme, should gather the matured and corrected results of all that thinking into a rounded whole. It is done in this volume, and with great gain upon most of his other writings, in condensation, point, and sobriety. The characteristics of Hengstenberg still remain: his learning, his positiveness, and often his contempt. But his learning is less lumbering and wearisome, his positiveness less dictatorial, and

* *The Two Consciences; or, Conscience the Moral Law and Conscience the Witness: An Essay toward analyzing and defining their two principles and explaining the true character and office of each.* Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen, and Haffelfinger. 1870.

† *History of the Kingdom of God under the Old Testament.* From the German of the late E. W. HENGSTENBERG. In two volumes. Vol. I. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York: Scribner, Welford & Armstrong. Pp. 469, 8vo.

his contempt less bitter. He makes an occasional sharp shot at the men of differing opinions, and decides some controverted points in a way which scarcely apprises the reader of the strength of the opposing view. Thus he peremptorily affirms that "there is not a single tenable argument to be adduced in favor of the pre-Mosaic existence of the Sabbath" (p. 230), and "it is false to assert that the division into weeks, which we find in the very earliest times, can be explained only by the existence of the Sabbath." In the same style he asserts (p. 238): "On impartial consideration it soon appears that the Hyksos of Manetho are the Israelites themselves." He boldly pronounces (p. 27) that "not one of the heathen traditions respecting the flood seems to have an independent basis," although, to say no more, it might puzzle him to show how the traditions of the North American Indians "may be recognized as an echo of the Old Testament narrative." Ill-considered assertions like these, however, are not characteristic of the whole history. It is in general more temperate in tone and less partisan in argument than almost any of his other works, and is a valuable repository of the opinions of a toilsome and thoughtful life. If it had no other merit, it is a history of the vast literature of the subject, unless we except the very latest. The present volume, after an elaborate and learned Introduction, traces the course of events from the call of Abraham to the death of Joshua. He regards the Canaanites as the original occupants of northern Palestine, speaking a Semitic language, which had somehow displaced their Hamitic tongue; Egypt as "having attained the highest degree of culture at a very early period," and Israel as a learner there, although he pronounces Bunsen's Chronology "a tissue of hypotheses" "making a measure of that which is to be measured;" idolatry as a religious degeneration; Ur as situated in the *north* of Mesopotamia, between the Tigris and the Nisibis; four hundred and thirty years as the time of sojourn in Egypt; circumcision as a rite not borrowed by the Israelites from other nations, nor in all cases (e. g., the Egyptians and ancient Ethiopians) borrowed by the surrounding nations from Israel; the "angel of the Lord" as the Lord himself, virtually the *logos*; the pretended miracles of the Egyptian priests as high and skillful jugglery; Rameses as Heroöpolis, near the Bitter Lakes; the crossing of the Sea, as near its extreme northern limit; the route thence to Sinai, substantially the same as suggested by Robinson. On the standing still of the sun and moon, the author takes the

same view with Keil and others, that the whole passage, Joshua x, 12-15, and not merely a part of it, is a quotation from the poetical and hyperbolical description of "the book of Jasher." This History appears to have been one of the author's courses of lectures in Leipsic. Necessarily some interesting aspects of the subject, as developed near the close of his life, and since, fail to be recognized.

STANLEY ON THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND.*—Everything from the pen of Stanley possesses a charm for cultivated readers, from the attractiveness of the style, and from the wide culture and charitable spirit which characterize all his productions. Though not a profound thinker in theology and philosophy, and though he does not offer anything like a complete or exhaustive treatment of the subjects on which he writes, his influence is yet wholesome upon the thought of the times. Stanley, like his master, Dr. Arnold, is a strenuous advocate of establishments, as the best safeguard of lay rule and of liberty in the church. He finds occasion in this sketchy and discursive volume on the Scottish Church, to maintain his thesis on this subject. As a treatment of the ecclesiastical history of Scotland, the book is quite inadequate and defective; but as a repository of interesting thoughts, and of facts bearing on the theme, it is a readable and even instructive little work. As coming from the gifted chief of the Latitudinarians, or Broad Church as they call themselves, using the Saxon in preference to the Latin term, it will find numerous readers.

REV. DR. WYTHE'S AGREEMENT OF SCIENCE AND REVELATION† is a well-intended series of Essays on a much discussed subject. We cannot agree with a writer who holds that man is incompetent to reach the knowledge of God without a revelation. The work is written in a pleasant style, and gives evidence of abundant reading; but it is altogether below the demands of those devotees of science who have serious difficulties that reach below the surface. For a popular discussion of the subject it may render a useful service.

* *Lectures on the History of the Church of Scotland, delivered in Edinburgh in 1871.* By ARTHUR PENRHYN STANLEY, D.D., Dean of Westminster. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1872.

† *The Agreement of Science and Revelation.* By REV. JOS. H. WYTHE, M.D. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1872.

HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

SENATOR WILSON'S HISTORY OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SLAVE POWER IN AMERICA* is a work which will certainly be read. The interest of the subject, the reputation of its author, and the ability with which the History is written, will ensure for it an extensive circulation. The work is to consist of three volumes, of more than six hundred pages each. The volume before us begins with the early introduction of slavery into the colonies, and ends with the annexation of Texas as a State. It covers the most exciting period of the Anti-Slavery controversy, and gives full narratives of the struggle at the admission of Missouri, of the imprisonment of William Lloyd Garrison, the Southampton insurrection, and the subsequent establishment of the Liberator; of the formation of the earlier and the later Anti-Slavery societies; of Miss Prudence Crandall's school; of the secession from Lane Seminary; of the presentation and rejection of the Anti-Slavery petitions; of the murder of Elijah P. Lovejoy; of the dissensions in the Anti-Slavery society and its consequent disruption; of the efforts of John Quincy Adams; of the Amistad captives; of the escape and career of Frederick Douglass; of the rise of the Liberty party; of the doctrine of no union with slave-holders; of the imprisonments of colored seamen from the North in the Southern cities, and the outrages upon Judge Hoar at Charleston; and of the formation, progress, and success of the plot to bring Texas into the Union.

The recital of these topics is of itself sufficient to indicate the exciting character of the themes with which the writer has to do. The fact that the writer had been an actor in not a few of them, and had a warm, not to say an ardent, personal sympathy with the men whose souls were fired with Anti-Slavery zeal, would promise at least an animating narrative. It is all this and more. It is glowing without rant, spirited without extravagance, earnest and positive without being offensively partizan. It is dramatic, condensed, and philosophical. The diction is admirable; the pictures are vivid; the view is comprehensive. That it is never one-sided in its representations of men and events we do not assert. That the veteran, in reciting events and words which once stirred his blood to fever heat, and called forth words which were hailstones, is always charitable to his opponents or construes their acts and words from their own point of view, we should scarcely expect. But that so far

* *History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America.* By HENRY WILSON. Vol. I. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1872.

as facts and sayings on both sides are concerned, he aims to be an honest narrator, is most manifest. The writer has had ample assistance and sagacious advisers, and if he prosecutes the work in the same spirit in which he has prepared the first volume, he will make an important contribution to the social and political history of this country. We do not require in such a history, written by such a man, any apology for, or explanation of, the reasons which led so many to look with doubt and hesitation on the movements and the ethics of the first Anti-Slavery agitators. Nor is it fair to demand that the narrator should conjecture what course the Anti-Slavery conflict might have taken had it not been precipitated upon the nation. For such disquisitions the senator has no call and no fitness. The work which he could do he has done with a willing zeal and with conspicuous success.

LIFE OF HENRY DUNSTER.*—This little work describes the life and character of one of the most learned of the early ministers of New England, and a man of upright and amiable character. On account of his erudition, judgment, and piety, he was chosen President of the infant College which was established at Cambridge, and labored with much assiduity and self-sacrifice, and with deserved success, for the building up of that now famous institution. But an adoption of Baptist—Anabaptist, as the term then was—opinions necessitated his retirement from his office, and he found it more conducive to his quiet and happiness to spend the last days of his life within the bounds of the neighboring colony of Plymouth.

The memoir by Dr. Chaplin, himself a Baptist clergyman, is interesting, and is instructive, not only for its strictly biographical matter, but also for the sketches, which are introduced, of the life and manners of the early settlers of Massachusetts. But Dunster is painted throughout as the victim of intolerance. It is true that there seems to have been some injustice in the failure to make him full compensation for his expenses and losses in the service of the College. But Dr. Chaplin fails, as we think, to make out a very grievous case of intolerance. He says himself (p. 194): "We laugh at the absurdities of the generations which preceded us, and in our turn we may be found vulnerable to the shafts of ridicule." Harvard College was eventually a theological semi-

* *Life of Henry Dunster*, First President of Harvard College. By JEREMIAH CHAPLIN, D.D. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1872.

nary, as well as a college, in the time of Dunster. Suppose now that Newton Seminary were a part of Waterville College; suppose, too, that it was the only Baptist institution of the kind in the country; suppose that the establishment of it, for the education of Baptist ministers, had been accomplished by contributions with difficulty spared: and now suppose that Dr. Chaplin, being its President, should publicly baptize his children, and, not content with this act, should rise in the Baptist Church, in Waterville, after a sermon against Pædobaptism, and dispute the doctrine which the minister had inculcated. How long would Dr. Chaplin be allowed to retain his post? But in the time of Dunster, the New England Church was small and weak; it had already suffered from dissension and controversy; religious questions were relatively far more engrossing than at present. We will not dilate on the subject; but simply suggest as a question worth considering,—were not the Puritan fathers more the objects than the agents of persecution, in relation to Anabaptists, Quakers, and other discordant sects?

MEMOIR OF ROBERT CHAMBERS.*—The memoirs of the eminent Edinburgh publishers, the brothers William and Robert Chambers, we heartily recommend as one of the most entertaining and really useful books of our times. To all sensible people it will be an agreeable tonic, and, like Franklin's autobiography, it ought to be in the hands of every young man who has his own way to make in the world. The two names have been honorably known for many years by popular works of a high character written for the instruction and benefit of the common people, particularly by "Chambers' Journal" and the "Cyclopædia of English Literature;" and this volume tells us how such distinction, with its attendant advantages, was acquired, and how richly it was deserved. The younger brother, Robert, born in 1802, died a little over two years ago, leaving sketches of his early life, which the survivor, William, now about seventy-two years old, has supplemented to the end, interweaving his own history also to this date, so that the two lives are blended in the narrative as in their course. There is a charm in this association of two such brothers in life and in literature. There is a picturesqueness, a quiet romance, in the history of their early years, with its surroundings

* *Memoir of ROBERT CHAMBERS*, with Autobiographic Reminiscences of WILLIAM CHAMBERS. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1872. 12mo, pp. 313.

of Scotch localities, personages, customs, and traditions, which must give the book wide and lasting favor. Their birth place, "Peebles, an ancient royal burgh on the upper part of the Tweed;" the family-portraits of the improvident father and the exemplary mother; the straits and shifts of poverty in their home; the scanty hard-won education of the boys, and better still their self-education and first efforts for relieving the family by supporting themselves; their thirst for knowledge, and finding the "Encyclopædia Britannica" in the old chest; their frugal and diligent ways; their lodgings together in the West Port" at "three shillings a week," their first attempt at a book-stall with the row of their old school books, and the beginning of their printing operations with the "wheezing" old press,—these are pictures that deserve this framing. We should like to enrich our pages with extracts, but must refer our readers to the whole narrative for their satisfaction. It was a stern discipline which these men went through before coming of age; but they were compensated in the result, and the world was benefited by their training. Nowhere is the lesson better taught that poverty and friendlessness need not compel a young man to despair of success or even eminence if he will seek and use knowledge as they did, like them not only shun vices but forego indolence and frivolity, and confront the hardest lot with iron industry and patience. In this instance it may be noted also, as in so many others, that according to the testimony of these men, a poor home, burdened rather than blessed by the father, had the inestimable blessing of a good mother whose "children arise up and call her blessed."

BELLES LETTRES.

WARNER'S SAUNTERINGS.*—There is no need of further endorsing Mr. Warner than to say, that in his "Saunterings" we recognize the same man who was so well known and so much liked in the "Garden." When abroad he is still at home. In his quaint preface, "Misapprehensions Corrected," he gets entertainment for his readers from the monotony and discomfort of a voyage, as before from the infelicities of horticulture. Most of the book is as really notes of European travel as if it wore a more pretentious title; but still he saunters, for he always stands or moves at his ease, and never long lets go his shrewdness and pleasantry what-

* *Saunterings*. By CHARLES D. WARNER, author of "My Summer in a Garden." Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1872. 16mo, pp. 289.

ever information he has to give. His wit "wanders at its own sweet will." One would think he must be a happy man, or at any rate his readers are likely to be made so for the time. And when we say "one would think," it reminds us how much he is addicted to this particular idiom, as "one sees not," and "one does not," on the twenty-first page. No doubt it is old English, but it may recur too often. We must take him to task more gravely, however, for saying "illy adapted," on the first page of the preface, as if *illy* were not an adverb as well as a noun and adjective. "Rarely used by good writers," says Worcester. Mr. Warner surely would not say "*welly* done." By the way, as he is connected with the press in Hartford, the question is suggested, how happens it that for more than half a century so many noted names have been enlisted in the newspapers of that city? The successful men now in that calling there have for their predecessors Whittier, Prentice, Col. Stone, Brainard, and Theodore Dwight.

THE MASQUE OF THE GODS.*—A rich man, on coming to reside in a New England town, purchased pews in the Congregational and the Episcopal churches, being willing, as he said, to patronize both congregations, and both survived the patronage. A brilliant American writer acknowledged that after our late war he believed in a Providence, of which he before doubted; which reminded an eminent jurist of a man who said, "I revere nature," and a hearer's comment, "I should think nature would be now encouraged to go on." The God of Israel and Jesus of Nazareth receive concessions and compliments as well as detraction from some of the radicals of our day, and no doubt will be as little affected by the one as by the other. It is the fashion of a class, taking the cue from certain leaders, first to stand outside of Christianity or of all revealed religion as far as possible, and then to concede some preëminence to said religion among all the systems reviewed. They cultivate what, if it could be realized in our time, would be no better than a monstrous impartiality between heathenism and Christianity, and then please themselves with the conceit of countenancing the latter. We have to associate Mr. Bayard Taylor with the writers here referred to. This poem, the "*Masque of the Gods*," brings him under our description. Among the *dramatis personæ* are Elohim and Immanuel, along

* *The Masque of the Gods*. By BAYARD TAYLOR. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1872. 16mo, pp. 48.

with Jove, Brahma, Ormuzd and Ahriman, and the rest, the two former heading the list, but coming last in the performance, thus getting the two kinds of precedence, and Immanuel even allowed to be the "one begotten Son" of the true God, who appears not otherwise than as "a Voice from Space," to whom all the others, in the Bible as well as out of it, are but subordinates. The only Godhead recognized is that of the absolute and infinite, best defined as the "unknown God" of the Athenians. Every reader at once sees how far the writer is—how far advanced he would himself say—from the stand-point of the Christian faith, as well as from that of the Hebrew prophets. For a moral estimate of the work we are content to refer to the June number of Scribner's Monthly, where a critic—who, we take occasion to acknowledge, is doing good service against certain popular forms of unbelief—after saying, "It has no meaning," adds, "but it does vaguely imply a dilute and insipid paganized Parkerism in religion." Parker's theism indeed had a substance and energy which required many triturations to reduce it to this quality. After this judgment we wish we could say more for the literary merits of the poem. The three "scenes" in the form of dialogue have not the distinctive dramatic quality, and the versification is not as happy as in most of the verses we have seen from the same hand. He has gained his hold of the public mind rather as a prose writer than as a poet. We should like to see his own analysis of the line, "We are the sun whereby our shadow falls" (p. 29). His admirers, we think, will own that other themes and forms are better adapted to his genius.

PANSIES.*—A beautiful little volume, with fair paper and type in binding of blue and gold, fit for a dainty token between friends. Nor are the literary contents unsuitable, for they show observation, refined sentiment, and command of language, with melody. Yet we confess some disappointment after the impression left on the public mind by the author's prose writings. Her chief claim can hardly be as a poet. The collection comprises thirty-two short pieces, under the three heads, "of occasion," "of suggestion" and "of interpretation and hope," the import of these titles and the allotment of pieces to one or the other not being always apparent, except that the themes of the first are patriotic, being

* *Pansies*: "... for thoughts." By ADELIN D. T. WHITNEY. Boston: James B. Osgood & Co. 1872. 16mo, pp. 111.

mostly dated during the war. It is in that department, where the author must have aimed to move the common mind rather than a select few, that we should complain of something like obscurity. At the same time there seems to be a degree of formality in presenting the moral of some of the pieces. We might complain of negligence in the phrase, "can only so," p. 62. "Our midst," p. 31, is reputed an "Americanism." In the poem "Twofold," some of the stanzas are fully rhymed, others only in the second and fourth lines. The pieces that please us most are grouped together in the third division, but in this partiality we include also "Sparrows" on p. 78. We like the book better than the title.

MCDONALD'S WITHIN AND WITHOUT.*—This is a dramatic poem. Why it is called "Within and Without" is not very obvious, unless it be the design of the story to teach how difficult it is to judge of the inner life from the outer life, and what mistakes may be made by inferring what is "within" from what we see "without." The hero of the poem in dejection of spirit quits the world and flies to a convent for peace. But failing to obtain the peace he sought, he escapes from the convent, finds the woman whom he has once loved about to be married to another, kills the lover and marries her himself. He loves her and she loves him, and yet each suspects the love of the other. The husband is philosophical and abstract in thought, and not demonstrative of affection in words, and the wife doubts his love. The wife is fond of social life and the friendship of others, and the husband thinks she is dissatisfied with him. Thus there are misapprehensions and alienations and separation; and death comes to part them finally without any recognition in this world of the depth of their mutual love. But they recognize each other in the spiritual world, and all the wrongs of life are righted there.

There are many passages in the poem of much force of thought and beauty of expression, but the murder is wholly out of keeping with the character of the hero, and the mode of introducing the supernatural at the close of the poem is altogether unsatisfactory.

But Mr. McDonald ought not to be judged at all by this work. It is, we believe, the first book he published, and only gives faint indication of his genius. Mr. McDonald is a true poet, and some of his minor poems, in a little volume of his poetry called "The

* *Within and Without.* By GEORGE McDONALD, LL.D. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. Pp. 219.

Disciple," are beautiful. But his real poems are prose poems—the novels by which he has delighted and instructed so wide a circle of readers. This work has its chief interest as a study of the mental life of the author himself.

MISCELLANEOUS.

OLIVER OPTIC'S BOOKS FOR BOYS.*—If, according to the familiar saying, he is a benefactor of the race who makes one blade of grass grow where no grass grew before, much more is he to be reckoned such who succeeds in making books, at once instructive and entertaining, for boys. Such is the good fortune of Mr. Optic (if we may designate him by his *nom de plume*). He appears to be the true successor of Peter Parley, who, in our boyish days, was the most interesting character then living. How were we disenchanted when, for the first time, we met him face to face, and, in the room of the venerable old man, leaning on a crutch, we found a spruce gentleman, in middle life! Optic, in the series before us, describes foreign countries in a style to captivate the minds of little folks. It is an example of the feasibility of communicating to the young a great amount of valuable information without tiring their brains. The proof of the fruit is in the eating; and we have seen these books practically tested in the family. We wish to Mr. Oliver Optic—these great authors are fond of alliteration—a long life, and hope that he will continue to write books, until he has written enough to build a monument to himself as high as the clouds, and *ære perennius*.

ZELL'S POPULAR ENCYCLOPEDIA† conveys a great amount of information in a very compressed form, and will abundantly satisfy all reasonable expectations of such a work. The information is brought down to the present time, and is commonly minute enough for all ordinary purposes. It will be found not only very valuable to those who cannot afford a more extensive work, but exceedingly convenient to those who can. So far as we have examined, we have found it trust worthy. In one instance in which we had occasion to refer to it, we gained more satisfactory, because more definite, information, than from the much longer

* *Young America Abroad*, by Oliver Optic. 6 vols. Boston: Lee & Shepherd, 1872.

† *Zell's Popular Encyclopedia*. A universal Dictionary of the English Language, Science, Literature, and Art. By L. COLANGE, LL.D. In two volumes. Illustrated by 2,500 wood-cuts. Vol. II. Philadelphia: T. Elwood Zell. Pp. 1,152, 4to.

article of another and larger work. On many topics the reader must expect only the outlines of a subject; but he will often be surprised to see how much can be conveyed in a small compass.

THE POEM OF LUCRETIVS.*—The poem of Lucretius on the Nature of Things is one of the most remarkable productions in literature. It was written, with sincerity and earnestness, by one who desired to deliver his fellow men from the fears connected with the expectation of death, by inculcating materialism. Of course, in ridding men of the fears, he deprives them also of all the humble hopes which connect themselves with our departure from this world. He is a disciple of the Epicurean philosophy, in the purer form, as it was held by the founder, and not in the degenerate shape which the Epicurean ethics assumed in the case of many of its votaries. The design of the poem, the evident seriousness of the author, and the blank infidelity which is set forth from a motive of philanthropy, make this work one of the saddest of literary productions. At the same time, its vigor and poetic merit enchain the attention of a thoughtful reader. The translation appears to be well done, and the accompanying observations of the translator spring from a close study of the work.

THE LAND OF THE VEDA.†—The subordinate title of this volume is the proper and legitimate one, and should be substituted for "The Land of the Veda,"—which naturally leads one to expect a learned investigation of the many interesting archæological and philological questions which gather about this vast field for scholarly research.

On the contrary, the work is the record of the personal experience of the author, for many years a resident-missionary in India; and his observations on the religions and art and political history of the Indian races—somewhat meagre and desultory in themselves—are all secondary to this main purpose. The book is wholly wanting in method, and its style is diffuse and slovenly, but it

**Lucretius on the Nature of Things.* Translated into English Verse by CHARLES FREDERICK JOHNSON, with Introduction and Notes. New York, 1872.

† *The Land of the Veda: being Personal Reminiscences of India; its People, Castes, Thugs, and Fakirs: its Religions, Mythology, Principal Monuments, Palaces, and Mausoleums; together with the Incidents of the Great Sepoy Rebellion, and its Results to Christianity and Civilization. With a Map of India and 42 Illustrations,* by Rev. WM. BUTLER, D.D. New York: Carlton & Lanahan. 1872. 8vo, pp. 550.

contains much information of interest to the general reader, and the Christian earnestness and hopefulness of the writer are everywhere evident.

The central point of the narrative, both as a personal reminiscence and as the focus of historical interest, is the Great Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-8; and the perusal of this part of the work brings back the shudder of horror with which the civilized world met the tidings of the Cawnpore massacre and the siege of Lucknow.

The wisdom of the policy of the English government toward India, since the establishment of the East India Company, has always been an open subject for discussion, and the recent massacre of the Governor-General at Delhi indicates that the old hatred, —perhaps also some of the old grounds for it—still exists.

Dr. Butler enters largely into missionary statistics, and discusses the condition of women in India; their legal wrongs and social degradation; and dwells upon the recent remarkable opening for missionary work by Christian women in the Zenana.

THE PEOPLE'S EDITION OF MILL'S POLITICAL ECONOMY* gives the whole of this exhaustive treatise, with a few unimportant omissions, in a portable duodecimo volume of less than six hundred pages. The type is small, but very clear, and the page is very legible, although divided into two columns. We are glad that this standard treatise, the ablest production of its eminent author, is brought within the reach of the multitudes who are interested in the subjects of which it treats. The labor strikes and the discussion of the hours of labor threaten to bring the discussion of the principles of Political Economy within the doors of every man, and to make the study of them indispensable to every man who thinks at all.

* *Principles of Political Economy, with some of their applications to Social Philosophy.* By JOHN STUART MILL. People's Edition. Boston: Lee & Shepard. New York: Lee, Shepard & Dillingham. 1872.

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ARTICLE I.—THE PREACHING TO THE SPIRITS IN
PRISON.

"Ὅτι καὶ Χριστὸς ἅπαξ περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν ἔπαυε, δίκαιος ὑπὲρ ἀδίκων, ἵνα ἡμᾶς προσαγάγῃ τῷ Θεῷ, θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκί, ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ πνεύματι, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασι πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξεν, ἀπειθήσασί ποτε, ὅτε ἀπεξεδέχετο ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ μακροθυμία ἐν ἡμέραις Νῶε, κατασκευαζομένης κιβωτοῦ, εἰς ἣν ὀλίγοι, τουτέστιν ὁκτώ ψυχαί, διεσώθησαν δι' ὕδατος, ὃ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀντίτυπον νῦν σώζει βάπτισμα, κ, τ, λ. 1 Pet. iii, 18–21.

THE main discussion turns upon the words, *ἐν ᾧ καὶ τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασι πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξεν, ἀπειθήσασί ποτε*. The adjacent sentences or clauses are given both for convenience' sake, and because of their relation, more or less direct, to these words.

It is proposed to inquire what is the meaning of this passage strictly according to the laws of the Greek language. There is therefore no occasion for encumbering the discussion with a history of the various interpretations or theories. It may be found, more or less full, in De Wette, Huther (Meyer), Alford,

and others. In the words of the last-mentioned writer—"it is ours to deal with the plain words of Scripture." At the same time, it is fair to remind the reader that, in a question involving careful Greek scholarship, numbers do not always count. A dozen expositors may only reflect the opinions of one or two leaders. The language of the Nicene Creed ("he descended into hell") naturally affected the opinions of the great mass of those who accepted it as a symbol, or incorporated it into their own formularies, aided as it was by the Vulgate version and the Romish expositors. A very large proportion of the Protestant expositors, particularly English and American, took the view of Augustine—that the preaching was done through Noah—a view which has been widely circulated in modern times by Scott and Henry. But when on the Continent so eminent a scholar as De Wette declared for a preaching to the lost spirits while in prison, and was followed by Huther, it was very probable that even Alford, who seldom rejects their combined authority on a question of construction, would follow them here, and quite certain that such expositors as Lange and his translator would assume that no "candid scholar" could hold any other view.

It is the less necessary to busy ourselves with the opinions of expositors, because, as perhaps will appear, the great mass of them have overlooked the decisive facts in the case, and have gone to arguing from data that determine nothing. The reason is, that here one or two very delicate, though very well-defined, points of Greek usage occur in rather unusual combinations and inverted order, in a very long and cumbrous sentence, and in illustration of a sentiment itself somewhat elaborate and complicated. To this may be added two or three words or phrases the meaning of which was also a subject of debate, and the sure misleading influence of a slight but long prevailing mistranslation.

We will shorten the discussion by throwing out all topics not indispensable to our purpose. Grant that *σαρξί* and *πνεύματι* are used adverbially, as it is sometimes called, meaning "in respect to;" "put to death [flesh-wise] in the flesh, quickened [spirit-wise] in the spirit." Grant also that *φυλακῇ*, prison, means a place of penal confinement, as usual in the New Tes-

tament; and that "preach," though not the technical term *ευαγγελίζομαι*, but *κηρύσσω*, is, as usual, its equivalent. We clear the subject of all collateral issues in order to reach the critical phrases, *πορεύσεις ἐκήρυξεν* and especially *ἀπειθήσασι ποτε*.

The common translation of the last-mentioned clause is, as Dr. Schweizer has remarked, equivalent to a wrong interpretation. It is not surprising that in the earlier stages of Greek study the translation, "which were sometime disobedient," should have found acceptance. But we wonder that the sharp eye of De Wette should not have detected the error (*welche einst ungehorsam waren*); that Huther should have followed him (*den einst ungläubig gewesen Geistern*); and that Alford, who elsewhere clearly recognizes the difference between the attributive participle with the article and (*when the noun has the definite article*) the appositive participle without it (e. g., in 1 Pet. ii, 15), should still have quietly assumed the rendering, "which were once disobedient."

Now, whatever may be the true version, we have no hesitation in saying that this rendering can be shown to be wrong, and inadmissible, except by doing violence to Greek usage. As the determination of this clause aright virtually carries with it a large part of the discussion, we will address ourselves to the proof of this position. To do this satisfactorily will require a recurrence to elementary principles. We might feel disposed to apologize for the rudimentary nature of the discussion did not the question turn upon these very rudiments, and were they not unconsciously and boldly set at nought so often in articles of no little pretension.

The reader is requested to observe, then, that *ἀπειθήσασι* is an aorist participle; and that, though referring to a noun (*πνεύμασι*) made definite by the article *τοῖς*, it is itself anarthrous. The functions of the aorist have not been more tersely defined than by Curtius: "The aorist indicative is the preterite of a momentary action, and therefore denotes the actual beginning of an action in the past ["past events or single facts, without reference to the time they occupied," Hadley]; the aorist of the other modes denotes a momentary action, *simply*, whether of the present, past, or future ["simple occurrence," Goodwin]; the aorist participle regularly expresses something [a transient

or single action] which took place earlier, or before the act of the principal verb." But this last statement is further limited by the more precise statement that "the aorist participle only expresses that the *beginning* of an action took place *before* another action, while its progress may continue simultaneously with that other" (Greek Grammar, § 492-496). Other late grammarians state the facts substantially in the same manner, including even the closing limitation, e. g., Hadley, § 705, 716, 717, and Goodwin, § 19, 24, note 3. The empirical fact, then, is that the aorist states an act or event as introduced into being or brought to pass; to which, in the indicative mode, is added the fact that the date of the event is absolutely past, and in the participle its beginning is relatively past. The philosophical fact is doubtless correctly stated by Jelf (§ 400): "The primary sense of the aorist seems to have been the occurrence of the verbal notion expressed by the root without any more reference to time than is necessary to the conception of a verb, and thus it is properly neither present, past, nor future; but as such an indefinite notion of mere existence is by the mind necessarily thrown into some time past, the aorist becomes the proper expression for past actions, without expressing any exact moment of time." The fact of occurrence, accomplishment, is the fundamental idea which alone appears in most of the modes; the *date* of the occurrence accidentally, but no less certainly, grows out of the nature of the *indicative* mode and of the participle.*

* T. S. Green generalizes still more fully: "In the Greek verb, tense is, in itself, the expression of the several stages or phases in which action may be viewed in thought. The points of view in which action may come before the mind, and which are severally expressed by the variety of form called Tense, are three, namely, process, accomplishment, and prospect. Tense is thus not primarily and directly an expression of time [date], but only so far as the idea of time may enter by association with those that are primarily expressed by the several tenses, and have just been specified. The Indicative mood directly combines with the essential idea of each several tense the further one of actual time, past or present. This is the characteristic function of the mood, and the groundwork of its entire usage." Grammar of the New Testament, pp. 128, 129. He defines that the present tense expresses an action as matter of process, which being commonly while we are speaking, is an actual present Indicative; but as the process is sometimes laid in the past, this distinction is added by the Imperfect; the Aorist represents an action as matter of accomplishment, consequently, in the Indicative, as past; the Future views the action as matter of prospectiveness; the Perfect expresses a compound idea—accomplishment and ensuing effect, action with its issue. Crosby long ago anticipated this mode of statement.

The participle of this tense, then, fundamentally asserts the mere fact or act of disobedience as a thing done or accomplished, without declaring either its continuance (present part.), its prospective intention (future), or its resultant connection (perfect). Such a participle must take its date from the principal verb or assertion, and, as a fact accomplished, must be antecedent, at least in its beginning.

The annexation of a participle to the subject of the verb is one of the commonest and characteristic Greek usages to express loosely the circumstances or occasion on which that action took place, and is by some writers called the "circumstantial" use of the participle. It is used to suggest the circumstances antecedent to (though sometimes continuing simultaneously with) the principal action, and out of which, commonly, the latter has sprung, or upon which it follows. By the laws of rational thinking, the participle not merely annexes but connects the subordinate with the main assertion. It suggests something as related, and, *when an aorist*, as antecedently related to that fact, commonly as in some sense an occasion for it. This general statement covers, we believe, the fundamental principle of the whole usage.*

The circumstantial participle occurs most frequently in connection with the subject of the principal verb; and when an aorist participle, it is a standing usage to express the occasion of the principal assertion, usually involving the time or date of that transaction, as being the sequel of the fact contained in the

* The grammarians have mostly failed to recognize the central principle of the case. Hadley approaches it when he describes the "circumstantial" participle as "loosely related to the principal verb, adding a circumstance connected with it." The more common explanation has contented itself with specifying several such circumstances (e. g., time, means, cause, end, condition, concession) thus "added," as though so many expressed distinctions. But Curtius correctly remarks (§ 579) that "in this case the participle is a shorter and *less definite* mode of expression for what is otherwise expressed by subordinate clauses with conjunctions of the most different kinds;" and, still more to the point (§ 583), that "it must not be overlooked that such a participle of itself does not clearly express any of these meanings, but that we make use of the one or the other turn in translating only in order to express in a more precise way what is simply suggested by the participle." The participle, then, is not merely an "added" but a related and "suggesting" circumstance. And the detailed distinctions are *not expressed*. In the use of the aorist participle, the one common element is the virtual antecedency of the act as accomplished.

participle. In this way it occurs *hundreds of times* in the New Testament, and is commonly represented by a verb whose action precedes the other—often connected by a “when,” though quite frequently by a simple “and.” Thus, in the second chapter of Matthew, “when Herod the king had heard,” “when he had gathered,” “when he had privily called,” “when ye have found him,” “go and search,” “when they had heard,” “it came and stood,” “when they saw,” “when they were come,” “fell down and worshipped,” “when they had opened,” “being warned, they departed,” “arise and take,” “when he arose,” “when he saw,” “sent forth and destroyed,” “arise and take,” “arose and took,” “when he heard,” “being warned, turned aside,” “came and dwelt.” The first verb in each of these phrases is, in Greek, an aorist participle. In nearly all these instances the preposition “on” or “upon” with the participial noun would correctly represent the meaning in English: “upon hearing, finding, being warned, opening, seeing,” etc. The English idiom in such cases rarely retains the Greek use of the participle. In Acts iii, 3, *ὁς ἰδὼν ἠρώτα*, “who seeing, asked,” would more commonly and naturally have been rendered, “who, when he saw, asked,” or, more loosely, “who saw and asked,” while the form, “on seeing, asked,” most nearly conveys the thought in English. In the passage preceding the one under discussion we have several instances of this kind. Thus: “when ye be buffeted” (1 Pet. ii, 20), “when he was reviled,” “when he suffered” (ii, 23), “while [when, Alford] they behold” (iii, 2)—all participles.*

Instances of the circumstantial participle are most common in connection with the subject of the verb. But the usage is substantially the same when connected with the object, direct or indirect. So in Matt. ix, 27, 28: “and when Jesus departed from thence two blind men followed him,” *παράγοντι ἐκείθεν τῷ Ἰησοῦ ἠκολούθησαν*; “and when he was come into the house the blind men came to him,” *ἐλθόντι δὲ εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν προσῆλθον οὗτοι*. Here the aorist participles, *παράγοντι* and *ἐλθόντι*, respectively belong to the definite datives, and the meaning would be very correctly expressed by translating, “on his departure,” “on his entering.” Luke viii, 27, “when he

* The first three are present participles, expressing a continuous process.

went forth to land," is in Greek, *ἐξελθόντι δὲ αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν*, and might perhaps be still more exactly rendered, "on his going forth." "And when he was entered into a ship, his disciples followed him," *καὶ ἐμβάντι αὐτῷ εἰς τὸ πλοῖον ἤκολουθήσαν* (Matt. viii, 23), on his entering. "And it came to pass that when I was come again to Jerusalem," on my coming again, *ἐγένετο δέ μοι ὑποσρέψαντι*, Acts xxii, 17. "It seemed good to us being assembled with one accord," when assembled, on becoming assembled, *ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν γενομένοις ὁμοθυμαδόν*, Acts xv, 25. The attention of the reader is called especially to these instances, as being in this respect precisely similar to the one in the text before us—anarthrous aorist participles belonging to definite nouns or personal pronouns in the dative. Instances of the circumstantial participle in the present tense, attached to oblique cases, are found, John i, 37: *ἤκουσαν αὐτοῦ λαλουντος*, "heard him (while) speaking," and (v. 38) *θεασάμενος αὐτοὺς ἀκολουθοῦντας*, "seeing them following," or as they followed.

The grammarians have made no definite attempt to discriminate the several meanings they have ascribed to the circumstantial participle as depending on the tense employed, except in the case of the future participle. It certainly is not easy to do so. But one who considers the various examples (sometimes erroneously designated in the grammars) will probably find a proximate solution in the fundamental meanings of the several tenses (outside of the indicative mood) as laid down by T. S. Green. The future tense expressing "prospectiveness," the circumstantial participle future is used strictly and almost exclusively to denote intention (so Crosby, Goodwin, Hadley). "The present expresses action as matter of process" and continuance. Hence the present participle (circumstantial), denoting a continuous state of mind from which an action follows, may be used to imply the motive, "cause, or ground of action;" as expressing a continuous process of action, it implies the "manner, means, mode of employment;" as asserting a continuous and therefore accompanying or contemporaneous (related) circumstance, it may suggest the "condition," even the "limitation" and "concession;" while quite as often taken in its simplest element, it indicates contemporaneousness of time,

and may be translated with a "while." As the perfect tense denotes an action with its issue, so its participle as a predicative naturally adduces some characteristic circumstance, some state or condition, some motive or reason. The aorist expresses a simple fact, act, or event antecedent (at least in its beginning), and hence, as any one who investigates will perceive, is the participle chiefly chosen to express barely the *antecedent fact or occasion on which (for whatever reason) some other act took place*. Actual examples, we believe, will sustain this statement as a general approximation. It thus becomes a brief and incidental, though loose, method of giving the time or date of the fact of the principal verb. It is so used literally hundreds of times in the New Testament. This we might fairly characterize as its chief use even when attached to the subject of the verb; and when attached to the indirect complement of the verb, so far as we have observed, its sole use. In occasional instances (none that we recall in the New Testament), when attached to the subject of the verb, the antecedent fact is alleged as though involving means or method. We recall but one passage in the New Testament where it is alleged to render a reason or motive: Col. iii, "seeing that ye have put off the old man," ἀπεκδυσάμενοι; and here even the only thing *asserted* is the antecedence of the fact ("after that ye have put off," Calvin); while De Wette, Olshausen, Michaelis, Storr, Flatt, and others, do not understand it here as suggesting a motive.

We pass now to a still more important question. We have hitherto proceeded on the supposition that the participle in this verse is what Hadley calls (from its function) "circumstantial," and Curtius (from its grammatical relation) an "appositive," and Donaldson, Green, and others, somewhat more loosely, a "predicate" or "predicative" participle; and that it is not what all these writers term an "attributive" participle—one which ascribes to its substantive an attribute, or defines it. Our version, however, by rendering it as a relative clause ("which were sometime disobedient"), and those expositors, great and small, who accept this translation, make it an attributive. Which is right? We maintain, then, that it cannot be an attributive, and that it can be and is an appositive. And here is the most critical point of the discussion. In view

of all the circumstances we shall be excused, we trust, if we abundantly fortify our position by authorities, and make it very palpable by detailed illustration.

The principle that settles the case is thus clearly laid down by Donaldson (Greek Grammar, Cambridge, Eng., 1862, 3d ed.), § 400: "Whatever words or phrases have the article prefixed, or stand between the article and its substantive, describe and define, i. e., they are epithets; and, conversely, if the article is prefixed to a substantive, and the adjectival word or phrase which agrees with it neither has the article prefixed nor stands between the article and substantive, that word or phrase is not an epithet but a predicate."* The last described case is precisely the one before us: a participle without the article referring to a substantive that has the article. Equally explicit is T. S. Green (Grammar of the New Testament, London, 1862), p. 50: "An adjective or participle is either a mere epithet serving to a definition, or else it is a predicate, or an actively constituent part of one. If the noun has the article in combination with the adjective or participle, it must, from the nature of the article, be the former, and this fact is marked by a peculiar collocation ['either placed between the article and the noun, or postfixed with the article repeated,' p. 49]; when, therefore, this collocation is not made, it is the latter. This last conclusion, it must be remembered, has no relation to the case of an anarthrous adjective or participle in concord with an anarthrous noun, and is made only *with respect to one which agrees with a noun that has the article*, but does not enter into combination with it with regard to the article." Here again the case is precisely described—not an epithet or attributive, but of the nature of a predicate. So Hadley (Greek Grammar, New York, 1871), § 531–2–3: "Where a substantive qualified by an attributive requires the article, this is always placed before the attributive; usually the attributive stands between the article and substantive; less often the substantive stands first, followed by the article and attributive."† Here again the

* Dr. Donaldson and some of the other grammarians do not distinguish the ap-
positive from the general class—predicate.

† In § 533 Mr. Hadley adds another remark concerning "appositives" which
might at first seem to conflict with this position. It is simply because he uses the
word in a different sense from ours.

απειρησασι is peremptorily excluded from being an attributive. Equally clear is R. S. Green (*Hand-book to the Grammar of the New Testament*, London, 1862), § 331: "With the article the participle qualifies the noun as a simple epithet, while without the article it implies a predicate. Thus, *ὁ Θεὸς ὁ ποιήσας τὸν κόσμον* is, God who made the world; *ὁ Θεὸς ποιήσας*, κ. τ. λ., would be, God having made, or, when he had made." Again, § 396: "By a comparison of examples the distinction between the use of the participle with and without the article will be clearly seen: *ὁ διδάσκων* is, he who teaches, *ὁ διδάξας*, he who taught; whereas *διδάσκων* alone would mean, while he was teaching, and *διδάξας*, when he had taught." This is both clear and undeniable. Jelf (*Greek Grammar*, 2 vols., 8vo, 4th ed., London and Cambridge, 1866), under a diverse phraseology and with occasional confusions of statement, takes the same ground. He lays down the universal principle, § 458: "Hence in all the forms of the attributive sentence, in which the article is indefinite [introduced?], the attributive stands either between the article and the substantive, or after the substantive, the article being repeated before it." Again, § 452: "When a participle with the article follows a substantive, it is in apposition, as *οὗτος ὁ παρών*, he, the man, who is present; without the article, it is gerundial, as *οὗτος πάρων*, by his presence, or, when he was present." Here the translations explain his meaning.* Again, § 459, note 11, he distinguishes between the forms, *τῶν πολεμίων φευγόντων* or *φευγόντων τῶν πολεμίων*, on the one hand, as "genitives absolute" (where of course the anarthrous participle is an appositive or "predicative:" the enemies fleeing, or, while the enemies flee), and on the other hand, *τῶν φευγόντων πολεμίων* or *τῶν πολεμίων φευγόντων*, where he says "the participle is attributive:" the fleeing enemies, and, the enemies that flee. So also (with a little confusion of terms, but with clear meaning) § 695, obs. 2. Winer, though incomplete and not altogether consistent in his statement, still brings out the principle at times very distinctly. Thus (*New Testament*

* Jelf's use of "attributive," direct and remote, "apposition," and "gerundial," are so peculiar as to mislead by themselves. His examples, however, show his meaning very clearly as concurrent with the authorities previously cited.

Grammar), § 20, 1, c, he says: "The above passage (1 Pet. v, 10) is peculiarly instructive respecting the use and the omission of the article with participles." The passage he quotes and translates as follows: ὁ Θεὸς . . . ὁ καλέσας ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν αἰώνιον αὐτοῦ δόξαν . . . ὀλίγον παθόντας, κ. τ. λ., "God, who hath called us into his eternal glory after we have suffered awhile." Here the difference between καλέσας with the article and παθόντας without it illustrates the precise position we maintain. In like manner he translates the anarthrous participle, 2 Cor. xi, 9: οἱ ἀδελφοὶ ἐλθόντες, the brethren, after they had arrived; ἀναστήσας ὁ Θεὸς τὸν παιδα αὐτοῦ, God having raised up.* He affirms the distinction very pointedly on the phrase (Eph. vi, 16), τὰ βέλη τὰ πεπυρωμένα, "the burning darts of the wicked." He says, "the article [with the participle] is not fully established; if it is not genuine, the meaning of the passage is: the darts when they burn, or though they burn." This again covers the ground.

This might seem sufficient both of precept and of example. But the singularity and the pertinacity of the prevalent oversight may justify us in adding line upon line. A good illustration of the different meanings of the participle with and without the article, in the same passage, and referring to the same noun, appears in John xi, 31: οἱ οὖν Ἰουδαῖοι οἱ ὄντες μετ' αὐτῆς . . . ἰδόντες, κ. τ. λ., which our version translates, "the Jews which were with her . . . when they saw." This is right, and indisputable, and palpable, we trust. Again, xii, 12, "on the next day much people that were come (ὁ ἐλθών) when they heard" (ἀκουσάντες). Acts x, 17, "the men who were sent (οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ ἀπεσταλμένοι) had made inquiry and stood;" literally, having made inquiry, or, when they had made inquiry, or, on making inquiry (διερωτήσαντες) stood. Alford corrects a mistranslation involving this principle in 2 Pet. i, 18: καὶ ταύτην τὴν φωνὴν ἡμεῖς ἠκούσαμεν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ ἐνεχθεῖσαν. He says, "not as E. V. ungrammatically, 'this voice which came from heaven' [τὴν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ ἐνεχ.], but, we heard it borne, witnessed it coming from heaven,"

* On Acts xxiii, 27, and xxi, 8, he translates, first erroneously and then correctly, τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον διλληφθέντα, "after he had been seized;" τοῦ ἐταγγελιστοῦ δυτοῦς ἐκ τῶν ἐπτὰ, "as being one of the seven."

and the translator of Lange discreetly follows. But more precisely still, R. S. Green (§ 231)—“the voice as it was borne from heaven.”* A grave theological error would have been introduced into Rom. ii, 27, by overlooking this distinction in translation. It actually reads, *ἡ ἐκ φύσεως ἀκροβυστία τὸν νόμον τελοῦσα*, the uncircumcision on fulfilling, or, “if it fulfill the law;” whereas the article before the participle would make it an attributive (“that fulfills the law”), and would thus assert or imply that the uncircumcision does fulfill the law. So again, Acts vii, 2, “the God of glory appeared to our father Abraham [not, who was, but] *when* (or while) he was in Mesopotamia”] (*τῷ πατρὶ ἡμῶν ὄντι*); and Acts viii, 12, “believed Philip (not, who was preaching, but) as he preached” (*τῷ Φιλίππῳ εὐαγγελιζομένῳ*).†

It were easy to multiply instances from the New Testament, and still more abundantly from classic Greek. Let the reader observe the difference, in the following sentence, between the same participle, *ἀκούων*, used as an appositive without the article and as an attributive with the article: *ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ ταῦτα ἀκούοντι ἐδόκει αὐτός τε μακάριος εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἐπὶ καλοκάγαθίαν ἄγειν* (Mem. 1, 6, 14), “he seemed to me, *when I heard* these things, both to be blest himself, and to lead *those that heard* him to honor and virtue.” But we forbear. The case before us is an instance of an anarthrous participle referring to a noun that has the article, and therefore it is not an attributive.

But as many minds have been confused and misled by the appended *ποτέ*, followed by *ὅτε*, some further elucidations may be necessary to relieve that confusion. And, first, observe that *ποτέ* is not, as many seem to suppose, the correlative of *ὅτε*.

* Similar oversights of translation are noticed by these and other commentators where “predicative” words (nouns, adjectives, or participles) without the article are treated as attributives with the article: e. g., Eph. v, 27 (that he might present the church glorious, not, “a glorious church”), 1 Pet. i, 11, etc. On the other hand, Alford, on the same principle, confirms the English version of *ἀστυποιῦντας* (Heb. vi, 6): “Crucifying as they do, ‘seeing they crucify,’ as E. V. well. The ratiocinative force is given by the omission of the article *as the demonstrative would be by its insertion.*”

† It will be observed that the present as the participle of continuance is most naturally translated with “while” or “as,” and the aorist, as denoting the bare fact with “when” or “upon.”

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ουκ *μεσω*
ελε *αυτη*
οτι *ουκ* *εστιν*

Instance: *the*
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in a definite pronoun instead of a definite noun, and a present instead of an aorist participle, requiring a "while" or "as" instead of a "when." It is found in Diogenes Laertius, II, 80: *εἰς Κόρινθον αὐτῷ πλέοντι ποτε, καὶ χειμαζομένῳ, συνέβη παραχθῆναι*. Here the translation admits of no possible doubt: "It happened to him *when* (or *while*) he once sailed to Corinth and was caught in a storm"—on or in his once sailing.

In view of these clear principles and examples we are now prepared to maintain, 1. That the proper grammatical and natural translation of 1 Pet. iii, is, "in which also he went and preached to the spirits in prison when once they disobeyed" (R. S. Green), or, "on their being once upon a time disobedient" (T. S. Green), or, "when formerly they showed themselves unbelieving" (Dr. Schweizer).* 2. That it cannot properly and grammatically be translated as an attributive phrase—"who were sometime (or once) disobedient."

In regard to the second proposition we would speak with more caution, in view of the difficulty of proving a universal negative. But we think we may safely say, that if any one can produce a clear instance or instances of an anarthrous participle used as an attributive *to a noun that has the article*, it would be as a singularly rare exception; so much so as to constitute a grammatical error or solecism in the use of the Greek language.

In regard to the first proposition, we do not see how any competent judge can venture to deny that the translation is thoroughly in accordance with Greek usage, and therefore impregnable. If any man demur, he is requested to descend from generalities, and to disprove it critically and grammatically. But we hold that it is not only grammatical, but proper and natural; in a word, that we are fairly shut up to it. The attributive rendering is excluded. The participle is therefore "circumstantial" or "predicative." Being such, it is most naturally, if not necessarily, taken in the temporal meaning: (1) because that is the primary and customary use of the circumstantial aorist participle, even in the nominative, and still

* The same view is advanced by Prof. J. Henry Thayer of Andover, in a note appended to the article, "Saints," in Smith's Bible Dictionary, American edition. The present writer would have been much gratified had Professor Thayer's engagements permitted him to discuss the subject himself, as he was requested to do, two years since, for the *Congregational Review*.

more (from the nature of the case, as a subordinate passing allusion), in connection with the indirect object; (2) because its temporal meaning is still further settled by the connected adverb of time, *ποτέ*; (3) because as a circumstantial aorist participle, so connected, it can have no other fairly probable rendering assigned to it. The only other ideas which could perhaps even be suggested would be, that it either makes a concession, "although they were once disobedient," or gives a cause or reason, "because they were once disobedient." But to bring out unambiguously the first thought would naturally if not necessarily call for a *καίπερ*, and, as denoting a state which had continued up to this time of Christ's death, the perfect tense of the participle instead of the transient aorist, together with the omission of the *ποτέ*. The suggestion that it might be a reason seems forbidden by the fact that when a participle alleges a reason or motive, it is naturally and properly a motive lying in the mind of the person referred to by the participle, and not of the writer or some one else. To understand here a reason or motive lying in the mind of these "spirits" is absurd. Clearly and unambiguously to express such a reason as lying in the mind of God, Christ, or the writer of the Epistles, would require a very different construction; most naturally *δία* with the infinitive, or still more explicitly *ὅτι* with a finite verb. No other supposition occurs to us that deserves attention.

We stand, then, simply upon the syntax of the case. The translation here advocated is clearly admissible, if not the only admissible translation. With this translation the interpretation takes care of itself.

We may add, however, that this view fully harmonizes with the logical exigency of the argument; with the adjacent indications of time; and with other Biblical allusions. It has all these things in its favor. (1.) The connection. In the verse preceding, and indeed from ch. ii, 11, onward, is enjoined the duty of willingness to suffer even for well doing, and of kindness to opposers and revilers. Now follows a motive introduced by a "for" (v. 18), drawn from Christ's own example. The example is two-fold, the first part very apparent: He suffered, the just for the unjust, *that he might bring us to God*, being put to death in the flesh. It was only in the flesh or human

nature that he died, for he was quickened in the Spirit or higher nature (compare Rom. i, 8, 4). This allusion to "the Spirit" makes the transition to the other part of his example (connected by an "also"),—an example of the very same conduct, when the Spirit strove with men and patiently endured the ungodliness that "grieved him at his heart." And the parallelism or analogy of the second instance is even made complete by reference to *eight souls "saved" on that occasion*, and that, too, by water, the like figure whereunto, even baptism, doth save us now. This interpretation finds significance, pertinency and logical consistency in the reference, and, what has sadly puzzled the expositors, *a valid reason why that class of sinners only* are mentioned. They are specified simply in allusion to a historic fact that included them only. (2.) This view is confirmed by the adjacent indications of time, which, with a three-fold or four-fold reiteration, direct our thoughts back to the time of the disobedience, rather than of Christ's burial. It was "when the long-suffering of God waited—in the days of Noah—while the ark was prepared—wherein few were saved." What was then? By the laws of coherent thought, as well as of grammatical speech, the main fact of the sentence concerning its subject, "went and preached;" and not the incidental fact of the subordinate participial description. If the writer meant to intimate that the preaching took place at Christ's death, it is a singularly misleading method thus to turn our thoughts wholly and steadily away to another period. Is it said that *πότε* corresponds to the *ὅτε*? We repeat that the correlative antecedent of *ὅτε* would be *τότε*; whereas *πότε* itself is indefinite, and the whole assertion is resumed and made definite by the following statements. (3.) This view is in harmony with other Scripture allusions; with the statement that God's "Spirit" strove with the antediluvians in Noah's time (Gen. vi, 8); that "the Spirit of Christ" was in the old prophets in their utterances (ch. i, 10, 11); that Noah was a preacher (*κήρυκα*, from the same verbal root as in our text) of righteousness, 2 Pet. ii, 5; and that this preaching of Christ was "in spirit." The whole train of association lies before us, and mostly in the Epistles of Peter.

It will now easily appear that the objections to this interpretation are invalid, and most of them irrelevant. As specimens of their quality, we will take two sets of objections, one from a late popular commentary, the other from a popular religious paper. In the American edition of the Lange Commentary we find a reiteration and supplementing of Alford's objections.*

This writer affirms that "*ἔπαθεν, θανάτωδεῖς, ζωοποιήδεῖς, and πορευθεῖς ἐκήρυξεν*, set forth events in chronological order." An assertion doubly groundless, which overlooks both the indefiniteness of the aorist in general, and the special fact that here the connection is broken and changed by the relative clause beginning *ἐν ᾧ*, and by the *καί*.

He alleges also that "*ἀπειθήσασι ποτε* interrupts the chronological order, and plainly separates the time of Christ's preaching from the time of their disobedience." It is difficult to see on what grounds he can either support or attempt to support this assertion. It is nothing but an assertion.

It is said that *πορευθεῖς ἐκήρυξε* means "he *went* and preached." But this applies as well to a going from heaven to earth at that distant point of time and space, as to a going from earth to hell. The Old Testament idiom is "let us go down." Nor does the word compel us at all to understand a local and personal going; for in Eph. ii, 17, we are told that Christ "*came* and preached (*ἐλθὼν εὐαγγελίζατο*) peace to you," that is, to the Ephesians, to whom Christ never spoke a word *in person*. The "going" and the "coming" alike were by his inspired messengers.

It is said that "the object (*πνεύματα*) designates not living spirits, but departed spirits." Certainly; such as they were when Peter spoke of them.

But, we are told in Alford's words, "the *τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασι* must describe the local condition of the *πνεύματα* at the time when the preaching took place." But why "must?" May not the writer, at his own option, describe them either as they were, or as they are? Especially when the latter descrip-

* The editor in one passage seems to advocate two conflicting views: "Verse 20 describes the character of the spirits in prison; they were still disobedient [view No. 1], *ποτέ* *bre* distinctly marks the period of their disobedience" [view No. 2].

tion, indicating their doom, intimates also their incorrigibility, and magnifies the patience that endured their "contradiction."

We are further told that the subject of the discourse is not the Logos, but the God-man, and the means by which he preached is not the Holy Spirit, but the Spirit of Christ, ἐν ᾧ, *sc.*, πνεύματι. Has the objector never read in this same Epistle (ch. i; 11), how *the spirit of Christ* "did testify" in the prophets?

We pass now to the objections of the popular newspaper, as found in the *Advance* of April 28, 1872.

(1.) "It is not the natural and obvious meaning." If true, this would be but a presumption easily removed. In multitudes of cases we do not take the most obvious meaning: e. g., "God is a rock: This is my body: Let the dead bury their dead." But it is not true. A correct translation makes this the natural and obvious meaning. (2.) "The words of Peter do not directly affirm any preaching by Christ *through Noah*, but at most only to persons disobedient in his days." No, the details of the case are otherwise supplied. The phrase, "the just shall live by faith," does not inform us that it is faith in Christ. We learn that elsewhere. (3.) "Such was not the interpretation of the early church, nor has it been that of the Greek or Romish churches, nor is it that of the ablest foreign critics at the present day." A statement too loose to answer definitely and briefly, and, as against the claims of Greek usage, too unimportant to contest. (4.) "It is difficult to show its pertinence to the immediate context. On the contrary, the relation of this interpretation (*and of this only*) is shown to be very clear." (5.) "This word 'spirit' does not easily stand for living men;" answered already. (6.) "The order of verbal arrangement is not natural for this thought, but should have been reversed." Natural enough in a right translation, "Went and preached to the spirits in prison, when once or formerly they disobeyed," etc. (7.) "The Logos or original Divine nature of Christ is not under consideration, but the God-man." It is Christ, not in the flesh or human nature, but in the Spirit or divine nature, as we are expressly told. The same distinction is made in the same terms, Rom. i, 3, and hinted at, ch. i, 11.

(8.) "It is without scriptural precedent to refer to the Logos such an act of inspiration as Noah's preaching; it would rather be referred to the Holy Spirit." It is not contrary to the Scriptures to refer the inspiration of the "prophets" to "*the spirit of Christ* which was in them," ch. i, 11. (9.) "The expression, 'went and preached,' would have been 'came and preached.'" No: *went* to that distant point of time; *came* and preached to us. (10.) "The successive expressions, 'put to death,' 'quickened,' and 'went,' are all aorist participles, and should be referred to the same period of time. Any reader of the original will see the violence of referring the last participle to a period more than 2000 years previous to the other two." A grammatical error as unconscious, doubtless, as it is remarkable and egregious in an "expositor." An aorist, even in the indicative, simply expresses "the momentary occurrence of an act" in past time *indefinite*, and two aorists have no necessary or even probable reference to the same point of time. Thus, in Heb. i, 1, 2, the aorist *λαλήσας* refers distinctly to the time of "the prophets," the next aorist *ἐλάλησεν* to "these last days," hundreds of years later, and *ἐποίησεν* to the time of making "the world" or universe, "a period *more* than 2000 years previous." (11.) "The repetition of this same participle *πορευθεῖς* in verse 22, to denote Christ's ascent from earth to heaven, calls here for the previous contrast of his descent into Hades." Does it? Is not a descent from heaven to earth a more direct contrast to the ascent from earth to heaven? (12.) "The word 'preached' (aorist tense) would more naturally have been in so distant an allusion, 'had preached,' pluperfect." Another of those perilous remarks on Greek usage. Any modern Greek Grammar would have furnished the information that the "generic aorist more frequently takes the place of the specific perfect and pluperfect" (Crosby); and Winer especially remarks that this takes place "in subordinate clauses specifying time," and "in relative clauses," of which this is one.

But further—for here is error upon error—in citing a second case of mercy and patience, coördinate to the first, there was a good reason for stating that parallel fact in a verb of coördinate tense, the aorist. The same writer makes another equally perilous grammatical remark: "If it were the occasion in the

sense of time, the participle would probably have shown the same fact by being put in the present instead of the aorist,—‘went and preached on occasion or at the time of their *being* disobedient.’” It is difficult to understand precisely what is the mysterious notion here entertained of a present participle; but Curtius would inform the writer that the present participle “simply expresses an action in progress, whether it lie in the present, past or future.”

We have taken pains to quote the latest forms of objection in their length and breadth and depth. They illustrate more points than we care to indicate. The writers themselves speak of them as “critical” and “exegetical,” “sound exegesis.” And one of these writers informs the world that the interpretation advocated by us “will be rejected by candid scholars as arbitrary and ungrammatical;” the other that “it seems to have been largely favored on dogmatic grounds.” It is gratifying to find men whose eminent Greek scholarship qualifies them so to speak.

It will be observed that we have now maintained this position *purely on grammatical grounds*, reinforcing it by ample reference to grammatical treatises, and what is more, to the facts on which grammars are constructed. And we shall continue to hold this view until we gain further light ourselves, or until some one shall prove two things, (1) that the common translation is grammatical, and (2) that ours is positively ungrammatical and untenable—two things that, so far as we are informed, have never yet been done.

ARTICLE II.—OUR NATIONAL BANKS.

THE success of our National Bank system, from its establishment to the present time, has been great, and, for the most part, we think, unexpected. It was put in operation under circumstances which, though perhaps almost necessary to its success, were still extremely adverse to its popularity. The country was involved in a revolution which threatened its existence. Public credit, on which the whole scheme was based, was well nigh destroyed. The managers of existing financial institutions were either positively hostile to the new plan or regarded it with doubt and suspicion. It came in the guise of an adventurer, avowedly hostile to established usage and to vested rights.

The banks then existing had done much for the government, and at a time too when doing for the government at all was regarded by many men as a matter of questionable prudence; and therefore they felt that they had a strong claim to consideration, and it might well seem that a scheme not only hostile to their apparent interest, but striking directly at their existence, would arouse their opposition and alienate their support.

Radical defects were believed to exist in the proposed plan. Old prejudices against a government bank and a government currency were aroused, and the similarity of the project to the so-called "Free Bank system," which, except in a few localities, was not a favorite, by no means assisted in producing a favorable impression.

We have no space here, nor would it answer any good purpose, to recapitulate the arguments, the complaints, the prognostications, the expostulations, the warnings, the entreaties, which were everywhere directed against this new scheme; but any one who will turn to a file of newspapers or pamphlets of that time will find in correspondence, editorials, doings of conventions, and reports of committees, a mass of hostile literature of which he has for the most part probably forgotten the exist-

ence. Indeed, perhaps the opposition to the measure, or, at least, the want of all popular sympathy for it, is made sufficiently clear by alluding to the fact that after the government had become committed to the plan, and the change from the State to the National form had been made as easy as possible, the State banks had then to be forced into the new system by "unfriendly legislation," and that of no very mild type.

Yet notwithstanding all these unfavorable circumstances, in spite of open opposition, silent distrust, and evil prophecies, the working of the scheme, it cannot be denied, if indeed at this time any one is disposed to deny it, has been thus far singularly, triumphantly successful. Since the establishment of the government, hardly an equal period of time can be selected, when, in all matters relating to banking and currency, affairs have gone on as satisfactorily as during the last eight years. There have been no losses to bill-holders, very few to depositors; differences of inland exchange have become almost unknown, and funds are transmitted or drafts collected at the most distant points at an expense of a very small fraction of one per cent.

We have not had a "panic," a "crisis," a "suspension," a "run," or any serious disturbance of any kind in our currency during all this period; yet judging *a priori*, we should certainly have looked upon it as a period peculiarly liable to every species of financial irregularity and disturbance.

But granting now that the condition of affairs has been in many respects peculiar during this period, and that while some of these peculiarities have been adverse to a settled condition of the currency, others may have been favorable to an exhibition of the good points of our new system, and, therefore, avoiding as far as is needful any conclusion based simply on a comparison of one portion of time with another, it still remains a very interesting subject of inquiry—To what extent, if to any, is the smooth working of our financial affairs for the last eight years fairly to be attributed to our National Bank system?

We are a people of short memories, and the present system has been in operation so long that we are already forgetting what preceded it. Let us look a little then at the condition of things prior to the establishment of the National Banks.

There were in the United States in 1860, according to the report of the Secretary of the Treasury for that year, fifteen hundred and seventy (1570) banks, distributed in thirty-one (31) States and Territories as follows:—

Maine,	68	Virginia,	65	Illinois,	74
New Hampshire,	52	North Carolina,	30	Indiana,	37
Vermont,	46	South Carolina,	20	Ohio,	52
Massachusetts,	174	Georgia,	29	Michigan,	4
Rhode Island,	91	Florida,	2	Wisconsin,	108 (1)
Connecticut,	74	Alabama,	8	Minnesota,	2
New York,	303	Louisiana,	13	Iowa,	12
New Jersey,	49	Mississippi,	2	Kansas,	1
Pennsylvania,	90	Tennessee,	34	Nebraska,	4
Delaware,	12	Kentucky,	45		
Maryland,	31	Missouri,	38	Total,	1570

Established by the legislatures of the thirty-one different States and Territories in which they were located, there were, of course, thirty-one different kinds of banks. But in several cases there was more than one kind in the same State. Moreover, in many of the States where the general system was pretty uniform, each bank had an independent or individual charter, and these, having been granted at long intervals of time, and under widely varying circumstances, differed much, and often materially, from each other; so that, instead of thirty-one, there were certainly several hundred different kinds in all.

There was a famous phrase, now seldom heard, but which in those days met the eye everywhere. It was in all the Presidents' messages and in every Secretary's report; no financial essay could be without it, and congressional speeches bristled with it—those made “for Buncome”—most of all. It was “A Uniform Currency.” No wonder, for each one of these fifteen hundred and seventy banks had, and, to some extent greater or less exercised, the power of furnishing a currency to the country. And what a currency was that? There was “red-dog” and “red-back,” “wild-cat” and “hard-shell,” “safety-fund” and “guaranteed” “real-estate,” “stock-secured” and “Brandon,” and other kinds more numerous than we can remember or record, and with qualities as numerous as kinds. Surely it must be good for us to call to mind those things occa-

sionally, and to be thankful that they exist no longer. "A uniform currency," indeed! like Falstaff's regiment, or those more recent domestic troops known as "Invincibles."

Usually, to be sure, in the older States there was some (frequently much) restrictive general legislation. Public sentiment there also required that corporators, officers, and managers should be men of known prudence and tried integrity of character. Indeed fifty years ago the position of a bank-director was a place of more honor than that of a cabinet-minister has sometimes been since that time; and men have held the latter place that could not, in the times we speak of, have obtained the former. Charters were granted sparingly and with great caution. A case of public necessity must be made out, and reasonable evidence shown that the capital would be furnished, and that the business would be successful. Beyond these wise precautions, no security for the public was demanded, and usually too, it is but just to say, though not always, they proved sufficient. But in later times such safeguards as these availed little against the chicanery of modern lobbyists and political managers. Still the honest legislators struggled manfully against the incoming tide of corruption. For instance, a legislature of one of the smaller and more conservative of the Eastern States repealed, at one time, thirteen charters granted by a previous legislature for banks at points where no public necessity required them, and where they would be likely to be useful only for purposes of speculation or fraud.

As more democratic ideas began to prevail, "these monopolies," as the chartered banks were called, grew unpopular, and the demagogues asserted that the right of one man to have a bank was as good as another's; the right of every man to have a bank was a corollary from this which could not be denied. It did seem advisable, however, to try to find some partial substitute for capacity, character, and integrity; and so, in the State of New York, and in some of the other States, what was called the "Free Bank" system was inaugurated. Under this system every man was free to have a bank, to receive deposits, and to issue currency; but while depositors were supposed to be able to look out for themselves, it was doubtful whether the democratic right to have a bank carried

with it the ability and integrity necessary to manage one, and it did seem better on the whole under this new state of things that the bill-holder should have some security. In theory, therefore, all bill-holders were to be secured either by mortgages or deposits of bonds or some other prescribed security; but then these prescribed securities were made to cover the whole range of property from United States bonds to mortgages on outlying farms, or wild lands taken at the appraisement of local committees; and so notorious was the want of care in the selection of these securities that the name "Safety Fund," by which a certain class of these institutions was designated, became an appellation of reproach.

In those States where this Free Bank system prevailed, the power to create currency was absolutely unlimited. Any persons having the requisite amount of prescribed securities could organize a bank and commence at once to issue notes. In establishing a bank of this sort the object was to get out as many bills and redeem as few as possible. It was therefore desirable to avoid traveled routes, frequented places, and all conveniences of locomotion. If it were off the lines of express, railroad, telegraph and even mail communication, all the better, for then protest could not be sent and bills could not conveniently be returned for redemption. All redemption agencies were eschewed. Thus it came about that banks were "located" where there was neither a demand for the conveniences nor facilities for transacting the business of such institutions. Thus it happened that if on the sea coast of New Jersey there was some little islet or rocky surf-beaten point more entirely inaccessible than all others, it was marked at once as a choice "location" for one of these institutions of finance. Then, if finally they were ferreted out and called upon to pay, if brazen impudence did not suffice, there was generally an ignominious failure, followed by a wonderful shrinking of securities and general disappearance of assets.

A characterizing anecdote of this time relates that when the officer of one of these institutions was called upon to redeem some of its bills, he declined on the ground that the law required him to "keep" ten per cent. of his circulation in specie, and if he redeemed the bills he would not have that amount

left, and would thereby violate the law, a matter about which he was very sensitive. As after the lapse of a few years we look back upon those times, the wonder grows how confidence and credit ever survived such a state of things. The truth is, they did live a wretched, struggling, precarious existence.

Almost every year, generally following upon the temporary demand for currency for removing crops which occurs in the autumn of each year, there was what was called a "crisis" in the money market. The bills of these various banks having all sorts of securities, and no person or bank being under any obligation to receive them, in the manner provided in case of our national currency, they assumed all sorts of values, usually rapidly diminishing as the distance increased from their place of issue, but sometimes unfortunately quite the reverse, they being valued most where they were least known. These differences of currency value, passing under the dignified name of exchange, were truly startling. Seven to ten per cent. between New York and Philadelphia, Baltimore, or Richmond was by no means unknown, and even five per cent. for crossing the Hudson river into New Jersey we think will be recollected by readers whose hair is not yet grey; while the more distant points of Chicago and New Orleans represented the greater differences of from fifteen to twenty-five per cent. The writer hereof once left New York provided with specie for a journey into Virginia. He bought Pennsylvania bills in New York and Virginia bills in Baltimore, and reached his destination, after paying his expenses, with about the same nominal amount that he had when he started.

Gradually and slowly this state of things, though not radically changed, was much ameliorated. The institutions of the Southern and Western States, where this loose style of banking mainly prevailed, so far lost credit, that it was no longer an object to establish banks at those points, and in many cases, as was natural, a chronic distrust of all banks, even an intense hatred of the name of bank, grew out of this unfortunate experience, and culminated in severe unfriendly legislation, and anti-bank constitutions; so that the furnishing of currency to the country was at length mainly left to the old and well known institutions of the Northern and Eastern States.

But notwithstanding these meliorations in its practical working, the most pernicious features of the system still remained, viz: under the "Free Bank" or New York system the power of the banks to expand the currency to an unlimited extent by the creation of new institutions and the issue of new bills, and under the New England or Charter system the power, though very much more limited, to still add very materially to the currency, liable always to a forced and sudden contraction, which liability was greatly enhanced by what was known as the "*Suffolk system of Redemptions.*" This took its name from the Suffolk Bank of Boston, though whose agency it was conducted. Its method of operation was as follows. Each bank in New England sent all bills of New England banks, received by it in the course of its business, to the Suffolk bank. The large banks in the cities usually sent packages of bills daily, the smaller country banks only once or twice in a week. These bills were "sorted" by the Suffolk bank, and returned to the bank that issued them. No direct charge was made by the Suffolk bank for doing this business, but each bank was expected at all times to keep a sufficiently large deposit with the Suffolk bank to meet all its own bills received by the Suffolk. If the bills of other banks sent by any one bank to the Suffolk did not furnish sufficient funds to meet its own bills received by the Suffolk, then its account must be kept good by other means; usually the means used for this purpose were drafts on some bank in New York, through which the country bank made its collections, and where it kept its surplus funds. If any New England bank failed to keep the Suffolk bank supplied with funds for this purpose, then the bills of the bank so failing were "thrown out" by the Suffolk bank, that is, they were not received by the Suffolk from other banks, and notice of this was immediately given by the Suffolk bank to all its correspondents, who at once refused to take the bills of the banks thus "thrown out." The circulation of a bank thus thrown out was by that means at once stopped, and the bank was virtually suspended. Its bills no longer had currency: they were bought up at a discount by brokers, and sent home to be redeemed in specie, or drafts, as the interest of the holder might dictate. This throwing out was a great injury to a bank, and

of course there was a great fear of it. It was usually the last thing which a bank would permit to happen, for even though the bank might be sound and able to go on with its business the next day, ill news with its proverbial rapidity would by that time have spread the story of its short-coming far and wide, and it would require weeks and perhaps months to efface the impression from the public mind, and bring up the bills to their old point of credit.

This system, with some modifications, was adopted in the State of New York through the Metropolitan bank, and perhaps to some extent in other parts of the country. It was in several respects an excellent arrangement. It was an economical method of effecting exchanges among the various banks. It had a strong tendency to check large issues of circulation ; it immediately detected any serious weakness in a bank, and advised the whole country of it. It impressed continually upon banks the necessity of having assets which could be depended upon for prompt payment or ready conversion. It enforced the constant keeping of a cash balance, equal in amount at the least to the weekly redemptions, which usually averaged about one-tenth of the circulation. In short, in all matters pertaining to the soundness of the banks themselves the immediate and direct effect of the arrangement was excellent, and under that system of banking came to be looked upon as a necessity.

But, on the other hand, for the interest of the mercantile community, the customers of the banks, and through them of the community generally, and so reflexively for the interests of the banks themselves, this system was in some respects very bad. It destroyed all flexibility in bank management, and all power to extend assistance to worthy dealers in times of necessity. It was so devised as always to aggravate any slight derangement of the money market, and to intensify it to the utmost degree, culminating every few years and usually oftener in a panic, a crisis, the temporary destruction of values, the permanent destruction of many hard earned private fortunes, and, for the time being, a total derangement of all monetary affairs ; producing always a stoppage of industrial employments with its attendant train of sufferings, and bringing to many innocent individuals utter ruin. And all this for no physical cause,

but from moral causes of excitement, fear, and distrust, aggravated and augmented by this unfortunate machinery. It promoted a strong antagonism of interests between the bank and its customers at all times, and in times of trouble an internecine strife among the banks themselves. It tended to make money easier, that is, cheaper and more plentiful, in times of ease, and not only harder, that is, scarcer and higher, when any cause produced closeness, but beyond certain limits it was sure to be absolutely unattainable, no matter with what credit or security, as the history of every one of those repeated "crises" so fully attests.

Now the banks individually and singly were utterly powerless in this matter. They had no control over it, and any general combination among the banks beyond the limits of a single city or State—or any attempt at combined action, even for temporary purposes, was, under the circumstances of the case which have been already set forth, utterly impossible. What could the individual banks do toward stemming the torrent? If they failed to redeem their bills they were at once discredited, if not legally enjoined, and their power to do anything for their customers was of course at an end. But to sustain their credit it became necessary to compel prompt payment from all their customers and to lend to none: where then were the customers to get their money to pay? It could not be had. The immense and sudden withdrawal of currency, and the utter impossibility of obtaining money with any amount of securities, or at any rate of interest, has been a marked and perfectly well known feature of these currency crises.

Time after time we have seen the experiment tried, and always with the same result. First, a somewhat stringent money market, from any accidental cause; then a scramble among the banks, each striving to outdo the other in their efforts to extort money from each other and from their debtors. And for what? To get their own currency securely within their vaults, where their debtors could not get it to pay these very claims for which they were pressing them, getting all they could and letting nothing go in return. Yet the struggle for the banks was a vital one—they were compelled, as it seemed, to commit suicide in order to save their lives. What followed? Of course a great and

sudden lessening of the currency, a ruinous depreciation of values, then a crash among the merchants in the great cities, then a stoppage of mills and other enterprises, throughout the country, workmen discharged, fortunes lost, property sacrificed, then at last a suspension of the banks, sometimes produced by a concert of action among depositors, but generally by a wild scramble for specie called a "run," impelled partly by a fear of ultimate loss, and partly by a vague desire of punishing the banks to whom the trouble was usually attributed. Then, after the suspension, when it was known that all the banks were acting alike, that they were no longer drawing on each other, that they were no longer compelled to ruin their customers in order to save themselves, then business would again resume its usual course; banks made their customary loans; people brought back the specie, which they had not really wanted, and had only drawn through fright; and if it had temporarily risen to a premium, it at once dropped back, and, in general, things went on as before. But in the meantime a great many good men,—and always in such times those who were most prompt and honorable suffered most,—had been ruined, industry temporarily paralyzed, confidence of men in each other destroyed, workmen thrown out of employment, poor people suffering for bread, and all through the workings of a deliberately adopted system of currency which none were found wise enough to remedy. The most sudden, severe, disastrous, and apparently unnecessary of these panics or crises was that of 1857.

The fright was commenced on the 22d of August by the failure of the Ohio Life and Trust Company, and culminated in the suspension of specie payments by the New York banks on the 17th of October. The cause of this panic seems to have been pure fright, as the volume of business transacted by the Trust Co. was not large enough, nor its transactions of sufficiently wide extent, for its stoppage to produce any necessary serious disturbance in the financial affairs of the country. We can see no reason why the failure of any well-known merchant of high standing would not have had precisely the same effect. But when the fright had once commenced, the machinery already described was ample to develop from this slight cause the train of disasters which ensued.

We can enter into none of the details of that panic in this place. Its history has been written, but its disastrous results and the quick return to a normal condition of things, followed by a plethora of specie in the great money centers, all showing fully the causelessness of the panic so far as the currency was concerned, afford incontestible evidence of the viciousness of the system under which it took place.

Travelers relate how in the passes of the Alps the pathway is overhung by immense avalanches, which the careless shout of some reckless passer-by may bring down to overwhelm all who are below; but in these places prudent men do not willingly linger—silently, swiftly, and anxiously they pass the dangerous ground. And yet with great pains we built up an avalanche over our heads, and went on shouting under it for years—only somewhat stunned and confounded when it came down, crushing our neighbors and half covering ourselves.

The final catastrophe of 1857 was brought about by a "run" upon the banks of New York city for specie on the 17th of October; and this run, so far as an intelligent purpose could be traced in it, was the result of a settled conviction in the minds of the mercantile community, that as soon as the banks were compelled to suspend specie payment, and were thus all brought to one level (of nominal bankruptcy), their internecine warfare must cease, and that with this the trouble would end. The result showed that they were right. The Kilkenny cats saved their tails, and a suspension of specie payments, instead of being regarded with horror, came to be looked upon as a legitimate means of affording necessary relief, as it has grown to be in England under Sir Robert Peel's act, and as it always must be in a system founded on such a palpable fallacy as that you can always and immediately redeem three dollars of paper with one dollar of coin.

Thus it happened that, in the fall of 1860, when we were again threatened with a similar state of things, the banks of the city of New York, profiting by the experience of 1857, and acting in unity through the association at the clearing-house, wisely and courageously prevented a most ruinous impending crisis, by promptly suspending specie payment, and thus *restoring confidence* (?) without waiting for the disease to run its usual

course. This measure of theirs was utterly illegal and in defiance of law, but it was so beneficial and benevolent, so wise and prudent, that the officers of the law, sustained by public opinion, withheld all legal action against them.

Now in the month of November, 1867, we had all the material for, and all the indications of, as serious a panic as that of 1857. We had the close money market, the dull trade, more suspicion and distrust of certain important classes of merchants, than in 1857; currency temporarily withdrawn by the moving of the crops, &c., &c. And yet we had no panic, and why? Mainly, it was because the banks throughout the country no longer feared each other, and they did not fear each other because the machinery no longer existed which made them mortal enemies. By the terms of the National Bank act any National Bank bills pay any debt to any National Bank. There is therefore no longer any need of forcing bills home to be redeemed, and no need of each bank cutting off all facilities from their customers in order that they may have funds to meet their own redemptions, and get their bills into their vaults out of the reach of their neighbors.

Now, recurring once more to the panic of 1857, it seems probable that it was in reality the turning point in our financial history; for although the precise nature of the evils under which we labored did not seem to be clearly understood, it had become so apparent that the want of homogeneity and of some general system was among the defects, that President Buchanan, in his message to Congress, in December, 1857, was induced to hold the following semi-apologetic language. It will be noted in reading what he says, how, at least in a negative way, he sketched the outlines of our present system; for which, perhaps, he has never yet received due credit.

He has just spoken of the crisis through which the country had passed, and from the effects of which it had not yet recovered, and then says:

"These revulsions must continue to occur at successive intervals, so long as the amount of the paper currency and bank loans and discounts of the country shall be left to the discretion of fourteen hundred irresponsible banking institutions, which, from the very law of their nature, will consult the interests of the stockholders rather than the public welfare.

"The framers of the Constitution, when they gave to Congress the power 'to coin money and to regulate the value thereof,' and prohibited the States from coining money, emitting bills of credit, or making any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts, supposed they had protected the people against the evils of an excessive and irredeemable paper currency. They are not responsible for the existing anomaly that a government endowed with the sovereign attribute of coining money and regulating the value thereof, should have no power to prevent others from driving this coin out of the country, and filling up the channels of circulation with paper which does not represent gold and silver.

"It is one of the highest and most responsible duties of government to insure to the people a sound circulating medium, the amount of which ought to be adapted with the utmost possible wisdom and skill to the wants of internal trade and foreign exchanges. If this be either greatly above or greatly below the proper standard, the marketable value of every man's property is increased or diminished in the same proportion, and injustice to individuals, as well as incalculable evils to the community, are the consequence.

"Unfortunately, under the construction of the Federal Constitution, which has now prevailed too long to be changed, this important and delicate duty has been disavowed from the coining power and virtually transferred to more than fourteen hundred State banks, acting independently of each other, and regulating their paper issues almost exclusively by a regard to the present interest of their stockholders. * * * *

"As a collateral and eventual security it is doubtless wise, and ought in all cases to be required, that banks shall hold an amount of United States or State securities equal to their notes in circulation and pledged for their redemption. This, however, furnishes no adequate security [he should have said *no* security, that not being at all the object of it] against over issues. On the contrary, it may be perverted to inflate the currency. Indeed, it is possible by this means to convert all the debts of the United States and State governments into bank notes."

In connection with the above, we have various remarks indicating the President's view of the cause of the trouble and of its remedy; among them we find the following:

"The first duty which these banks owe to the public is to keep in their vaults a sufficient amount of gold and silver to insure the convertibility of their notes into coin at all times and under all circumstances."

This would of course require an amount of coin equal to the whole amount of circulation and deposits to be kept constantly on hand, and as he proposes in addition to this, as quoted above, that the United States bonds should be deposited as collateral for the circulation, it is clear that his views of banking were *eminently conservative*, though somewhat impracticable, we fear, viewed from a stockholder's standpoint.

He elsewhere seems to assume that one-third of the amount

of circulation held in coin, combined with stringent legislation, would answer the purpose; but in that case, if depositors called first, the bill-holders would stand but a meager chance. So that it seems probable on the whole that he has rather overstated his own views of the necessity of convertibility in the paragraph quoted above. But we shall have occasion to speak of convertibility again.

Now what Mr. Buchanan saw was greatly needed, but pronounced forever unattainable, and that not without good apparent reason, the late Secretary of the Treasury did, nevertheless, accomplish. Availing himself of the exigencies of revolution and the necessities of war, "plucking the flower 'Safety' from the nettle 'Danger,'" and an uncommonly ugly nettle too, he so controlled his adverse fate as to minister to the relief of an exhausted exchequer, and to rid the country of the thralldom of a wretched system of currency. It is one of the emancipations, and by no means the least, for which we have to thank our revolution.

This brief outline of the condition of things, which existed prior to the establishment of our present system, and which led to its adoption, has been intended to answer, in some sort, the question with which we commenced it, to wit: *To what extent, if to any, is the smooth working of our financial affairs, for the last eight years, to be attributed to our National Bank system?* If it has not done so, it has failed of its object. But to enumerate more specifically some of the advantages derived from the change, they are these:

1st. It furnishes a currency *uniform in value* in every part of the country, and which no financial disturbances can render otherwise. This fact is due in part to all bills having a uniform security, but mainly to that provision of the act which requires every bank to receive the bills of every other bank, and also makes them a legal tender in all transactions to which the Government is a party, customs duties excepted. The value of this quality in a currency, simply in an economic point of view, is almost beyond computation. The losses involved in the so-called exchanges of other days, and the risks of collection and transmission which grew out of this want of uniformity in value, are swept away at a blow.

2d. It gives us a currency *perfectly secured*. The public debt forms, perhaps, the best practicable security for a currency for domestic purposes than can be imagined. It is the guaranty of all the resources of the State to each of its citizens.

3d. This *security is uniform*—the same kind and amount of security for every bill of every bank. The moral value and influence of this feature of the system is very great. It is not that all are well secured, but that all are *equally* well secured, and in exactly the same manner. State obligation, or others, which might be considered perfectly safe and desirable as a private investment, or as a private security, would nevertheless be subject to relative fluctuations of value as between each other. And this would necessitate watchfulness and care, and an intimate knowledge on the part of the public of the concerns of each bank, and thus become a prolific source of anxiety, suspicion, and distrust.

4th. The currency thus furnished to the country is of a *fixed amount*, subject only to be changed by act of Congress, as the necessities of the country may demand. It is true that this power of increasing and decreasing the currency is a most delicate and dangerous one to wield. It involves the value of all property and labor. It is the balance that weighs all material objects of human desire. But under this act, perhaps, this power is as carefully limited as the nature of our government permits. It can only be exercised openly, in the sight of all the people, after deliberation, discussion, and criticism; whereas, heretofore, it has been left to the interests or caprices, or, as Mr. Buchanan has said, "to the discretion of fourteen hundred irresponsible banking institutions, which, from the very law of their nature, will consult the interests of the stockholders rather than the public welfare."

5th. The banks of the country all being regulated by one bureau, and under the same laws and rules, are thereby brought into relations of harmony with each other. This has a great tendency to produce uniformity in their methods of doing business, and the tendency of this uniformity will be to increase until a system substantially homogeneous, the fruits of the combined wisdom of all engaged in it, will be the result. Thus sound principles of banking will be developed, and when

developed their adoption will be but a question of time. Mistakes and irregularities will be less likely to occur, and wilful misconduct more promptly detected and punished.

6th. The evils and prejudices connected with a centralized money power like the old United States banks, or with a simple government currency like our present legal tenders (which, though necessary to meet the exigencies of our condition, cannot be safely continued when that exigency shall cease), are obviated and avoided.

7th. That feature of the act which permits a portion of the "legal reserve" of the country banks to be kept with their city correspondents, is a wise one. It recognizes the existing course of business, and places the funds where they are wanted for use, instead of locking them up in the vaults of the banks.

8th. Whatever may be our opinion of the wisdom of the popular judgment, it is doubtless a fact that the "free" clause in the National Bank act, that is, the right of everybody to establish such a bank on the same terms, is calculated to, and does, avoid prejudice and conciliate popular favor. It is regarded as being in harmony with the spirit of our free institutions. And since the clause limiting the total circulation of the country, and the requirement in all cases of United States bonds as security therefor, avoids two of the greatest dangers of the old system, there can be no serious objection to this feature of the bill; while everything in it which conciliates popular favor tends to increase its usefulness and stability. If we could return to the old ideas of the honor attached to the position and duties of a bank officer, and of the high character required to fill such a post, it would undoubtedly be a great gain; but for the present, at least, any such hopes are futile, and we must look to other means of protection, and other guarantees of sound management. And, indeed, it may well be doubted whether any plan which involved the granting by Congress of special charters would not be liable to abuses and evils far greater than the advantages which could be reasonably hoped to accrue from it.

9th. There is one great and perhaps fatal fallacy which underlies all our systems of paper money. Whether that fallacy is necessary to constitute a "sound system" is not now

the question. The fallacy is this, and we cannot state it more clearly than again to quote the language of President Buchanan : "The first duty which these banks owe to the public is to keep in their vaults a sufficient amount of gold and silver, to insure the convertibility of their notes into coin, at all times and under all circumstances." That is, that, everywhere and always, each dollar of paper money represents an actual dollar of coin lying ready for exchange, whenever it may be demanded. Now, there are a few things about this matter that we do positively know, and the first is, that it is not true; and the second is, that everybody knows that it is not true; and the third is, that all of us each know that the other knows it is not true; and the fourth is, that nobody ever expects, or did expect, or requires, or did require, that it should be true; and the fifth is, that if it were true, we should have no paper money; and the sixth is, that if it were true, we should want no paper money; and the seventh is, that there is never gold enough in the country at any one time to make it true; and the eighth is, that our legitimate needs do not require it, and that we all know that they do not; but that, through fear and loss of confidence, the truth of it occasionally comes to be practically tested, and always, of course, with the same negative results, which tests are both dangerous and disastrous to property and morals. Therefore, so long as our currency system must continue to be based on this fallacy, it is of the last importance that we have a currency which will command public confidence thoroughly, and will be least liable to such fluctuations in amount or value as will be likely to induce any such demand for specie, and to precipitate upon us the evils connected therewith.

10th. Under this system a plan of general redemption, Suffolk or otherwise, has so far been, and we believe safely may be, dispensed with, thereby avoiding one prolific source of panic, and of sudden and unnecessary contraction, and all the evils that follow in its train. For it cannot be too much dwelt upon that what we want above all things, in a paper currency like ours, is a system which shall, if possible, contain neither the temptation nor the power to produce contraction in times of stringency, nor inflation in times of abundance. That such was the result of the old redemption system, important and

valuable as it doubtless was in some respects and for some purposes, we think we have already clearly shown; but, whether we have succeeded in making it clear or not, the fact is so.

Our object in this Article has been to draw a contrast between our present system of currency, as at present administered, and that which preceded it, endeavoring to point out what we have gained by the change; and, having done this, we might perhaps properly stop here. But, being aware of the fact that our view of the non-necessity of a system of general redemptions will be regarded by some persons with great horror, and by others with a considerable degree of modest doubt, we feel it incumbent upon us to add a few words directly upon that point. And, in the first place, we note the very obvious fact, and one which we cannot help regarding as substantially conclusive, that we have had no such system in operation during the last eight years,—the marked feature of which time has been a lack of those very disturbances in our currency which we are so anxious to avoid. We have more than hinted that the smooth working of our financial affairs during this period has been owing in no small degree to the absence of this redemption system; and we shall at least hold, until the contrary is clearly shown, that any claim for the absolute necessity of such a system must, in the light of experience, be given up. But, granting that it is not a necessity, advantages may still be claimed for it which should not be disregarded. Now, as all our notions and prejudices in favor of this scheme have come from our experience under our old system, let us inquire what, under that system, was the value of this plan of redemption. It was this: first, that it *tended* to prevent, but by no means prevented, undue expansion; this is now forever and at once prevented by a limit set to the whole volume of currency. Second, that it *tended* to prevent, but by no means prevented, the issuing of bills without sufficient security for their ultimate payment. On the contrary, by its very operation, it not unfrequently destroyed the value of the assets on which reliance for this ultimate redemption had been placed; but ultimate payment is now fully secured by United States bonds. Third. It can hardly be seriously claimed that this system of constant redemption had anything to do with getting specie for

daily legitimate use by customers, except so far as it exercised an influence upon the general soundness of the banks. On the contrary, it was what continually stood in the way of getting specie whenever any considerable extra amount might be wanted, and the scheme usually had to be temporarily got rid of before the amount could be had. Witness the panic of 1857, when specie became abundant so soon as *confidence was restored by the suspension of the banks*; which was really a suspension of constant compulsory general redemption, and nothing more.

What, then, is this process of redemption from which so much is expected? The banks of the country, instead of paying out (as now) the bills of the various banks which they receive, will put them up in packages and send them to their correspondents in New York. And do they pay gold for them? No, they are passed to the credit of the bank sending them. Then this New York bank counts them over again, and sends them to the redeeming agency. And do they pay gold for them? No, they pass them to the credit of the bank which brought them, and give them in return a package of bills of the same bank which sent the original bundle; these the New York bank takes and sends back to the original country bank. And now, surely, the gold will be forthcoming. No, not at all, but this bank has now another package ready, either of bills or checks on some city bank, which it sends back to pay for the package received, and so on. This is the whole transaction. It calls for no gold from anybody. It is a simple *swapping* of each other's bills, to the great and lasting benefit of the express companies—and that is all.

A late official paper, advocating a system of general redemptions, admits that the notes are all equally well secured, and their ultimate redemption established beyond a question, but says, "when this," that is, the redemption scheme, "is accomplished, the amount of notes in circulation will be regulated strictly by the demand. When the volume is greater than is necessary to do the business of the country, the banks will be called upon to redeem the surplus, and it will be returned. When trade is active, and more currency is required, the banks will expand their issues, and redemptions will not be demanded until the season of activity is over."

Now does not experience teach us that almost precisely the reverse of this is true. Which way does the currency tend, which way has it always tended, under our old system, in times of pressure and alarm—to contraction or expansion? Where do the bills go?—out of the vaults into circulation, or out of circulation into the vaults? All the tables tell the story. And is it not also on record how once the Bank of England boldly and forcibly reversed this natural and acknowledged tendency, and thereby checked a panic and saved a crisis. But, without this system, the funds which the banks do not loan they will certainly have on hand, whether in their own bills or those of others, and when there is a demand for them they will be loaned. And there is a positive and great advantage, and, so far as we can see, no disadvantage, in making our paper currency, either in the hands of banks or the people, those that issue it or those that take it, as near like actual gold and silver, in all its monetary functions, as is possible to make it. Besides this, a system of redemptions would at once withdraw a large part of the currency, probably about one-fifth, from active, useful circulation; this portion being about the amount *in transitu* and in the hands of the redemption agencies, and of the various banks, waiting to be forwarded. This loss falls on the banks, and through them on the public, and is equal, with our present paper circulation, to a loss of \$120,000,000 of the circulating medium. There are other attendant expenses equal to, perhaps greater than this. The express companies, who are really the only parties interested in the redemption system, will, under this scheme, be paid for transporting the whole currency from eight to ten times in the course of the year.

Then, one extra clerk for each \$500,000 circulation will not be a large estimate for the extra labor demanded by this scheme; and unless some substantial advantage is to be gained all this expense is thrown away.

At this point we hear the awful question sounded in our ears, "Do you advocate an irredeemable currency?" To which solemn inquiry we reply, "Not in the least." Neither do we see the necessity of testing its redeemability every few minutes or every few days, any more than we can see the wisdom of

those youthful gardeners who dig up their seeds two or three times a day to see if they have sprouted. And it is just this sort of redeemability which heretofore has been always being attempted and has always failed, and which a system of redemptions most inevitably leads to. Let, then, every bank be required to redeem its bills at its own counter, or, better still, let this requirement be so guarded as not to be abused, and at the same time it will be much more certain of furnishing all legitimately required specie at all times.

The true use and necessity of specie in a currency of a mixed character, and the effects of the return to specie payments upon our new system, though so closely connected with the subject, cannot be entered upon here, but still are to be considered in any full estimate of its value. The object of this article is rather to bring the comparison up to the present time. History rather than speculation.

It may be asked if we suppose the national banking system has rendered crises and panics impossible. We certainly do not. Banks and the currency are but a part of the machinery by means of which the operations of commerce and finance are carried on, and through which, so to speak, the results of these operations become visible. But no system of finance has yet been discovered, nor is it likely that there can be any, which will prevent fluctuations in the value of money and occasional serious disturbances in commercial affairs. It is mostly through the banks, at such times, that these troubles become visible, or are immediately felt; and the unphilosophic mind, mistaking this connection for cause and effect, naturally enough suspects the banks of being at the bottom of all the trouble. Hence the violent abuse of these institutions always indulged in on such occasions; hence, also, the frequent attempts to mitigate these evils by remedies applied to what are themselves but involuntary instruments worked by a superior force.

Again, the regulation of the currency under our National system, if unfortunately, still unavoidably, falls under the control of Congress. We cannot be very sanguine as to the unerring wisdom of this body in conducting our financial affairs. A large popular body is, in many respects, peculiarly unfitted for the discharge of so delicate a trust. Its members

are not selected or elected on any principle or in accordance with any practice which tends to beget confidence in that regard, and we never see them approach this class of subjects without serious apprehension of the results. These remarks are not intended in any unfriendly spirit, but would be accepted by the members of that body whose opinions are best worth having. They are made simply because they are true, and because they indicate one of the serious dangers to our financial success. Nevertheless, our present system is so far superior to anything we have ever had before that we can afford to run some risk; and the more clearly we understand what are its dangers, and what its advantages, the more likely we shall be to avoid the one and secure the other.

ARTICLE III.—CYPRIAN AND HIS TIMES :

A LECTURE BY THE REV. DR. MERLE D'AUBIGNÉ

TRANSLATED FOR THE NEW ENGLANDER.

IN the history of the Church, the third century is remarkable for the invasion of Catholicism in the form of Episcopacy. That invasion had already commenced in the second century, but the evil increased in the third; and Cyprian was one of the most powerful instruments in its development.

Catholicism should be distinguished from Papism or Popery : they are two very different ecclesiastical forms. There are three clearly marked, successive transformations of the Church. Evangelism was the distinguishing peculiarity of the first century ; then Catholicism or Episcopacy was born in the second, was formed in the third, and established, with all its essential characteristics, in the fourth century. Popery at length appeared in the seventh century, as the gradual outgrowth from Catholicism or Episcopacy ; in the eighth century it began to be invested with temporal power, and from that time its ruling influence continued to increase to the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, which are the periods of its greatest power. It may be said that what the gospel is to Catholicism, Catholicism is to Popery,—or that there is as great a distance between Popery and Catholicism as between Catholicism and Evangelism, or the gospel.

What then is the peculiarity or character of Catholicism ? In the times of the Apostles or the gospel, we find the Church spiritual and living. The Lord had said, The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life. Little by little the spirit was withdrawn, and there remained in the Church only the form. So it is that when the spirit departs from the man, there remains only the body ; or when the vivifying water escapes from some fissures, there is left only the vase. Something not unlike this occurred in the Church ; but the vase, that is to say, the Church, did not lose immediately all its vital force, i. e., the Holy Spirit. In the first century the

presence of Christ was the great power of the Christian society; it was the same also in the second, and even in the third; but that power was continually decreasing. Jesus Christ departing from the Church, what remained in it? There remained consecrated persons, consecrated places, and consecrated times and seasons; i. e., priests, temples, festivals, rites, and ceremonies. But what are all these without Jesus Christ? What life-giving power can come from all these institutions. Alas! they are as the bed of a river, where appear the banks, the dikes, the bridges, all except the ever flowing waters which cause the trees planted near them to give fruits in their season, and which cover them with glittering verdure.

The invasion of Catholicism or Episcopacy had perhaps natural, if not legitimate, causes. The appearance of heresies, of schisms, and the decline of spiritual life, seemed to necessitate the introduction of certain forms, of certain institutions and laws. But very soon the form began to oppress the spirit. Then the love of evangelical liberty was revived, and opposition was at once manifested. Courageous Christians set forth the Holy Scriptures against new customs, opposed the spirit to the form, liberty to domination, and proved that Catholicism was neither evangelical nor apostolic, but simply a new product of a degenerate age. Formalism, which did not expect this vigorous attack, was for a moment confounded; then, to save itself, carried its claims to an unreasonable extreme. It was set forth, not only as a proper means of extending the truth and maintaining order, but as the end, the essence, the nature itself of the Church. Catholicism, in order to defend itself, taught that Episcopacy was of divine right, and affirmed that it came from the same source as the Holy Scriptures; and to prove this assumption, produced the apocryphal books of the Apostles, which were written evidently not in the first, but the third century. With a loud voice Catholicism claimed to be Christianity itself, the work of God, and that outside of its enclosure neither the truth nor the Holy Spirit could be found.

Two historical incidents contributed specially to establish the sacerdotal and episcopal power, which was the leading trait of Catholicism. The first of these incidents was the prevalence in the Church of the ideas of theocratic Judaism, in which the

priests and the high priest had played so important a role. The second was the influence of the virtues of many bishops, whose zeal and devotion led them to die martyrs to their faith, as did Cyprian himself. The Church, as compensation for these virtues, became enslaved almost to those who gave such examples of self-sacrifice.

The question may be asked, in what consists the difference between the priest and the minister? The priest belongs to legal and theocratic religions which have preceded Christianity; the minister or pastor to the religion of grace, to the Church of the gospel, which is as much above Judaism as the man is above the child. Unfortunately, the Roman Church, in its religion, though coming after the gospel, has gone back into a state of infancy. The legal or theocratic Church can not exist without persons, who by birth or by succession, or by sacramental arrangement, possess a sacerdotal character which qualifies them to lead the people in the way of salvation, and establish them in communion with the Lord. Disconnected from this specific priestly character, no one, according to the legal religion, can have part in the work of redemption, or even enter into communion with God. This idea of Catholicism is not only foreign to the gospel, but is directly opposed to its teachings. According to the gospel, communion with God does not in any manner depend on the interposition of consecrated persons, but it is secured simply and only by faith in the word of God. The idea of a priest, which is for the Roman and Anglican Churches the principal idea of the religious system, finds no place whatever in the Evangelical system. There is one mediator, says the Scripture, the man Christ Jesus. It is true, the minister of the New Testament is called to preach the word of grace, to pray with all the people, to administer the sacraments; but these acts, so far from implying a priesthood or a clergy, are made the work of the minister only as being better qualified to do them, and in case of necessity they can be accomplished by simple believers. A man alone with the Holy Scriptures, separated from priest, from minister, from all other men, can by the grace of the Holy Spirit find the Lord Jesus Christ in the word of God, and with him eternal life. The Catholic priest keeps man, even to the end, in a state of dependence and in a long minority. The

Evangelical minister instructs the child with a tender love, but endeavors to lead him to God who speaks in the Holy Scriptures, and he knows no happier moment than that in which he sees the young man grow in the word, obeying the truth with all his heart, and coming thus into a state of spiritual manhood.

But we are to speak more particularly of him who, in the third century, was the hero of Episcopacy.

Not far from the ruins of ancient Carthage, which had been destroyed by the third Punic war, was built by Augustus the new Carthage, which soon became the most important city of Roman Africa. Among the splendid gardens which surrounded the city was one in particular, remarkable for its beautiful shades, its statues placed in the midst of flowers, of ornamental trees and groves, and all the luxury of the *villas* of that time. On the road which led from the city to this pleasant retreat was often seen a young man of elegant appearance, clothed in purple and fine linen, covered with jewels, his hands brilliant with precious stones, and his rich garments shining with ornaments of gold. A crowd of youthful flatterers surrounded him as he went forth, talking and laughing; and coming to his gardens, he was joined by his friends around a table, richly covered with the choicest viands, the most delicate meats and the most delicious wines. The name of this young man was Cyprian; his parents were pagan; he was himself a pagan; a man also of rank and fortune, and of remarkable intellectual powers. Mingling in the world, he loved to rule; he was conspicuous by the renown of his position; he indulged his passions without restraint, he entered boldly in the way of corruption, so general in large cities; it is indeed affirmed that he resorted to magic or sorcery to gratify his guilty desires.

The Christians of Carthage admired the beauty of his genius, but deplored the disorder of his life. "Ah! they said, one to another, if this young man could only be brought into the kingdom of heaven! Was not Saul as much estranged from God, before he was converted on his way to Damascus?" Among the elders of the church was a pious, enlightened, decided Christian, named Cecilius. He had some intercourse with Cyprian, and soon resolved to call his attention to the knowledge of the true God. He said to him, "You are living

in vanity, and you are yourself vanity ; it is necessary that you should be born anew, for if a man is not born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." Cyprian, astonished at these words, replied, "How can I become another man, if I have always the same body? Can a man change his habits, his temper, his constitution? Can the leopard remove his spots?" Cecilius replied: "*He* who made your heart at the first, can now give you a new heart, with which you will love Him." He then declared to him the love of Jesus Christ. Cyprian believed that great love; his eyes were opened; he confessed the Saviour, and was baptized. This was in the year 246. "My heart has received light from on high," he said; "my doubts have vanished; all is clear, all is luminous about me. I taste that peace which passes all understanding; I take hold of those verities which appeared to me incomprehensible, and that which seemed to me impossible I now do with joy." So an entire change was wrought in him. He had loved a splendid table; now he became frugal. He had indulged the most sumptuous habits. Now he was remarkable only for a modest simplicity; and in the place of the vain company with which he had been so long surrounded, he sought retirement and solitary communion with God. He sold his delightful gardens, and soon after despoiled himself of his possessions, giving the proceeds of them to the poor. He was filled with the most lively affection for Cecilius, who had been the means of opening his eyes to the truth; he said to him, "live with me;" "let us live together in this world, as we shall live together hereafter in heaven." He carried his affection for him so far as to take his name, for he was called from that time Cecilius Cyprianus. He lived now no longer in a superb palace, but in a modest house. He meditated on the Holy Scriptures day and night; he studied the writings of the most learned teachers. Every day he might be heard addressing these words to his secretary—"Da magistrum"—give me the master; and the secretary respectfully presented to him the roll of parchment containing the works of Tertullian.

Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus had been pastor in Carthage at the commencement of the third century, and the first of the great writers of the Latin church. Possessing a

vigorous mind, a violent character, a fertile imagination, Tertullian had fallen into the errors of the Montanists, who pretended to have prophets like those of the Old Testament, and who affected great severity in religious practices. In the first part of his Christian life Tertullian had composed some admirable works. He had particularly endeavored to unfold the doctrine of sin, and show how sin now appears in every individual. His system is known under the name *traducianism*. According to his theory the soul of Adam was as a germ embracing or containing all souls. So that when man transmitted the soul to the child, he transmitted sin also. Against this doctrine of sin he wrote,—O Christ! Thou hast been wounded for my healing, and hast died to give me immortality.

But Tertullian contributed something to the formation of Catholicism. We are indebted to him for a theory which gave great importance to human traditions. He had been an advocate, and carried into Christianity some of the ideas of the legal profession, particularly that of *prescription*. Where a certain property has been held a given number of years, .e.g., thirty, without being reclaimed by any one, it is acquired by *prescription*, by those who have had it in possession during that period of time. Tertullian applied this principle to the teachings of the church. If any dogmas had been generally admitted for a great number of years, they belong to the church, he said, by prescription, and no one can question the truth of them. He introduced this method of reasoning in order to repel innovations, but it was a dangerous expedient. To ascertain the truth on this theory, the question was not what is *written*, but what has been generally believed for thirty or fifty years. It was sufficient that an error was old to have it baptized as true. All the false doctrines and practices of the Roman church are justified on this principle. Yet Tertullian was a man of great power, a wonderful genius. Doubtless his Latin savored a little of Africa, and his style was sometimes obscure, but his thoughts were ordinarily striking and profound. Even in his errors he manifested a true Christianity, and the most admirable gifts of nature and of grace are always recognized in him. Such was the master of Cyprian.

About a year only passed after Cyprian was converted, when Donatus, the bishop of Carthage, died. Who should be his successor? Two parties were immediately formed among the Christians. The majority of pastors and people said "Cyprian ought to be bishop. Who preaches with so much eloquence? Who evinces so much piety? Who possesses so much talent and zeal?" But five pastors and another portion of the flock formed an earnest opposition; these sought to maintain the independence of the church. They said: "The bishops have no other rights than simple pastors; they are only first among their equals. Then, do we not know the domineering spirit of Cyprian? He will make all yield to his will." But the multitude would not listen to remonstrance, and learning that Cyprian himself refused the office to which they would call him, surrounded his house, and cried, "*Cyprian or no one.*" The disciple of Tertullian wished to fly, but all the doors of the house were guarded. At last he yielded, and became bishop.

Cyprian is one of those remarkable men who, according to the point of view from which they are regarded, present the most opposite characters. He is one of those men who are at the same time both good and bad. On the one hand he is an ascetic, a priest, a prelate full of clerical prejudice and domineering ideas; but on the other hand, he has a pure mind, a heart full of patience and love, his soul is animated with the most lively faith and entire devotion to the service of his Lord. His clerical character is deplorable; his Christian character is admirable. None of the fathers of the first centuries give evidence in their writings of more profound piety. Undoubtedly he aspired to power, he demanded obedience, but it was neither from ambition nor pride; it was for the prosperity of the church and for the glory of his Saviour. He desired the external unity of the church; he was full of zeal for the cause of Catholicism; he deceived himself, he wandered out of the way of truth, yet he believed he was contending for liberty, for order, for peace, for holiness. And when he died he left to the church a strange example of the most admirable virtues and the most fatal errors. He was between the living and the dead.

It was a difficult moment when Cyprian commenced the exercise of his functions. It was near the middle of the third century, and for many years there had been no persecution, so that a great degree of worldliness prevailed in the church. Christian women appeared in their assemblies with painted faces; and the men had their hair and beards artistically colored; marriages between Christians and unbelievers were common; members of the churches attended gladiatorial combats, and beheld with excited interest the flowing of human blood; Christians also attended the representations of the theater. The love of the world had also invaded the pastors; the bishops left their churches to travel in the provinces, in pleasure parties, and above all were lovers of gain. Perhaps they did not gamble in stocks or on the race-course, but they showed themselves very skillful in inventing divers ways and means of procuring money. Cyprian looked about him with great inquietude, and finding everywhere only worldliness and vanity and avarice, he wept over the sad decadence of the church. He addressed to the worldly the most earnest prayers; he conjured them to be transformed by the renewing of their hearts; to prayers he added threats, and endeavored by all means to pluck the burning brands from the fire. But his severity often carried him too far.

But the church became always weaker under the influence of worldliness. Faith wavered, holiness was rarely found, Christianity was without force, and the deplorable fruits of this seed of vanity very soon appeared. About the year 250 occurred the persecution of Decius and with great violence. A terrible alarm was felt in all the church; some concealed themselves, others fled; others trembling abandoned their religion under the fear of martyrdom.

Nowhere was the terror greater than at Carthage. On the public place was an elevated seat, in which sat the Proconsul surrounded by his guards: near him was the statue or image of a pagan divinity; the sacred fire burned before it, and grains of incense were beside it. The magistrate waited with dignity the arrival of the Christians to abjure their Lord. They came in haste and in great numbers. They gave their names; then pressing near the idol they took a grain of incense, and casting

it into the fire thus gave to false gods the adoration which Decius required. After the first apostates, new ones appeared; bands succeeded bands, till a vast multitude filled the place demanding the opportunity to denounce and deny their Saviour. The Proconsul, moved with pity for these miserable beings, then repelled them, saying: "Go away, unhappy men, and return another day; we have no more time at present to receive your abjurations."

Among those who sacrificed to the idol might be observed many different persons and characters. Some seemed almost overcome by fright, others were indifferent, others made light of the whole affair; others seemed to wish, by servility and flattery and protestations, to gain the favor of the Emperor and the proconsul; but many came forward with trembling step, their faces pale, their looks full of sadness, and their hearts evidently sinking with despair. A crowd of pagans surrounded them, and covered them with reproaches and sarcasms and jeers. It was thus that the flood of worldliness laid waste the churches of Africa in the time of Cyprian, as did the invasion of the Vandals in the time of Augustine.

Meanwhile there were some who had the love of God and not of the world in their hearts, who braved the fires of testimony rather than renounce their faith. But the persecutors were not satisfied so long as the bishop of Carthage was not numbered with the martyrs. In the circus, at the moment when a great crowd was assembled there, suddenly the cry was heard, "Cyprian to the lions." On the public places, in the streets, and even before the churches, this funereal cry was repeated. Then occurred an event, which has been, and will continue to be, differently judged. Cyprian fled from Carthage, and concealed himself in a distant retreat. The party which had opposed him triumphed. Oh! said many elders and believers, "He that is an hireling, and not the shepherd, seeth the wolf coming, and leaveth the sheep and fleeth. The hireling fleeth because he careth not for the sheep." Cyprian, to justify himself, replied, The Lord also said to his disciples: "When they persecute you in one city, flee into another." But these words had been addressed to missionaries, called to go from place to place, and Cyprian was no missionary. The

spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak. The weakness of the flesh occasioned the fall of Peter in the court of Caiaphas; it did the same in the case of Cyprian at Carthage. And yet it should not be forgotten that Cyprian was a truly pious man, and showed at a subsequent day that he did not fear a martyr's death. He said: "If I have concealed myself, it is not to save my life, but to secure the quiet and peace of my brethren. I was persuaded that if I went away, the persecution would cease." But he was deceived; the persecution was redoubled.

Cyprian remained fifteen months in concealment, and, it is just to say, he was constantly occupied for the church. A great number of his letters are dated from the place of his exile. Not only did he seek for himself consolation in nearness to Jesus Christ, but he endeavored to secure the same consolation to others. The churches were desolated, the Christians were scattered abroad: "they wandered about, being destitute, afflicted, tormented. They wandered in deserts, in mountains, and in dens and caves of the earth." Learning that many were in the forests and deserts, he wrote to them:—"Let not the solitude alarm you. He is not alone whom Christ accompanies in his flight; he is not alone whose heart is the temple of the living God. O my brother, thou art hungry, thou art thirsty, thou art cold, thou art hot: the tempest smites thee, robbers assail thee, ferocious beasts surround thee. Fear not, Christ sees thee and protects thee.

Christians in prison often wrote to Cyprian to seek encouragement in the day of trial. To one thus seeking comfort, Cyprian sent only a copy of the Holy Scriptures, adding: "It is not with the trumpet of my own words, but with the word of God, that I can strengthen you. If I send thee a coat ready made, that would be *my* coat, and might not fit thee. But now I send the wool and the purple of the Lamb, by which we have been saved and made alive; thou canst thyself make of it a garment, and even give of it to others, in order that they may wear the robe of Christ." There is no mere Catholicism in this; Cyprian is purely evangelical. It is difficult to express in a manner more clear the principles of Christian Protestantism.

Learning that the martyrs had had their feet loaded with chains, and had been taken to dark mines, where they were

doomed to hard labor, he wrote to them. "O most happy feet, covered with chains, which shall soon be at liberty, not by the smith, but by God himself. O most happy feet, which, even in horrible caverns, walk in the way of salvation, ever advancing toward paradise. O feet, bound in this present world, but to be always free in the world to come. O beloved brothers, in these mines, your bruised and weary body has no place of repose; but your soul has the comfort and consolation of the Saviour."

But the activity of Cyprian appeared in another field, in the constitution and the government of the church. He formed Catholicism; he did more; he gave it practical illustration, and this is by no means the most pleasing view of Cyprian's activity.

What are the elements of that Catholicism of which Cyprian may be the author? What are its marked traits? Primarily, it was traditionalism—or a system of faith founded on tradition. Little by little, the Holy Scriptures were made to give place to tradition. At first the Word of God, either spoken or written by the Apostles, possessed supreme authority, and communicated to all light, salvation and life. After a time this divine word was read less and heard less, and less regarded as the nourishment of the soul. Attention was drawn to the teachings of learned men, the commands of bishops, and the decrees of councils. The word of God declined; the word of man advanced. This double movement, the growing insignificance of the Word of God, and the growing importance of the word of man, became for the church a cause of darkness, of weakness and at length of death.

The second trait of Catholicism was hierarchism. At the first there was a spiritual, inward, and living unity among all Christians; all having the same Saviour and the same heritage, were of one heart and one mind. But this unity being lost, it was replaced by an ecclesiastical organization. Christians being no longer united as brethren, masters were given to unite them. Unity was reconstructed by means of priests, bishops, and patriarchs, as the unity of an army is formed by officers and generals.

The third trait of Catholicism was Sacramentalism. Living communion with Jesus Christ is necessary to the Christian. By the Word and by faith Christ is found. The water of

baptism, the bread of the supper, are signs which call us to seek the renewing of the Spirit, to eat the flesh of the Lord. But soon the sign took the first place; it was believed that the water of baptism regenerated the soul; the bread was regarded as the very body of the Lord; and a superstitious materialism succeeded to a living Christianity.

The last trait of Catholicism was theocratic. From the earliest times of the church there had been rule or authority and obedience; the authority of the Saviour, and the obedience of faith; but when the church had no more life, the authority of priests succeeded to that of Jesus Christ, and the obedience of a soul enslaved to men supplanted the living and free obedience of the children of God.

Cyprian was a man of ruling clericalism and formal Catholicism. He did not cease to insist on the outward unity of the church, and the most remarkable of his works is entitled *De Unitate Ecclesie*. It should not be forgotten that this work has been altered and interpolated by the Roman teachers; though Cyprian does not appear therein purely evangelical. His errors arise from not distinguishing the spiritual, invisible church, which is the company of all true believers, the body of Christ, from the outward visible multitudinist church, which is the union of all who bear the Christian name. He introduced also the ecclesiastical materialism of the Roman church.

What should be attributed only to the true, spiritual church, he attributed to that outward Christianity which embraces the unconverted, the worldly, and the unbelieving. The church, he said, is an organism, an outward and living union, founded by Jesus Christ, and by means of which the influence of the Holy Spirit is shed abroad on the earth. Out of this external church, governed by bishops who are the successors of the apostles, none can receive the influence of the Spirit, none can be saved.

To defend his principles and their consequences, Cyprian had to engage in violent contests, the results of which were serious and deplorable. The first conflict of that period, in which Cyprian was the chief actor, was that of the episcopate against the pastorate. In politics there are three systems, democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy. These three systems are found

also in the church. The first is that in which the ministers and elders or other officers are elected by the flock. The aristocratic form is the Episcopate, in which the churches are ruled by bishops. The Papacy is an absolute monarchy. It was between the democratic and aristocratic forms that the first contest occurred. These two words, bishop and presbyter, designate one and the same office and charge: this is evident to anyone who will examine the Scriptures. Jerome, also, at the commencement of the 5th century, said the bishop and the presbyter are identical. But, in the eyes of Cyprian, the bishop was the exclusive channel of grace; there was no unworthiness in the bishop; he rendered the sacraments efficacious; he represented or personated the church. There was no equality.

The five pastors who were opposed to his election, and many of the brethren, held to the democratic form, which is Congregationalism or Presbyterianism. They thought all pastors were equal, and, if they admitted a bishop, he was only as the president of his brethren. We cannot very well judge of the character of these five ministers, for we know them only through their enemies; it is necessary to be prudent, therefore, and not believe all that has been said of them. They, however, earnestly maintained the rights of the pastors. "The bishop," they said, "ought not to rule the flock of God with inflexible authority. The origin of his office is the love of God and of souls, and not some law as an office of the world. His ministry is a devotion, not a privilege." Cyprian, on the contrary, claimed his rights; he was irritated; and, to maintain his pretensions, he asserted the authority of dreams, of revelations; though a man of piety, he evidently deluded himself concerning his episcopate. "Ridiculous dreams," replied his adversaries; "foolish visions." Cyprian was yet more irritated; he said to a layman, a friend of the five pastors, "Whoever does not believe in Christ who instituted the priest, will be obliged to believe in Christ who will avenge the priest." The layman replied the bishop ought to be humble, because Christ and his apostles were humble. Novatus, the most influential of the five pastors, had charge of a church near Carthage, situated on an elevation, and which was called *in monte*. He had in his parish a layman named Felicissimus, whom he set apart as a

deacon by the laying on of hands, without regard to Cyprian. He was greatly excited, declared Novatus guilty of audacious disobedience, and pronounced the election illegal.

Some unpleasant events occurred, which increased the discord and widened the separation of parties. The *lapsed*, so called, those who had denied Jesus Christ during the persecution, were excluded from the church. The question in dispute was, Shall they be restored if they appear penitent? Cyprian was very severe; he sent them away when they applied to be restored, saying it would be determined what to do when the persecution ceased. Whoever could not wait, he said, had only to seek a martyr's crown. The five pastors in the opposition received the repenting apostates with kindness. Cyprian was indignant. "Compassion," cried the pastors; "Holiness," responded the bishop. "Pardon," said the one; "Justice," said the other. The division increased. A new question rendered the contest more bitter. While Cyprian was in exile he sent two bishops charged with distributing alms taken from the funds of the church. The five pastors said this could not be done lawfully, without the consent of all the elders. The earnest Felicissimus said to the poor, "You shall want nothing, but do not receive the alms which the bishop sends you." Cyprian returned from exile in the year 251; called a council, which decided that the apostates should be restored to the church only when they should be at the point of death. Thus irritated against the five pastors, he proceeded to condemn and excommunicate them. Driven to this extreme, they elected one of their number, Fortunatus, bishop, and opposed him to Cyprian. Cyprian called Cornelius, bishop of Rome, to his help; Cornelius supported him, and the two bishops trampled under foot what remained of the apostolic constitution. The episcopate triumphed; the pastorate was vanquished. Such was the first conflict and the first victory of Episcopal Catholicism.

The second contest took place between *multitudinism* and *purism*. On the one side, it was thought necessary to retain in the church all who joined the company of believers, the good and the bad; on the other, it was thought right to retain only the pure — *καθαροί*. Unity without holiness, or holiness

without unity—such was the dilemma. It was not then a question concerning a national church: for paganism was the only national religion. The question was between multitudinism and purism, or puritanism. A pagan, named Novatian, a man of severe character and of eminent ability, was led to the knowledge of Christianity; he had great inward conflicts, so that he became ill, was apparently about to die, and was then baptized. He recovered; his soul was at peace in believing; he evinced an admirable talent for instructing, and became an eminent theologian. Having been made pastor of a church in Rome, he lived in retirement and asceticism, and declared in favor of sanctity rather than catholicity. The bishop of Rome, Cornelius, was in favor of the multitude, of catholicism. Novatian was remarkable for quietness of character, cultivating the hidden life with Christ, and had no difficulties with the bishop. But Novatus, having quarrelled with Cyprian in Africa, came to Rome; he was an active disputer, particularly inclined to oppose the bishops. In Africa he had been on the liberal side against Cyprian; in Rome he took ground with Novatian against Cornelius. He had received apostates into the church, but Novatus and Novatian said the church should be pure, holy; so they formed a church of puritans, who they said had white robes.

Novatus urged Novatian to allow himself to be named bishop,—as he had named Fortunatus, bishop of Carthage, he desired also to name one at Rome. Novatian declined the honor; but Novatus assembled some bishops from the country, and they laid their hands on him. This proceeding was at first attended with success. But Cornelius applied to Cyprian, who joined him in opposing Novatian, and, in this second contest gave the victory to Cornelius, as he had given the victory to Cyprian in the first. This was the second defeat of spiritual principles; from that time discipline declined; Christianity was corrupted with pagan elements. These elements of paganism entered the church more abundantly when the emperors became Christian. Then there was one church, catholic, but without truth, without holiness, and without life.

The third conflict was between the episcopacy and the primacy of Rome. This primacy was the germ of the Papacy,

though the Papacy did not then exist. On the one hand, it was affirmed that the church should have a visible unity, and as a necessary consequence, should have a visible head. In the east, this question was not agitated; in the west, the need of this unity was felt. Who should be chosen to represent ecclesiastical unity? Rome had been the capital of the world for centuries; it was, besides, the only city of the west where an apostle, Paul, had labored; though it was claimed that Peter had been there, against all the intimations and teachings of the Scriptures. But the church at Rome had been the mother of many churches; it was from that church that the gospel had been carried to many places in the west. The bishops of Rome were then naturally designated to be the first. Some of them had already made prominent this passage: "Thou art Peter; and on this rock I will build my church." No one at that time spoke of infallibility, of the government of the church; no one dreamed of temporal power, maintained by national or foreign soldiers; the question had reference to a simple primacy. Already Tertullian had said: "The expression, 'Thou art Peter,' has no reference to the bishop of Rome, but to Peter personally, as a man enlightened by the spirit of divine grace, and (in him) to all those who have received Christ as their master, who have become in the true sense stones, i. e., true Christians." "From whence came this Roman tradition?" demanded Cyprian. "Is it by the authority of the Lord? No. From the commands of the apostles? No."

Firmilian, of Cesarea, said: "They of Rome do not observe the things which have been taught from the beginning. To the practice of the Romans we oppose another, that of the truth; holding to that which has been taught by Christ and his apostles. Another difference arose between Cyprian, bishop of Carthage, and the bishop of Rome, concerning the baptism of heretics. Cyprian sent deputies to Rome to make known his opinion; the bishop of Rome would not hear them. Cyprian was angry, for he wished to humble those elders, but he would not be humbled by a bishop. The churches of Asia declared for Cyprian, and he assembled a council in Africa, which decided the same thing in his favor. So while Cyprian had contended for the episcopate against the equality of pastors,

for multitudinism against those who dissented, he was in favor of episcopal liberty against the invasion of the Papacy. The chief and founder of Episcopal Catholicism did not wish the Papacy, but in later times episcopal aristocracy was vanquished, and Roman monarchy triumphed.

A last conflict remained for Cyprian: it was with paganism and persecution. In the year 250 he had saved himself by flight; he desired to wash out that stain. Having been arrested, he was taken before the imperial proconsul, who asked him: "Who art thou?" "A Christian and a bishop," he answered. He was sent into exile, but returned some time after, and remained quietly in his garden. He was again brought before the proconsul; he was firm in the faith. "Are you the pope, or bishop of sacrileges?" said the proconsul. "Yes." "Sacrifice to the gods?" "No," Cyprian replied. "Let him be beheaded with the sword." "God be praised," cried Cyprian. He was taken to a field near Carthage; he laid aside his cloak, and fell upon his knees. His head fell under the blow of the executioner. He desired to die in his church, for, he said, "A bishop should die in the midst of his flock."

ARTICLE IV.—THE NEW LIVES OF SIR WALTER RALEIGH.*

A LIFE of the most brilliant gentleman and most versatile genius in English history during the reigns of Elizabeth and the first James, which shall be worthy of taking the place of an English classic, is yet a desideratum. No public man in the Tudor-Stuart period was noted in so many ways as Raleigh; none was so unfortunate, comparing his achievements, his capacities, and his fate. Of his active fifty years—1569–1618—“just thirty-four were spent in toils and duties, the most diversified, perhaps, that ever lay open to an English gentleman.” But he has been hardly more fortunate in his biographers than in his career. They have been many—Shirley, Theobald, Prince, Oldys, Birch, Cayley, Tytler, Southey, are merely the prominent names. Many others have passed into oblivion with their books, and even these are little known in this country. If Gibbon could have undertaken the task, with the united facilities of the two most recent biographers—the lack of which and other difficulties discouraged him—it would hardly have been attempted by any one else. Yet none has been attempted oftener.

The two new Lives before us, though published the same year, and evidently prompted alike by the discovery of new materials and the greater accessibility and availability of old ones, both in England and abroad, are very unlike in character. Mr. St. John's is much the more readable of the two. But Mr. Edwards's is far the more labored, rich in facts, and critical in the examination of testimony. It is also much more strictly a biography. The author has refrained from treating the public history and national transactions of the age, “even

* 1. *Life of Sir Walter Raleigh. 1552–1618.* By JAMES AUGUSTUS ST. JOHN. 2 vols., 331, 356. London: Chapman & Hall. 1868.

2. *The Life of Sir Walter Raleigh.* Based on contemporary documents preserved in the Rolls House, the Privy Council Office, Hatfield House, the British Museum, and other MS. repositories, British and Foreign. Together with his Letters, now first collected. By EDWARD EDWARDS. 2 vols., 723, 530. London: Macmillan & Co. 1868.

by way of giving an historical back-ground to his theme." His reason for this course is that the Life he undertook to narrate "presents disputed questions enough, and problems—hard, if not indeterminable—much more than enough to overcome any temptation in that direction. The *Life and Times of Raleigh* would, for him, have been a theme much too broad, and too arduous, however otherwise inviting. Happily, too, the 'spacious times of great Elizabeth' have long been under treatment by abler hands." Among purely biographical materials, Mr. Edwards seems also to have made larger use of those which are English, Mr. St. John of those which are Spanish—the latter being more mingled with historical materials than the former. Raleigh's youth, which occupies two chapters of thirty-four pages in the one biography, is despatched in the other in one chapter of sixteen. Each writer gives half his space to the misfortunes, plots, and intrigues—together with the long, grand episode of his literary life, in the Tower of London—which ended in the downfall and violent death of the wonderful old knight. But all through the story of the one is a historical picture, with scenery and other accessories: that of the other is a judicial examination and deliverance concerning matters of personal fact. The former is far more lenient in accepting traditions, generally current and often unchallenged by many previous biographers; the latter is more rigorous in rejecting what is not absolutely proven by evidence. Incidents that seem in keeping with Sir Walter's character and career find readier acceptance with the former than with the latter, aside from questions of testimony. Comparing the two works throughout, it can be seen with no great difficulty how much new light is thrown upon the life which "the father of American civilization," the great sailor, scholar, statesman, and author, actually lived.

It can hardly be necessary, as a basis for the running account of the results of research which we propose to give, to do more than outline the well-known points of Raleigh's life.* Born of a

* The diverse methods of spelling his name here need no examination, since in his own life-time it was written Rawly, Rawley, Rauley, Rawlye, Rawlie, Rawlighe, Rawleigh, Rauleigh, Ralegh, Raleghe, Raleigh, Raleighe, Raghly, and Raughley. The same persons spelt it differently, viz: Sir Robert Cecil, his clerks, and Sir Edw. Coke. So Raleigh wrote the Secretary's name in five different ways,—Cecil, Cecile, Cecyl, Cecyll, and Cecylle. The form "Ralegh" has most evidence, his own signatures and those of his wife included, and is employed always by Edwards.

knightly ancestry, about 1552, in the old manor-house of Hayes Barton, in the hundred of Budleigh, near the eastern corner of South Devonshire, "the paradise of England;" educated a little, not very much, we gather, at Oxford, though his distinction there as wit and scholar is unquestioned; growing up in an atmosphere of adventure, the air astir with stories of discovery, conquest, and martial conflict; related, on his father's side, to several lines of brave knights and gentlemen, and on his mother's to great explorers and navigators; attracted in his opening manhood to the battle-fields of France and Ireland, perhaps to those of Netherlands,* and to the deck of a discovery-ship on the high seas; entering upon court life at the age of 30, or earlier, and rising at once to posts of trust and honor; brilliant in person and dress, in the manners of a court, in elocution, in literary accomplishments, in his faculty and tact for public affairs; grasping at once with ready comprehension and skill the highest and most difficult matters of State; stimulating all forms of domestic industry and national growth; passing naturally to the head of the Queen's counselors in dangerous public complications, and of her soldiers and seamen on the field of action; ambitious, public-spirited, full of insight and foresight, unhesitating and daring in plan and execution, open to jealousies and assaults, venturesome always, at times foolhardy, taking a chief part ever in international affairs, in foreign colonization, in intrigues both in parliament and in court circles; a life-long enemy of Spain; girt with great enemies, personal and political, abroad and at home; imprisoned on one charge, and executed on another, after sixty-eight years full of dash, audacity, and achievement, and a prison life of more than twelve years; dying on the scaffold at Westminster, Oct. 29, 1618,—this was his story and career. Among the splendid persons and splendid pageantry of Elizabeth's reign no apparition is more striking than that of this large natured, versatile, wonderfully endowed, and most unfortunate man. Edwards thus describes him:

"His stature was about six feet; his hair dark and full; his visage, in early years at least, bright and clear. He was already noted for that splendor in dress and equipment of which Elizabeth was

* St. John, 1; 19. Edwards denies.

herself so fond, and which at a later date, when the means of large expenditure had come, he carried to a pitch almost unexampled, even in her brilliant court. How he appears in the fine portrait of him by Zuccherro, which now belongs to the Marquis of Bath, many readers will have had the opportunity of seeing at the recent exhibition. In another full-length, which long remained in the possession of his descendants, he is apparelled in a white satin pinked vest, close-sleeved to the wrist, with a brown doublet finely flowered and embroidered with pearls, and a sword-belt, also brown and similarly decorated. Over the right hip is seen the jewelled pommel of his dagger. He wears his hat, in which is a black feather with a ruby and pearl drop. His trunk-hose and fringed garters appear to be of white satin. His buff-colored shoes are tied with white ribbons. In a third portrait, long known to the frequenters of the gallery at Knowle, he wears a suit of silver armor, and is richly adorned with diamonds, rubies, and pearls. Drexelius, the Flemish Jesuit, was so impressed by the portraits he saw, and by the current accounts of Raleigh's magnificence of attire, that in his curious treatise, '*Trismegistus Christianus: seu triplex cultus, conscientiae, coelitum, corporis*,' he chooses him, 'the darling of the English Cleopatra,' as a modern Roman pendant to certain Roman emperors famous in that way. Raleigh's very shoes, he says, were so bedecked with jewels, 'that they were computed to be worth more than six thousand six hundred gold pieces.' This was the full flower of the gorgeous tastes which already, in 1582, had burgeoned with luxuriance enough to fix upon him many eyes little gifted with the power of discerning what sort of inner man it was that lay beneath the gilding."

The story of the young courtier's velvet cloak, spread on a sudden as the Queen passed at Greenwich, for a royal footcloth, and his introduction and favor at court in consequence, Edwards dismisses as apocryphal. St. John says: "He may have thrown his brave silken cloak upon a narrow splash, to enable her delicate feet to traverse it without a soil." The story first gained currency in Fuller's Worthies of England. Another account of Raleigh's attracting the royal attention by his eloquence against Lord Deputy Grey at the Council Board is dismissed by both our authors, though vouched for by Sir

Robert Naunton, Lloyd, and others. There was enough, it is thought, in Raleigh's personal graces within doors and without, in his soldierly bearing and supremacy at tournaments—not then passed away—in his gallantry, in his general military ability as cavalry captain, in his poetic genius, his great capacity for State business, to bring him notice and honor without any striking incident. St. John also shows that he had many friends among public men. Both biographers agree as to his previous career in Ireland, his bravery and vigor, and his shameful cruelty in the massacre at del Oro. He acted under orders with another captain, and the Queen wrote a formal approval of what had been done, but it was no less simply barbarous and murderous. St. John claims it as one of the things that are new in his book that he has shown that Raleigh was in Ireland six months earlier than others: viz, Feb. 22, 1580, instead of August: Edwards says his service "appears to have commenced under the Lord Justice Pelham," who was succeeded by Lord Grey, Sept., 1580, and that "Raleigh's reckonings as an Irish captain extend from 13 July, 1580," onward. A more important discovery of the former author is that, "instead of living in obscurity before his services in Ireland, he passed his time in the company of the foremost men in England," which is well established. His associations with Pembroke, Oxford, Lord Charles Howard, Robert Cecil, Leicester (with whom he served in France), and Sir Philip Sidney, his nephew (whose friend he had become in the University), and with other men of note, fill up a considerable gap in the story. Still more important is the evidence brought forward by St. John from new documents that Raleigh visited the West Indies sixteen years earlier than he has hitherto been known to have done so. It has been the common account of the successive biographers that previous to his engagements and exploits in Ireland he made a voyage with his celebrated and able half brother, Sir Humphrey Gilbert, to *Newfoundland*. The year was 1578: two ships, the common account is, composed the fleet. According to Edwards—who merely alludes to "an enterprise at sea with Sir Humphrey" previous to his Irish career, and who treats it as "part of the momentous history of the colonization of Virginia,"—Gilbert had obtained a royal charter in 1578, licensing him

"from time to time, and at all times hereafter to discover . . . such remote heathen and barbarous lands . . . not actually possessed of any Christian prince or people, as to him, his heirs and assigns . . . shall seem good, and the same to have, hold, and enjoy," &c. The two half-brothers not only sympathized in the spirit of adventure and foreign acquisition, but also in their views of Spanish pretensions over sea, and in their anti-Spanish aims. Gilbert was thirteen years older than Raleigh, and when the latter was first in London sat in the House of Commons for Plymouth. His home was the old castle of Compton, in Devonshire, near Torquay, and not far from Budleigh. The mother of both, wife successively of Otho Gilbert of Compton, and of Walter Raleigh of Hayes-Barton, was buried with the latter in Exeter Cathedral. How closely the lives of her two greatest sons ran together in all respects we know not. "But when we find proof that between the years 1563 and 1576 Sir Humphrey served in the wars of France, of Ireland, and of the Netherlands, and that during his Irish service he became Governor of Munster, the obvious suggestions of some intimate connection between the successive steps of the two careers are too striking to escape notice, even in the absence of all precise detail about them." So writes the careful pen of Edwards, who adds that this connection only became "obvious" in the year 1579, with the beginning of the Virginia enterprise. Our other biographer, however, is confident that the "Discourse to prove a Passage, by the northwest, to Cathara"—written in 1576 or 1577—which bears the name of the elder half-brother, was really the work of the younger. He was the better writer of the two. Moreover on the original MS., still in the General Record Office, "the signature is that of Gilbert, but apparently by the same pen the name has been attempted to be obliterated, though it is still legible." The explanation suggested is "that Gilbert, after the 'Discourse' had served its purpose, took the first step toward restoring the credit of it to its real author." This paper was issued as a feeler. Subsequently a fleet was collected. Both the leaders were forbidden to sail by an order of the Privy Council (says Edwards), dated May 28, 1579. "Raleigh was then at Dartmouth." Orders to the same effect had been sent to Sir Humphrey, "as early

as the 26th of April." Later in the year they both sailed, encountered Spaniards, lost a "a tall ship," and a valuable captain, and returned with their vessels "sore battered and disabled." Thus Edwards, following Hakluyt and Hooker. St. John says: "By the end of summer, 1578, Gilbert's fleet, consisting of eleven sail, manned with five hundred mariners and soldiers, assembled on the coast of Devonshire." Dissensions followed, and four ships left them. "On the 19th of November, Gilbert, with seven ships and three hundred and fifty men, set sail from Plymouth." The authority for this statement is a letter of Gilbert's to Secretary Walsingham, dated Nov. 12th, 1598, and now in the State Paper Office. It is argued that they sailed to the West Indies from several considerations, one of which is, that though Raleigh's first voyage thither is commonly dated in 1595, a book now lost was written in 1586 entitled *Sir Walter Raleigh's Voyage to the W. Indies*. "In the spring, apparently of 1576, our countrymen came to action with a Spanish fleet, when, either through inferiority in strength, or (in) scientific seamanship, they were defeated with the loss of one of their principal ships, as well as of the gallant captain Miles Morgan. Toward the end of the spring, or beginning of summer, Gilbert and Raleigh, with the wreck of their fleet, returned to England." Both our authors find that Raleigh was with Gilbert on this voyage, and the one last quoted has made it highly probable, at least, that he acquired his rare familiarity with the West Indies much earlier in life than has been supposed.

It is cheering to find an English writer expressing an honest moral reprobation of the "Discourse," which inaugurated this voyage. It was thoroughly unscrupulous in the suggestion of means to advance the greatness of England. It furnishes perhaps the earliest historical example, of any note, of the headlong ambition of Englishmen to make their nation mistress of the seas. It suggested measures "by which your Majesty shall engraft and glue to your crown in effect all the northern and southern traffic of the world, so that none shall then be able to cross the seas but subject to your Highness's devotion." It proposed a maritime deceit from which one would think our Southern Confederates took copy. A small fleet, ostensibly for the peaceful and innocent purpose of discovery alone, was

to be fitted out by the Queen. The ships were to be manned, victualled, and armed for this single object. But another squadron, with four or five thousand men, and provided with a powerful armament, was to be sent secretly to sea, and join the former in a certain latitude—(as in the case of the *Alabama* and other vessels). The united fleet was to capture the Spanish and other fishing vessels on the Banks of Newfoundland; and from the proceeds of these and their cargoes, to be sold in ports of Holland and Zealand, a larger fleet was to be fitted out to dispossess Spain of her West Indian possessions. It is well said that this policy was that of the Jesuits turned against themselves, “one which even the loose practice of that age could scarcely have considered defensible,” and that the “Discourse” which proposed it “has of morality, either public or private, not a particle.” “We know too little of this paper, or of Gilbert’s capacity as a writer, to judge whether he was capable of it; the daring it displays, and the ambition to give England ascendancy over Spain and the rest of Europe which prompted it, might be that of either of the men. “I hold it as lawful in Christian policy,” says the writer, “to prevent a mischief betimes as to revenge it too late, especially seeing that God himself is a party in the common quarrels now afoot, and his enemies’ disposition toward your Highness and his church manifestly seen.” Either might have so written, having both fought against the Catholics in France; Raleigh having been present as a Huguenot trooper under Condé at the battle of Jarnac, and at that of Moncontour under Coligni, and having been in France on St. Bartholomew’s day. One of the conditions of England’s triumph is in the “Discourse” said to be holding Ireland well in hand, which is still the problem of England’s greatness,—Ireland being still the “commonwealth, or rather common woe,” Raleigh described it in 1581,—but there is every probability that of the two Gilbert was earlier in the country.* One sentence—if it be from this document—sounds extremely like Raleigh’s peculiar style. “If your Majesty like to do it at all, then would I wish your Highness would consider that delay doth oftentimes prevent the performance of good things, *for the wings of man’s life are plumed with the feathers of death.*”

* In 1569, the year Raleigh went to France.

On the whole we incline to venture the suggestion that it was written by both Raleigh and Gilbert jointly, and that this, quite as well as St. John's supposition, may account for the tampering with the signature which he mentions.

The new biographers found hardly more to be gleaned than the old ones from Raleigh's martial apprenticeship in France. Six years in scenes of such struggle and bloodshed, however, must have so hardened and trained him that the words of one of the former are true. "In Moncontour he was a raw stripping. In Munster he is an accomplished captain. But he is also something more. He is familiar with sea-service." Still, "the experiences which had ripened the boyish recruit of 1569 into the veteran, on land and water, of 1576, must be, for the most part, imagined. With the Irish campaigns (1580, '81), the biographer of Raleigh begins first to tread on somewhat firm ground." From the more full and picturesque account the other gives of his Irish career we can draw a better conception of it, and of its incidents, character, and surroundings, than has heretofore been possible. To this his letters from that country, now first published by Edwards (Vol. II.), add something. Queen Elizabeth gave him his last appointment there "chiefly," so runs the royal warrant, "that our pleasure is to have our servant Walter Rawley trained sometime longer in that our realm for his better experience in martial affairs." A pretty lively and thorough-going experience he seems to have acquired. There was an insurrection in Munster of the wild Irish sort. There were Spainards and Italians there. Popery was at the bottom as usual. His Holiness sent over two thousand men to help the rebels. "Priests going from castle to castle, from cabin to cabin, stimulated noble and peasant to take up arms for the church; mountains, bogs, woods, valleys, swarmed with the fanatical acolytes of Rome." The movement that culminated in the coming of the Invincible Armada had begun. Gentry and nobles who would not take part personally in the insurrection fomented it. Brigands and other criminals from the Papal prisons held Irish forts: more were expected. The style of hostilities was simply savage. "The country was governed by innumerable chiefs, nearly always engaged in mutual hostilities. The galloglass, mounted on his small but bony and in-

defatigable horse, with battle-axe, generally bloody, on his shoulder; the kern, light, fleet, remorseless, muffled in his cloak, armed with skene or rapier, with conscience at the command of his officer or priest, scoured the country singly or in bands, firing the habitations of the English, killing their cattle, ripping up their women, and perpetrating every other atrocity which national hate could inspire. On the other hand the English soldiers revenged crime with crime; their acts fully equalling those of the kern and galloglass in recklessness and ferocity." The soldiers received little pay, and were substantially quartered on the country, which they harried and wasted. Dashing adventures of all sorts, raids, captures, hand to hand encounters, scenes of ambush, flight, and chase, hairbreadth escapes, deeds of reckless daring and prowess, often with fearful odds against him, wholesale slaughters,—these made up Raleigh's Irish life. His renown spread through the land. Great was the rebel dread of him. The sovereign listened with respect to his military counsels. His superior officer was superseded. The command in part of Munster was given him, once Sir Humphrey Gilbert's office. Out of the confiscated estates of Munster afterward he came to be owner of twelve thousand acres in Cork, Waterford, and Tipperary. Lismore Castle and the manor-house of Youghal became his seats. The castle is now one of the seats of the Dukes of Devonshire. The Raleigh lands became the foundations of great fortunes like those of the Boyles—Earls of Cork—and the Cavendishes. Meantime, at home, for services at court, profitable licenses were granted him, and he had become Warden of the Stanneries, Captain of the Guard, Lieutenant of Cornwall, Vice-Admiral, and a landed man in five English counties.

Another result of the Irish episode in his career was the commencement of a lifelong friendship for that great English poet who dedicated to him, as his next literary friend, the *FÆRIE QUEENE*, and whose dust sleeps next to that of Chaucer in Poet's Corner of the Great Abbey. It is very probable that Spenser received his appointment as Secretary to Lord Grey, the Lord Deputy under whom Raleigh served in Ireland, by Raleigh's recommendation. The poet had unbounded admiration for the soldier every way, as his "View" of the state of

Ireland, his sonnets, his "Colin Clout," and his "Letter" prefatory to his great poem, addressed to Raleigh, all show; and, gentle-spirited as he was, did not dissent from that stern advice touching the extermination of Irish rebels which the soldier gave his Queen down quite to her dying day. The former thought no better of Popery than the latter. He penned, perhaps composed, that narrative and defence of the affair of del Oro, which Lord Grey—a merciless man exulting in a merciless deed—sent in his own name to Elizabeth. But other ties drew these two famous men together, as well as joint participation in Irish campaigns and like views of Irish affairs. Spenser had received lands of the condemned Earl of Desmond—three thousand and twenty-eight acres—as well as Raleigh; the domains of both lay in Munster; and both were zealous in improving and adorning their estates, and anxious to leave them to their children. In this region Raleigh found his friend again years after. At Kilcolman Castle, his seat, on a beautiful lake near the Mulla, Spenser was living and writing, (1588,) surrounded by romantic scenery, but poor. To this visit of Raleigh, who persuaded his friend,—after hearing his verse, and reading to him some of his own—to return with him to England, the world owes the publication of the *FÆRIE QUEENE*. Raleigh's estimate of it is familiar from his fine sonnet* beginning

"Methought I saw the grave where Laura lay,"

and Spenser's judgment of Raleigh's rare poetical gifts is seen in his own fellow-sonnet,

"To thee that art the summer's nightingale."

"Whether or not his appreciation of Spenser's work," remarks Edwards, "helped, with other causes, to keep him from bracing his own poetical energy to a great effort, we shall never know. The pursuits on which he had embarked already were more than enough for a long life-time. He was at this very moment brooding over new plans of vast scope. Yet it is hard to avoid the conjecture that at some time or other the idea that a great poem was among the things possible to his powers must have crossed that fervid and unresting mind." There seems to us ground for more than a conjecture, something like evidence

* He wrote two, but the second is of far less merit.

known to both men and to the public. For in commending his friend as the only one "fit this Argument to write," Spenser calls his own "rimes unsavory and sowre" in comparison with the "golden showre" of Raleigh's, and confesses modestly to him that it were well for himself to turn to other work,

"Whenso thee list thy lofty Muse to raise.
Yet till that thou *thy Poeme* wilt make knowne,
Let thy faire Cinthias praises be thus rudely showne."

Hardly less can be here meant than a poem of Elizabeth by Raleigh.

This was in 1589. English literature was then unshapen, and its place in the world's regard yet to be fixed. It was eighteen years before the birth of Milton. Bacon was eighteen years old; he had not yet written his defence of Elizabeth's treatment of Essex—the literary precursor of his political meanness and shame—and the first edition of his *Essays* did not see the light for eight years. Beaumont was but three years old, and Fletcher but thirteen. Ben Jonson's first publication, "*Every Man in his Humour*," was issued seven years later. Shakespeare, a young man of twenty-five, had two or three years before moved to London from Stratford, and gone into theatrical business, but published nothing till as many years after or more. We have no popular collection of Raleigh's purely literary productions; that of Sir Edgerton Brydges is known only to public libraries and to literati, and by most American readers has not even been seen. Had the same genius and industry been given to some "Poeme" of considerable pretensions which he devoted to his great History, and had this been done in earlier days, when fortune smiled upon him and his powers were at their best, the spirit and beauty of his lesser pieces would have escaped their comparative oblivion and been floated into permanent fame.

No intelligent American will look into the volumes before us without a feeling of the deepest interest in Raleigh's American enterprises. Among the great English discoverers and explorers there is none who so deserves our attention. His own efforts at discovery and exploration were preëminent and

unequaled. And "men who began their training under Raleigh," says Edwards, "were amongst the foremost promoters of the American plantations." Bancroft long since justly styled him "the father of American civilization." His attention was divided between North America and South America; his energy was directed to Virginia and to Guiana. Three times he crossed the Atlantic in the prosecution of his plans. The first voyage—already mentioned—was in 1578 with Gilbert. "No incident in the life of Raleigh," says St. John, "is enveloped more thoroughly in mystery." The cause is conjectured to be the defeat of the English navigators by a Spanish fleet in the spring of 1579.* Much more clear and manifest are the objects of the unsuccessful expedition. "If your highness will permit me, with my associates," says the writer of the "Discourse," speaking in the character of Sir Humphrey, "either openly or covertly to perform the said enterprise, then with the gains thereof there may easily be such a competent company transported to the West Indies as may be able, not only to dispossess the Spaniards thereof, but also to possess your Majesty and realm therewith." In Raleigh's last book he says, "By these colonies the northwest passage to Cathay and China may easily, quickly, and perfectly be searched out, *as well by river and overland as by sea.*" Three years later, in the height of his prosperity at court, when his military, naval, and political plans against Spain were ripening, it was still to America he looked for the trade and treasures, the goods and the gold necessary to their success. "Thitherward, therefore, should the enterprise of England tend; and at the very moment," says one of our authors, "when his dalliance with the Queen maddened Sir Christopher Hatton, and appeared to absorb his thoughts and exhaust his vigor, his imagination in truth was wafting (winging?) its way across the Atlantic, and planting in

* Edwards makes the briefest possible allusion to this voyage of 1578-79; referring to the scanty information collected by Hakluyt in his "early and sedulous researches;" giving his contemporary, John Hooker, as authority for Raleigh's having actually sailed, despite orders in Council to the contrary; and quoting from Hooker these words,—"Infinite commodities in sundry respects would have ensued if the fleet then accompanying you (Sir Walter Raleigh), had according to appointment followed you; or yourself had escaped the dangerous sea-fight, wherein," &c.

the virgin soil of North America the germs of those mighty colonies whose power and grandeur constitute at this moment the astonishment if not the terror of the world." His half-brother, who had lent the Queen's government the three remaining ships of his former fleet for service against Spain on the Irish coast, was planning another adventure in America, and urging his claims for payment on the exchequer. Raleigh earnestly seconded him in every way, and himself adventured two thousand pounds in the new undertaking. "Elizabeth's contribution was 'an anchor guided by a lady,' which the gallant commander was to wear at his breast." She reluctantly consented that Gilbert should go, but forbade Raleigh. His ship, the *Ark Raleigh*, was the largest vessel in the little fleet of five; she put back a few days after sailing, in consequence of the breaking out of an infectious fever among the crew. The admiral (probably unaware of the disease and its consequences) wrote thus, in his indignation at the desertion, to his brother-admiral, Sir George Peckham: "I departed from Plymouth on the 11th of June (1588), with five sail, and on the 13th the *Ark Raleigh* ran from me, in fair and clear weather, having a large wind. I pray you solicit my brother Raleigh to make them an example to all knaves." This letter and Sir Walter's own farewell to Sir Humphrey on the eve of sailing are evidence sufficient of the error of those biographers who speak of Raleigh as on board. "I commend you to the will and protection of God, who sends us such life or death as He shall please or hath appointed," wrote the younger of the half-brothers to the elder. This was the voyage in which Sir Humphrey, after taking possession of Newfoundland in the name of the Queen, and sending back one of his vessels with disabled men, was shipwrecked off the coast of Maine in a night-storm, two ships going down with all on board. The single surviving ship reached Falmouth in the month of September. "Within six months, Raleigh resumed the enterprise. His brother's charter had virtually expired. He obtained from the Queen another charter, with somewhat larger powers, incorporating himself, Adrian Gilbert, and John Davys, by the style of 'The College of the Fellowship for the Discovery of the Northwest

Passage.'” This charter was dated March 25, 1584.* “The Gilberts seem, on the whole,” says one of our authors, “to have looked on their pregnant enterprise in America rather as skilful and daring navigators than as statesmen. By Raleigh, brilliant sailor and explorer as he was, colonization was seen to be a more important undertaking than a northwest passage to China.” “Raleigh left out of sight,” says the other biographer, “scarcely any consideration that could actuate a statesman in coveting foreign possessions. In his addresses and memorials he constantly expatiates not only on the raw mate-

* Edwards 1: 83, 84. In one of this biographer's few picturesque passages (*Introduction*, pp. xxxv, xxxvi, xxxvii), describing the amazing versatility to which he often alludes, he says: “In England, as in Ireland, Raleigh was at the same time soldier and admiral, statesman and engineer. . . . In Devon, he sat, occasionally—clad in some antique garb or other, rustic and weather-proof—on a rude bench of granite, placed upon a wild and secluded tor, as Speaker of a ‘Stannary Parliament,’ composed of Devonshire and Cornish miners. Those Stannary Courts were held in a place so high and so lonely, that both chairmen and members were not unfrequently immersed in cloud-drift. Had any other scholarly courtier from Whitehall dared in those days to venture his person upon the solitary heights of Dartmoor, and within sight of Crockern Tor, it is probable that the place of meeting, the methods of procedure, and the whole aspect of that Parliament of Tinnars, would have suggested to him ideas of some remote Icelandic gathering, or of a still more remote and pre-historic assembly of ancient Britons, in their goat-skins and war-paint, rather than of an English tribunal, subsisting in full vitality under Queen Elizabeth. Meanwhile in some half a dozen ports scattered along our coast, between the Thames and the Hayle, the Queen's Lieutenant of Cornwall and Warden of the Stanneries had his own little fleets of privateers, building, repairing, or in course of reëquipment and victualling, that they might be constantly at hand for any openings of money-bringing enterprise which should offer,—whether on the coasts of Spain, in the Indies, or in the far Pacific.

Perhaps, it was after all in these sea adventures that Raleigh's genius breathed most freely, though in his own person he was never—to his dying day—free from occasional sea-qualms, when fairly under weigh. Yet no writer has ever been able to tell us where or when it was that he got his elementary education as a mariner. . . . When we get fairly upon his maritime track, we do not follow the novice, but the master. He already speaks of naval affairs with a voice of authority. Raleigh not only made great and enduring improvements in ship-building, and wrought changes in naval tactics; but he is the first man of any nation who is known to have set his pen at work upon a complete, practical, and systematic treatise of naval service and naval architecture, ancient and modern.” In 1596 his advice overruled the plans of the Lord High Admiral of England, “sitting in council with other veterans of the navy,” and he led the van of attack in his flag-ship.

rials of opulence, but on the outlet for redundant population, on the expansion and improvement of industry, on the advantages to be derived from a large carrying trade, on the increase of political power, and on the satisfaction of imparting the Christian religion and a more enlightened morality to savage races. These were the topics by which he prevailed upon the Queen, as well as upon parliament, to favor his scheme of colonization." The royal charter authorized him to discover and to hold "remote heathen and barbarous lands," "with all prerogatives, commodities, jurisdictions, royalties, and privileges, by sea and land, as We by letters patent may grant, or any of Our progenitors have granted," "to remain, build, and fortify," "to lead such of our subjects as shall willingly accompany," "to employ and use sufficient shipping and furniture," and to "enjoy forever all the soil of such lands, or towns in the same, with rights and royalties," &c., "with full power to dispose thereof, in fee simple, or otherwise, according to the laws of England, reserving always to Us, for all service, duties, and demands, the fifth part of all the gold and silver there obtained after such discovery." Power to defend and take prizes was also granted, and the rights of citizenship continued to him and all engaged with him in colonies, and authority to govern, "correct, punish, pardon," "as well in cause capital or criminal, as civil, both marine and other, all Our subjects who so adventure themselves and shall inhabit the territories aforesaid, or shall abide within two hundred leagues." Under this ample charter he sent out Amadas and Barlow, a month and two days after the date of the instrument, according to St. John,—within a few days, according to Edwards. In May they were among the Canary Islands, in June at the West Indies, and, coasting by Florida and the Carolinas, took possession of Roanoke in July. They found the island "fifteen to sixteen miles long, a pleasant and fertile ground, full of cedars, saxafras, currants, flax, vines, deer, conies, hares, and the tree that beareth the rind of black cinnamon."* In September they returned with two of the natives, "some commodities from the salvages obtained, as chamois, buffalo, and deer-skins," and a present for the lord-proprietor—doubtless

* *Travails into Virginia*, by William Strachey (Secretary to Lord Delaware).

very acceptable to one so fond of splendour—"a magnificent pearl," according to one author, "a bracelet of pearls as big as peas," according to the contemporary writer quoted by the other. He signalized the English discovery of North America by a new seal with the legend, *Propria insignia Walteri Raleigh, militis, Domini et Gubernatoris Virginiae*; in December his patent was confirmed and enlarged; and a State order dated Feb. 25, 1585, styled him for the first time Sir Walter Raleigh. By March a new fleet was ready for the work of colonization, and on the 9th of April it left Plymouth, "a fleet of seven sailes, with one hundred* householders, and many things necessary to begin a new State." Sir Richard Grenville, Raleigh's cousin, was in command, Thomas Cavendish, who afterward circumnavigated the globe, Thomas Hariot, to whom was due much of Raleigh's knowledge of mathematics, With, a painter, and Ralph Lane, the governor of the colony, were on board. Cattle, trees, plants, vegetables for kitchen gardens, seeds, &c., were shipped with them. The lord-proprietor, always bountiful in his outfits, was liberal in his offers to colonists. "The least that he hath granted," says Hariot, "hath been five hundred acres to a man, only for the adventure of his person." It used to be the fashion to accuse him of illiberality and inhumanity to those sent out, but the article of Mr. Macvey Napier in the *Edinburgh Review* for April, 1840, thoroughly disposed of such groundless allegations. The fate of Lane's colony we need not recite. There is a story, told by one Richard Butler,—whom Raleigh sent out with Amadas, at the age of sixteen, and who was afterward taken in Spain as one of Raleigh's spies,—to the effect that Grenville left in Virginia a hundred and forty men and ten women, with provisions, arms, and ammunition. Butler's document was discovered by St. John at Simancas, in Spain, being his deposition before the criminal court at Madrid, which arraigned him as an English spy, and is entitled "Declaracion que dio Ricardo Butiler, 2 de Mayo, 1593." Butler says he himself returned with Grenville. His accuracy is not to be relied on. There is no question, however, of the dissensions between Lane and Grenville on board

* "And eight" St. John. "And seven." Others. Cf. Barrow, *Life of Drake*, 93.

ship, and between Lane and the natives on land; nor that Sir Francis Drake, returning that way from the sack of St. Domingo, Carthagena, and St. Augustine, took all the planters on board, and landed them at Portsmouth, July 27th, 1586. Raleigh, meantime, had sent out supplies, one vessel arriving at Roanoke a few days after the departure of the colonists with Drake, June 19th, and Sir Richard with three ships, a few days later. Grenville left fifteen men "furnished plentifully with all manner of provisions for two years." To give more form and continuance to future colonies, Raleigh then incorporated Captain John White and twelve associates under the name and style of "The Governor and Assistants of the City of Raleigh in Virginia." They sailed from Plymouth, a hundred and fifty householders on board, May, 1587. Grenville's fifteen men had perished when they landed, and White, unwisely, soon returned to England for supplies. By special license—the struggle of England with Spain being now at its highest—Raleigh was able to send back three ships with White, but they did not wait for the intending colonists, and the expedition was a failure. Of the rest of his Virginian efforts, of which St. John says nothing, let us take the account of Edwards in his own words.

"Presently came Raleigh's great mishap of 1592,* and the various distractions of pursuit and purpose which it entailed; and then came the strong allurements of new enterprise in Guiana. None the less did he take vigorous and repeated measures for the succor of his plantation in Virginia. Between the years 1587 and 1602 he had fitted out, at his own charges, five several Virginian expeditions. He did this amidst all the pressure of great employments and varied enterprises. Virginia lost his care and labor only when he had himself lost his liberty. There is no evidence that either Elizabeth or her ministers (collectively) gave any real furtherance to the great undertaking which, as Hakluyt well puts it, 'required a prince's purse to have it thoroughly followed out.' At one time he leased his Virginian patent to a company of merchants, trusting that their combined resources might achieve that to which his single resources were unequal. But this step also failed. In the last year of the Queen (1602), he sent out Samuel Mace, a mariner of experience, who had already twice visited Virginia, with special instructions for the relief of the survivors of White's colony. When Mace returned, all Raleigh's interest in the colony, as proprietor and chief, had escheated to the crown, by his attainder. But his interest in it, as a statesman, was as vivid as ever. His hopes for the Virginia to come were strong enough to withstand the failure of nine several expeditions, and the natural dis-

* With Elizabeth Throgmorton—disgrace and imprisonment.

couragement of a twelve years' imprisonment. Just on the eve of his own fall from outward greatness, he had written: 'I SHALL YET LIVE TO SEE IT AN ENGLISH NATION.'^{*} That faith remained with him in the Tower; and he did live to see his prediction realized, when he wrote these words, England, it is to be remembered, nowhere visibly possessed even the beginnings of a colony.

Twenty-four years, however, were to pass by, between Raleigh's first expedition and the permanent settlement of the English in Virginia. . . . At a date as late as five years after (this), Spanish intrigue was thought to be still a formidable enemy to the colonial enterprise of Englishmen, but far less formidable than the indecision and inertia of Englishmen themselves. In such words as those which John Chamberlain wrote to Dudley Carleton in 1612, about the prospects of the Virginian enterprise, we are apt to think there must have been both exaggeration and ignorance. But there was probably more of truth than either. After telling his correspondent that fresh expostulations were looked for from the Spanish ambassador against the colonizing of Virginia, he goes on to say: 'That action, it is to be feared, will fall to the ground of itself, by the extreme beastly idleness of our nation; which, notwithstanding any cost or diligence used to support them, will rather starve and die than be brought to labor.' This writer was looking too exclusively at the common herd of men. Raleigh, . . . on the other hand, had been intimate through life with a whole cluster of the men who are the salt of a nation. And he had faith that, in time and under Providence, they, and such as they, would savor the mass. It is his special honor, that of this health-preserving influence few men have spread abroad more than he. He was a pioneer in a multitude of paths, which have converged at length in the greatness of Britain. He had, in conspicuous measure, the failings which commonly accompany his eminent qualities. And, as is the wont of pioneers, he fell on the field. In the history of Britain, at large, there are not many greater names than his, whatever be its real blots. In the history of British America, there is none. His Virginian enterprise had failed; but his perseverance in it had sown broadcast the seeds of eventual success. He had set an example which lived, with a more than common vitality, in the minds of men. Persevering as he had been, his plantation in America, like many other of his great undertakings, had been in some degree injured and impeded by his self-seeking pursuits at court. The same 'calamity' that cut short the temptations which were preying on the noblest part of his nature, opened the way, as it proved, to the new plantations, which were destined to prosper. None the less Raleigh is the virtual founder of Virginia, and of what has grown thereout."

A curious episode in the life of the great colonizer, briefly mentioned by previous writers, is brought out in stronger light in the new biographies. Whether his rewards for public ser-

^{*} This expression is from a letter to Cecil, in "the priceless collection of Elizabethan and Jacobean MSS. at Hatfield" (Edwards 2: 251-3), which "no biographer of Raleigh has hitherto used—or seen." Hatfield is one of the residences of the Marquess of Salisbury, descended from the Cecils. Raleigh's language is: "It were pitty to overthrowe the enterprize: for I shall yet live to see it an English nation." He wrote to protect his interest in a cargo of "sarsephraze."

vices rendered began in the gift of confiscated estates, of which he afterward received—and lost—so many, or in special privileges of license and tax upon industries, is not certain; but his limited original resources must have been already largely increased by royal favor when he began to fit out fleets for the new world. In 1584, 1585, 1587, and 1589, he received grants to export broadcloth; in 1583 he had obtained another gainful monopoly, the privilege of licensing ale-houses and the sale of wines, with power to regulate the price of wine, under certain restrictions. Each vintner was to pay a yearly tax of one pound sterling. The total revenue could hardly have been so "princely" as is represented—notwithstanding the number of vintners—since he underlet the patent for seven years at £700 a year. At its best it yielded him £1,200 a year; a State paper of 1628 says £1,000. But the lessee was a knave, and swindled him, and he expended a year's revenue in recovering the patent. It brought him oddly enough into conflict with the University of Cambridge. Under it one John Keymer had been licensed to sell wine at Cambridge. "The doctors, tutors and under-graduates, considering themselves privileged by ancient usage," says St. John, "to regulate their own tippling, fiercely resented" it. Our author confounds, as do the American advocates of free drinking and free selling, the selling and the tippling of wine. "Legislators," he says in the same connection, "have always been haunted by a desire to regulate other people's morality"—evidently meaning not the mischief of selling, but the vice of drinking. Perhaps the Cambridge authorities were of the same illogical way of thinking; at least the Vice-Chancellor, regardless of the new grant, had already licensed other vintners. A riot ensued, and Keymer's wife was nearly killed. The University champions "were probably right," St. John intimates, "because hard study needing much refreshment, it was surely for them to determine when and how much they would drink!" The point of the controversy, however, was not this at all, but whether they should buy, whenever and how much soever they chose to drink, from the vintner who held a license from the royal patentee. Raleigh wrote three courteous letters* to the Vice-Chancellor and Masters,

* Edwards, Vol. II, in full.

asking only that Keymer should "quyetlye enjoye" his grant "untill by lawe (that governeth us all) yt be otherwyse determyned," professing great good-will to the University, and confidence that its authorities would punish the rioters, "the younge and unbridled hedds," as he calls them. Their answer was the imprisonment of Keymer,*—on the plea that for two hundred years the Cambridge charter had specially empowered the authorities to regulate wine-selling for their own behoof,—and Raleigh desisted. When his patent was renewed in 1588, the wine-selling privileges of Cambridge and Oxford, as University rights, were expressly excepted, and a moiety of all penalties accruing under another wine statute given him instead.

We get glimpses in the volumes before us of the relations of Raleigh to religious liberty and to the Puritans, which no other biographers have afforded. In Southwalk prison, in 1591, there was confined a Puritan scholar, compiler of the first Hebrew Grammar in English, and minister for seven years at Kingston-upon-Thames, John Udall. He was one of the men of whom the Queen had said in 1566 that she "did not know what they were after," to which the Spanish ambassador very shrewdly replied; "*They want liberty, madam.*"† Udall had published at Newcastle-upon-Tyne, while minister there, a book called "The Demonstration of Discipline, which Christ hath prescribed in His Word for the Government of the Church in all times and places until the World's End," and he is spoken of as an indiscreet and intemperate reformer. The Queen's Council "had taken strong measures at first to silence, and then to punish him. Raleigh's attention had been drawn to the case, and his interest aroused by the manly firmness of the defendant." He intimated to the Puritan prisoner that he would exert himself to save his life, if he would give in writing a brief and temperate statement of his views fitted to correct exaggerations. Udall did so, professing loyalty to "Her Majesty's happy government," and asking "that it would please her Majesty—that the land may not be charged with my blood

* Not Baxter, as St. John has it, who was one of the University agents. See Raleigh's letters, July 8, 1584.

† Dr. Jno. Waddington's Congregational History, 733.

—to change my punishment from death to banishment.” His prayer and Raleigh’s intercession* were successful; but while the terms of banishment were under discussion he died in prison. In the session of 1593 a bill for the suppression of Brownists was brought into Parliament, “expressed in terms so generally,” says St. John, “that hardly any person could consider himself safe from its operation.” In the title of the bill the object is mildly stated to be, “to retain the Queen’s Majesty’s subjects in their due obedience.” Raleigh spoke against it “with caution and reserve”—as a man who declared on the scaffold, “I die in the faith professed by the Church of England,” might be presumed to have done; “meaning to screen (the Brownists) from death, yet not forgetting who were their enemies.” “In my conceit,” he said in the debate, “the Brownists are worthy to be voted out of a commonwealth. But what danger may grow to *ourselves*, if this law passes, were fit to be considered. It is to be feared that men not guilty will be included in it. *The law is hard that taketh life, or sendeth into banishment, where men’s intentions shall be judged by a jury; and they shall be judges what another man meant.* But that law that is against a *fact* is just. Punish the fact as severely as you will. If two or three thousand Brownists meet at the sea-side, at whose charge shall they be transported? or whither will you send them? I am sorry for it, but I am afraid there is near twenty thousand of them in England. When they are gone, who shall maintain their wives and children?” One of our authors—we presume they are both good Churchmen—quotes this speech, not for its tolerance, but to show “with how much adroitness and ready wit he avoids breasting the current of an impetuous debate, whilst suggesting considerations and objections which tend nevertheless entirely to turn the tide.” The other displays his familiarity with ecclesiastical history by the following: “Who and what the Brownists were may be explained in a few words; they agreed with the church in doctrine, but differed from it in matters of discipline, being opposed to prelacy, to subscription, and to the predominance of one

* Others interceded also, even the archbishop, Strype says. St. John says Udall was condemned to death “through a juggle practised by Puckering on the jury at his trial.” Puckering was the Lord Keeper.

congregation over another, for which last reason they afterwards obtained the name of Independents." "The Brownists were first sought to be suppressed by the burning of their books, but when that failed, two of them were hanged at St. Edmund's Bury." As another example of Raleigh's relations to religious freedom, his opposition, years later, to a bill "for more diligent repair to church on Sundays"—another soft title—is instanced. The picture he drew of the condition of the courts, if the bill should pass—"a crowd of prosecuting church-wardens, and another crowd of accused Sabbath-breakers," i. e., pious dissenters who attended their own places of worship instead of the parish churches,—would not be without instructiveness, in its mingled humor and severity, to "the Church of England as by Law Established" to-day.

We have no space for the additions which these volumes furnish to our knowledge of Raleigh's services against the Armada, his acquisition of his beautiful estate of Sherborne and loss of it, his marriage with Elizabeth Throgmorton, his first imprisonment in the Tower, the expedition of 1592, and his recall, the capture of the *Madre de Dios* and the transactions resulting,—illustrating the avarice of the Queen and others, and the precarious position and small rewards of her former "minion,"—and his anomalous relations to public affairs and to Elizabeth from the March preceding his departure for Panama (1592) to June, 1596, the four years during which he was not admitted into her presence. The details respecting "the great carrack," the *Madre de Dios*, a ship of seven decks and 1600 tons burthen, the largest prize that had ever been brought into England, are very curious and amusing: the Cecils figure in them, not to their credit, and the evidence of Sir Walter's renown among navigators and seamen, though sent to Dartmouth with a keeper—"the Queen's poor captive," as he called himself,—is very striking. Instantly on his release (1592 or 1593) a great voyage of discovery filled his thoughts. His wife besought the younger Cecil to turn him from his purpose, but in vain. He had embarked in his last venture more than his whole available estate; the Queen* and others received double and more in

* She contributed one tenth, and took half the profits.

return; "we that assisted her service," he says, "have not our own again." Yet on the 9th of February, 1595, he sailed on his second transatlantic voyage, with five ships, for Guiana. One of the ships belonged to the Lord High Admiral, and Sir Robert Cecil also contributed to the expedition. On the 22d of March Raleigh was at Trinidad, and leaving his ships at Los Gallos, in the Gulf of Paria, he was soon moving in barges with a hundred men, victualled for a month, through the Bay of Guanipa along the "River of the Red Cross" (the Canyo Manamo), and the Orinoco to the mouth of the Caroni, above the island of Tortola. He explored the Canyo Piacoa, and returned to the ocean by the Canyo Macares, another of the mouths of the Orinoco, having penetrated South America some four hundred miles. Giving up his plan of relieving his Virginia planters on his return, he touched at some Spanish colonies, and in August was back again in London. He brought with him the son of Topiowari, "King of Aromai," an aged chief in the neighborhood of the Caroni, and left with him two of his men, one of whom he found again in 1617. He had sent out Captain Jacob Whiddon to explore the coast and the Orinoco the year before, and five months after his return he dispatched Captain Lawrence Keymis to complete what he had himself left undone. Keymis found Topiowari dead, and a Spanish guard near the mouth of the Caroni to defend certain mines, and returned after scanty results. The expedition of the next year (Oct., 1596), under command of Captain Leonard Berry, was still less productive. He attempted to find Lake Parima and El Dorado, by ascending the river Corentine, the boundary at present between British and French Guiana, but was deterred by hostile Indians and Spaniards on the Essequibo. Of Raleigh's published accounts of Guiana* no respectable writer would at present speak in the indiscriminating and abusive terms employed by Hume. They serve now chiefly to illustrate the harsh and heady prejudices

* *The Discovery of the Large, Rich, and Beautiful Empire of Guiana, &c.* Printed at London by Robert Robinson, 1596—with appendix, an abstract taken out of certain "Spaniards'" letters, taken at sea by Capt. Geo. Popham, 1594,—and Considerations, on the voyage to Guiana, published later. The editions before us are those of Constable. Edin., 1820.

under which that excellent hater wrote, and the slack and incomplete style of his historical researches. Guiana stood in Raleigh's day, not only for the three European colonies now known by that name, and the large neighboring province of Venezuela, but for a wide and indefinite tract of interior South America besides. Its wealth had been extolled from the time of Columbus. Raleigh tells what he heard of it from Spaniards, Indians, and others,—what he believed, and what he had seen and knew. The critics have shown a marvelous want of distinction between the three sorts of statement. It is quite inexcusable in those who have read in our own day baseless newspaper reports from our mountain territories. The modern knowledge of true geological and mineralogical indications of the precious metals cannot be required of Raleigh, or his contemporaries; every one else made the same report he did; he brought home specimens of gold, &c., and although the mining of Venezuela is still unthrifty, in the district of Upata, two hundred and thirty-seven years after his statements, discoveries were made that sufficiently vindicate them. Edwards gives a brief account of explorations earlier than his, under German and Spanish leaders, and of their reports of all sorts, including the most incredible points in the "fables" for which the great Englishman was traduced; St. John found in the archives of Simancas, "in perfect preservation and signed with his name," his own original map, from policy unpublished by himself, which well enough represents both the geographical knowledge and the belief of his time;* Charles Leigh (voyage, 1604), Robert Harcourt (do. 1608), and Fisher, "the Mariwin Inquirer," Harcourt's associate, found the natives of whom Raleigh made inquiry expecting his return, as Dr. Bancroft (*Hist. Guyana*, 1766) says the Charibees still did, a hundred and

* In his "Discoverie," p. 35, Edin. edit., he says; "How all these rivers cross and encounter; how the country lieth, and is bordered; the passage of Ximenes and of Berreo; mine own discovery, and the way that I entered, with all the rest of the nations and rivers,—your lordship shall receive in a large chart or map, which I have not yet finished, and which I shall most humbly pray your lordship to secrete, and not to suffer it to pass your own hands; for by a draught thereof all may be prevented by other nations." Probably it was an English "draught thereof" which was presented to the Virginia Company, 1620, Nov. 15, by a "stranger." See Neill's *Eng. Colonization of Amer.*, Lond., 1871, p. 123.

seventy-one years after his first voyage; and Humboldt heard traditions to the same effect, "almost two hundred years after Raleigh had been laid in his grave." Sir Robert Schomburgk, following Raleigh's route very nearly, two hundred and fifty years after him, found his descriptions thoroughly accurate.* An American writer, Van Heuvel, himself once a resident in British Guiana, has collected a multitude of confirmations from English, Dutch, French, Spanish, Italian authors, entirely relieving Raleigh from the suspicion of having invented anything,† and successfully answering the few critical objections of Humboldt. And there seems ample warrant every way for the following paragraph of Edwards:

"The expedition of 1595 gave its color to the whole remainder of Raleigh's life. The fame of it spread far and wide. It intensified that Spanish hatred of Raleigh, and of everything even remotely appertaining to his name, which the capture of the *Madre de Dios* had already raised high enough to leave enduring marks on the history both of Spain and of England. It gave rise to aspersions at home, on his veracity and honor, which gained currency amongst his contemporaries in tolerably exact proportion to their want of education and of the power of weighing evidence. And these aspersions have been repeated by historians in still exacter proportion to their ignorance of facts and their carelessness of truth."

The best proof of his own faith in respect to Guiana was given by Raleigh twenty-two years later in his second expedition. It was no less proof of his life-long and intense hatred of Spain.

* Edition of Raleigh's "Discoverie," 1848.

† *El Dorado*; being a narrative of the circumstances which gave rise to reports in the sixteenth century, &c., &c. By J. A. Van Heuvel; N. York, J. Winchester, 1844. pp. 166.

The play of "*Eastward Ho*," (Lond., 1605,) shows that in the popular English belief of the period there were more exaggerated and unfounded notions about precious metals in Virginia than even in South America. "*Sea-Gull*," reproducing, as Neill says, "the conversations that had taken place on the pavements around the Royal Exchange," is made to say:

"I tell thee, gold is more plentiful there than copper is with us, and for as much red copper as I can bring I'll have thrice weight in gold. Why, man, all their dripping-pans and chamber-pots are pure gold; and all the chains with which they chain up their streets are massive gold; all the prisoners they take are fettered in gold; and for rubies and diamonds, they go forth in holy days and gather 'hem by the sea-shore to hang on their children's coats and stick in their children's caps as commonly as our children wear saffron-gilt brooches and groates with holes in 'hem." Neill's *Eng. Colonization*, p. 4. The play was published after Raleigh had given Salterne and Hakluyt permission to make settlements in Virginia under his patent.

During his long imprisonment in the Tower, to encourage the Indians against Spain, "he held a constant intercourse with Guyana, sending at his own charge, every year, or every second year, a ship," says Campbell, in his *Lives of the Admirals*. In June, 1617, with thirteen sail and nearly nine hundred men, he was at sea again on his way thither. It was the most heroic act of his heroic life. He was sixty-five years of age, broken in health and spirits, dead in the eye of the law, drawing after him, as he said, "the chains and fetters whereunto I have been thirteen years* tied in the Tower (being unpardoned, and in disgrace with my sovereign lord)."† His company consisted largely of miserable adventurers. There is sufficient evidence that King James had previously listened favorably to proposals to give Raleigh command of an expedition against Genoa; that when this fell through a commission was offered him in behalf of Louis of France—a Spanish copy of which is at Simancas—which would have secured him on his return a welcome and honor in France; that Raleigh sailed under legal advice—perhaps Francis Bacon's—to the effect that James's commission was as good as a pardon; and that after it was written, the words of grace and favor in it on which he trusted were, at the request of Goudomar, the Spanish ambassador, *erased*. He endured the most terrible sickness of his life on this voyage; he lost at the same moment his best friend at Court after Queen Anne, Sir Ralph Winwood, Secretary of State. Of his former voyage he had declared: "I could have returned a good quantity of gold ready cast, if I had not shot at another mark than present profit." His one fixed idea, as Kingsley has well said, was "the destruction of the Spanish power and colonization of America by England." Yet this last desperate and most extraordinary enterprise of his life benefited neither England nor himself. His gallant son Walter fell in battle with Spaniards, on the banks of the Orinoco; his trusted captain, Keymis, turned back when within two hours' march of the mine, which was the objective point of Raleigh's movements, and the possession of which would have turned, he was confident, his destiny. The rest of the story need not be told. The

* From Dec. 16, 1603, to March 20, 1616.

† Apology for the last voyage to Guiana, pub. 1650.

false King disavowed and denounced by proclamation Raleigh's acts; he returned to London to be imprisoned again at the instance of Spain, and to die as one attainted of treason under the old charge of 1603,—intent to bring in a Spanish invasion. A multitude of painfully interesting and new details concerning the later incidents of his life, the debates at Madrid and at London, the critical relations of Great Britain, France, and Spain that hung upon his fate, and the particulars of his death, are given in the new biographies.

Of the political career of this wonderful man and the new lights here thrown upon its successive and changeful phases, we have left ourselves no room to speak. Like English and American political history in our own day, it is too full of personal struggles, of intrigues and plots and unprincipled dealing for the purpose of putting up one and putting down another, to have the highest interest for the reader. From the time of his entering Parliament at Queen Elizabeth's instance in 1585—sitting for Devonshire, as his ancestors did before him in many Parliaments—to his execution at Westminster on the 29th of October, 1618, all the favorites of two reigns, from Hatton and Essex to Carr and Villiers; all the great statesmen of England, Burghley, Leicester, Salisbury, Bacon, and the rest; all the great captains and admirals of his time, Drake, Gorges, Frobisher, the Howards,—figure in the story. The expeditions against Cadiz and Fayal are richly worthy of illustrations from the new materials, and the whole course of domestic and foreign policy in England in the times of Elizabeth and James is made clearer thereby. But after all, the story is too much one of personal politics, and would lead us too far. It is the more ignoble portion of his great life. A more grateful theme—to which we may be tempted hereafter to turn—is the literary life of Raleigh, with its rare extant monuments, central among which stands that extraordinary production, the *History of the World*. On the side of his practical writings he influenced such men as Cromwell and Hampden, John Eliot and John Milton; on the side of belles-letters he touched such men as Spenser, Jonson, and Shakspeare. St. John somewhere intimates that, like all thoughtful men, he came in measure under

the mighty spell of metaphysics, and Edwards quotes the admission of Dugald Stewart that on one point the prisoner of genius in the Tower of London had forestalled him by two centuries. "In the region of abstract philosophy, as in that of the most intensely concrete problems of statecraft, Raleigh was able to anticipate some of the ripest conclusions of men who have given—two hundred years after his death—large sections of their lifetime to statesmanship apart, or to philosophy apart." There is wisdom enough and noble writing enough in his now neglected works to set up a score of modern authors. His prose style is confessed by all critics to be singularly natural, unaffected, robust, and choice; his poetry is worthy of association with it; and both deserve a literary resurrection. If the new lives of this wonderful man shall have no other effect than to recall attention, in this country and in his own, to the literary remains of one of the most splendid actors and one of the greatest geniuses in English history, they will confer a boon of no little value upon the culture of the nineteenth century.

ARTICLE VI.--MUSIC AS A FINE ART.

ITS HISTORY — ITS PRODUCTIONS — THE ELEMENTS OF ITS
BEAUTY.

A LECTURE BY THE LATE PROF. E. T. FITCH, D.D.

I AM to speak to you on the subject of music—a subject to which I have devoted many of the leisure moments of my life, and which has often proved a solace to me amid the exhausting cares of professional labor. The aspect in which I am to present it is that of a *fine art*. I shall treat of it as such, in respect to its *history*, its great *productions*, and the constituent elements of its *beauty*.

The fine arts originate in a desire, inherent in man, to represent, to himself or others, the conceptions of the imagination that give him pleasure. In the depths of his spiritual being he is ever conceiving of transient forms of natural or moral beauty. He loves, by means of art, to represent these to his external senses; to give them birth and being in some outward form, which will prolong their existence to himself, and present their beauties to other minds.

The fine arts, consequently, have their origin in the childhood of man, in the infancy of the world. Even the children of our proto-father Adam amused themselves, I fancy, with the rude tracery of outlines on the sand, the construction of little huts of turf, the whistling or humming of song; like other boys of later date, before and since the Christian era. But in the world at large, as in individuals, the imaginative arts require a long series of efforts for their cultivation and growth, before they attain maturity and present models of perfection. Yet in reaching that stage of advancement, none has been so long delayed as the art which I now bring to your notice. While sculpture, painting, architecture and poetry, attained their highest forms of beauty under the hand of artists who lived before the Christian era; music, for various reasons, deferred to so late

a period as the last century the era of her triumph—the development of her highest forms of beauty.

The sculptor and painter were employed on imitative arts. The ideas on which they labored were familiar. The objects of their conceptions, singly or in group, were often presented to view in the field of nature. The tools they employed, too, were simple, and their labors stood forth in real forms of marble, or in the colored representation of forms upon the panel, addressing their beauties at once to every eye. Nothing but the simplest mechanical inventions and most obvious chemical discoveries were necessary to the prosecution of those arts. And productions, whose beauty was recognized at once, stimulated the artist to excellence by the prospect of immediate responses of pleasure and reward. The architect, dealing in forms addressed to the eye and adapted to the constant wants of man, and depending on the simplest mechanical inventions for the prosecution of his art, could easily advance, in the beauty of his designs, with the progress of man toward wealth, civilization and taste; and, following him from the rude hut and tent of savage life to the wealth and compactness of the city, was sure to crown the art on the plains of Thebes and Palmyra, on the acropolis of Greece and the seven hills of Rome. The poet, too, ever furnished with the means of his art in living language, and with the materials of it in the living world that surrounded him, needed only the occurrence of subjects of great interest, the discipline of repeated production and study, the stimulus of a listening world, and sufficient leisure to attend to his art. These at an early age were afforded him, by the incidents attendant on human life and the founding of empires, by means of public rehearsals, by the invention of the art of writing, and by the patronage of the public or of the wealthy: and his art attained the culminating point of beauty and perfection, in works of a remote antiquity which now survive even the life of the languages in which they were written—the immortal epics of the man of Scio and the bard of Mantua, and lyric and dramatic compositions, which charmed, two thousand years ago, the inhabitants on the banks of the Ilyssus and the Tiber.

But the musician labored under far greater difficulties in bringing his art to perfection. There were no specimens before him extant in the book of nature. None, that would represent to him the higher capacities of his art, as addressed to the ear, the intellect, the feelings of man. There were indeed fragmentary sketches of the natural language of sounds, in the ocean roar, the murmuring brook and waterfall, the forest winds, and the varied cries and songs of the animal creation, as well as in the varying intonations of human speech, which characterize the various passions of man, and constitute a natural language that is without national limits, the same amid all the diversity of human tongues. Whatever musical ideas might be suggested to him from these sources, they could not supply the demands of his art: which respected the full capacities of music in its application to *man*; which sought out of all possible qualities and combinations of musical sound those which would best adorn the utterance of his thoughts and feelings, which would most gratify his ear and best awaken the emotions of his heart.

Here was a new language for man, yet to be formed. The element out of which it was to be composed was known. The laws of its combination were indeed fixed: yet they were to be explored. How far man could advance in this new language, and to what extent he might apply it, was as yet problematical—the subject of future experiment and discovery. Mankind would indeed early indulge their voices in music: but the specimens from this source would not furnish the real artist—the man of nice ear and judgment—with so good models as he could produce from the trial of his own voice. For the line of discipline, improvement, discovery, must begin and proceed with the line of true artists. To advance in the art in the experimental way,—the only way in which he could judge of new combinations,—he needed the means of representing to his ear the evanescent sounds of music at will, in order, by repeated production, to acquire familiarity with musical ideas.

Accordingly, as the history of the art shows, he had early recourse to other means than the voice, for producing the musical sounds of which he conceived—by the invention of passive instruments, which the Scriptures date back before the

flood to the times of Jubal, the father of such as handle the harp and pipe, and which secular history ascribes to the Egyptian Thoth, to the Grecian Apollo and Pan. With a musical instrument in his hands and skill to utter its notes, he was prepared to act as composer and judge.

But in the musical instrument itself, a new and vast field was opened for mechanical discovery and invention. The first musical instruments were rude: very confined in the scale, not susceptible of changes in the key or pitch, requiring a separate instrument for each modulation. They were—besides instruments of rhythm and percussion, such as the timbrel or tamborine, drum and cymbal—a whistle-mouthed instrument, with a very few stops like the flageolet, a collection of stop reeds blown on the open orifice like the pandean pipes, called in our translation of the Scriptures an organ; a trumpet with no compass in the scale: and a few stringed instruments, called harp, psaltery, lyre; differing in nothing essential from the principal one called the lyre, the compass of which among the Greeks was at first four tones—the tetrachord, and afterward seven—the heptachord.* Among the Jews the harp had eight strings, and their instrument of ten strings was called the psaltery. With such instruments only as were known to the ancients, no artist could have gone beyond the simplest melodies. No entrance could have been made on experiments in counterpoint or harmony. For, with these solo instruments, the artist could not have produced a harmonic concurrence of sounds himself; and the obstacles to any entrance upon experimental harmonics, with such instruments in the hands of others, would have been almost insurmountable. In accordance with these principles is the fact, that in ancient Egypt, Judea, Greece, and Rome, the use of counterpoint was wholly unknown. In their Sacred Temple hymns, their martial, nuptial, and festive songs, their musical contests at the public games, and the chant of dialogue

* Timotheus, a famous Milesian artist, when he appeared in Sparta with a lyre of eleven strings, brought upon himself an edict of the Kings and Ephori—a very curious document, which has come down to us—in which they resolve to “oblige him to cut off all the superfluous strings of his *eleven*, leaving only *seven tones*; and to banish him from our city, that men may be warned for the future not to introduce into Sparta any unbecoming customs.”—Burney, vol. i, p. 408. (Lacedæmonians.)

or chorus at their theatres, the music was confined to one part: and whether that part was sung by an individual, a choir united, or a choir divided for antiphonal responses, the voices and instruments were all in unison.* In this its ancient state † music has still remained in all the nations that have not come under the improvements in the sciences and mechanic arts of modern times. Along the shores of the upper Nile, as Bruce, ‡ the traveler, wrote in 1774, the instruments still are the flute, the trumpet, and the lyre. This last instrument is played in accompanying the voice, "with which," says that writer, "it plays constantly in unison: nor did I ever hear *music in parts* in any nation, savage or polished, out of Europe. This is the last refinement music received after it was in possession of complete instruments; and it received it probably in Italy."

In order to perfect himself in the beauties of musical composition, the artist needed an instrument by which he might conveniently represent to his ear, not only melodies but co-temporaneous parts, distinct yet grouped into one harmonious movement and expression. To this stage mechanical invention had not proceeded until the thirteenth century of the Christian era: when the organ, which from the time of its invention in the sixth century had been confined to a few notes, and worked by keys five inches in breadth, was so far perfected in the extension of the scale and construction of the keys, as to allow the composer to represent full harmony to his ear by the action of fingering with both hands. The name organ, a Greek word signifying instrument, had been applied previously to wind musical instruments in general; and when the instrument now

* Gardiner (*Bombet's Life of Haydn and Mozart*, p. 159), I see, is incredulous on the point of the ignorance of the ancients in respect to counterpoint; not on the ground of historic testimony, but for the philosophical reason that counterpoint has its foundation in the fixed laws of nature. But the laws of nature may exist ages before their discovery by man; as is demonstrated by modern astronomy and chemistry: and the history of the rise and progress of counterpoint among the *moderns*, from the time of Guido, furnishes abundant facts in direct contradiction to his theory.

† On this subject, vid. *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities*, London, Art. Music. *Pindari Opera* by A. Boeckh, Prof. of Eloq. and Poetry, Roy. University, Berlin. Lib. iii, cap. x.

‡ Burney, vol. i, p. 217.

known under that name was invented, it was called *the organ*, by way of honor, as the chief of such instruments. The organ was invented indeed as early as the sixth century: but in a very imperfect form, without a key board to withdraw the action of the valves at a convenient distance from the wind chest, and with so few divisions in the wind chest as to distribute all the pipes into the narrow compass of eight or ten notes of the scale. In the long interval that elapsed till the thirteenth century, no improvements were made upon it that were conducive to the study of harmony, none except in reference to its size and power. The great organ of the Bishop of Winchester, for instance, in the tenth century, described by Wolfstan, which required the power of seventy men to work its twenty-six huge bellows, had all its pipes confined to the compass of ten keys, and each key, five inches in breadth, required the whole hand to work it. But, in the thirteenth century, the organ was extended to the compass of more than two octaves, and allowed, as is necessary to the production of harmony, the action of fingering with both hands.

Before this period, however, in the ninth and tenth centuries, experiments were begun in the choirs of the churches. There was introduced into the music of the Church,—in which the voices and instruments had hitherto moved in unison to the plain song or chant,—the new practice of *discant*; in which some leading singer separated from the canto of the choir by venturing forth into a voluntary. These discanters, guided by no known laws of harmony, sometimes carrying along the canto itself at the interval of a fourth, called “*diatessaronare*,” or of a fifth, “*quintoier*” (B. vol. ii, p. 173), were engaged, as Rousseau remarks, like a man throwing at a mark in a chance play at hit or miss; nevertheless they were entering upon the boundaries of a new province in music, that was to present to future explorers all the riches of modern harmony. Guido, a monk of Arezzo, in Tuscany, in the eleventh century gave some rules for *discant*, and to him has been generally ascribed the origin of regular counterpoint, though, from the specimens given in the history of Dr. Burney (vol. ii, pp. 76, 77), taken from the *Micrologus* of Guido, he seems not to have advanced into the regions of pure harmony.

During the first essays in harmony, it became apparent that music in its progress has to deal with a sense less generally cultivated and more prejudiced in its habits than the eye. The uncultivated ear rests satisfied with a single current of melody, just as the eye may repose with satisfaction awhile on a single color. But that higher form of beauty, which occupies the mind with variety grouped in unity, which constitutes alike the charm of painting and of modern harmony, the eye is ready, but the ear is slow, to appreciate. While the new art of counterpoint was extending its boundaries and settling its code of laws, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, great scandal was given to the ear so strongly prejudiced in favor of the simplicity of ancient usages: and, in the commencement of the fourteenth century Pope John XXII, by his papal bull, excommunicated the accursed thing, describing it in his decree as a "new measure of the disciples of the new school,"* holding on with most conservative strength to the old canto forms of the Church. But the new school was destined to survive and accomplish its mission of good. Its masters indeed went forward to excesses in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, building up a vast Gothic pile of mere complicate harmony, set off with the frivolous airs and ballads of the times. They neglected to construct pure and touching melodies to guide the expression and give unity to their productions. These excesses, again, for a time, brought the whole progress of the art into danger. The Pope and conclave in 1555 determined to banish music in parts entirely from the Church, and nominated a commission to advise upon the question. At this juncture, John Pierluigi da Palestrina, an eminent musician, yet in his youth, during the short pontificate of Marcellus II. besought his holiness to suspend the execution of his design, till he had heard a mass composed according to the conceptions he had formed of a pure choral style. Palestrina now applied himself with enthusiasm to the great and complicated work of a mass. He felt that it was an experiment on which depended the life or death of the grand music of the Church. He completed, during the same year, but under Pope Pius IV, the successor of Marcellus, a mass, known by the name of the mass of Pope Marcellus, that surpassed all expectation. Full of sim-

* B. vol. ii, pp. 149, 213.

ple and affecting melody, it yet had, in its choral parts, great compass and variety. In the language of Ranke *—that spirited historian of the Popes—"The meaning of the words is expressed with unrivalled accuracy and force: the Kyrie is submission; the Agnus, humility; the Credo, majesty. Pope Pius IV, before whom it was performed, was enraptured, and compared it to the heavenly melodies which the apostle John heard in his ecstatic trance."

"By this one great example, the question was now forever set at rest. A path was opened, in following which the most beautiful works, the most touching, were produced."

Palestrina since that day has been regarded as the immortal genius † who shook off from the art the fetters of barbarism which had been thrown around it in the middle ages: the author of the modern melody with its pure harmonic accompaniments.

In the seventeenth century the artist was favored in his studies and progress, not only by a new field that was opened for the exertion of his talents (which I shall notice shortly), but by the invention of a new musical instrument. This was the harpsichord, a keyed instrument which substituted for the bellows and pipes of the organ the indirect action of the keys on the strings of the harp, and placed the sounds of music in more complete subjection to the musician. Nought but the perfection of this species of instrument, and perfect execution upon it, seemed now necessary to the artist in order to give him the full ideas of his art: and to empower him to utter forth all the feelings of his soul in expressive melodies, sustained and adorned with the richest harmonies. To this perfection the keyed instrument was brought in the last century by the invention of the *piano-forte*: which, by the substitution of leather-covered hammers to strike the strings for the crow-quill jacks which snapped them in the harpsichord, and the introduction of pedals to raise the dampers and soften the hammers at will, has brought under the hand of the artist a far richer treasure of mellifluous and varying tones, and, by superior mechanism in the action of the keys, has given him facilities for acquiring far superior rapidity, delicacy, and trueness of

* Vol. i, p. 510.

† Bombet, p. 161.

touch in his execution. "The invention of the piano-forte," says an accomplished musician and critic,* "has formed an era in the art. It has been the means of developing the sublimest ideas of the composer, and the delicacy of its touch has enabled him to give the highest shades as well as the boldest strokes of musical expression. It is the only instrument that will represent to his ear the effects of a full orchestra."

At this instrument, above all others, the musical genius and artist has been aided in his studies and stimulated to explore the hidden recesses of harmony. At this instrument, Haydn and his successors studied and prepared their great works. How was it possible that Mozart, even with all his native genius, could have acquired such familiarity with the laws and combinations of harmonic sounds as to have composed an elaborate opera at the age of twelve, unless from earliest childhood he had enjoyed this means to awaken, by the mere movement of his fingers, a whole living orchestra, as it were, into obedient song?

The improvements in finished harmony and accompaniment, arising from studies with the piano-forte, as well as progress from example, are at once apparent, when, from the accompaniments of Scarlatti, Durante, Pergolesi, Hasse, Bach, and Handel, those earliest stars in the galaxy of modern music, who studied at the organ and harpsichord, we turn to the richer and more exquisite harmonies of Haydn and Mozart, von Weber and Beethoven, who studied at the piano-forte,—the last and brightest constellation of the modern art.

Another difficulty which this art has had to encounter, is that of presenting, as do the other fine arts, its productions to the eye, in some permanent form which will summon with accuracy their beauties to the mind. A system of musical notation was to be devised by which music might be written with accuracy and recorded for preservation, that the specimens and models of one age might be transmitted to another, and the art, by the instruction and incentive of example, advance to perfection. Here then a new *written* language was to be formed. The artist has his musical ideas conceived clearly, but how

* Gardiner, *vid.* Bombet, Note P.

own consideration and revision? How shall he write them down so as to summon them before others in their richness and beauty?

The art of notation was an experimental one, that began in a rude form, and that was altogether inadequate, in its first state, to represent the full music of the moderns. On the subject of the ancient Greek notation, its moods, and its notes, and the ancient Roman notation, the system from which the modern has sprung, and the various stages through which the modern has passed in arriving at its present stage of perfection, I will not detain you. I will barely observe that the time-table, so indispensable for writing measured and harmonized music, was not begun till the twelfth century, and consequently, measure and accent were regulated in all previous ages, solely by the rhythm and quantity of words; and during this long period instrumental music must have been tied to vocal or the words of the ode, and could not have asserted its independence.

The very simple musical idea, too, of the relative pitch of a tune was set forth in the very indefinite language of Dorian, Ionian, Phrygian, Æolian and Lydian moods, and their five correlates below them and above. These five middle moods, ascending in the order named, were set upon the five semitones from D to F sharp in our present bass staff: the five lower moods were set upon the five semitones below D, and called by the same names, with the prefix of the Greek preposition "*hypo*" or "*under*": the five higher moods on the five semitones immediately above F sharp, with the prefix to their names of "*hyper*," or "*above*." Beginning, therefore, at A in the lowest space of the bass staff with the *hypo* Dorian, the Greek notation ascended, through fifteen semitones, to the *hyper* Lydian, as the several key-notes, each, of a distinct mood. In respect to these moods it is to be remarked, that the names present no definite standard of pitch to the eye, as do the fixed letters on the modern staff with their sharp or flat for the semitonic intervals: and that the number of fifteen is imperfect, since the semitonic intervals being only twelve in the octave before we return again to the same mood, there must, if the minor mood alone were intended, be three too many, or, if both shall he write down these sounds so as to retain them for his

minor and major nine too few, or, if a part only of either, the selection is arbitrary, and false to the scale.*

In writing down the notes of music, the letters of the alphabet were employed to the number of sixteen, to represent as many intervals of the diatonic scale. This was perhaps necessary, because nothing was presented to the eye, significant of relative position of the notes, as is now done by means of the staff. But as if to render notation as cumbrous as possible, a change was made in each of the primary letters (by sections, additions, inversions and other means) to form a distinct set of characters for each of the three genera of music, and for each of the fifteen moods, and—what is still more astonishing—a change in all the characters of all the moods was again made to distinguish a copy, designed for the instrumentalist, from one designed for the vocalist. On this plan, as Rousseau remarks, the Greeks must have employed at least 1620 marks as distinct notes. No wonder that, with such a complex system of notation to represent the simplest musical ideas, all advancement should be stopped at the threshold; and that Plato should have prescribed to youth a three years' course of study, in order to learn the mere rudiments—the alphabet† of music.

The modern system of notation began with the Romans, who wrote their music by the first fifteen letters of their alphabet, and discarded the Grecian moods. At least, whatever may have been their more ancient mode of notation, however much conformed to Greek, this simpler system of notation was in use among them before the time of Gregory. Near the close of the sixth century, when the fifteen Roman letters were in use, Gregory, Bishop of Rome, considering that the relation of the sounds are the same in each octave, reduced the notation to the seven first letters of the alphabet; writing these seven letters in Roman capitals for the bass octave, in small letter for the tenor, and in small letter doubled for the treble, and with these letters the canto was written.‡ In the tenth century lines were intro-

* There is much obscurity resting upon the subject of the ancient Greek moods. For as they are all known to have been minor, the number has been accounted for by different conjectures: the most probable of which is, that beside relative pitch in the scale, they were appropriated to particular kinds of measure in the rhythm and accent of lyric poetry.

† Rousseau *Dict. de Mus. Art. Note*, p. 10, Vol. II. (Vol. XI. *Œuvres*.)

‡ B. Vol. II, p. 31, 32.

duced, the *spaces between them* receiving the Roman letters to denote their value in the scale, and the words to be sung were then written so as to dispose of their syllables on the spaces, according to the canto; afterward the *lines* were lettered instead of the spaces, and the syllables written on the lines.* In the eleventh century Guido introduced the plan of writing on the lines, by means of black points, the *canto itself*, without the words: and, with this improvement, he was able to write the first imperfect conceptions he had formed of harmony; placing, for notes that were to be sung together, point under point, point opposite or counter to point; from which notation, the composition of harmony derived its name of counterpoint. Afterward the size of the staff of lines was reduced, by prefixing the Roman letters to both the spaces and lines, and writing the points on both. The points were next changed to a square character, written in black at first, and afterward, written open. But nothing had been devised, as yet, to represent the measure and accent of notes. As in the ancient Greek music, so in the *canto fermo* of the Church up to this period, notes signified only the relative pitch of the sound; measure and accent were regulated solely by the ode. The time-table, so indispensable to writing the measured and harmonized music of the moderns, was begun by employing different shaped notes to represent relative lengths of the long, the breve [short], and the semibreve; and the improvement is attributed by Rosseau to John de Muris, Doctor and Canon at Paris, in 1388, but by Dr. Burney, still earlier to Magister Franco, soon after Guido, in the eleventh century. But not till a much later period was the modern time table perfected: with its various kinds of notes both plain and pointed, and their correspondent rests; its bars, drawn across the staff, to measure off the movement into equal parts of exactly recurring rhythm; and its marks of time at the head of the staff, to characterize the movement as to rapidity and accent.

But even the present mode of noting down musical ideas, precise and perfect as it is, gives, to most minds, but a poor and frigid representation of the beauties of sound which the characters are designed to express. A musical composition, when

*B. Vol. II, p. 35.

written, is a work of the imagination in which the conceptions of the artist author are sketched; and, he who is able to enter into the spirit of melodies and harmonies by perusing the score, may appreciate its beauties. As a work of art, it is as independent of the accidents of a good or bad representation to the ear, as are the written dramas of Shakespeare. Yet there are very few who can peruse a score intelligibly, with a clear perception of the musical combinations intended and their beauty. Representation is therefore necessary to make known to the public the character of a musical composition. The written work of an artist must needs be in the hands of an artist, to represent it fully to the ear, before its merits and beauties can be generally appreciated. On this account, his works often fluctuate in the estimation of the public, according to the chance qualities of the representation. You may conceive of the disadvantage, if you suppose, for example, that the works of Milton and Shakespeare could not be perused by the eye in the retirement of the study and the wakeful communings of the imagination; but, for their appreciation or enjoyment, were thrown upon the mere chances of a good or bad public rehearsal.

The great artists in the composition of music, consequently, have ever needed, in order to make known the beauties of their compositions, and impart to other minds their own beautiful conceptions, not merely to publish their scores for the inspection of the world, but to have them represented, under their own superintendence, by an orchestra of accomplished musicians and singers. The opportunities for this representation were first afforded them in the Church; and, until the period of the Reformation, the most finished specimens of the art were consecrated to the service of the Catholic Church.

The great composers were employed as chapel-masters in the royal cathedrals of Europe. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries there was a Flemish school of masters, among whom John Okenheim and Jusquin du Pres were most celebrated; with the French, Anthony Brumel and John Monton were most distinguished; Francis Salinas and Christopher Morales among the Spanish; and with the English, Taverner, Dr. Fairfax, and Dr.

Tye. The musical talents of all nations were then held in subjection to the Church of Rome. Not only did the great masters at that age labor for the service of the Catholic Church in the countries where they lived, but many sent up their musical offerings or went up with their personal services to the central and mother Church at Rome. At the Pope's chapel, men of the greatest musical genius were employed; and, being candidates for favor in the art, were stimulated, by the prospect of having their pieces well represented and liberally rewarded, to make their best efforts in composition. Their music consisted of choral compositions on passages of Scripture and on metrical hymns, and the solos, duets, trios and chorus of the service of high mass,—all of which received the general name of *motetta*. At this period we begin to gather specimens of secular music—in the secular airs that had been handed down among the people, which these masters collected and harmonized, and in their own compositions of canons, rounds, catches for bravura harmonies, and madrigals, named it is supposed from the *madre*, or holy mother, devoted to the more tender sentiments of song.*

At the opening of the seventeenth century, the invention of the opera presented a new field to the artist, both for composition and for the public rehearsal of his works. His musical conceptions were enlivened by their application to a species of dramatic representation on subjects, interesting to the social feelings of man, yet unfitted for the services of the Church. The opera was invented and first exhibited in Florence in the year 1600 A. D. It is a dramatic composition in which some impassioned action is represented by means of recitative, song, duet and chorus, sustained and ornamented by the instrumental accompaniment of the orchestra. This invention aided the artist to excellence in composition, not only by bringing his works to the test of the public ear for criticism or applause, but, more especially, by imposing upon him the task of adapting the character and expression of his music to the varying current of thought and feeling attendant on the progress of the represented action. From this source we have derived most beautiful specimens of descriptive music: and in this depart-

*B. 325, Vol. II.

ment of labor some of the best musical writers of Europe attained their eminence.*

At the same period with the opera are we to date the origin of the oratorio: the first production of the kind, entitled "*L'animo e corpo*," having been performed in the oratory of the church of Santa Maria della Vallicella at Rome, in February, 1600. Philip Neri, founder of the congregation of the priests of the oratory at Rome, to render the service of the sanctuary attractive, had previously introduced a practice of having some Scriptural story, when set to verse and music by the best poets and musicians, sung in the oratory in two parts,—one before sermon, the other after it: and this is supposed to have given rise to the sacred drama and its name of oratorio. In the oratorio, the opportunity was presented of bringing the beauties of descriptive music within the precincts of sacred themes. It is a drama, cast in still life, founded on some action or event narrated in the Scriptures, which is impassioned with religious thought and feeling. Like the gilded and illuminated page of the Scriptural manuscript of old to the eye, so is the oratorio to the ear. It is an adorned reading of the Scriptures—a reading breathed forth in tones of beauty and impassioned feeling, to represent the scene most vividly to the imagination and the heart. In this species of composition, the story is carried forward, as in the opera, by means of recitative, song, duet, and fuller vocal harmonies, combined with instrumental accompaniment; but the character of the music is ever grave, ascending to the sublime of religious sentiment, in all its shadings from grief to joy; while the opera, mingling in the freer play of the social feelings, descends from the serious and grave to the light and comic, and is cast both in the form of the "*seria*" and the "*buffa*." Oratorios were common in Italy and the Catholic churches, performed chiefly in the season of Lent; they were afterward introduced into Protestant Germany and England. Several were written by eminent musicians during the last century;† and among them, a few have obtained celebrity as

*Scarlatti Leo, Porpora, Vinci, Pergolesi, Jomelli, Stradella, among earlier Italians; Lulli and Rameau among the French; and Hasee, John C. Bach, Gluck, Graun, Handel, among the Germans.

† By most of the opera writers already named; Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, among the Germans; Drs. Greene, Arne, and Arnold, among the English.

among the highest and most beautiful productions of the art.

But music could not attain its highest perfection without the possession of *suitable themes to inspire the artist in the work of composition*. He may be most intimately acquainted with musical sounds and their combinations; he may be able to write down with accuracy his compositions for perusal or rehearsal; but his genius for composition will not be awakened to its highest and most beautiful creations without the aid of inspiring themes. He works on design. He must have the thoughts and feelings he would express clearly conceived, and must labor on such as are pure, if he would give unity, character, expression, beauty to the song. He depends much on the sentiments that pervade the literature of the times in which he lives; the particular compositions of that literature to which he applies his art. If these be wild and barbarous, or scholastic and dry, his works will be stamped with their character. His art is allied most intimately to the poetry of the times. His triumphs cannot well precede an age of good models of lyric poetry.

The days of the classic poetry of Greece and Rome occurred too soon for the triumphs of the art. They passed by with only chant and air, and unison accompaniment. Whatever beauty may have characterized the ancient Greek and Roman airs, they were not sustained nor enriched by harmonic accompaniment: and I strongly doubt whether, in the absence of the science of harmony as well as of the more generous sentiments fostered by Christianity, they had the classic purity of the modern song.

In the Middle Ages, at the time in which the music of the moderns was extending its domains into the province of harmony, the Latin tongue, which had been the ecclesiastical and court language of the Roman empire, was going into disuse among the people, and the nations once composing that empire had not yet established the dominion of their separate tongues or adorned them as vehicles of poetic thought and expression. At this period, music, which ever seeks alliance with immortal verse, was denied any living, any suitable companion. In the Church, the sublime poetry of the Scriptures was chanted or motetted in the expiring language of a former age, whose

glory was departed from the sight of the worshipers and which, though ministering by its unknown voice to the superstition or reverence of vacant minds, was, as a vehicle of distinct thought and feeling, becoming "dishonored," and might almost as well have been "unsung." The *hymns* of the church, too, were written by the monks in Latin; and received a name,—very characteristic of most of them,—the name of *proses*. From the insinuation of such a remark, it becomes me, however, to except the beautiful hymns on the crucifixion and the judgment, beginning: "Stabat mater dolorosa;" "Dies iræ, dies illa." These proses had rhythm and rhyme, in both which music delights to utter her sweet voice; but the winter of age, which was upon the language, was withering the life in them of thought and feeling. In all the cathedral service, as chanted, or as sung in the harmonies of the grand mass, the same expiring language was still wedded to the song.

The secular music of these Middle Ages was wild and errant, uttered in a language and in legends that were destined to decay. The people living within the limits of the ancient Roman empire were now ignorant of the Latin language; and the only vehicle for the expression of thought and feeling, which was common to all, was a dialect of Provence, called, from the general name of the Roman empire, in distinction from central Latium, the *Romanse*. This was the language of the troubadours—the wandering poets of an uncivilized age—who composed for song strange legends of war and love—of the exploits of heroes and the charms of the fair. These strolling poets flourished from the eleventh to the fourteenth century,* and, acting as minstrels themselves, or, when wanting in voice or musical skill, accompanied by minstrels whom they employed, wandered through Italy, France, Spain, and Britain; being welcomed to the castles of barons and counts, and at the courts of kings: entertaining them in their halls at home, or on their marches to the wars in Palestine, with rehearsals to the song of the rebec or harp. But the poetry of the *Romanse* language was too rude and licentious, too full of the marvels and extravagance of a state of ignorance, long to endure or serve the purpose of pure

* B. 233, Vol. II.

and exalted song. It was a short romance among the nations, a wild and pleasant dream of the night, to flee forever before the light of day. It could not suit the taste of man, when his imagination and feelings were chastened and refined by the cultivation of science, the liberal arts, and the laws of humanity and religion. The time was at hand when these nations were to compose a literature in their own languages: to form a poetry, based on the classical purity of the fallen Latin and Greek of the ancients, yet breathing the purer sentiments of man under the influence of a religion of truth and love. The days of Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio; Huss, Jerome, Luther; Marot, Beza; Chaucer, Shakespeare, Milton; were on their way, and soon to arrive.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,—when improvements in navigation and the newly invented art of printing were ready to diffuse abroad the influence of the intellect and sentiment of each ruling spirit in the world of letters; when the Reformation, having disenthralled not only religion, but science, from the tyranny of the Church of Rome, gave it a free and wide empire without her bounds, in which to expand and from which to roll its increasing waves of intellectual light even back within her censorious and forsaken pale,—poetry and literature were cultivated in Italy, France, Germany, and England, and producing their models of epic, dramatic, and lyric beauty.

The time had now come for the musical art to triumph. With artist composers, eminent for scholastic accuracy and depth in science and skill, who needed only to have their genius awakened by its application to popular and inspiring themes; with the multiplied instruments gathered up in the past, of organ, harpsichord, viol, bassoon, violin, guitar, rebec, cornet, sackbut, haut-boy, clarionet, flute; with accomplished instrumentalists who had already asserted their independence of the vocalists;* with well-skilled and sweet toned vocalists trained to public rehearsals; and presented also with a literature, polished yet fervid in the glow of social and religious sentiment, in which to breathe her strains; music now arose to put forth her highest and most

* B. p. 355, Vol. III.

beautiful efforts at composition. She came into the Church, uttering her sweet voice in a tongue known to the people, breathing sentiments of fervent piety. The services of the Lutheran and English Protestant churches, composed in the vernacular tongue, she chanted and sung to the voice of organs and trumpets, in the great cathedral.* She resounded throughout Protestant Germany the metrical German hymns and psalms of the Bohemian brethren and Luther.† The psalms, translated into metre in French by Clement Marot and Beza, in tunes written by Goudimel and by Claude le Jeune, she uttered with feeling by the choirs of the French Calvinistic Protestants of France and Holland, and, with the exception of the harmonies, by the congregation of the French Calvinistic Protestants of Geneva. And in the musical drama, sacred and secular, assembling her chosen instrumentalists‡ and vocalists, she came, with more accomplished grace than in ancient days, to meet her sister art revived—adorned as of old, but breathing purer sentiments: and throughout Italy, Germany, France, and England she entered into a friendly contest with poetry for the palm of excellence; vying with it, in the representation of thought and feeling; lending it new force; embellishing it with new charms; and triumphed, by imparting to it its crown.

Such has been the progress of the art until the period of its perfection in the last century. Advancing with the Romish Church to the time of the Reformation, its chief school was in Italy, in the cities of Florence and Venice, Naples and Rome. The churches and people which then separated from the doctrine and ecclesiastical polity of Rome, afterward pursued their independent courses. Germany, under the auspices of Luther (who in parting from Rome still loved her fine arts and her music more than all), encouraged music in the churches and the schools; and in that country the early education of all has served to bring forward musical genius and talent, and to aid in rearing a school of eminent professors of the art, excelling even those of Italy. The Protestant Church of England, retaining

* B. p. 9, III.

† pp. 35–40, III.

‡ p. 40, &c., III.

§ At the representation of Orpheus at Florence, 1607, the instruments were (p. 30, Vol. IV), the harpsichord? bass-viol, double harp, violin, guitar, organ? sackbut, cornet, clarion.

the cathedrals and organs and choirs that carried forward her service during the days of her dependence on Rome, gave patronage to eminent musical composers and performers still, in her separate ecclesiastical organization; and raised up a series of men, eminent in musical science and taste, such as White, Tallis, Bird, Morley, Gibbons, Purcell, and a worthy list of successors. The great Genevan Reformer appears not to have been a lover of choral music, as he introduced into the Genevan church the practice of the whole congregation singing the canto in unison: in which he seems to have been followed by the reformers in Scotland, from which practice his disciples in France and Holland dissented, preferring the choral music of Goudimel and Claude le Jeune. The progress of the Reformation in England brought forward also a class of ultraists that were the antipodes of Rome in all things—who, fearing the seductive influence of all rites in religion as being addressed to the senses, utterly eschewed all music, as nothing but a cunning device of Satan; an ornament which, for mere purposes of seduction, he had thrown over the mystic and meretricious Babylon. In our nation planted in a new world, a nation of composite order made one by the junction of exiles from all these branches of the old world, poor and struggling into existence, it could not be expected that attention could be bestowed at the first on any of the fine arts, but that we should be content for a while to sing the songs of Zion, not with our harps on the willows, but without possession of organ or harp or accomplished choir. Yet we early started on the course of improvement. Billings, Swan, Holden, Law, Read, and others of the fathers of our music are fallen asleep. And during the present century we have been favored with many persons of musical talent, who, making the science and art their profession, and studying the finest models of the age, have done much to improve the music of the Church and to diffuse a musical taste among our population. And I anticipate with confidence that, at no distant date, this art and the science which unfolds its principles will enter into all our systems of education.

From this survey of the history of the art, we now turn to consider some of its *great productions*.

There exist, at the present day, compositions of great beauty and excellence in each department of the art, vocal and instrumental; in the music of the Church, the drama, the camp, the salon. I suppose that most of you have heard passages from the greatest masters, extracts from the most beautiful productions, either as wafted on the tones of the piano-forte or the voices of the choirs of the Church. Yet for a criticism of the higher works, I will briefly present in outline two productions which are allowed to stand at the head of the art: the oratorio of Handel on the *Messiah* and that of Haydn on the *Creation*.

Though for years I have studied and admired these works, I cannot promise to give you a very definite description of their character. The themes may be easily presented by words: but words, even the descriptive terms of the art, are inadequate fully to represent the music. Enshrined in the score, it will not be evoked into life by their use; nor can they summon to the imagination very precisely its changing movement and expression. "Recollect," wrote a lady when criticizing a great musical work, "that in proportion to the facility with which I could render my ideas intelligible to you, if we were conversing by the side of a piano-forte, will be the difficulty of conveying them by post from Vienna to Paris."

The oratorio of the *Messiah*, the great work of Handel, is designed to represent the story of redemption accomplished by the Messiah, and is founded on a series of Scriptural passages, selected and arranged in a manner to set forth the progress of that work to its completion, occupying about 150 three-scored, folio pages: and divided in the representation into three Parts.

The First Part carries forward the story to the birth of the Messiah. After four bars of symphony, anticipating the key and movement, which is E major in common time, a beautiful recitative begins to the words, pure and cheerful as the starlight of morning, "Comfort ye my people," announcing the dawn of hope to Israel; it proceeds, till John the forerunner of Jesus is proclaimed as crying in the wilderness, when a melodious air begins with the words, "Every valley shall be exalted," and closes with a chorus of assent, "The glory of the Lord shall be revealed," and expressive of assurance, "For the

mouth of the Lord hath spoken it." Next, a bold bass recitative, a subdued minor air on D, and a chorus partaking of its characteristics, present the Lord of Hosts declaring his intention to shake the earth and to come to his temple; the cry, "But who may abide the day of his coming;" and the anticipation, "He shall purify the sons of Levi, that they may present their offerings in righteousness." Next, the annunciation to the Virgin is presented, in which, after the recitative, occurs a much admired air on D major, $\frac{3}{4}$ time, "O thou that bringest good tidings to Zion;" after which, the birth of Jesus is celebrated by an air and chorus most strikingly in contrast: the air, dwelling not on the light that has arisen, so much as on the gross darkness, the shadow of death, that was resting on the people, an air in bass, and in its dark chromatic character and continually turning and groping movements knowing no repose, except on the words, "Hath seen a great light;" when a chorus on G major follows, clear and lucid in its simple and sweet movements as a cloudless day, to the words, "Unto us a child is born." We next see the shepherds abiding in the field, hear the voice of the angel addressing them with glad tidings, and listen to the joyous and heavenly chorus of the attending hosts. And now, in an air and chorus which set forth joyful anticipations of the future course of the child as the Shepherd and King of Israel—a sweet pastoral air full of hope and tenderness, to the words, "He shall feed his flock like a shepherd,"—the First Part closes.

The Second Part opens with a striking contrast to the joyful anticipations with which the first had closed. "Behold the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world," is the first voice that breaks on our ear in a fuguing chorus on G minor; a chorus in which the feelings of joy and grief, in conflict awhile, settle at the close into the calm of peaceful submission. We now behold him despised of his nation; broken in heart; cut off from the land; yet, not suffered to see corruption, he rises from death, and ascends to heaven; in which description the recitative, "Thy rebuke hath broken his heart," the air, "But thou didst not leave his soul in hell," and the chorus, "Lift up your heads, O ye gates," shadow forth, in most expressive music, the night of sorrows, the placid morn of the resurrec-

tion Sabbath, and the majesty and honor of the ascent from Olivet. Next, we behold him crowned as king over angels; receiving gifts for man; sending forth apostles and messengers with his word; extending his kingdom on earth and putting down his enemies: when this Second Part closes with the chorus—so full of grandeur and majesty as to have received the title of the grand Hallelujah Chorus—a chorus of joy that “the kingdoms of this world are become the kingdom of our Lord.”

The Third Part opens with the beautiful solo, “I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that he shall stand at the latter day upon the earth.” The resurrection of man, his triumph over death and sin granted of God through Christ, and his final justification and acceptance, are then presented; when this part, and the whole work, closes with that most sublime chorus of the redeemed gathered in heaven, “Worthy is the Lamb.”

The oratorio of the Creation, the great work of Haydn, has been styled the Epic Poem of Music. A French writer,* in his zeal, remarks that none of the academicians of his country has produced a more celebrated work to descend to prosperity. This oratorio occupies about the same number of pages as the Messiah, and is also divided into three parts.

The First Part is devoted to a description of the creation of the *inanimate world*, the work of the first four days: embracing the origin of light; the erection of the firmament of air; the separation of the waters to their place, and clothing the dry land with the verdure of plants; and the shining forth of the lights of the firmament. Each of these separate works is presented to view by a recitative in the words of the Mosaic history, followed by words, descriptive of the thoughts and feelings of the angels who are supposed to witness the event, wrought into air and chorus. In the distribution of the music, the soprano recitatives and solos are assigned to Gabriel; the tenor to Uriel; and the bass to Raphael: and whenever one of these presiding angels opens the scene of a given day in his recitative, he proceeds to celebrate its wonders in a solo air

* Bombet's Life of Haydn and Mozart.

appropriate to his voice; after which the whole body of attending angels express, in chorus, their joyful praise. This is the plan of the First Part. In respect to the music, I would remark; that in the opening symphony to represent chaos, the mass of all the elements of harmony imperfectly formed; in the expression "There was light," the perfect unison of voice and instrument on the clear key of C minor, followed by the instruments diverging and flashing forth to a full diffusion, on the scale of four octaves; in the despairing fall of the evil angels, the minor key with the repeated occurrence of the flat seventh, the natural language of shuddering and groaning; in Raphael's description of the thunder, the staccato crackling, ending in a rolling accompaniment, and in his description of hail, the snapping of staccato quavers in which two movements alternate in a high staff; are fine instances of musical imitation: and that, in the soprano air of Gabriel, "With verdure clad," and the tenor air of Uriel, "In splendor bright," we are presented with specimens of great beauty in the pleasure they give the ear; and in the chorus, "A new created world," interrupting with its clear melody the dark chromatic description of the despair of the vanished angels, first with sotto voice, then again with mezzo voice, and finally with forte, the body of angels are seen reposing with joy on the new formed world, forgetful of the fallen spirits of disorder: and in the closing chorus, "The heavens are telling," the body of angels, enkindling each other's admiration in their lively fugues, become filled with their theme, and as they approach toward the close, seem loth to leave it, reiterating the thought; approaching, it would seem, at each time the cadence, when, by semitones and a new modulation, the cadence is deferred again; and so to the hearer expectation is raised and deferred, through repeated modulations, till suddenly the harmony, clear and full on the key of C major, brings out a cadence that more than satisfies, that charms the ear.

The Second Part describes the creation of the *living world*; the work of the last two days, in which the fowls in the airy cloudy firmament, the fish in the waters under the firmament, the beasts and creeping things of the land, and man, the lord of all, are summoned into existence on the vast theatre pre-

pared for their residence. Here again the music is cast in a form of great beauty. Gabriel, with his soprano voice, leads off the opening recitative, expressing the command to the waters to bring forth the fowls of the air; and then, in a song majestic at first, changing, as it advances, to the sprightly and terminating in the *affetuoso*, describes the characteristic actions of the eagle, the merry lark, the affectionate dove, the plaintive nightingale. Next, Raphael, with his bass recitative, introduces the narrative respecting the creation of whales and every living creature that moveth in the waters, and the blessing of God pronounced on them and the fowls, which closed the fifth day: when the wonders of that day are celebrated with solo airs, trio and chorus. Gabriel leads off with his soprano in the words, "Most beautiful appear," describing the fresh scenery of nature; Uriel follows him, with his tenor, in the words, "In lofty circles plays," applied to the flight of the host of cheerful and gay plumaged birds; then Raphael, with his bold bass, "See flashing through the floods," describing the sports of the finny tribes and the immense leviathan, attended in the deep double bass of the instrumental accompaniment with imitative turns and strong shakes of the octave, when, just as he is preparing for his cadence, Gabriel exclaims in words of adoration, "How many are thy works, O God;" Uriel, catching at once the inspiration, takes up the same words at the second bar, and Raphael, who has now finished his cadence, in the third bar follows up the fugue. They now move forward in regular trio till in their praise they reach the words, "The Lord is great, and great his might, his glory lasts forever more," when suddenly, by a double score, the choir of angels are introduced, taking up the words of their leaders and moving forward in harmonic accompaniment with the trio: which complicated movement of trio and chorus terminates the scene of the fifth day.

The sixth day opens with a recital, by Raphael, of the Scriptural words summoning the beasts and insects into existence, and a description, still in recitative, of the lion, tiger, steed, cattle, flocks, and insects; when he commences on the words, "Now heaven in fullest glory shone," a melody in bass as expressive and beautiful as the art can furnish. At the close

of Raphael's song, Uriel begins with the recital of the history of the creation of man, and then sings his descriptive song, "In native worth and honor clad," the most celebrated song in the work, characterized by great power and dignity, and softening its character more into the *affettuoso*, as toward the close he describes the fair Eve, the creature of affections, the partner of man, appearing at his side, the dispenser of joy and bliss. Raphael now recites the words, "God saw every thing he had made, and behold it was very good," which introduces the chorus of angels, "Achieved is the glorious work"—an animated fuguing chorus which, during its progress, is suspended awhile by a cheerful duet from Gabriel and Uriel, "On Thee each living soul awaits," a sombre solo from Raphael, "But when from them Thy face is hid," and a trio of overflowing joy, "Thou lett'st Thy breath go forth again," after which the chorus is again resumed in all its vigor, and closes the Second Part of this great work.

The acts of creation being now finished, it might seem that the work had reached its termination. But no, we have not fully contemplated yet the last and crowning works of the creation—man, its lord, and woman, his partner. Here are creatures of high thought, breathing sentiments of purest love, made like the angels. The Third Part brings them forward on the scene, expressing their admiration at the beautiful and happy existences around them, in hymns of devout praise to their Creator, breathing forth the affections which sweetly bind their destinies together, in songs of mutual love. The angels, kindled to fresh ardor of devotion at the sight, unite with them in the praise of God. The action thus terminates in setting forth the great end of creation, the happiness of pure and virtuous beings, devoted to the welfare of each other and the praise of their common Creator. These are the materials, and they are well cast in the representation.

The time is the morning of the seventh day—the Sabbath of creation—as Uriel recites at the opening, "In rosy mantle appears, by sweet tunes awaked, the morning young and fair. From the celestial vaults pure harmony descends on the ravished earth." The happy pair walk forth hand in hand, expressing in their looks the emotions of grateful hearts. After

this recitative, Adam and Eve immediately commence their devotion in a duet of praise, "By Thee with bliss, O bounteous Lord, the heaven and earth are stored." Eve, with her soprano, begins; for woman's susceptible heart is ever first to feel and utter devotion. In the second bar, Adam catches the words from her lips and adds the beautiful harmony of his bass; and thus, by short fugues, in which Eve constantly precedes, a duet is carried forward which is remarkably rich in its expression of admiration and joy. At the twentieth bar, the angels begin a chorus, "Forever blessed be His power," which, uttered with suppressed and piano voices, comes as from afar, sweetly blending with the duet, and fading away into the pianissimo as the voices of Adam and Eve become more subdued toward the close. "The distant effect of the responsive choir," as a judicious critic observes,* "gives us an idea of space, amplitude, which nothing but soft music can produce. It is like the misty atmosphere which artists, in painting, introduce for the same purpose in their designs." Adam now gives his solo address to the sun, "Of stars the fairest," succeeded by the distant chorus, "Proclaim in your extended course the praise of God." Eve then sings her exquisite solo, "And Thou that rulest the night, and all ye starry host, spread wide and everywhere His praise," succeeded by Adam's address to the strong elements of the air that rage in storms, when both unite in a duet, with which the angels blend their distant chorus, to the words, "Resound the praise of God, our Lord." They continue their devotions still by alternate solo addresses to the beautiful objects and animated beings around them, calling upon them to unite with them in praising the Creator, till their thoughts and words and voices sweetly mingle together again in a duet. During the progress of this duet, a wave of harmony from the angelic chorus for a moment bursts on our ears and then dies away—a gush of feeling, to the words, "Ye living souls extol the Lord." The duet still proceeds, and closes their act of devotion. The artist now, to close this first scene, brings forward more distinctly to our hearing the devotion of heaven in the exulting chorus, "Hail, bounteous Lord."

To this scene of *devotion* on the part of Adam and Eve now

* Gardiner, note in *Bombet*.

succeeds that of their *mutual love*. After a short recitative address from Adam, and reply from Eve, they commence that long and most exquisite duetto, "Graceful consort," inimitable in its expression of affection and tenderness, one which I can never cease to admire, and which I cannot but regard as invested with higher merit even than Uriel's melody over the creation of man, "In native worth," the composition which most have regarded as the *chef-d'œuvre* of the piece. True, in that melody we hear an angel sing; but in this duet, though we hear mortals, the enchanting melodies bring down the angels to listen. For no sooner do their united melodies cease, than Uriel appears in their immediate presence and directly addresses them in his recitative, "O happy pair, yea happy ever, if still content, in humble mind, God's mandate ye obey." And now, in united devotion, the angels and mortals raise the full and final chorus, "Praise the Lord, ye voices all."

From this outline of these great works in the musical art, it will be readily seen that the Messiah abounds most in solemn and serious sentiments; the Creation, most in those which are affectionate and joyous. In simple and majestic melodies, in simple and grand harmonies, every note of which, as the Neapolitan Gluck remarked, *draws blood*, the music of Handel appears in the sublimity of the high and naked rock towering to heaven. In its joyous melodies, with their rich and ever-varying accompaniments, that of Haydn resembles the sunny and verdant hill adorned with shrubs and flowers. One master in his sublime energy has been well styled the Michael Angelo of the art: the other, full of animation and warmth, the Tintoret. Handel is faulty at times in the excess with which he iterates a phrase, and in divisions or roulades of extreme length which he plays off on a syllable, turning the voice into a mere musical instrument, while the thought and sentiment are held back, awaiting the cease of this play and the utterance of the syllable on which it is indulged. Haydn has been censured for the abounding joy, almost amounting to levity, which he throws into all his sacred melodies; his want of the dark and sombre shading of slow time and the minor key. But happy cheerfulness was the temperament of the man; and however unfitted to characterize the composition of a *Miserere*, it well

suited the theme of the Creation ; which, from the first darting forth of the light to the hymns of Adam and Eve in their paradise, presented a constant succession of wonderful works over which the sons of God might well shout for joy.

The great work of Handel was composed by him at the age of 57, when his originally splendid musical talents [—talents which shone forth in the boy of five, stealing away at midnight to the garret to amuse himself with a clavichord he had cautiously concealed from his parents ; in the child of seven, who was allowed by his preceptor Zackaw to preside at the organ of the Cathedral at Halle ; in the youth of fifteen, who composed at Hamburg the successful opera of *Almeira* ;—] were, by the constant efforts and studies of a life zealously devoted to the art, ripened to their full maturity and vigor.

The great production of Haydn was begun when he was 63 years of age,* and occupied him in a study of two years before it was completed. At the request of a society in Vienna, it was brought forward in the Schwartzenberg palace, the year it was completed, 1798, during the season of Lent. "I was present," remarks a lady of Vienna,† "and I can assure you I never witnessed such a scene. The flower of the literary and musical society of Vienna were assembled in the room, which was well adapted to the purpose, and Haydn himself directed the orchestra. The most profound silence, the most scrupulous attention, a sentiment, I might almost say, of religious respect, were the dispositions which prevailed when the first stroke of the bow was given. The general expectation was not disappointed. A long train of beauties, to that moment unknown, unfolded themselves before us : our minds, overcome with pleasure and admiration, experienced, during two successive hours, what they had rarely felt—a happy existence produced by desires ever lively, ever renewed, and never disappointed."

What is it that gives to music this power to please—to awaken and gratify the imagination and the feelings ? What are the *elements of its beauty* ?

A hearer of the performance in the Schwartzenberg palace,

* Bombet, p. 186.

† Bomb., p. 186.

could he have acted the part of a philosopher as well as amateur, and while enjoying the beauties of the performance, inquired into the sources of his pleasure, might have comprehended all in a brief analysis. The simple element of which the whole is composed, and by which the whole is addressed to the ear, is *musical sound*. In this vast concourse of sound, there is apparent, with its varying character and expression, the progress of *melody*. Accompanying this melody there proceed distinct parts, sustaining it and adorning it with the expression of concurrent *harmony*. Last of all, symphonious with these parts as they proceed from many and variously toned instruments—ascending on this vast cloud of instrumental song like fragrant incense—is heard the voice of living man, breathing forth the thoughts and sentiments, to which the whole is subservient, in articulate *speech*.

This simple analysis presents in outline all that enters into the art to give it beauty—to adorn it with its peculiar power of expression. Yet that we may more clearly perceive and more correctly estimate these various elements of its power, we will take a more minute observation of each, and subject it to a more thorough analysis.

The simple material employed in the art, I have remarked, is *musical sound*. This, independently of its being wrought into any melodious air, has the power of imparting pleasurable sensations. It has a peculiar character which distinguishes it from every other noise which may be addressed to the ear. Sonorous, clear, liquid in its flow, it is the perfection of sound—sound in its most finished and polished form. The sounds that come within the purity and clearness of musical tones are pleasing to the ear in the different qualities that characterize them, accordingly as they proceed from reed, string or pipe, and in all the colorings which these genera receive as modified by particular kinds of instruments. Musical tones gratify the ear, too, in all their varied range of pitch, from the utmost height of piano or violin down to the vast pedal pipe of the cathedral organ, pouring out the voice of deep thundering.

These are the pure and varying colors in which the pencil of the artist is dipped. All sounds foreign to pure and clear tones—the thousand harsh and offensive compounds of noise that

rasp on the ear in this jarring world—are banished from the art; and nought is admitted but the purest ingredient, to be employed in “notes of linked sweetness long drawn out.”

The sweetness and purity of musical sound are most congenial to the expression of feeling. The vehicle is pure and beautiful. The sentiments conveyed to us through such a medium appear like flowers in a golden vase, or affection beaming through features of loveliness. Expression puts on its æsthetic form, and becomes beauty to the ear. Nor can it be denied that those emotions of the heart which have their intrinsic beauty, and which are so often seen shining through harsh or disagreeable external forms of utterance, have their most appropriate expression in forms of external beauty. On this principle the art of eloquence depends; which is thought, breathing through the most expressive and appropriate forms of speech. On the same principle, music—the most finished form of utterance—is the crowning art of expression; which is feeling breathed forth in sweetest tones.

We pass to another element on which the power of music depends: the adaptation of a single current of musical tones to the flow of thought and feeling. We are now introduced to *melody*, with the elements it has at command to change its expressions, and adapt them to the various sentiments the heart would utter. Every one has felt the power of heart-touching melody. The strain, attuned to sentiment, meets its responsive chords in the heart, and moves it to sympathy. Who has not felt the plaintive strains of sadness, unsealing within him the fountain of tears; the notes of exulting joy, making his heart to rebound; the witching notes of love, holding him captive; the stirring notes of patriotism, animating his breast to courage; the reverential and grateful strains of piety, lifting up his heart to God? But my object is not to describe the various effects of melody, but to trace up those effects to their cause. What is it that gives to melody this varied expression? What are the means it employs to shadow forth the various sentiments of the heart?

A listener to the melodies that run through the oratorio of the Messiah or the Creation, if he were to study critically the sources of their varied expression, would find that the succes-

sion of notes, employed in different airs, is made to differ in respect to the pitch of their key-note or tonic; the intervals between them; the governing mood, major or minor, to which they move; their relative force; and the time they occupy. The *governing moods*, major and minor, serve to class all airs under the cheerful or plaintive, the sunny or shady; under which broad division all the feelings of the heart may be classed, which are ever attuned to joy or grief. The *pitch* of the *key-note* affects the expression of an air as it transposes to a different part of the scale those notes which most frequently occur and bear strongest on the strain. The different effects of the keys it is difficult to describe, though most obvious to a practised ear. On this change, the Greeks, as we have seen, predicated of music its moods. The effect is seen in the transposition of the same air; or in a modulation occurring in any air to change the key-note, of which our national air furnishes an example: the first part of which is usually set to the key of C major, and the latter part by a new modulation falling to the key of F major. As a general rule, if the key-note ascends, bearing with it the canto, the air becomes more fitted for spirited and stirring themes; if it descends, and with it the canto, it better suits those of a milder and gentler sort: both which extremes are well represented by D major for the spirited, and E flat major for the delicate and gentle.

Another means by which the expression of melody is varied is that of the *intervals* between the successive notes. These paint precisely the form of the canto, and of course vary with every air. Yet as these intervals all proceed according to the diatonic scale, they must be constructed not only in reference to the major or minor mood, which we have already considered, but with reference to their departure from the key-note and their return.* In this respect, the intervals must be either those of *direct* melody, as it is called, when the air moves *above* the key-note; or those of the *oblique*, when the air moves on

* The intervals of the canto are also regarded in their particular degrees as seconds, thirds, major and minor, and so through the largest intervals admissible in good melody. But to go into this minute analysis might be abstruse and tedious, and I will dismiss it with one general remark that as in speech, so in melody, the nearer to monotone and the less the interval, the less marked and emphatic is the expression, and the greater the skips and slides, the more vehement.

the intervals of the scale *above* and *below* the key-note. Of the direct melody a good example may be seen in the Hindoo air, "I have come from a happy land," and of the oblique in the song entitled "The Swiss boy." The difference of expression in these is that which I have mentioned already as the general characteristic of a high or low key-note. For it is the direct melody that usually characterizes the low keys, from E flat to A flat; and the indirect the higher, from B flat to D.

Another means by which the expression of melody is varied is that of the relative *force* of the successive notes. By the skilful distribution of the single element of force, melody becomes the beautiful representation of certain modifications of feeling. A passion may flow in an impetuous torrent like that of a strong river, or in a current soft as the gentlest zephyrs. It may rise by degrees like a vast surge of the ocean, or descend and die away like a wave upon the shore. The varied force of sound is employed for the same purpose by men in speech. It is an element of natural language, known at once of all. But when exalted out of speech into the more refined and polished tones of music, it softens down the more rugged features of passion, and beautifully paints, in their varied flow, the purer and finer feelings of our nature.

And, lastly, the expression of melody is varied by the relative *time* given to successive notes. This element of time, as expressive of thought and feeling, is a part of natural language. All men feel and recognize it at once in their speech. Who would utter in equable time such varied sentiments and thoughts as these:—from the sprightly Cinderella: "Swift as a flash that mocks the sight, thou seemest a bird in airy flight:"—from Uriel's description of man: "In native worth and honor clad; with beauty, courage, strength adorned; to heaven erect and tall, he stands:"—and from the hundredth Psalm in the version of Watts; "Before Jehovah's awful throne, ye nations bow." This natural language, when supported by the sweet tones of melody, proceeds to more graphic and rich variations of movement than mere articulate speech admits: from the brisk movements of the canary bird, outstripping all speed, to the slow and long drawn tones of the organ when some vast thought unstops the keys and breathes through the swelling diapason. This element of

expression can be distributed over melody very unequally, to suit the changing thoughts and sentiments that rise in the progress of any theme. For instance, in the air of Uriel just mentioned, when the theme advances to the words; "He stands—a man—the lord—the king—of nature all;" the artist has beautifully marked the importance of the thoughts, and painted the sentiment of admiration in Uriel, by prolonging the time to a bar for each accent.

We proceed to another source of beauty and expression in music, mentioned in our analysis: the power of the concurrent sounds of harmony to sustain and adorn melody.

Harmony, well constructed, enhances the two sources of beauty just considered—that of musical sound and musical expression.

The clear and liquid notes of music, when sounded alone, are beautiful to the ear; that beauty is enhanced when they come together in all their clearness to form a true and perfect concord. The concords, which form the groundwork of the parts of a progressive harmony, have a characteristic beauty in each of their varieties and through all their diffusions on the scale, partaking of the nature of a short passage of melody run through the notes of the concord. If imperfect chords are occasionally introduced into harmony, though not perfectly satisfactory to the ear in themselves, they excite, for that very reason, the expectation of some perfect chord into which they are to be resolved, and as soon as the new concord is introduced, it falls doubly grateful and sweet upon the ear.

But the higher beauty of progressive harmony is that of the concurrence of distinct *parts*, bearing each its distinct melody, united together in the expression of *one thought* and sentiment. This constitutes the unity of design in harmony—without which it is but an unmeaning concurrence of sounds. In order to this unity, there must be a leading melody—an air, which has a distinct character expressive of the sentiment, and which is suited to a thorough bass, the groundwork of harmony: and the parts that unite with it are to partake of its character and contribute to its effects.

The distinct parts that enter into full harmony are the soprano, alto, tenor, bass. The soprano, the highest part, bears forth, above all, the leading melody—the expressive song.

The alto follows at an agreeable interval of thirds or sixths, an imitator of the melody, inspired by its movement and seconding all its varied expressions. The tenor listens to the warblers who carry forward the melody, yet, desirous to sustain and aid them, mingles in their song, but chiefly pours forth the principal note and the upper dominant on which their melody depends, and thus holds them to their course. The bass, with its deep toned movements octave below octave, on the tonic, subdominant, and dominant, hears all; controls all; and from its depths responds to all: furnishing for all,—like the plain, valley and mountain of the solid earth to the winds that rest upon and rove over its surface,—the basis of all their movements.

I cannot enter fully into all the various means which are at the command of harmony to vary its expression, such as *fugue*, concert, quantity, modulation. I will briefly say that the *fugue*, in which a short phrase of melody is taken up by the parts successively till they all fall into concerted harmony, enables the artist to represent the parts as suggesting the thought and sentiment to each other till the whole body is enkindled and animated with one feeling: that *concert* in the movement of the parts presents the whole body as alike absorbed,—contemplating one thought, animated by one sentiment: that *quantity in harmony*, as it respects the *number of parts* employed, shades forth in duet, trio, and chorus the number of hearts that seek utterance, and as it respects the diffusion of the parts on the scale into full chords or their approach to unison, pictures the comparative intensity of the feeling in which they sympathize, and which at its highest pitch brings all into perfect unison with the melody: and that *modulation*, by changing the key note of the whole movement or the mood, beautifully marks a change in the character of the theme, the new thoughts and sentiments it presents.

But that which adds the finishing grace to music is the voice of living man, uttering the thoughts and sentiments to which it is subservient, distinctly, in *articulate speech*. All the other sources of musical expression and beauty which we have considered are in the power of mere musical instruments in the hands of man; but the human voice can breathe out in musical tones, instinct with life, the words that shadow forth distinctly the sentiment of the song.

In vocal music the art has respect to the properties of the voice when alone, and to its union with instrumental accompaniment in unison or with variations.

The properties on which the beauty of vocal music depends are the purity, compass, strength, flexibility of the mere vocal tones; their utterance in the canto with accuracy and feeling appropriate to the themes; and a distinct enunciation of the language. I will remark only on the last of these, that a distinct pronunciation is too important to be sacrificed, notwithstanding the sounds it introduces that are foreign to pure musical tone. Yet marked as the consonants of our language are with the unmusical sounds of mutes, aspirates, sibilants, nasals and gutturals, care and skill are demanded of the vocalist in order to good performance, and, I will add, are demanded also of the lyric poet, that he select his language as far as possible in accommodation to the vocalist. There is a great difference on this point in the language of nations. The Italian, most abounding in pure vocals and liquids, is of all most favorable to the art. The English and German, possessing more harsh consonants than the Italian, yet distributing them about equally, may perhaps contend as to which shall take the precedence. But the French, on account of its abounding and deep nasals, its want of broad and generous vocality, and the absence of exact and strong rhythm in the length and accent of syllables, is the least favorable of all. If any dispute the verdict, I refer them to the Letter of Rousseau, "*Sur la musique Francais.*"

The union of *instrumental* music with vocal serves to give body and purity to the musical sound of the voice, and in the bass to add depth, and to throw the unfavorable sounds of articulation more into the shade: while in its relation to the sentiment, it is like passive nature waiting on man and honoring the sentiments that rise in his heart and are uttered on his tongue. When instrumental music accompanies the voice in unison, it presents the vocal song in a strong and clear light, like a figure on a mere *drapeau blanc* or white ground. When it accompanies the voice with variations, it presents its own beauty in harmonious keeping with the vocal song and its expressions, as in a picture the scenery and coloring of an appropriate front and back ground set off to advantage the principal figure.

The art of which I have now spoken at so great a length is deeply inwoven with the thoughts and sentiments of the heart. Its greatest beauty is evolved in the utterance of the pure and more generous feelings of our nature. The concord of sweet sounds suits not the feelings of variance and wrath. But love, friendship, patriotism, piety, here find congenial utterance. Music, though often abused, serves to spread abroad and sustain the reign of such sentiments, amid the trials, jealousies, rivalries of a cold and selfish world.

This heaven-descended guest has come to earth to aid us in our course, not to withdraw us from the active duties and stern conflicts of life. The wants and woes of a world of fellow beings ever surround us, and demand attention. Our daily labors and cares and trials are crowding on us. Each is tempted to say: "O that I had wings like a dove, then would I fly away to some better land and be at rest!" We are inclined to withdraw from all duties and cares to some retreat of self-indulgence. Yet life we may not sacrifice. Duty we may not relinquish. If we go forth, buckling on the armor of faith and love, to do our duty in the world, we find a powerful friend and helper in this heavenly attendant. She meets us as a friend in the parlor, the social circle, the sanctuary of God. The type and pattern of a higher state, she raises our drooping spirits, she cheers us onward, she points us upward, with foretastes of the high banquets she holds forever in the regions of immortality. Luther, when some fine music was performing, exclaimed in transport, "If our Lord God has shed forth such wondrous gifts on this earth, which is no better than a dark nook, what may we not expect in that eternal life in which we shall be perfected!" There all angels and redeemed men, united as lovers and friends, dwelling in the cloudless land of perfection, glowing with supreme devotion to the eternal King, have their hearts forever filled with the sweetest sentiments for song. The glories of creation and redemption, the themes of the first song and of the new, forever fill their hearts. Nor can I doubt that—as over Bethlehem once and as revealed to John in his ecstatic vision—there are modes in which melodious and harmonious utterance is given to their sentiments of praise, powerful and majestic as the voice of many waters and mighty thunderings, sweet and enrapturing as the voice of harpers harping with their harps.

ARTICLE VI.—THE OBERLIN COUNCIL, AND ITS DOCTRINAL STATEMENT.*

I. ANTECEDENT VIEW.

THERE are two uses for a Church creed. 1. As a test of fellowship or communion; 2. As a guide for the exercise of official power and teaching in the Church. These two distinct *uses* are reached by two distinct *parts* of the creed, or rather, by two distinct forms of creed for the two uses. Such is the case, at least, in all denominations but the close-communication sects. They restrict Church fellowship by the same full creed by which they officially govern their Church. All others use two forms, reserving their fuller particular creed for purposes of Church control and instruction, and setting forth a briefer general confession as sufficient for fellowship and communion. The latter includes simply Evangelical doctrine, as held in common by all ordinary Christian denominations; and, though pretty generally understood and agreed upon among the sects, is *not ordinarily reduced to writing*.

Any Church or association of Churches may, for convenience and emphasis, write out this general Evangelical creed held in common, as they understand it; and may distinctly set it forth as the test of their fellowship and communion. The Boston Council of Congregationalists have done this very thing. And this more distinct announcement of our Evangelical *fellowship*, (as including admission to the privileges of our Churches), is what so many leading Congregationalists have of late been urging, as ably set forth in an Article by Dr. Patton in the *New Englander* for April. The Oberlin Council of course followed in the same line. At the late meeting of the Illinois State

* Compare the Article in the April number, entitled "The Doctrinal Basis of the National Council."

See, also, Article VII, "Sectarian Symbols," by Rev. Dr. Bacon, p. 745.—[EDS. NEW ENGLANDER.]

Association, President Sturtevant eloquently urged the matter; and other foremost minds in different directions have reëchoed the cry. But while we thus set forth anew our *broad Evangelical fellowship*, let us not forget that we and all others (except close-unionists) have always been proceeding *practically* upon the same principle, only with less parade of a written form.

If any Church or association of Churches proceeds further, and declines to *have any other* creed besides this simply Evangelical outline; exercising not only its fellowship and communion, but also its Church government, on this broad basis,—we have thus a new denomination, a simply Evangelical Church or association, more comprehensive and limited *in teaching and control*, though not any more liberal *in fellowship and communion*. In such case, the two uses of a creed are blended upon one single form of creed, as in the case of close-unionists; that is, a simply Evangelical Church and a close-union Church agree in this, that the same creed which governs and instructs the Church is to be used to measure its fellowship and communion: but they differ as to the extent and particularity of that creed, the one affirming that it should include only what all true Christians hold in common as *indispensable*, the other affirming that it should include all that a Church deems highly *important* to Christianity.

On the other hand, the sects generally believe that a distinction is to be made between fellowship and government, and that two distinct forms of creed are proper for the two uses,—the one simply Evangelical, and uniting the Churches and sects all into one brotherhood in Christ,—the other more particular, for the ordering of each Church or sect internally, as it may find for its profit and advancement. Under this view of things, all that is wanted to consummate that Christian union so much desired is (1) to magnify sufficiently the general Evangelical fellowship feature of our Churches, as Congregationalists are trying to do, in common acts and occasions of united effort and communion,—keeping more in the background our distinctive doctrines and customs, as the sects are fast learning to do;—(2) to drop entirely the distinctive features, for the time being, *in small communities*, in order to operate together a

union or simply Evangelical Church, until such time as the population and means shall warrant distinctive organizations.

Some think that *nothing but* simply Evangelical Churches should exist, and that all sects should come together into them, as they might do without forswearing their own peculiarities of doctrine. Some Congregationalists are anxious to turn our denomination into such a merely Evangelical order or line of Churches, having no distinctive faith. But all confess that this cannot be applied to polity also, and so it must amount to but little: and if it is applied to doctrine, it is hard to see how a pastor is to know what he is authorized to preach. Sects are not so very bad a thing, if only *sectarism* can be cast out. The more thoughtful are convinced, that, as man is, Christian studies and labors that are confined to the simply Evangelical basis of what all hold in common, must necessarily be meager and stunted, lacking that depth and warmth of devotion, that breadth and height of growth, which comes from the "strong meat" of distinctive doctrine, superadded to the rudimentary "milk for babes" in Christ.

Hence, our denomination generally (like others) prefer the old method, of gathering the people, where they are numerous enough, into distinctive Churches, each maintaining the views which most satisfy and edify itself,—while we do earnestly and growingly desire to have all these distinctive Churches of every name, in each town (as well as larger territory), come together in an Evangelical Alliance or Union, for common fellowship and labor; reserving the simply Evangelical Church for smaller communities, where distinctive Churches cannot well be maintained. Let us hasten ourselves and our neighbors to this happy consummation, as we may easily do, without any vain war upon the sects, any futile struggle against human nature in its unavoidable diversities; and we shall thus have attained the great need of our times, namely, one grand Evangelical union of Christendom, to the dismay of infidelity, to the triumph of the Cross!

Congregationalism has long been growing into this plan and this practice,—of standing in substantial adherence to the faith of the fathers where she has room to stand,—whilst ready, with outstretched arms of fellowship, to organize Evangelically with

other denominations into one common alliance and brotherhood in Christ,—being especially anxious, in small communities, to give the field to simply Evangelical labor, in which all can unite. As a denomination, we have long been urging and helping such union or simply Evangelical Churches; and, for want of general Evangelical organizations of the united sects, such as we have just suggested and are hoping to see, our Congregational Associations and Missionary Societies have spread and will spread their liberal wing over such union Churches, and receive them to our *fellowship*, though not qualified to enter into our distinctive teaching and *control*.

When a Congregational body (like any other) thus welcomes a simply Evangelical brother or Church, it is to their *fellowship*, not to a *control* of their particular views and teachings. For, this distinction has thus far always been wisely kept in view, by our denomination as well as others. Many want us now to relinquish this distinction, and enlarge all our Churches and associations, district, state, and national, into simply Evangelical bodies, with no distinctive doctrines to be maintained and taught,—with all Evangelical persons and bodies invited to join us in full control as well as in fellowship; in fact, to set ourselves forward as merely the nucleus of Evangelical Alliance for all, with Congregationalism itself (as anything distinctive) dropped out, and all the other sects urged thus also to empty themselves, and become simply Evangelical like us. Some go so far as to say that we are already committed to this stand, that the late National Council at Oberlin has made for us a “new departure,” and put us all on this simply Evangelical platform. Is it so?

The theory now being set forth is this: that in regard to doctrine, although the Council did not of course denounce or “disown” any doctrine of the fathers, yet as a simply Evangelical body they did mean to *ignore or omit to mention* everything, beyond the simply Evangelical faith held by all sects, as no longer to be maintained at our head-quarters; and that they thus assumed a *new position* for the denomination, to be followed by all the associations, and even Churches, of our order. But, since the Council did certainly retain the denominational title “Congregational” in all its potency, which does not look

like fixing a simply Evangelical basis, therefore, the new theory further alleges, that, while becoming simply Evangelical in *doctrine*, the Council has not become simply Evangelical in *polity*, but stands, and expects its constituents to stand, squarely as ever on the Congregational platform of government and procedure.

So that, while the title "Congregational" is thus emptied of all reference to doctrine, the term "Evangelical" is thus also emptied of all reference to polity. And though a grand rally is thus to be made for doctrinal union on a simply Evangelical basis, this is to be only among those who will fully agree in *our* Church polity; and there is still to be no general union on a simply Evangelical basis of polity as well as doctrine. We are to have the same sects still, Congregational, Presbyterian, Episcopal, Methodist Episcopal, Baptist, anything that differs in *form* or *method*; it is only every shade of Calvinistic or predestinarian *faith* that is to be put into the shade. This seems to be the whole upshot of the plan. Let us see if our magnates have done up for us this little job.

II. ACTION OF THE COUNCIL.

The Council at Oberlin saw fit to perpetuate itself by a Constitution commencing thus:

"The Congregational Churches of the United States, by elders and messengers assembled, do now associate themselves in National Council, to express and foster their substantial unity, in doctrine, polity, and work, etc. . . . They agree in belief that the Holy Scriptures are the sufficient and only infallible rule of religious faith and practice; their interpretation thereof being in substantial accordance with the great doctrines of the Christian faith commonly called Evangelical, held in our own Churches from the early times, and sufficiently set forth by former Councils."

The whole controversy turns on the meaning of the term "Evangelical" here used, which, as every one knows, has two senses or applications, namely: (1) as applied to doctrines, it means *truly* Evangelical, or *including all* essential doctrine, as opposed to heresy, Socinian, Pelagian, etc.; (2) as applied to union of sects, it means *simply* Evangelical, or *excluding all but* essential doctrine, as opposed to specialty, Calvinistic, Arminian, &c. We claim the former meaning for the word here;

the theory we oppose claims the latter meaning. Which is right? There is no evidence of any illusion here to the union of sects; and therefore the word *cannot* mean *simply* Evangelical. But the word is here directly applied to "doctrines," and therefore *must* mean *truly* Evangelical. It cannot mean *simply* Evangelical, (i. e., confined to doctrines held in common by the sects,) unless that word *simply* is put in; which is an interpolation entirely unwarranted.

What did the Council aim at in giving this their brief notice of doctrine? They themselves state most clearly their object; saying, the Churches do now associate themselves "to *express* and foster their substantial unity in doctrine, polity, and work." This is what they give as the design; and this is all. Not to set up any new platform of doctrine; not to make any "new departure" in regard to fellowship. For the Council knew full well that they had no shadow of authority to attempt any such thing. As representatives, they could only "*express*" what unity they understood as already existing among Congregational Churches. They could order or create no new unity, especially between Churches of different denominations. That must be done, if done at all, by Churches themselves in their Church capacity. Their object was to *express*, simply to express, the unity that *is*; and therefore we find them immediately going on to make this expression in regard to doctrine, saying; "They agree in belief that the Holy Scriptures," etc.

Without stopping to particularize,—and only wishing to distinguish the Scripture belief agreed upon from all Socinian, Pelagian, or other unevangelical heresies, that try to sail under the colors of Congregationalism,—they go on to tell us that the true Congregational interpretation of Scripture is "*in substantial accordance* with the great doctrines of the Christian Faith commonly called Evangelical." And then, to show clearly that there is no attempt at a new platform, they take pains to add, that these Evangelical Congregational doctrines remain the same as have been "held in our own Churches from the early times, and sufficiently set forth by former Councils." What could be plainer than that there is here no new position taken, and no thought of such an attempt? How evident that the word Evangelical is here used in the sense of Orthodox, to separate

us from Socinian and other errors that have arisen among us. Even the liberal freedom with which we will receive to our *fellowship* those who are simply Evangelical, is not here re-iterated, but taken for granted, as a thing already understood, and needing no further enforcement. Much less is there here any new announcement, that this Evangelical freedom of fellowship is *all there is of us*,—that everything in our old standards which is not *simply* Evangelical is now at length ignored!

There are evidently *three* things said about the doctrines in question. They are (1) “doctrines commonly called Evangelical, (2) *doctrines* held in our own Churches from the early times, and (3) *doctrines* sufficiently set forth by former Councils.” Now, if we understand these three clauses to qualify “doctrines” *separately*, then the “substantial accordance” is with three sorts of doctrine, (1) all doctrine commonly called Evangelical, (2) all doctrine held by our own Churches from the early times, and (3) all doctrine set forth sufficiently by former Councils. So that whatever sense we give to Evangelical, the doctrines of the fathers are likewise endorsed.

But suppose we consider the three qualifications as *jointly* applied to “doctrines,” so that the “substantial accordance” is only with doctrines which are both Evangelical and held by the fathers, etc. Then, if we interpolate, and understand the meaning as *simply* Evangelical, we have these three absurdities: 1. The faith of our fathers, set forth by former Councils, is said to be *simply* Evangelical, or confined to points held by all sects, which is notoriously untrue. 2. For an exhibit of this *simply* Evangelical faith of the sects, we are not referred to a comparison of the sect formulas themselves, which is certainly the proper place, but only to “our own Churches” and “former Councils,” with all their specialties of doctrine,—a most absurd resort for such a purpose, surely. 3. With this *simply* Evangelical faith, in which all sects are agreed, *we* ourselves are said to be not fully agreed also (as we certainly are), but only “in *substantial* accordance; i. e., we are *not precisely* one of the Evangelical denominations,—a statement not only untrue, but very absurd for the Council to put forth “as the ground of fellowship.”

If it be said, the "*substantial* accordance" refers to the fact, that our faith has in it *more* than the *simply* Evangelical faith, then all that we claim is conceded, and the Council did set forth and maintain our specialties of faith, as truly as that which is common to the sects. And in that case, the clauses added after the word "doctrines" must certainly qualify it *separately*, thus: Our interpretation is in *substantial* accordance, (1) with the doctrines commonly called Evangelical, (2) with the doctrines held in our own Churches from the early times, and (3) with the doctrines sufficiently set forth by former Councils. To say that our faith is only in *substantial* accordance with *simply* Evangelical faith, i. e., it is *more* than that (as was our fathers faith),—and then to add that this *simply* Evangelical faith, (which is *less* than our own faith as well as that of our fathers,) is *the very faith* held by our fathers and set forth by their Councils,—this would be the very height of absurdity. The phrase "*substantial* accordance" settles it, that the doctrines (more than *simply* Evangelical) held in our own Churches from the early times is what our accordance is with.

To understand the Council's reference as *simply* Evangelical, is to make their three statements to be these (as expressly avowed by one writer):—" (1) that our Congregational Churches hold to the [simply] Evangelical system of faith; [i. e., the system which recognizes nothing but doctrine common to the sects; is this true?];—(2) that they always have held to it, since the early history of our land; [is such a limited system true of our fathers?];—(3) that the details of that [simply] Evangelic faith will be found in the confessions approved by former Councils." Is it true that the former Councils from the early times gave this limited system of doctrine? While the theory objected to thus makes all untruth, our own understanding of the Council's reference, as *truly* Evangelical, gives the following as their three sensible statements: (1) that we are a truly Evangelical denomination, agreeing *substantially* with all the Orthodox system, commonly so called; (2) that in this we agree with our fathers from the early times; (3) that we need not particularize, as the details will be found in former confessions.

In this *Constitution*, the Council are not settling "the ground of fellowship," as some allege; that is not a matter of denominational constitution. They are only defining Congregationalism, and explaining what is the controlling theology for *their government* as a national body. If they meant mere fellowship here, they would "insist only upon a *full* accordance with the great doctrines of the Christian Faith *held by the Evangelical sects in common*, as the ground of fellowship." But since they ask, not a *full*, but only a "*substantial* accordance" with something, it certainly must be with the doctrinal system of ourselves and our fathers "commonly called Evangelical" or Orthodox,—not as the limit of *fellowship*, but as the doctrinal basis of the National Council for *control* of its affairs. To say, as one does, that the Council "insists only on a *substantial* accordance with the great doctrines of the Christian faith, commonly called [simply] 'Evangelical,' as the ground of fellowship,"—is not only to attribute to the Council an *unevangelical* laxity not to be supposed, but also to assign to their doctrinal basis a *fellowship* aim having nothing to do with it.

Mark the language of this Oberlin Constitution. It asserts no such strange notion as that our Congregational faith is *nothing but the simply* Evangelical faith. Everybody knows better than that. It only says that our faith is in *substantial accordance with all* Evangelical doctrine (so-called), does not fall short of it, is *truly* Evangelical, as the Presbyterian or any other faith can claim to be Evangelical. So that they need not throw upon us the stigma of Unitarianism, or any other ism. Let the appeal be particularly to New England delegates to Oberlin, to say if this is not what was chiefly in their mind. Did they mean to throw up everything but what Methodists believe?

We have seen that it is only by the unauthorized interpolation of that word (or thought) *simply*, that the term Evangelical can be narrowed down to teach here an ignoring of all the doctrines except those held in common by all. And we have seen that this *unwarranted interpolation* of *simply* involves a *threefold absurdity*. If a part of the Council thus carelessly interpolated the *thought* in their voting, and so imagined that they had got rid of Calvinism, it should be understood

that no such private interpretation binds the whole Congregational denomination to anything not expressly "in the bond."

If the Council had wished to assert that we alone, of all the Evangelical denominations, maintain no doctrines but those common to all, they could easily have said so in a dozen plain words. But they evidently meant to assert no such strange and unreal thing. If, thinking of the Calvinistic fathers, a brother (as alleged) "thought we had left that and them out; so far as their *peculiarities* went,"—it was only because, he said, "you have got *in another way* all you wanted;" i. e. (seemingly), I think of a turn we can give to the word "Evangelical"* which shall carry our point, whether the Council meant it or not. We are asked how the unanimous Council could *help* meaning to ignore everything in the old standards except what is simply Evangelical, when this was what so many present wanted to have done. We ask in return, how they *could* unanimously mean this, when there were so many present refusing to express any such thing.

Any attempt to thrust upon the simple obvious utterance of the Council a forced interpretation, which should make that Council stultify itself, in an effort to *legislate* a platform for the whole denomination,—and this as the first demonstration that they had no possible legislative power!—any such attempt would look too much like having an end to answer, and seizing an opportune opening to force a favorite theory, by a "snap judgment," upon a bewildered people. Thus to wake up some morning after the fire, and find ourselves as a denomination, by some sudden and unconscious process, transferred to an entirely new policy, would savor too much of political attempts to trap the nation into woman-suffrage through a 15th amendment interpretation "dodge!"

III. FOREIGN RELATIONS.

But suppose the attempt abandoned to fasten on the Council any interference or "new departure" in regard to the doc-

* Is this the reason why the Council's action is *now* given us with the word "Evangelical" put in quotation marks, as if used in a particular technical sense, —and also with a comma after "faith,"—both which glosses were wanting as the action was first printed?

trine of the Churches;—and there does seem to be a drawing back from this conclusion “off and on,” giving an aspect of inconsistency to different portions of the theory as pressed from time to time; the idea is still urged that the Council did at least mean to “foster” unity, by organizing *themselves* on a simply Evangelical basis of doctrine; as shown by their admission of such delegates from Kentucky. Against this view all the arguments before given fully hold, with this additional fact: The Council do not give their doctrinal statement as simply their own basis of organization; but they expressly proclaim it as the old platform of the Churches. “They [the Congregational Churches] agree” substantially in these doctrines. So that, whatever they here adopt for themselves as a body, they profess to derive direct from the Churches; and they do not mean to put the National Council on a simply Evangelical basis, unless they are proclaiming the Churches to be already there,—which we have seen to be impossible.

Their action in regard to the Kentucky delegates is simple. While like the Churches recognizing the distinctive doctrines of the fathers as still ours substantially, they like the Churches received to *fellowship* and communion (though not to *control*) those who were simply Evangelical. It is understood, now as always, that our *fellowship* is thus broadly Evangelical, not only in the National Council, but in all associations and Churches. But, if the Council did mean further, that those Kentucky delegates were received to full *control*, with liberty to move for the eradication of all distinctive Congregational doctrine, from the whole body as from themselves,—then it is simply a question whether the Council in that matter did the wise thing or not? and whether any Church or association is praiseworthy, in thus undermining stealthily its own avowed principles? A bold strike for a simply Evangelical basis may be a better “fostering” of unity than such a roundabout arrival at the result as if by cowardly inadvertence.

And, in the case of this *national* body, we would not object to such a liberal platform, if thus *clearly* avowed, and kept from all encroachment on the Churches. If it is thought best to have this central organization, not for the special uses of Orthodox Congregationalism (already sufficiently supplied *per-*

haps with apparatus), but for the mere advancement of the Congregational *polity* as distinguished from doctrine,—why then, invite to it all who can agree with us in polity, whether called Congregational, Baptist, Independent, Methodist, or otherwise. Only, let it be plainly understood that this is what it is; and do not let the title Congregational remain applied to it in our narrower sense, as if this body were also to be the grand axle of *our* denominational machine.

Suppose it true that the National Council sets out to be a body so little ecclesiastical, so purely an extra or voluntary gathering of spiritual workers, like a common Christian Convention of divers denominations, that it will not go into nice doctrinal points, but is satisfied with describing the faith of its constituents as soundly Evangelical. It will not then complain, if this dismissing of particulars should allow, or even invite, Churches of differing views to associate in this National Council or Convention. Nay, the thing might go so far, that Churches or organizations of all Evangelical orders might come to represent themselves thus, in one national gathering. And we would not object.

But this would not affect the particular Churches at all. Some might be Methodist, some Presbyterian, some Episcopal, at home. But there, in the happy Union or Council of all Evangelism, they would show one peaceful family of Christians, to the dismay of the Satanic hosts. This is the very consummation we have longed for, the plan of union we have always preached as most desirable: liberty of distinctive belief in each Church, and each combination of Churches, each denomination if you please; but, overshadowing all, one grand Evangelical Alliance, cosmopolitan, national, but sub-divided to every State and village,—wherein Christians of all names should do their common work together, saving the scandal and waste of numberless sects in little divided communities.

If the word Congregational, in this Oberlin Constitution, should be found a bar to the coming in of some of the sects, that would only prove that the Council needs to go one step farther before the glorious union platform claimed shall have been fully reached. We can certainly afford to fellowship, and in many things work together, with all who will work Evangelically in polity, as well as with all who will work Evangel-

ically in doctrine;—unless indeed we mean to exalt polity as of more consequence than doctrine, which no orthodox son of the Pilgrims will be likely to do.

We mistake. Since writing thus we have with new surprise read over an article based upon this very idea. We find a brother in ecstasies over the prospect, that now (by the action at Oberlin) all *doctrinal* distinctions of the Evangelical denominations are soon to be obliterated, and only the *more important governmental* distinctions, Congregational, Presbyterian, Methodist, Episcopal, Baptist, are to remain. We Christians are at length to be a happy family, when we zealously get into our Churches all shades of *belief*, and as jealously keep out all question or doubt of our own Church *polity*;—when we have taught other sects to do the same, putting questions of order above questions of faith, each pushing his purely Ecclesiastical *ism* as if the one thing needful for the salvation of the world!

Listen to the announcement of one:

"The Church of God has moved on to meet new issues of transcendent consequence, and it adapts its fellowship to the changed circumstances. As the foes of the gospel unite and become increasingly powerful, its friends cannot afford to divide on minor differences ['of the faith'] which no longer invite attention or excite interest. . . . There can be no doubt the progress of Congregationalism has been greatly retarded by the former limitation of its denominational fellowship [management] to Calvinistic ministers and Churches. . . . The way will now be open for Evangelical Churches and ministers to come to us from every quarter . . . whether theologically they be Calvinists, Lutherans, Arminians, or even to a certain extent Sacramentarians. . . . Surely this opens a bright prospect for the progress of Congregationalism as the representative of Evangelical Church democracy and Christian coöperation. . . . While denominations may still be unavoidable, owing to conscientious differences of sentiment as to the prescribed organization of the Church and ministry, they should be made as few as possible, and not be multiplied by basing them also on minor theological differences. . . . Thus when our example shall have had its full effect, we may expect to see Evangelical Christendom less at war with itself, and the surviving denominations reduced to those who feel obligated to maintain certain fixed forms of Church polity."

It is of but little consequence, if at the outset we begin Church with a capital and gospel with a little *g*. It may be of no great account if our main drift seems to be, how men *unite* so as to be *powerful*,—what we can *afford* for the *progress of Congregationalism, Church-democracy, organization*,—about which people may have *conscientious differences of sentiment*, and may

feel obligated to maintain certain fixed forms of polity, making such denominations unavoidable,—while it is too bad for them to have any conscience or care *whether they be Calvinists or Armenians*, seeking to be born of the Spirit or of the will of man, or attentive to any such *minor theological differences*.

But there are those who still hope that matters of Christian faith, "the great doctrines of grace," as our Churches have always called them, which have lifted us above the loose theologies and looser disciplines around us,—that these are *not* henceforth to be set down (*as if* by decision from Oberlin) as only minor differences or petty quibblings, no longer cared for among us; and that matters of Church government are *not* to be exalted to the front rank as of transcendent consequence, and as all that we can afford to press in our new zeal for a wide-spreading denomination. There are many who still believe that the "doctrines of grace" are of even more consequence than mere Church polity (highly as we estimate the latter, in its puritan simplicity); and who think that there is more promise of harmony and true success to us in remaining somewhat homogeneous and high-toned in faith, even though we may thereby not swell so fast our statistics, to outvie other Church establishments.

The wish, for some years past so evidently growing especially in the "interior," to exalt our polity *ism* at the expense of our orthodoxy, in the hope of swelling our ranks to compete with the on-rushing *isms* around us,—(*they* are all enlarging themselves by inward re-unions, and why should not *we* too enlarge by uniting with *somebody*?)—this wish, now at length more fully developed as a craved outgrowth from the Oberlin Council, is (we think) in a dangerous line of experiment. Already it brings on us the rebuke of the *Presbyterian Monthly Record* (for April), which declines further coöperation; not only because "the arrogance of Congregationalists in claiming to be peculiarly non-sectarian is offensive," but also because (it says) "the Calvinism of Congregationalism has been rendered suspicious by the *new doctrinal departure* of the Oberlin Council, and needs a new vindication as preliminary to any joint action."

Let us not give color to these complaints. Let us not so interpret as to confirm the charges of heterodoxy that have been made against us, and thus cut ourselves off from what sympathy we have got in more orthodox quarters. Let us not boast too greatly of our non-sectarianism, while we cling to that word Congregational as of transcendent consequence. Since we acknowledge Methodists, Presbyterians, and Episcopalians, with all their peculiarities of polity, as soundly Evangelical Christians and Churches, how can we consistently keep them out of our Evangelical Council, if they should be taken with a happy desire to come in ?

It will be the easiest thing conceivable, in this era of charity and good feeling, to consummate the glory of "the new departure" by erasing that little obnoxious word "Congregational," and letting our National Council become the grand Evangelical Alliance of all sects, that we so much need. Some of us think that this would be greatly better than the present half-way proposal, to open the door to all who are Evangelical in doctrine, while we impolitely slam it in the face of the many, who would be willing in such alliance to be also Evangelical in polity.

IV. DOMESTIC RELATIONS.

The mistakes made concerning the Oberlin action have arisen in part (we think) from the unfortunate wording of that action, growing out of the assumed position of the new organization as a *Council*. Some of us doubted, and still doubt, the wisdom of such a standing body for our order, under the ambiguous and suspicious name of Council. And if the body is really Congregational, it cannot be treated as anything more than a Conference or Association on a larger scale. But, unlike our District Associations, and even our Western State Associations, this is to be a gathering, not of the Churches as such, but of the associations (and benevolent societies), which are the only bodies represented in it.

This late-devised plan, of organization by delegates from other delegated bodies, instead of delegates from individual Churches, has always been questionable, as to its consistency with our polity. Such a borrowing of Presbyterian gradation in the mode of organizing (a thing unknown among the fathers),

certainly tends towards a Presbyterianizing, or at least a centralizing, in the spirit and result of things. For it throws the influence and control more and more out of the reach of individual pastors and Churches (especially in the humbler walks) into the hands of leading spirits, who usually make out to reach and manipulate such select central bodies.

Our National Council decided, it seems, not to go into the business of creed-making. And in this they were wise. When a Congregational body gets to consist, like this, of only representatives of representatives of the Churches,—the third dilution of mere advice,—the cube-root of delegated instruction *not* to govern; then it would better leave off not only creed-making, but polity-making also. Its best province, surely, is that of *full* Evangelical fellowship only. We see no possible need for specialties of creed, or even a denominational name, or the title of Council, to *such a national body*; unless we want to make it a hierarchical affair.

The National Council being thus only a re-union of the associations by representatives sent from them, it can aspire to no higher prerogative than they possess. And if the name Council is meant or allowed to cover anything more, it certainly is a fatal mistake. An association cannot act as a Council, or give advice to individual Churches or members, or speak in the name of the Churches as such, but only in its own name, as a voluntary gathering of members sent from different Churches. And a central body, made up from sub-associations, being itself only a voluntary gathering like them, is at a still further remove from being able to speak in the name of the Churches as such. It is not even constituted or got together by Churches (which will have *nothing* to do with all its subsequent meetings); but is only a re-union of certain other voluntary unions, entirely outside of Churches.

Any other view of associations or national organizations than this here given, seems to us a Presbyterianizing view not known to pure Congregationalism. And if the present view is called in question, it is only to us a sad token of the imperceptible stages by which this generation is drifting away from the simple *Church* polity of our fathers, into a centralizing polity of *standing synods*, general assemblies, national councils,

—such arrangements as are more in harmony with denominations around us.

According to this simple puritan idea of the case, it was a mistake of the Oberlin delegates, in this their Constitution adopted, to say as they do, "The Congregational Churches of the United States, by elders and messengers assembled, do now associate themselves in National Council. *They agree*," etc. Not to discuss here the propriety of saying, "*The Churches of the United States*," as if none could be Congregational Churches unless represented there (most certainly a Presbyterian assumption)—not to discuss here the propriety of saying, "*the Churches agree*" so and so, when the matters there agreed upon have never been submitted to the Churches, (as even the more hierarchical sects around us deem wise and fitting in such a case,)—not to delay now on such matters, important though they be, we will only press this point. It is not *the Churches* that act in that National Council, for no Church is there, or is a constituent of that body, according to Congregational ideas. It only represents associations, and can not rightly act for individual Churches, unless by some uncongregational interpretation.

The memorable body that set forth the Cambridge platform, the one great basis of our polity, issued it as coming from *themselves*;—"The Synod of the elders and messengers of our Churches assembled at Cambridge" thus agree. And in that platform they give as the only acknowledged composition of such a Synod or Council,—"*THE CHURCHES* sending forth *their elders* and other messengers." Not a word of allowance for associations or other volunteer representative gatherings to send together *their* messengers statedly, and call this a Council or Synod for the making of platforms. And no assumption even by the true Synod assembled, that it is "*the Churches*" speaking "by elders and messengers;" but only a modest utterance, as from "*A Synod of the elders and messengers of our Churches*," giving their own opinion, which their Churches are to follow or not as they please.

Hence this Oberlin Constitution would more appropriately begin like this: "The elders and messengers assembled from various associations of Congregational Churches in the United

States, do now associate themselves and their successors. . . . They agree," etc. For they, the delegates of associations at Oberlin, have indeed agreed upon certain action. But the particular Churches *have not agreed* upon any such thing. And what is more, there is in Congregationalism no superior authority that can summon them to such agreement. It is the very glory of our system that each Church is free from outward control, or attempt at conformity,—and that even advice volunteered from abroad, though from any number of associated Churches, without special letter missive from that one Church calling for that precise item of advice, is an impertinence to the Church advised, and not to be tolerated for a moment. Such was the jealous guarding of our system by the fathers. Alas for us! if we are insensibly sliding away from their polity, into a more powerful centralization, where leading minds can have fuller scope to rule, as in other dynasties.

We think this objectionable mode of wording was an *oversight* on the part of the Council, and that they did not *intend*, though they seem to *express*, that their utterance comes from the Churches themselves, all the Churches of the land. But this oversight, and the consequent misunderstandings arising, only show more clearly the anticipated danger from all such central movements, especially the danger of the name Council. No sooner had the body decided upon that ominous and somewhat pretentious title, than it seemed to fall at once into the error feared of talking as if it were really a Council, and entitled to give advice to Churches, and speak in their name, and as if it had the authority of letters missive on the particular points.

The whole current discussion over this matter arises from the mistake of some (helped on by the unfortunate mode of expression introducing the constitution), that the Oberlin action commits the individual Churches and the denomination at large; and that this committal is to a *new basis* of *simply* Evangelical control, as well as fellowship. Whereas the Council did not and could not act for the Churches; and it did not and could not make any such change of base. All error is saved, by marking well the distinction between *fellowship* and *control*. We have no "new departure." We have only *added* this National Council, as a fifth wheel to our coach, an extra patent device,

(which already jolts us with its working),—namely, one wheel of an omnibus, which some of us are watching curiously, to see if it would not be full as well to get a complete omnibus itself!

As a denomination, we need perhaps a "Congregational Union" of the churches, such as they have in England; but we have always and justly shrunk from a National Council. So says a work issued by the Congregational Publishing Society of Boston. Let us heed such advice. Let us have one thing or another; either a simply Evangelical Alliance, or a general Convention representing the Congregational polity only, or a Convocation purely denominational both in faith and polity. Let us not attempt a mongrel production, really one thing, but claiming to be another, and so bringing the world's laugh upon our nondescript "National Council." It is not too late to amend the title, and (in proper negotiation with the owners of the name) to start our national work anew, as the **AMERICAN CONGREGATIONAL UNION.**

ARTICLE VII.—SECTARIAN SYMBOLS.

WE publish in this issue of the *New Englander* an Article [Art. VI, pp. 726-744] which may do good by the exposure which it incidentally makes of the folly inseparable from any attempt to institute a sectarian Congregationalism. It reminds us that we have not done all our duty in relation to the present bearings of that distinctive element in the Congregational polity, which the authors of the Cambridge Platform attempted to elaborate in their chapter "Of the Communion of Churches one with another." Six months ago, or more, we began to write what might have been in some sort an appendix to the Article in our April number, from a valued contributor, on the Oberlin Council; but we were too busy to finish. We now find ourselves recalled to the unfinished task by a new contributor, whose article is on some points clear and convincing, and nowhere more so than where he refutes himself. The Article, if its positive merits were far less than they are, would be worth publishing as an example of the mistakes into which a clear-sighted man may fall by assuming that it is the right and the duty of churches to be sectarian. We regard it as a valuable illustration of the perplexity—to some minds almost ludicrous—which has arisen, within and without the fellowship of the Congregational churches, concerning the significance and effect of the so-called Doctrinal Basis in the constitution of the proposed triennial convention to be called a National Council.

Much of that perplexity arises from an easy misconception. It seems to be assumed by some who ought to know better, as well as by many whose ignorance is more excusable, that Congregationalism (especially since it is now to be represented in a sort of General Assembly, meeting under the name of National Council) instead of being as it once was, and as the word implies, the antithesis of Nationalism in church polity, and of all provincial, synodical, or classical church government, is only a name to denote one particular method of governing a certain ecclesiastical unity territorially coëxtensive with the nation.

The assumption, underlying the perplexity, is that the Congregational churches are an organized sect with doctrinal standards to distinguish them from other sects, instead of being simply so many several churches of Christ, each complete and distinct; each deriving its powers, not in dribblets of concession from a superior judicatory, but in plenitude from Him who is Head over all things to the Church; each independent of all other churches, save as independent nations are mutually dependent in their relations of intercourse and neighborhood; and each holding intercourse with other churches according to its needs and opportunities, and according to its own discernment of what Christ requires. Thus, some Methodists on the one hand, and some Presbyterians on the other, forgetting, or having never known, what the Congregational polity is and must be, have imagined that because the National Council does not set up some old syntagma of dogmatic theology, such as the Westminster Confession, or the Savoy Declaration, and establish it as the standard of faith and doctrine for all Congregationalists, those who bear that name are henceforth to be numbered as belonging to one of the anti-Calvinistic denominations. Some Congregationalists, even—or men who have thought that they were Congregationalists—seem to think that, since the adoption of that Doctrinal Basis, there is no knowing whether they themselves are or are not Calvinists as their fathers were. Perhaps some such souls are waiting for the interpretation of the Doctrinal Basis to be settled, so that they may know what it is which they themselves believe.

We have adverted to this matter for the purpose of saying that the harmless sentence which describes so vaguely the agreement of the churches represented at Oberlin, is not a confession of faith to be imposed on all Congregationalists, nor a standard of orthodoxy by which ministers or churches, institutions or individuals, are to be measured and tested. The breadth of this Doctrinal Basis, if to any it seems too broad, impairs no man's liberty to be as narrow as his conscience may require him to be. Nor is any man, to whom it may seem too narrow, forbidden to be as much broader as he can make himself. There is no church, no association or conference of churches, no theological seminary, no individual teacher of theology or

pastor of a church, whose views of Christian doctrine have been reformed, or whose ecclesiastico-theological relations and sympathies have been modified in even the slightest degree by anything in that constitution. Churches, pastors, colleges, theological seminaries, and theologians, are no less Calvinistic, and no more, than they were before the assembling of the Oberlin Council. If it be said that they are not now bound to profess their acceptance of the body of divinity in Calvin's Institutes, or of that in the Westminster Assembly's Catechisms, the ready answer is that, notoriously, they were not so bound before. No feature of the Congregational polity is more characteristic, or more essential to its being, than its repudiation of all human standards imposed as tests of orthodoxy or as conditions of Christian fellowship, by whatever authority. Nothing indicates more clearly some ignorance or inconsiderateness in relation to first principles than when Congregationalists begin to talk as if there had been, or might be, some synod or assembly sufficiently powerful either to bring the churches under such a bondage or to release them from it. John Cotton said, two hundred and thirty years ago, "We have reason to thank God that we desire not to be accounted Catholics or Hierarchics, nor stand members of a diocesan, or provincial, or cathedral, or national church, but bear witness against them all;—that He hath given us churches and congregational assemblies by his covenant, to worship him in all his holy ordinances;—that he hath given us to look for no laws but his word, no rules and forms of worship but such as he hath set down in his word; NO PLATFORM OF DOCTRINE but such as are held forth in the words of the prophets and apostles."* Was not John Cotton a sound Congregationalist?

There are certain historic names which serve to denominate distinct systems of theological opinion,—such as Sabellian, Arian, Pelagian, and Augustinian. The names of some memorable theologians since the Reformation—for example, Calvin, Arminius, Edwards, and Hopkins—have been used in this way. But certain other names that figure in ecclesiastical his-

* Quoted in Felt's *Ecl. History of New England* (published by the Congregational Board of Publication), p. 415.

tory—Presbyterian for example, or Episcopalian—are derived from distinct systems of church polity, and represent differences in the method of ordering and governing the Christian commonwealth. In regard to these two classes of names, nothing is more obvious than that no name of the former class is, or can be, precisely equivalent with any name of the latter class. Dr. Samuel Clark was at once an Arian and an Episcopalian; but all Arians are not Episcopalians, nor are all Episcopalians Arians. Everybody knows that a member or a minister of the Anglican communion may be, theologically, an Arminian or a Calvinist, a Lutheran or a Hopkinsian, without ceasing to be, ecclesiastically, a *jure divino* Episcopalian. Nor is there any inseparable bond between Presbyterianism and some distinctive system of orthodoxy. The Cumberland Presbyterians have eliminated certain doctrines from their edition of the Westminster Confession, but in so doing they did not cease to be Presbyterians. On the European continent, as well as in Great Britain and Ireland, the history of Presbyterianism shows that the name represents not at all a certain body of theological opinions, but simply a certain polity. Not individuals only, but presbyteries and synods holding fast that polity, have become Arminians and even Arians without losing their right to the Presbyterian name. What is so manifestly true of Presbyterianism and Episcopalianism is much more true of Congregationalism. The name is not theological but simply ecclesiastical. Nothing is more indisputable than that Arminians as well as Calvinists of all schools, old and new, have been and may be Congregationalists. We go farther. A Congregational Church—say John Cotton's, the First Church in Boston—if it retains the Congregational polity, does not lose its right to that name by any change in its doctrinal theology. It may go far astray, it may find itself excluded from communion with the neighbor churches, but the only intelligent way to deny that it is a Congregational church is to deny that it is a church at all.

We must be allowed to insist on these rudimental ideas, even at the risk of repetition. A simply Christian church, self-governed under Christ, is a Congregational church. Christian believers agreeing to meet statedly for Christian worship, to

order their affairs according to the examples and precepts given in the New Testament, and to uphold and help each other in the Christian life, are a church, and he who is Head over all things has given to no hierarchy, to no primate or prelate, to no national or synodical assembly, and to no classical presbytery, any "power of the keys"—any right to admit or exclude, to censure or absolve, to ordain or depose—which he has not given to that brotherhood meeting together in his name. Such a church claims no *control* over other churches; nor, standing fast in the liberty wherewith Christ has made it free, does it permit itself to be *controled* by any exterior power. Yet it acknowledges and practices, according to its opportunities and its light, certain duties of fellowship which churches owe to each other as churches of Christ. There is the comprehensive duty of mutual recognition and respect, including the comity of admitting each other's members to occasional communion, and of dismissing and receiving members from one to another; and there are such duties as that of giving and receiving advice in matters of common concern or in cases of special difficulty, and that of coöperating against wickedness or misery and of helping each other especially in efforts for the advancement of the gospel.

What then have such churches to do with any sectarian symbol? So long as they are simply and purely churches of Christ—nothing less, nothing more—each self-governed under Christ and none of them governing another—who can make them into a sect? How can they be anything else than the one Catholic Church of Christ organizing itself in various places, under the simplest forms, as a visible institution? There may be, and will be, differences among them—differences in the order of worship and the forms of administration—differences in intelligence and culture, and in the special type of religious experience as modified by culture—differences in respect to strictness or laxity of discipline—differences in the degree and the methods of Christian activity—differences on disputed points of Christian doctrine. Such differences may cause an interruption of fellowship between one church and another, or between many on one side and many on the other side. A few of them, or many, may confederate themselves into a sect with

an imposed liturgy or an imposed confession of doctrinal belief; but at whatever moment they attempt such a thing, they begin to depart from the first principle of Congregationalism. Instead of being each self-governed under Christ, they are contriving how to govern each other. They are not satisfied with being simply local churches of Christ—nothing less, nothing more; they therefore cease to be Congregational churches pure and simple, and have become Congregational churches of a certain sect or schism, with an inevitable necessity of choosing or receiving some distinctive surname. However close their confederation may be, and however numerous or powerful, they cannot coerce any church into it, nor will the churches that stand aloof from them be any less Congregational than they.

Let us come then to the question of creeds in churches. We take the word "creed" as signifying not a simple profession of personal faith in Christ and his gospel (like the old tradition called the Apostles' Creed), but a doctrinal formulary, such as the creeds of Congregational churches in this country generally are. The first question is, whether such a creed is a good thing in a church. We answer, A church cannot be intelligently formed without a mutual understanding among those who are forming it as to the distinctive truths of the religion which is to be the bond of their union. It is not enough that they recognize the being of a personal God, and intend to maintain some sort of public worship. They are to be a church of Christ; and they must ask each other, Who is Christ? What do we want of him? What do we hope from him? What is his relation to the intercourse between our souls and God? What is his place in our theory of the universe? What do we mean when we call ourselves by his name and profess to believe in him? They cannot intelligently and honestly agree to be a church of Christ, without a substantial agreement in their answers to such questions as these. No plausible reason can be given why their agreement in belief concerning Christ and his gospel may not, for the sake of clearness and definiteness, be written down in a series of doctrinal propositions; nor why in their act of covenanting with each other, they should not formally express their assent to that summary of their united belief, so that "with one mind and one mouth they may glorify

God." By their recognition of each other's Christian character, and their mutual agreement to be a church of Christ, they become incorporated under the New Testament, the only charter of their rights and duties; and under that charter they proceed to the election and ordination of their officers, both "bishops and deacons." Then comes the question concerning the admission of new members into this divinely chartered institution. We are not required to discuss that question here, for we are writing, as Congregationalists, to those who profess, at least, that they hold fast the first principles of the Congregational church-theory. The language of the Cambridge Platform (A.D. 1648) serves our purpose.

"1. The doors of the churches of Christ upon earth do not, by God's appointment, stand so wide open that all sorts of people, good or bad, may freely enter therein at their pleasure; but such as are admitted thereto as members ought to be examined and tried first whether they be fit and meet to be received into church society or not."

"2. The things which are requisite to be found in all church members are *repentance* from sin, and *faith* in Jesus Christ; and therefore these are the things whereof men are to be examined at their admission into the church, and which then they must profess and hold forth in such sort as may satisfy rational charity that the things are there indeed."

"3. The weakest measure of faith is to be accepted in those that desire to be admitted into the church; because weak Christians, if sincere, have the substance of that faith, repentance and holiness which is required in church members; and [because] such have most need of the ordinances for their confirmation and growth in grace." "Such charity and tenderness is to be used, as the weakest Christian, if sincere, may not be excluded or discouraged. Severity of examination is to be avoided." Cambridge Platform, ch. xii.

The church, then,—the society of believers which has been constituted by the mutual engagement of the members to be a church of Christ, "joining themselves, by a covenant of the Lord, into a church estate, in the fellowship of the gospel, to walk in all his ways made known or to be made known unto them"—has no right to receive as members all sorts of people good or bad; nor has it, as Christ's church, a right to shut out any who upon examination "profess and hold forth in such sort as may satisfy rational charity" their repentance from sin, and their faith in Jesus Christ. In other words, it must require of

* Such was the covenant of the Pilgrim Fathers. See Bradford's History, p. 9.

candidates for admission a credible profession of faith. A credible profession must be, in some measure certainly, an intelligent profession, for "how shall they believe on him of whom they have not heard?" Such a profession includes some satisfactory answer to the question, "What *think* ye of Christ?" All the questions about Christ and salvation which the original members of that church (as we have just represented) answered to each other before entering into the covenant which made them a body-politic under Christ, are the questions which should be answered satisfactorily, in some way, by any who are afterward received as members. Nor is there any good reason why a new member may not, at his reception into the brotherhood, express his assent (if he can without any painful scruple) to the same series of doctrinal propositions in which the original members expressed their belief concerning Christ and his gospel, and to which they publicly assented in their solemn covenanting with each other and with Christ. It is thus that the forms which, under the name of Confessions of Faith, are ordinarily used at the admission of members into our Congregational Churches, have originated. They were not invented or imposed as tests that would detect and exclude "him that is weak in the faith." It is only by usurpation and a heedless departure from first principles that they can be used for the purpose of shutting out of the church any applicant for admission who is regarded as holding forth, intelligently and sincerely, repentance from sin and faith in Christ. Inasmuch as "the weakest measure of faith, if sincere, is to be accepted in those that desire to be admitted into the church"—inasmuch as "weak Christians, if sincere, have the substance of that faith, repentance and holiness which is required in church members"—inasmuch as "such have most need of the ordinances for their confirmation and growth in grace"—such a person ought never to be debarred from the church because of his being too scrupulous to adopt as the expression of his faith, some prescribed formula, one, for example, including the phrase so often found in these confessions, that "God *for his own glory* hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass." The phrase, if we may explain it, is in our judgment true; but shall a devout believer who cannot be convinced that it does not make God supremely selfish, be therefore shut out of the church?

But churches, as well as individual believers, have occasion to make profession of their faith. When a new church is instituted according to the usages of New England, it asks recognition and the right hand of fellowship from a council of neighbor churches; and, for the satisfaction of that council and its constituency, it must present not only such documents and other evidence as will attest the orderliness of the organization, but also a confession of faith, so well considered and definite as will show what views of Christ and of salvation from sin, what theory of Christianity—in a word, what doctrines—it rests upon and expects to inculcate in the training of its catechumens and to maintain by its pastors and teachers. Such a confession may be as extended, as minute in its specifications, as technical in the use of language, and as hard to be understood, as the voluminous standard of the various Presbyterian churches, without encroaching on anybody's Christian liberty; for it is not given out to be imposed on the Lord's free people as a condition of communion. It is not a standard by which other churches are to be measured and judged, but simply a statement on which other churches are invited to pass a charitable judgment. The question for the council and its constituent churches, and for all churches that may have occasion to take cognizance of the document, is not, "Do we adopt this as the confession of our faith?"—nor, "Do we certify these views of Christian doctrine as entirely correct?"—but only, "Shall we recognize this church as a true church of Christ with which we can safely hold communion?" If a church has set down among its articles of belief a proposition which implies that Christ did not give himself a ransom for all, and that God is not earnestly inviting all men to believe and be saved, the question is not whether we ourselves believe that dogma, but only whether we can acknowledge, as evangelical and worthy to participate in the communion of the saints, a church which has been misled by logic and metaphysics into the profession of a dogma so inconsistent with every aspect of the gospel recorded in the Scriptures.

We have, then, two distinct uses of what are called church creeds. *First*, It is fit, though not indispensable, for a church to have a form of words in which those whom it receives as mem-

bers may be allowed to make the public profession of their faith. Such a form (we hardly need say) should be brief, simple, and with as little as possible of technical theology,—a profession of personal faith in Christ and in the offers and promises of the gospel. Instead of saying, “I believe *that* there is a God,” it should say, “I believe *in* God.” Instead of laying down a proposition about the trinity of persons in the unity of the Godhead, it should express a believer’s confidence in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, the one God of our salvation. Instead of defining carefully the doctrine of justification by faith alone, it should express reliance on Christ who is the propitiation for our sins. From beginning to end it should be not logical or doctrinal, but devotional, the utterance of religious trust and hope. But, *secondly*, a church may be convinced that for other uses it needs another sort of confession. It desires to be in relations of intimate confidence and coöperation with other churches, and for their sake it may be required to set forth either in words of its own, or by reference to some recognized summary of orthodoxy, the system of doctrines which it derives from the Scriptures. It may find itself charged with unsoundness of doctrine, or called to protest against errors which are directly or remotely subversive of the gospel, and for such uses it may reasonably have its more or less extended confession of faith in the form of doctrinal statements. Such a confession or summary of Christian doctrine should represent what the church holds as a body, and need not imply that all who dissent in any particular from the confession are to be excised.

Creeds of this doctrinal sort may have an important relation to “the communion of churches one with another.” The churches of New England were in the beginning close-communion churches. Only in times comparatively recent have they, and other Pædobaptist churches of the Congregational polity, learned that there are degrees of intimacy in the intercourse of churches mutually recognized as “evangelical.” They now use a large, and sometimes a loose, liberality in their invitations to the Lord’s table, and in permitting preachers supposed to be evangelical to officiate in their assemblies. But there are still some acts of communion which are practicable only among

churches walking in the same order and holding substantially the same system of doctrines. The communion practiced by our churches in the ordination or dismission of their pastors, and in the giving and receiving of advice about difficult cases of discipline, is of this kind. Congregational churches have adopted, also, as part of their communion one with another, certain new methods of mutual helpfulness and of coöperation in the work of Christ. Stated conferences of churches are perhaps the most important of these new methods, and the most hopeful, being directly tributary to the life of the churches so confederated. This method of communion is in its nature limited. It presupposes a certain measure of agreement both in polity and in doctrine. Accordingly the constitution of such a conference, while carefully disowning all authority legislative or judicial, intimates in some way that only Congregational churches are expected to confederate under it; and each conference stands on some "doctrinal basis," either formally incorporated into the constitution or unequivocally understood. But the "doctrinal basis," even if elaborated in the form of a confession of faith, is not a test imposed upon the members of the conference; nobody is required to say that it is the confession of his faith. Neither the delegates nor the churches that send them are measured by it to ascertain their orthodoxy. What then is the use of it? Just this: It shows what the conference is, and what it intends. This free association, called a conference, has no authority over the churches and desires none. It is constituted simply by elective affinity. If it publishes any confession of faith, it does so not by way of dictation to anybody, but only that the churches may be its judges, and may decide for themselves whether it is worthy of their confidence. They are invited not to show whether they can say "Shibboleth," but to judge whether they can edify each other by this method of communion.

Now the National Council, to be convened every third year after 1871, is, on a large scale, just what those stated conferences are on a small scale. Like them, it carefully disowns all control over the churches or over individuals, and guards itself against every temptation to usurp either legislative or judicial authority. It is a perfectly free confederacy of

churches for coöperation and mutual helpfulness. It does not propose to take away—nor can it take away—from any church, any local conference of churches, or any State conference, the right of withdrawing from it at any moment. Thus it commends itself to the confidence of the churches, traditionally and wisely jealous for their independent self-government. But those churches, jealous for Congregationalism, are also jealous for the gospel. They do not receive, to such communion as the National Council proposes, every self-governed society which calls itself a church. They recognize the historic fact that some of the ancient churches in New England have lapsed into Unitarianism without renouncing their independent self-government, and have become not only the nucleus but the chief support of “the Unitarian denomination” in the United States, which is as really a Congregational body as “the Remonstrant Synod of Ulster,” in Ireland, is a Presbyterian body. They know that the “Universalist denomination” consists of independent congregations that call themselves churches. They are not ignorant that all the Antipædobaptist churches, and all that insist on immersion as the only baptism, are strictly Congregational churches; nor that among the various “Baptist denominations,” regular and irregular, there are all varieties of doctrine—frantic Antinomianism at one extreme, and mere Unitarianism at the other. Just here is the propriety of some “doctrinal basis” for the National Council. Some churches are invited to confederate under this constitution, and to meet by delegation every third year for consultation in order to more efficient action in a common cause. What churches? Not all that accept the Congregational polity, but only such as are Evangelical in doctrine. Not all Evangelical and Orthodox churches, but only such as are at the same time Congregational. The doctrinal character, therefore, of the churches invited to share in the benefits of this confederation is described by saying that “their interpretation [of the Scriptures] is in substantial accordance with the great doctrines of the Christian faith commonly called Evangelical, held in our own churches from the early times, and sufficiently set forth by former councils.” These words, following a recognition of the Scriptures as the sole authority in religion, are the entire doctrinal basis of the Triennial Council.

We frankly confess that as an expression of doctrinal agreement this formula is, beyond all precedents known to us, empty of definite meaning. Whether it means less or more than absolute silence would have meant, is a question on which antiquaries may dispute in some distant age hereafter, but on which we hazard no opinion. The single word, Evangelical, or Orthodox, without any explanation, would have been comparatively definite; but if the intention had been to say nothing in particular, while seeming to say something, the formula as it stands would have been exceedingly felicitous. What the intention was of the committee which contrived that exquisite collocation of words, or what was the intention of the assembly which adopted it by a vote, we could not say without being liable to the charge of temerity,—perhaps not without seeming to express a disrespectful sentiment which we do not feel. Taking the words in their successive clauses, we find, *first*, that the Congregational churches invited to coöperate under the constitution are those whose interpretation of the Scriptures is “in *substantial* accordance with the great doctrines of the Christian faith;” *secondly*, that the great doctrines of the Christian faith with which the interpretation of the Scriptures by the aforesaid churches is in substantial accordance are “commonly called Evangelical;” *thirdly*, that these doctrines, commonly called Evangelical, have been held in our own churches from the early times; *fourthly*, that they have been sufficiently set forth by former councils; and, *fifthly*, that what they are the authors of the constitution do not tell us, preferring, evidently, that every particular church be at liberty to determine the question according to its own knowledge of theology and of dogmatic history.

But, on the whole, awkward as this formula is, we are compelled to doubt whether the committee that framed it, or the assembly that voted it, could have done much better. Somehow, the impression is made that the constitution invites to its National Council not the Unitarian churches, nor the assemblies of Universalists, nor the synagogues of Judaism, be they ever so Congregational in the management of their affairs, but only such Congregational churches of the United States as are commonly called Orthodox, or Evangelical. What more do we want? If the National Council were to

have *control* over the churches—if it were to have the power of determining who shall be ordained to office in the churches, who shall be authenticated as qualified to preach the gospel, and who shall be received to communion or excluded—if it were to be a court of appeals in trials for heresy—in brief, if instead of three thousand distinct and self-governing churches, we were to have one church distributed into three thousand assemblies under one government, a sectarian church geographically co-extensive with the nation, and making proselytes to its “denomination” in other lands—then some doctrinal standard besides the Bible and the Spirit of Christ in His churches, would be necessary—or, at least would be possible. But all these matters, pertaining either to the internal government of churches, or to their communion one with another, are left just where they were “from the early times”—just where they would be if the National Council had never been thought of. Every church will continue to administer the law of Christ according to its own judgment. Every church will choose its bishops and deacons, and ordain them as heretofore, according to the grace given to it. Churches will give and receive advice as heretofore, at their discretion. Associated pastors will continue to examine and approbate (or, as the word goes, license) candidates for the ministry, and they will do this under rules of their own making, and according to their own ideas of what constitutes fitness for the work of preaching. The standing of a church as Evangelical or non-Evangelical—the question whether it shall be counted in or counted out when the constituency of the National Council is to be reckoned up—will be a question for neighboring churches, and not for any higher judicature. The churches to be represented in that triennial synod of elders and messengers are not an organized and governed sect; and for that reason they neither have nor need to have sectarian symbols.

Some are anxious to know how the churches, notoriously though freely Calvinistic from the beginning, will retain their “distinctive doctrines,” unless it be maintained that the National Council stands on a sectarian basis. They think it will be “hard to see how a pastor is to know what he is authorized to teach” if the “doctrinal basis” is understood to be, like that

of the Tract Society, only Evangelical. "Every shade of Calvinistic or predestinarian faith is to be put into the shade" (they say), if a church that is not clear on the doctrine of the Divine decrees, or that of the perseverance of all saints, can be represented in the National Council. In friendly deference to such a feeling, we may be allowed to say that, if the churches continue to be Evangelical in doctrine, and to demand that their ministers shall be not flashy and fluent speakers only but thinkers, well educated in theology, their Calvinism will take care of itself; and we say, farther, that the pastor who must have a satisfactory interpretation of that singular combination of phrases called "the doctrinal basis," in order "to know what he is authorized to teach," should be advised to "go a fishing" rather than to pursue a work for which he is unfit. A man may hold all the theology of John Wesley (shallow as his theology would seem to Edwards or to Taylor), and yet be far more fit for the pastoral office in one of our churches or for a seat in our National Council, than the man who, not being able to discover a sectarian symbol for his rule of faith, does not know that he is authorized to teach whatever the Bible teaches, and that he must teach it whether men will hear or forbear. Surely every Congregational pastor, if he knows at all what Congregationalism is in its genius and history, acknowledges that God's commission to him is not, Teach what the symbol of your denomination authorizes,—but, "Preach the preaching that I bid thee."

There are men, we are sorry to say, who seem to think that their relation to Christ, whether as ministers of his gospel or as disciples, is, and can be, only through a sectarian organization. The conception of a church belonging directly to Christ, instead of belonging to him through its connection with one of the organized sects, seems to be quite beyond the range of their thinking. If any such are among the readers of what we are writing, we say to them that the legitimate definition of a Congregational church is that it is a church of Christ and nothing else—a church belonging directly to Christ and independent of sectarian symbols and sectarian arrangements. Such churches accept a doctrine not because it is Calvinistic or Arminian, Edwardean or Wesleyan, but only because it is

Evangelical. In like manner their polity is simply what they find in the New Testament, the Evangelical polity, and nothing else. On the basis of the gospel as given in the New Testament—the doctrine which is according to godliness, and the order of the gospel—they have communion one with another, and communion as far as it is practicable with churches which, having added sectarianism to the gospel, hold forth the compound in their sectarian symbols. What was attempted by the earliest English Congregationalists—the martyrs and confessors under Elizabeth, the exiles in Holland, the Pilgrim Fathers of New England—was simply to fall back upon the gospel and nothing else. Their ideal was Evangelical truth and Evangelical order. If they were exclusively Calvinists, it was because they did not recognize the distinctive doctrine of Whitgift or Laud as Evangelical. If they were Separatists from the Church of England, it was for a polity that was to be Evangelical and nothing else. What they proposed to themselves, what they attempted as an example to Christendom, was “union on a simply Evangelical basis of polity as well as doctrine.” The pole-star by which they steered was “gospel rules and patterns;” and so far as those who call themselves Congregationalists swerve from the purely Evangelical basis, and attempt to be a sect among the sects, and to rejoice in sectarian symbols, “by so many degrees,” as John Davenport might say, “will the compass of their conclusions vary toward the antarctic.”

ARTICLE VIII.—NOTES AND COMMENTS.

IN a review of *Récit d'une Sœur*, in the January number of the *New Englander*, we called attention to a discrepancy between the original French edition of Messrs. Didier & Co., of Paris, and an English translation published in this country by the Catholic Publication Society of New York. In *Récit d'une Sœur*—the original Memoir of Alexandrine de la Ferronnays, written by her sister, Mrs. Craven—the Profession of Faith is given which she made when she abjured Protestantism and submitted to the Roman Catholic Church. It is a document which she signed in the presence of at least six persons, whose names are appended as witnesses. Our statement in the January number was that this Profession of Faith was such an one as we should suppose would naturally have been drawn up at this time for Alexandrine by those whom she had selected as her spiritual advisers. It is expressed in very general terms, and there is nothing to alarm her prejudices and nothing which would appear especially distasteful to one in her situation whose life had been spent out of the communion of the Roman Catholic Church, and who was not yet very far advanced in her faith." But in the English translation of which we have spoken—called *A Sister's Story*—a very different document is inserted as the Profession of Faith which Alexandrine made on this occasion; and the names of the same six persons are appended as witnesses. In view of this manifest discrepancy, and the fact that this last document with its minute details with regard to the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church seems under the circumstances of the case somewhat unnatural and even suspicious, we said that it was incumbent in the Catholic Publication Society to offer an explanation. In the "Literary Bulletin" of the *Catholic World*, for April, the following reply was made. "The Catholic Publication Society's edition is printed exactly, word for word, from the first London edition, published by the respectable house of Bentley, in three volumes. If any deviation from the French was made, the Catholic Publication Society did not make it, but followed the London edition in good faith." This statement was of course enough to clear the society of responsibility in the matter; but they went further and offered to

write to Miss Bowles, the translator, for an explanation. In due time the following letter was received from her.

"5A DAVIES ST., BERKELEY SQ.,
LONDON, W., March 18th, 1872.

"Sir: The 'Profession of Faith' in the first edition (3 vols.) of *A Sister's Story* was the correct one, given me by Mrs. Craven herself. I think she said it was incorrectly given in Didier's editions, having been copied from those commonly used. She was very particular in writing it out herself for *A Sister's Story*. Mr. Bentley published the one vol. edition in a singular manner, without referring to me at all, and I never knew why he had shortened the 'Profession.' I have never compared the editions, but possibly there are other mistakes.

Your obed't serv't,
EMILY BOWLES."

This letter is rather curt, and is in several respects ambiguous. It throws the responsibility, however, of substituting one document for another on Mrs. Craven. According to the letter, the Profession of Faith which appears in the English translation is the one which was used on the occasion in question. How then came another Profession to be substituted for it in the original Memoir? It is not enough to say that it was "copied from those commonly used," for it is evident that Mrs. Craven had the genuine Profession in her possession, and that she consulted it at the time of writing the book, for she was able to give the names of the six persons who witnessed it, and in the exact order in which they signed. Are we to understand, then, that it is Mrs. Craven who is responsible for knowingly substituting one document for another? If not, who is responsible? Did Messrs. Didier & Co. assume to mutilate a solemn document attested by witnesses? If so, were they ever called to an account for so high-handed a proceeding?

ARTICLE IX.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

A FAITHFUL MINISTRY.*—It is well that the faithful ministries of such comparatively young men as Scudder, and Holmes, and Tyler,† should find their faithful recorders, and not be left alone to the silent record of men's hearts. Leonard Swain, whose eloquent lips and burning heart were but so recently stilled in death, should ere this have found a biographer, or at least an editor, of a few of his characteristic sermons. These would have been a rich contribution to American homiletical literature. Great feelings, thoughts, and energies were concentrated in the brief careers of those true preachers of Christ's gospel. They set their eye on the work of their "high calling in Christ Jesus," and halted not till it was won. In the book before us we miss some of the sermons which once moved and delighted audiences, raising them above themselves into a purer atmosphere, like the discourse on "Elijah on Horeb," yet we recognize in the examples selected fair specimens of the ordinary style of John Milton Holmes' preaching. We wish we could recognize as well his features in the photograph portrait. His was a style that kindled as it went. It was a rolling fire of emotion and thought. There was a living spirit in it. He flung himself into his theme, mind, heart, and soul. His rhetoric was sometimes turgid and his style redundant and careless, but it glowed with a deep spiritual purpose and a sanctified imagination. The sermon entitled "Satisfied in Heaven" is full of this elevated imagination, this impassioned utterance of a believing and consecrated heart. We have supposed that his Christian name, "John Milton," had a real influence upon his literary character. He clothed his thoughts on spiritual themes in the orotund and full-mouthed diction of Milton's poetry. With this tendency to the florid, he could be terse also, saying plain truths in a direct,

* *A Faithful Ministry. Sermons by JOHN MILTON HOLMES*, for eight years pastor of the First Congregational Church, Jersey City, N. J., 1861-1869, with a Commemorative Sermon by G. BUCKINGHAM WILLCOX. Edited, with an Introduction and Commemorative Sermon, by GEORGE B. BACON. New Haven, Conn.: Chas. C. Chatfield & Co. 1872.

† We understand that a volume of sermons by the late Rev. Jas. B. Tyler is to be published.

pungent way. His theory of preaching was, however, too serious an one to admit of much of the genial element or play of wit in his sermons. He curbed himself here too much. If he had been as true to himself in his style as he was in his feeling, and had trusted to the free conversational form in which he spoke extemporaneously, his sermons would have been the better for it.

His ministry began in 1861, that year of conflict, doubt, and gloom. It was baptized in the fire of patriotism and martyrdom. He was a loyal soldier at his own post of duty, where many around him were wavering or false. In the biographical sketch that opens the volume it is related that, when the draft was ordered and the enrollment begun, the enrolling officer called at his residence, and as soon as he made his business known, Mr. Holmes replied, "Put me down as John Milton Holmes, born on the island of Sheppy, on the east coast of England, aged 31 years, able-bodied and willing." When his name was drawn, "the first from the list," he was ready to go, and with difficulty was persuaded to remain at home to do manly work in his chosen sphere. What he loved, he loved with all his soul. He loved his country, his friends, his church, his Saviour. He gave them no half-hearted devotion, but was as ready to die for them as to labor for them. He loved his alma mater. He kept his college associations and friendships alive. At class-meetings and college reunions he was running over with exuberant affectionateness, as well as kindly mirth and wit. He was the most brilliant light of such occasions. He was almost persuaded to leave his beloved people and become an instructor at old Yale. It may have been better that he did not do so, for he has now set for her sons a pure example, that shines the more brightly from a distance like a star. In his ordination sermon he gives a bit of personal biography with which we close this notice, only adding that the two discourses by the editor, Rev. George B. Bacon, and Mr. Holmes' successor in the pastorate, Rev. G. B. Willcox, are very worthy as well as loving memorials of this ardent and eloquent young preacher, who dropped when running with all his might to bear the Master's message to his fellow men.

"As I stand to-day and look back upon my past experience, and see the way in which my God has led me, I can trace with joy, at every step, the workings of His guiding hand preparing me for this hour. Born across the waters, on a far distant shore, and carried when a little child into the heart of New England to drink from Massachusetts fountains the sacred waters of freedom, intelligence, and religion; early instructed in my obligations to God by the teaching and the

example of pious parents, one of whom is still a missionary of the cross, and the other exalted to be an angel in heaven; obliged when yet a boy to leave home and seek my fortune, I knew not whither, often in circumstances of bitter privation and friendlessness, God has always cared for me. He raised up angels of deliverance. He opened doors of light when all was solid dark. With an intense desire to obtain an education, it had been my dream, ever since I was old enough to hope, that I might go to Yale College. I went there without academical preparation, without means, without any reasonable prospect of success. But God led me by a way I knew not, and translated my dreams into reality. When in my ignorance and waywardness, I did not acknowledge God's sovereign care and love, when I was seeking only earthly gratification, and was without hope and without God in the world, He sweetly drew my wandering will, and showed me the blessedness of sins forgiven through the sacrifice of Christ. He enabled me to record as the expression of my hope these words of consecration, 'O Lord God, I believe Thou lovest me, and I love Thee in a feeble way instead. I desire to love Thee supremely. I desire communion with Thee, and take courage through the life and death of Christ. O God, I dedicate myself to Thee. I will love Thee, serve Thee, praise Thee, glorify Thee, in my body and in my soul, now in this life and the life that is to come. Oh, help me thus to do for the sake of Jesus Christ.' Gradually my tastes and desires pointed toward the ministry, and I gave up the study of the law, which had greatly attracted me. Every kind of obstacle and impediment has been removed by God's blessing upon my strong endeavors, and I stand here to-day a living witness of God's preserving and redeeming mercy, testifying with the apostle of old, 'Unto me, who am less than the least of all saints, is this grace given, that I should preach among the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ.'"

MURRAY'S SERMONS.*—The twenty sermons here gathered, and noticed in our last number, we suppose to be fair specimens of the preaching now so much resorted to in the pulpit that gives name to the volume. That *name* has been for many years so conspicuous in connection with orthodoxy in Boston and its vicinity, that older readers cannot but think of the earlier and the later styles of preaching in the same place as of two "dispensations," whatever may be thought of either. Such have been the traditions of the place, from Dr. Griffin's lectures to our times, that the present pastor must be admitted to have inaugurated a new way if not a "new departure." The book and its author have been already so freely noticed, however, both in religious and secular papers, and in this journal among others, that we attempt no formal criticism; yet we recur to it as an occasion for dropping two or three hints that cannot be untimely. It is no secret that Mr. Murray's "success," as it is popularly termed, has been a surprise to those

* *Park Street Pulpit*. Sermons preached by WILLIAM H. MURRAY. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1871. 12mo, pp. 372.

who knew him in his preparatory course. We advert to the fact as another of not a few examples that should abate the positive sentences passed beforehand on candidates for the ministry. It must be admitted, too, by this time, that his success is something more than a sensation of the hour, and that as a preacher he has qualifications for a wide and wholesome influence on the masses of a city population, which qualifications, however, are not held of as much account in the training of theological students as the results would seem to warrant. May it not be well for educators to consider (as one of them has said) whether such gifts and methods as are illustrated in Mr. Murray ought not to receive more attention in the work of preparation for the ministry? And further: without distinguishing among these sermons, or describing or estimating their quality, we call attention to one merit of the style which we believe to be of more moment in the work of the pulpit than is generally imagined, that is, *perspicuity*. We mean that absolute instant clearness of expression which Dr. Taylor used to commemorate in Prof. Stuart as a preacher, saying that he "not only could be understood, but could not be misunderstood." Even writers, addressing only the eye, the reader having time to go back upon a sentence or paragraph, fail to get or to keep hold of the public mind, whatever other merits they may have, if wanting here, as some will find in our day who go out of their way to test or perplex or startle by giving unnatural form to a too obvious thought. Much more must a speaker, whose meaning is caught as soon as uttered or else lost, make himself instantly intelligible. He will not be readily understood, and hence will not be generally and eagerly listened to, if the meaning is involved in needless qualifications or held suspended through successive clauses. It is one of the chief merits of H. W. Beecher, though seldom noticed, that by the simple structure of his sentences he makes himself understood at once. Mr. Murray, too, has this merit, or he would not have filled or would not still continue to fill Park Street Church with listeners. It is one of the legitimate means by which (as Philips is reported to have said of him), he "has got a Boston audience by the nape of the neck."

CUNNINGHAM'S SERMONS.*—This volume, though of foreign imprint, belongs to an edition imported for sale in this country by

* *Sermons, from 1828 to 1860, by the late William Cunningham, D.D., Principal and Professor of Church History, New College, Edinburgh. Edited, with a Preface, by Rev. J. J. BONAR, Greenock, Edinburgh. T. & T. Clark, 38 George st. 1872. 8vo, pp. 416.*

Scribner & Co. Besides the inviting appearance of the type and paper, it gives a portrait of the author, photographed from a bust, which impresses us as an antique ideal. It seems to us as if we had seen him in this country, which we believe he visited some years ago, but hitherto he has not been so well known here as some of his countrymen, who yet were not more prominent than he seems to have been in Scotland. As a professor, a theologian, and a churchman, he evidently filled a large place in his time, and the works from his pen, named after the preface as published since his death some ten years ago, are occupied with grave themes. Mr. Bonar's preface, itself twenty-seven pages, assigns him high rank as a preacher, and especially as a champion for sound doctrine, fitted to do solid service in his own day and actuated by the highest motives. At the same time, it seems to admit that his sermons are of a more dogmatic and controversial cast than the author would have framed for a later generation, and something like a conviction is betrayed that they will not make an impression answering to his reputation. Turning to the first and last sermons there cited as examples—first and last in his ministry as in this volume—we find clear statements, careful discrimination, logical reasoning, and a manly style, maintaining the rigid Calvinism so much identified with the Church of Scotland, but we miss the fervor, the unction, which the preface led us to expect, and which so often redeems even the *odium theologicum* among that people who have been characterized not more by their tenacity of doctrine than by their "*perfervidum ingenium*." They seem to us to have the merit of a theological professor with his class, rather than of a preacher with his congregation. In this respect, aside from any question of difference in doctrine, he impresses us unfavorably in contrast with Dr. John McLeod Campbell, who was ejected from the Church of Scotland about forty years since for heresy so-called, and died a few months ago, crowned with the esteem and love of all who knew him. A beautiful tribute was paid him in "Good Words" by the gifted and eminent Dr. McLeod (who so soon followed him), affirming him to be "the best man he ever knew," and at once explaining and condemning the ejection by saying it was done when the assembly was not full, and would not be done in these days. It appears by this preface, p. 26, that Dr. Cunningham was of the ejecting party ("we made short work with John Campbell," &c.), and probably a leader. Now happening to have lately read Campbell's work on "The Nature of the Atonement" (London, 1869), and admiring, as every

reader must, the St. John-like spirit of the book (whatever may be thought of the doctrine), we cannot but miss the like inestimable grace in these sermons. Not that we impute to them or their esteemed author any contrary temper, but that their acknowledged merits are too exclusively intellectual at the best to give the highest attraction or value to Christian preaching.

MURPHY'S LEVITICUS.*—The Book of Leviticus, offering fewer themes of permanent interest than other books of the Pentateuch, has been comparatively neglected. Dr. Murphy has done a good work by setting forth in a strong light its permanent relations and deeper significance. More even than in his previous commentaries does the exegetical element predominate over the critical, and here to excellent purpose. The strong point of the author is not so much profound scholarship, whether on the broader or the narrower scale, as clear insight, general comprehension, and fertile suggestion. His introductory discussion is admirable in matter and manner. His classification and interpretation of the various forms of sacrifice are clearly an improvement upon Kurtz and Keil, to say nothing of Kalisch. His exposition in detail is marked by wisdom and sobriety, commonly giving results rather than processes or even proofs. It is rather singularly clear of references to authorities, or to the views of others, whether conflicting or coinciding. This trait is apparently matter of deliberate purpose. The mature student would often desire further evidence and fuller discussion, as for example, on such important topics as the use of *kaphar* (atone) and the like. Thus too in his decision on the famous passage (ch. xviii, 18) concerning a wife's sister, though perhaps right, he fails to answer the main objection to his view, or to recognize it. For this kind of satisfaction we should not turn to the present commentary. But for the other qualities mentioned, and for general use, it is deserving of very high commendation. For the use of the Christian community probably no other will be more acceptable.

BURGON'S LAST TWELVE VERSES OF MARK.†—We have read through, with some care, this large volume on so short a theme.

* *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Leviticus*, with a new translation. By J. G. MURPHY, LL.D. Andover: W. F. Draper. Sold in Chicago by W. G. Holmes. 8vo, pp. 318.

† *The Last Twelve Verses of the Gospel of S. Mark vindicated against recent critical objectors, and established*. By JOHN BURGON, B.D., Fellow of Oriel College, etc. Oxford and London: James Parker & Co. 8vo, pp. 334.

We recognize its prolixity, its frequent intemperance of expression and inconsequence of conclusion, and various other defects of matter, method, and style. But taking simply the materials which the author collects and furnishes, and judging for ourselves—and assuming the truth of those statements of fact which we have not the means of testing—we rise greatly strengthened in our conviction of the singular precipitancy with which modern critical editors have refused to admit these verses into the genuine text of Mark's Gospel. Such is the well-known fact in regard to Tischendorf, Tregelles, and Alford—although scholars like Elliott, Wordsworth, and especially Scrivener, refuse adhesion to this judgment. One who has tracked Tischendorf through his devious path, e. g., his edition of 1859, his *Harmony of the Gospels*, his *Seventh Critical Edition*, and now through the immense, capricious, and often clearly inconsistent changes of his *Eighth Critical Edition*, gradually becomes less and less prepared to accept his decision as a finality, or to believe that we have yet gained a second “received text.” In regard to this passage, even an epitome of the facts, given so as to show the full force of the testimony in its favor, and the inadequacy, and, in considerable degree, erroneousness of the statements urged against, is beyond our limits. It is true that the Vatican and Sinaitic codices omit it. But here *they stand alone* among all the uncial and nearly all cursive manuscripts; and one of these (the Vatican), by leaving a blank space sufficient for the passage—the only vacant column in the manuscript—clearly shows that the older copy which the copyist had before him, or other older copies well known to him, contained it. Meanwhile, older than these manuscripts, and of about the same age, we have in favor of the genuineness of the passage, the express recognition by the Peshito, the Curetonian Syriac, the Italic, the Thebaic, Gothic, Vulgate, and Memphitic versions, Irenæus, Hippolytus, the seventh Council of Carthage, the *Acta Pilati*, Jacob Nisibenus (or rather Aphraates), Ambrose, and other weighty testimonies, followed by Chrysostom, and others, representing almost every portion of the early church. As to certain alleged patristic testimony sustaining the omission, a careful sifting by Mr. Burgon attempts to show a remarkable carelessness in quotation and affirmation on the part of the critics, who repeat each other somewhat as their alleged authorities do, thus: homilies of Hesychius, Severus, and Gregory of Nyssa, cited as three witnesses, prove to be one and the same homily ascribed to different persons, Hesychius being the real author: again Hesy-

chius, Jerome, and Victor, cited as independent judges, are merely quoting Eusebius verbatim, it is argued, and thus six writers are reduced to one, viz: Eusebius, and he nowhere gives the express opinion ascribed to him.

Without giving our full assent to all this showing, we recognize the force of a large part of it. Next comes an examination of twenty cursive manuscripts cited for the omission. If the author gives a true *testimony* of the facts, we have here a most astounding series of blundering references handed down from Wetstein, through Griesbach, Scholz and others, and blindly accepted by Tischendorf, Tregelles, Davidson, Alford, and others, so completely misleading, that, on the contrary, sixteen of them contain the express statement that in most of the accurate copies and especially the Palestinian exemplar, these verses are found. In like manner a celebrated "Scholion of Eusebius," at first cited by Matthaei, adopted by Griesbach and now by Tregelles, Tischendorf, and all the rest, is conclusively shown, from a personal inspection of the manuscript now at Moscow, to rest upon a misconception as to the author and the statement. The argument from diversities of style is well shown to lack weight.

But we can neither analyze, epitomize, nor criticize the entire argument. The volume contains many things from which we strongly dissent, and is more successful in its destructive than in parts of its constructive argument. It leaves some phenomena in the case not sufficiently explained or disposed of. But it leaves us, personally, with the feeling of perfect freedom to receive the last twelve verses of Mark as we do the remainder, till some better evidence is adduced against it. The case requires strong evidence against the vast weight of authority, by reason of the singular predicament in which the rejectors stand: admitting the gospel to be unfinished without these verses, finding no trace whatever of any other original termination, unable to account for its disappearance, possessing here a consistent and suitable termination sustained by all the earliest evidence, and yet rejecting it because not found in two manuscripts, one of which leaves a space for it, and both of them dating one or even two centuries later than some of the versions and fathers that contain it.

CHRIST IN MODERN LIFE.*—These sermons discuss many of the questions that are awakening great interest among theologians at

* *Christ in Modern Life*; Sermons preached in London. By the Rev. STOPFORD A. BROOKE, M. A., Honorary Chaplain in ordinary to the Queen. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 12mo, pp. 408.

the present day. They are thoughtful, are written in a style of freshness, beauty, and force, and many passages in them are truly eloquent. But they are often very illogical, and the theological views presented in them are vague and indefinite. Indeed the author seems to think it is because Christianity is vague and indefinite in its teachings, and nothing systematic in theology can be made out of it, that it is suited to be the religion for mankind; it can easily adapt itself to changing modes of thought and phases of society. And truly it can if the author's views are correct, for there is very little in Christianity to be adjusted to those changes. Indeed, it is difficult to say what he really thinks on what have always been considered the fundamental truths of the gospel. He seems to teach the incarnation of God in Christ; but he seems also to teach the incarnation of God in every man. He receives the doctrine of the Trinity, but not as an absolute truth—only as a relative truth. God may be, he says, twenty in one, as well as three in one. He is a minister of the Church of England, and subscribes of course to the thirty-nine articles, but we cannot find that there is any doctrine of Christianity which he holds in the sense usually attached to it by Christians.

Still many truths are presented in these sermons in a very original way, and they may be read with great profit. But considered as sermons to be preached to a congregation, we do not see how they could at all further the end of preaching—the salvation of men.

THE FOOTSTEPS OF CHRIST.*—The preface informs us that “the work of Kirchenpropst Caspers, of which the present volume contains the more important portions, is well known and prized by readers of devotional theology in Germany, as being one of the best books of that kind which have recently appeared in that country.” It is meant for devotional reading, and a glance at the contents shows its evangelical quality. There are sixty-five chapters, each of a length suitable for a daily portion, and these again are distributed into four “Parts,” which bear titles happily chosen and in themselves suggestive: “Christ for us,” “Christ in us,” “Christ before us,” and “Christ through us.” We have examined

* *The Footsteps of Christ*. Translated from the German of A. CASPERS, Church Provost and Chief Pastor at Husum, by ADELAIDE E. RODHAM. Edited, with a Preface, by Rev. CHARLES H. H. WRIGHT, M. A., Chaplain of Trinity Church, Boulogne-sur-Mer, &c. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1871. 12mo, pp. 434.

it enough to see that, as the editor says, "it is remarkable for the firm hold it exhibits of the grand doctrine of justification by faith only, and for its peculiar terse and epigrammatic style." The style indeed (apart from what may be due to the circumstance of translation) is so unlike that of devotional writers in our language that it will at first seem strange to most readers, and the more attractive to some, who may be not unprofitably stimulated by new forms of evangelical sentiment. The author belonging to "the high Lutheran party," parts of his original work present "extreme views on the sacraments," and are omitted in this volume. The length of the original also led to omission and condensation for "the English public." It might not have been amiss to reduce it still further for general use. The editor commends the translator's part in the work. Books of this kind are best appreciated when read day by day, chapter by chapter—a practice which ought to be more general than it is among Christian people—and for such use the volume before us may be safely recommended.

CHRISTIANITY AND MODERN THOUGHT* is the attractive title of a volume of discourses which were delivered during the winter of 1871-72, at Hollis Street Church, on successive Sunday evenings, and repeated at King's Chapel on Monday afternoons. The authors of these discourses were Henry W. Bellows, *The Break between Modern Thought and Ancient Faith in Worship*; James Freeman Clarke, *A True Theology the Basis of Human Progress*; Athanase Coquevel, Fils, *The Rise and Decline of the Romish Church*; Orville Dewey, *Selfhood and Sacrifice*; Charles Carroll Everett, *The Relation of Jesus to the Present Age*; Frederic Henry Hodge, *The Mythical Element in the New Testament*; James Martineau, *The Place of Mind in Nature and Intuition in Man*; Andrew P. Peabody, *The Relation of Ethics and Theology*; G. Vance Smith, *Christianity: what it is not, and what it is*; Oliver Stearns, *The Aim and Hope of Jesus*. They are all elevated in their tone, and believing in spirit, they are marked by the literary excellencies, and we may be excused for saying it, the literary defects, of the school to which their authors belong. Among these defects are a vagueness of conception and a corresponding looseness of statement which would not be tolerated in any school except that of a somewhat indefinite and tolerant theology.

* *Christianity and Modern Thought*. Boston: American Unitarian Association. 1872.

The justness of the accessory thoughts, the variety and richness of allusion, the finish of culture, the reach and profoundness of philosophic and practical truth, in no way compensate for these capital defects, in discourses which are designed to moderate between Christianity and modern thought. Modern thought is too sharp and cool and earnest to be content with any but definite statements and positive assertions upon the most important questions at issue between Christianity and itself. Christianity, also, although she is more liberal and tolerant the more she sympathizes with true philosophy and genuine culture, is stubbornly jealous of a few cardinal positions. We welcome very much of what is asserted in many of these able discourses, and count the volume a very important contribution to our current apologetic situation.

BARING-GOULD'S *LEGENDS OF THE PATRIARCHS AND PROPHETS*.*

—The Jewish and Mussulman traditions contained in this volume, which constitute far the larger part, are drawn from certain German and French collections, to which reference is made in the preface; the rest "from various sources," without special regard to quality. The order of time is followed, from the fall of the angels to the death of Ezra. There is no further attempt at systematic arrangement or scientific use. The legends themselves are for the most part grotesque, and often prolix, seldom either impressive or instructive. The perusal of them for any length of time becomes wearisome. Almost the only strong impression made upon the mind of a thoughtful reader is the somewhat familiar one of the singular contrast between these puerilities and the sober dignity of the Scripture narratives.

The interest of the volume is chiefly that of curiosity. The value that would attach to a collection of legends, exhaustive, or made in all cases from trustworthy sources, or carefully analyzed and investigated, is wanting. Even the abundant materials for a traditional account of the Deluge are imperfectly used. We question some of the few opinions that are advanced: e. g., that "the Mussulman traditions are nearly all derived from Talmudic sources." We do not understand Christ's words, "I saw Satan as lightning fall from heaven" (Luke x, 18), to refer to Satan's former fall from holiness, but to his certain overthrow by Christ. Nor

* *Legends of the Patriarchs and Prophets, and other Old Testament Characters, from various sources.* By S. BARING-GOULD, M.A. New York: Holt & Williams 1872. 8vo, pp. 366.

do we see why a writer should so boldly assert (pp. 2 and 6) that the declarations of Isaiah xiv, 13, 14, clearly addressed to the king of Babylon, are utterances concerning Satan. Still, no little labor has been expended in bringing these legends together, and many readers, no doubt, will be interested in them.

DALE'S JEWISH TEMPLE AND CHRISTIAN CHURCH.* A series of discourses delivered in the ordinary course of the author's ministry. They are "intended not for scholars, but for ordinary Christian people." Some twenty-five topics are selected, mostly of a doctrinal character, and discussed from an evangelical point of view. Without exhibiting any very remarkable points, either of style, matter, or method, these discourses are well written, able, instructive, and thoughtful, beyond the average of sermons.

MR. WELDON'S UNITY IN VARIETY† is a plea for variety in the organization and discipline of the church against those who insist on strict uniformity. To us with whom the truth is a self-evident axiom, the somewhat extended and ramified arguments of this volume is superfluous. To those whom it may concern we commend it as well presented and conclusive, though not characterized by special superiority. Its catholic spirit is excellent.

THE MYSTERY OF PAIN.‡—This is a small book on a great subject, and partly perhaps because of this, many pages are quite obscure. The thoughts are not sufficiently developed and illustrated to be clear. But if we apprehend the meaning of the writer, he maintains that sacrifice for others is the highest good, and that pain is a necessary means or condition of such sacrifice; consequently pain is not an evil at all, but a real good. Much that is excellent and suggestive is said about self-sacrifice and the endurance of pain; but the main propositions of the book are by no means self-evident, and are not proved. If self-sacrifice is the highest good and pain is a necessary condition of it, then the higher one rises in the spirit of self-sacrifice the more of pain there

* *The Jewish Temple and the Christian Church.* A series of Discourses. By R. W. DALE, M.A. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 12mo, pp. 314.

† *Unity in Variety*: a series of arguments based on the divine workmanship in our planet; the constitution of the human mind; and the inspired history of religion. By GEORGE WARBURTON WELDON, M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge. *Mobilis Constantia.* New York: T. Whittaker, No. 3 Bible House. 1872.

‡ *The Mystery of Pain*; A book for the sorrowful. By JAMES HINTON. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 16mo, pp. 101.

must be, and the angels must be great sufferers, and the Supreme Being the greatest sufferer of all.

We do not think the author would shrink from these conclusions, which are certainly very questionable conclusions. We understand the writer, moreover, to teach, that pain is necessarily remedial and purifying. But experience affords no evidence of the truth of this doctrine, and the teaching of the Scriptures is decidedly opposed to it. There is much in the book quickening to thought, but it furnishes no solution of the mystery of pain.

MANUAL OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH.*—This little volume has been prepared by Rev. Whitman Peck, of New Haven, as a means of instruction in families and Sabbath Schools. It presents the various doctrines of the Christian Church in the order of a theological system, and connects with every one its own appropriate proofs. The design of the author is to give these proofs clearly and concisely—not in the way of a long theological discussion, but in such a manner as may be best adapted to give young persons, as they begin their education, a well-grounded knowledge of what the Christian system is. Such a book cannot but be useful, and, if prepared carefully and written in a lucid style as this volume is, it may be commended to Christian parents and teachers. As the volume is free from a controversial spirit and is not intended to press the views of any one party, it will be serviceable to those of all denominations, while persons of the author's own denomination will find in it all that is essential for their use. Mr. Peck's purpose is an excellent one, and we are glad he has so successfully carried it out.

PRESIDENT CHADBOURNE: LECTURES ON INSTINCT,† are an addition to our means of investigating this most difficult topic if they do not largely contribute to the solution of the many questions which we ask in regard to it. They enable us to ask questions more intelligently, if they do not enable us to answer them satisfactorily. We are confident, however, that they do the latter to a

* *Manual of The Christian Faith: or, Religious Truths Generally Believed by Evangelical Christians.* Designed to facilitate the instruction of the young in families, Sabbath Schools, etc. By Rev. WHITMAN PECK, A.M. New York and Boston: Warren, Broughton & Wyman. 1872. 12mo, pp. 247.

† *Lowell Lectures*, 1872. Instinct, its office in the Animal Kingdom, and its relation to the higher powers in man. By P. A. CHADBOURNE, LL.D., etc. New York: Geo. P. Putnam & Sons. 1872.

certain extent. We eliminate what we do know not to be true, from what we do not know to be true, and this is an important step toward the solution of any philosophical problem—whether mathematical or speculative. In doing this the book presents a large number of very interesting facts which concern this fascinating field of inquiry, and these are stated with more compactness and method and point than we have observed in the earlier writings of this popular author.

DR. HICKOK'S *HUMANITY IMMORTAL** is the last, but by no means the least, valuable or interesting of his published writings. It presents in brief compass, and in a popular and flowing style, his views of the history and destiny of men, as understood by the light of a spiritual and Christian philosophy. The philosophy is not specially technical in form. The work contains few of the "private interpretations" of any special school of theology, but it gives an animated exposition of the facts of man's moral and religious history, as they are set forth in the Scriptures, and interpreted by the truths of human consciousness and the history of human redemption. It, in fact, contains and embodies a brief *resumé* of the import of the Old and New Testaments in popular language. We recommend this work to clergymen and laymen because it gives a comprehensive view and a rational vindication of the ways of God to man, because it gathers into a brief compass the answers to many of the most important questions which man is prompted to ask, and because it introduces them to a somewhat more liberal treatment of the great principle and facts of Christian philosophy and theology than they can find in the great mass of our religious literature. We might express our dissent from some of the speculations of the respected author, but we do not care to do anything more than recommend a volume which is in general so excellent.

THE DESERT OF THE EXODUS.†—Sacred geography has made great progress since the publication of Professor Robinson's Bib-

* *Humanity Immortal*; or, Man Tried, Fallen, and Redeemed. By LAURENS P. HICKOK, D.D., LL.D. Boston: Lee & Shepard, Publishers. New York: Lee, Shepard & Dillingham. 1872.

† *The Desert of the Exodus*. Journeys on foot in the Wilderness of the Forty Years Wanderings; undertaken in connection with the Ordnance Survey of Sinai, and the Palestine Exploration Fund. By E. H. PALMER, M.A., Lord Almoner's Professor of Arabic, and Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. With maps

lical researches, only about thirty years ago. The New York professor, learned and painstaking, with a salutary prejudice against monkish traditions, and with a reverent confidence in the veracity of the Scriptures, had the inestimable advantage of being associated with a fellow traveler who was his peer in learning, and to whom the Arabic was as familiar as his own vernacular—the illustrious missionary and translator, Eli Smith. That advantage made the publication of Robinson's *Biblical Researches* a memorable date in the progress of sacred geography. Dean Stanley's admirable work on Sinai and Palestine is one product of the new era introduced by Smith and Robinson. Dr. Wm. M. Thompson's work, "*The Land and the Book*," is what no traveller of the former era, ignorant of the Arabic language and of the people that speak it, passing through the country from convent to convent, and trusting in the monks for information, could possibly have produced. Such works have prepared the way for the exhaustive investigations which have been undertaken by the Palestine Exploration Committee, and which are already yielding rich results. The British Government, by its Ordnance Surveys, has contributed with imperial munificence to the progress of knowledge in this direction, and our own Government, twenty-four years ago, did something by its Dead Sea Expedition.

Professor Palmer's book is of the highest value. The "*Lord Almoner's Professor of Arabic*" in the University of Cambridge bears no resemblance to Goldsmith's celebrated professor of Greek in the Vicar of Wakefield, for he knows the language of which he is professor, and can not only read it, but freely speak it. Many travelers have taken the route through the Desert between Egypt and Palestine, but no man heretofore has explored that singular region so extensively or so thoroughly, or has had such helps and advantages. His two journeys, covering together a period of eleven months, and performed entirely on foot, were undertaken, the first in company with an Ordnance Survey expedition, and the second in the service of the Palestine Exploration Fund. The result is a volume in which scientific exactness of observation is combined with liveliness of narrative, which cannot but be recognized as an invaluable contribution to our knowledge of the subject.

and numerous illustrations from the photographs and drawings taken on the spot by the Sinai Survey Expedition, and C. F. Tyrwhitt Drake. New York: Harper and Brothers.

THE CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE CEREMONY.*—This work, as the long title might lead us to expect, treats of marriage as a divine ordinance, and especially as a Christian rite, its forms, symbolism, and history, from the stand-point of an American Episcopalian, giving prominence to the Ritual of the Protestant Episcopal Church in this country. The author has taken pains to bring together a good deal of the literature of the subject, and his citations may be often more highly esteemed than his own comments. The most valuable part of the volume may be said to be in the "Appendices," where we find the ceremonies of the English, Roman, Greek, and Jewish Churches. While we recur curiously to the more ancient forms, appreciating touches of beauty or pathos here and there, we are only the more willing to have escaped from so cumbrous a yoke, and to accept the simpler rites with which we are now familiar. With all his ecclesiasticism, Dr. Bingham regards the ritual of his own church as an improvement on the English, but evidently, like most of his brethren, allows no open question as to *further* improvement. For instance, there is not a more perfect English phrase than "husband and wife," and, if it had been used in the declaration in the "Form of Solemnization of Matrimony," nobody would tolerate the proposal to change it into "man and wife;" yet Dr. Bingham goes into an argument for the latter, and even maintains that "husband or houseband is not so much a native, divine word, as one of artificial and human arrangements." The perfection of the Prayer-book, as left by the American changes, seems to be as much a "foregone conclusion," with most of those who expound it, as the satisfaction of the Shakesperian critics with their idol, or that of the most devout readers with their Bibles. On the score of taste we should take exceptions to the style of the author as wanting in ease, sometimes florid, almost lackadaisical, as in the last paragraph but one of the Preface, and the titles and part of the matter in the 9th and 10th chapters, on the "Theory of Marriage," and "Whispers for the Wedding Night." The phrase "pervading to every fibre, etc." (p. 14), is not felicitous. And how is "the beatitude of earthly marriage" to be "*forestalled*" in the future? (p. 20). And how is it that our "little tree of life" is an "emblem" of the orange ("whose emblem it is," p. 157), rather than the orange

* *The Christian Marriage Ceremony. Its History, Significance, and Curiosities: Ritual, Practical and Archæological Notes; and the Text of the English, Roman, Greek, and Jewish Ceremonies.* By J. FOOTE BINGHAM, D.D. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1871. 12mo, pp. 322.

itself the emblem? It is due to the book and its author to commend the earnest Christian view of the marriage relation which everywhere pervades it, as especially wholesome for these times.

THE SACRIFICE OF PRAISE.*—Only a few years ago, happening to attend public worship in the "Brick Church" in the city of New York, we found "Watts and Select Hymns" still in use there, and that too in the modern Murray Hill edifice. It was something of a curiosity. Amidst the multitude of new books springing up on every side, no innovation had yet prevailed against the "customs" of that conservative fold. We noted, too, subsequently that when that flock yielded to a change in this department, the change was made by themselves and for themselves. In 1869 the collection called "The Sacrifice of Praise" was prepared "by a Committee of the Session" of that Church, among whom we understood the Pastor and Mr. Gilman to have had the chief part. That work we examined at the time with some care and no less satisfaction. It was, as might be expected and as we should desire, conservative, and yet in some respects an innovation as compared with most of its recent predecessors. It had not so many pieces as most of them, indeed hardly more than half the number, and this reduction seemed desirable, the only difficulty in the process of reduction being always that which was indicated by some good man who owned some things from Watts might well be omitted, but was not willing any should decide on the omissions but himself. The reduction, however, in this and all similar collections, relates quite as much to other and later matter as to what was drawn from Watts. A more radical change,—which of course we approved as having ourselves favored it in earlier instances,—was in doing away the formal division prevailing since Watts' time between hymns on the one hand, and on the other what were classed as "psalms," the latter being not strictly metrical versions but rather metrical paraphrases and imitations; and putting all together as hymns. With this innovation we would have joined another by prefixing all the psalms in our Bible version, with other Scripture selections for chanting. This collection contained also the Commandments, the Lord's Prayer, the Apostles' and the Nicene Creeds, and one form of prayer to the Trinity. Another feature was added which interested us, and

* *The Sacrifice of Praise*; with Tunes. Psalms, Hymns and Spiritual Songs, designed for Public Worship and Private Devotion. With Notes on the Origin of Hymns. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 12mo, pp. 597.

we believe most readers also, in the "Notes on the Origin of Hymns," appended to the whole, which had a right to a place in the book, especially as it was meant for private as well as public use. The volume now before us is a new edition of that collection, with *tunes*, the work of compiling and adapting them being under the direction of "the session of the Brick Church." To the body of hymns are now prefixed nearly sixty pages of selections from the psalms in prose, and other suitable Scriptures, and some of the ancient unmetrical church-hymns, with music for chanting, arranged for the mornings and evenings of the several days of the month and for special occasions. This addition, except in the arrangement, makes the book answer more nearly to the preference we have expressed. If the Scotch instead of the New England element had prevailed in that congregation, there might have been more difficulty in using the Psalter according to the days of the month, as savoring of the Anglican ritual. The whole change thus brought about in their worship is only another instance of the fact that a people who are slower to move than others may at length move farther. We pass no judgment on the musical adaptations in the book, except to say that much care seems to have been expended in this department, with a proper partiality for tunes that have been tested and therefore approved. A similar partiality is seen in the selection of the hymns. From the examination bestowed on the first edition we reckon it among the best of the many volumes of the kind, of the making of which there still seems to be no end. For the best effect in public worship it is none the worse for being one of the smallest, and indeed, in view of all the materials offered to a compiler, rather a selection than a collection. Judgment is shown in most of the omissions, and, what is rarer still, in most if not all the additions. We miss few of our old favorite pieces, and find few if any new ones that have no merit but their novelty. Formerly a compiler found it difficult to curtail the limited material already familiarized to the people by use: now he finds it difficult to reject the abundant material that never can be all so familiarized. Looking over some of the recent large collections, we are surprised to find so many pieces, many of them anonymous as well they may be, which we can conceive of no reason for introducing unless to swell the number and hence the bulk and the expensiveness of the work. Our hymnology has come to be abundant and rich, and a compiler's net must needs gather "of every kind;" but he is the more required to "cast the bad away," because the "vessels," if they are

to be used, cannot hold even all "the good." In this discrimination as to the new as well as to the old, we are most favorably impressed with the work now before us. Its mechanical execution too is unexceptionable.

JACOX'S BIBLE MUSIC.*—A farrago of texts, quotations, anecdotes, and occasional reflections, belonging together only as having some relation to music, and in a degree classified in seventeen chapters, each headed by the chapter and verse for one or more passages from the Bible just noticed in the opening paragraph. From its affinity with music, dancing is made the chief subject of the sixth chapter, entitled, "a Musical Monarch," from the incident of David "dancing before the Lord." Songs and singers, instruments, eminent composers, and musical effect are treated of, not scientifically, but in a fragmentary, gossiping way, with some vivacity. The thirteenth chapter deals with "Music and Morals," not without sobriety and discrimination. Of course such a book is not meant to be read at a sitting, nor to be studied, but rather to be taken up at leisure, a chapter or a few paragraphs at a time, by which method we claim to have read it all, and this is more than we expected when we set out. Hence we feel warranted in pronouncing it, in its way, an entertaining book. Each chapter may be said to have a partial unity, which is at least hinted by the text cited, and sometimes by the title, as in the last two, which are among the best,—'Songs of Exile,' and 'Songs in the Night.' The texts are scarcely more than mottoes, with introductory allusions, yet not irreverently applied. In the musical phrase of the title, they may be called *themes*, with at least as much propriety as that term is used in some pieces of music, and, we may add, as the text can be so termed in some fashionable sermons. The author disarms criticism here by acknowledging that "the texts are taken less as stand-points than as starting-points; less as something to make a stand upon, than as something to get away from." But the main feature of the volume is the abundance of its quotations, in prose and verse, incidents and sentiments, strung together profusely and often with the slightest connection. We remember nothing to be compared with it in this way, except Burton's "Anatomy of Melancholy." The author must have a marvelous

* *Bible Music*: being variations, in many keys, on musical themes from Scripture. By FRANCIS JACOX, B.A. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1872. 12mo, pp. 330.

memory, or has emptied a well stored *index rerum* into this volume. His range comes short of that quaint master's, which was both modern and ancient, foreign as well as domestic; nor does he, like Burton, produce something of his own which starts up citations and marshals them around itself, but rather they are collected by his hand, one often scarcely more than touching another. Hence we might call him compiler rather than author, but here too he disarms complaint by disclaiming the latter title, modestly saying, "If I could think of another term that should not look affected or pedantic, I would use it." As might be expected, among so many extracts some might be spared as too familiar if not hackneyed. Dr. Burney's compliment to "Music's Monument," on p. 10, is carelessly repeated on p. 145. But we wonder that so large a part of all this material, perhaps half or more, should be put into foot-notes, when we seldom see a reason for the discrimination, and the text itself is of such a quality that if the notes were incorporated into it, instead of the reader's eye being jerked from one to the other, both would give more pleasure. We protest still more against the author's whimsical affectation in now and then introducing into the midst of his own prose several lines of verse with or without quotation-marks. A delicate ear is positively annoyed by unexpected measure and rhyme thus out of place. Yet, with all these abatements, this volume, with its quaint title and typographical neatness, will be found to be, what we have called it, entertaining, in the leisure hours of literary and musical readers.

BELLES LETTRES.

THE PENNSYLVANIA PILGRIM.*—Mr. Whittier is still a fresh and fertile contributor to that part of our literature which, besides the general interest of poetry, is distinctively American in its themes and spirit. The principal poem in this elegant volume, comprising nearly half of the whole, commemorates Francis Daniel Pastorius, a German scholar and pietist, who became a Friend and the leader of the company that settled Germantown, Pa. An interesting account of his life and enterprise is given in the preface, with sketches in the notes of some of his remarkable associates. The poem is in stanzas of three rhymed lines, one stanza often gracefully flowing into another in the manner of

* *The Pennsylvania Pilgrim, and other Poems.* By JOHN GREENLEAF WHITTIER. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1872. 16mo, pp. 129.

Tennyson in the "In Memoriam." We rank it with the author's best productions in touches of graphic description, the love of nature, reverence for all goodness, and sympathy with every human and philanthropic movement, and not less in rhythmic skill. He here does for the Quaker colonists of Pennsylvania what he has done before so well for the colonists, both Quakers and Puritans, of New England, of course with a pardonable partiality in both fields for the milder type of Christian heroism, thus meeting a want which he indicates in the preface, where he notes the scanty tribute hitherto paid by poets and historians to the memory of the colonists of his own faith as compared with their sterner northern brethren. A staunch adherent as he is of Penn, he is yet in catholic fellowship with the best things in other communions. The shorter pieces, some of which we recognize as gathered from periodicals in which they first appeared, are worthy of their place in this more permanent form.

Besides his distinctive poetical merits, Mr. Whittier has the claims not so generally appreciated of a candid and diligent explorer of the local and personal history that has furnished the materials for so many of his pieces, while he is never insensible to the events and wants of his own time. His most honorable distinction, however, and that which has given him his strongest and most lasting hold of the public mind, is the moral or rather the Christian element that pervades his works as it pervades his spirit. He is preëminently the poet of reverence and charity, of freedom and peace. Aspiring versifiers will do well to mark what a place he has thus won, not accessible to a mere poet, in the popular heart.

We cannot leave the book without turning the reader's eye to the very beautiful imagery of the aloe, on pp. 26, 27, illustrated in the frontispiece.

LONGFELLOW'S THREE BOOKS OF SONG.*—The "First Book" is made up of "Tales of a Wayside Inn,—the Second Day," which will need no recommendation to those who have before read those of "the First Day," the same device serving to string other pearls of the same quality. Among them we are glad to recognize "the Poet's Tale, Lady Wentworth," and more particularly "the Theologian's," "the Legend Beautiful," of the monk who, when favored with a vision of Christ in his cell, was interrupted

* *Longfellow's Three Books of Song.* By HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1872. 16mo, pp. 204.

by the bell summoning him to his office of feeding the poor at the gate, and having obeyed it, even at such a sacrifice, on returning found the vision still standing as he had left it, and heard the words, "Hadst thou stayed I must have fled." A poet cannot do finer service at once to letters and to religion than thus to enshrine and perpetuate such legends. The "Second Book" is "Judas Macabæus," a brief tragedy commemorating Jewish patriotism turning back the invasion of Antiochus. We recognize the second act as before printed, setting forth the heroism of a Hebrew mother exulting in the fidelity and martyrdom of her "seven sons." "Book Third" is "a handful of Translations," some of them very brief. It must seem superfluous to commend a writer who is so great a favorite at home and abroad, but we never take up his volumes without a fresh admiration for his graceful imagery and rhythmic skill, whatever may be his theme. The rapid, easy flow of his verse, and the clearness of the thought, are indeed a refreshing contrast to the laborious obscurity of some poets, who would claim to be more profound yet must inevitably go unread, while he wins the ears and the hearts of the people.

SIX OF ONE BY HALF A DOZEN OF THE OTHER.*—In literature as in mechanics some things, requiring ability or even genius for their production, may be classed as curiosities, rather showing what can be done than having utility or artistic merit in their own department. To say it of this quaint book with its quaint title—and the latter more quaint than apt—may be nothing worse than the writers anticipated and even proposed, or than the necessities of the case required, when it was projected as a serial. It was a half rollicking experiment of the six authors named, all contributors to the "Old and New" Magazine, to see what would come of their partnership in a story, each writing several chapters and a separate preface, with only a general understanding among them as to the principal facts to be so framed together. The chief interest turns on the three heroes and three heroines "pairing off" differently three times, the last mating being brought about by the Chicago fire, which so jostled the party as to reconstruct their relations. Besides other inevitable diversities in the course of the narrative, we should complain of some minor discrepancies

**Six of One by half a Dozen of the Other.* An every day novel. By HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, ADELINE D. T. WHITNEY, LUCRETIA P. HALE, FREDERIC W. LORING, FREDERIC B. PERKINS, EDWARD E. HALE. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1872. 16mo, pp. 245.

which any care in consultation might have been expected to avoid. A more satisfactory account might have been given of the composition, showing how so many hands parceled out and wrought up the materials enumerated. The chief fault of the story as a work of art is in dealing with so many principal personages, which are fatal to unity of interest and effect. Some of the writers named could not be enlisted even in this way without giving us fine passages. For the happiest we note the exquisite description of Rachel Holley at her toilet, which we could only assign to Mrs. Stowe's pen, but a friend more conversant with Mrs. Whitney's gifts claims it for her. Mrs. Worboise is one of the best delineations. Nettie Sylva and Jim Fellows, who is recognized as known before, are well done in their class. Readers who know all the writers better than we do must find pleasure in guessing their several shares. The "first preface," we take it, betrays Mr. Hale. It is a touching instance of the tragedy that so often mixes itself with the comedy, whether of literature or life, that Mr. Loring's violent death left his part to be finished by his coadjutors. Some foreign critic wonders that authors of their standing could have been induced to undertake such joint work. We can see how it may have offered them an inviting amusement and a pleasant association, yet the result can be hardly satisfactory to themselves or their readers.

SEPTIMIUS FELTON.*—The proposal, made soon after Mr. Hawthorne's death, to print his note-books, though coming from his own family, met with wide disapprobation and in some quarters severe remonstrance as making merchandise of his private papers and endangering his literary fame. There was some reason for such misgivings in this case, as in that of any admired author. In the absence of his own directions, his desk might claim to be sacredly guarded, if only through jealousy for his name. But his family were safe custodians. And, as it turned out, no harm was done, but on the contrary, while the private informal character of the papers, as materials for the writer's workmanship rather than his finished works, gave them peculiar interest, they were found to be in themselves readable and characteristic of his mind. They seemed to let us into the personality of the man, which in his case, as still more in that of Charles Lamb, took such hold of the public

* *Septimius Felton*; or the Elixir of Life. By NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1872. 16mo, pp. 229.

mind as to prepare the way for fragments from his pen and personal recollections from his friends to be received with unabated zest long after his decease. It deserves inquiry why or how some authors seize and keep this hold of their readers beyond others of no less general merit and even not less original. A similar scruple might have arisen as to the posthumous tale now published, with a brief preface by his daughter Una, who tells us it "is the last written by her father" and "is printed as it was found among his manuscripts." Of course had he lived he would have chosen to revise and finish it if it was to be published, but no injustice is done to him, since it is manifestly incomplete and printed in view of that fact, and can be judged by no higher standard than it will bear. The editor is fully warranted in her judgment when she says, "I believe it is a striking specimen of the peculiarities and charms of his style, and that it will have an added interest for brother artists, and for those who care to study the method of his composition, from the mere fact of its not having received his final revision." She did well also to retain several passages "within brackets, which show how" he intended to amplify some of the descriptions and "develop more fully one or two of the character-studies." It appears also that "he changed his first plan" in one of its principal features, and "in the copy for publication this alteration would have been made." In the phraseology of artists, the work is "a study," only carried further than the note-books, which were materials for building secured in case they should be needed, while this is already a house only here and there incomplete, and still enabling us to understand what the architect's last touches would have made it. As a story, its machinery, stages, and catastrophe are fairly brought before us. For the most part it needs no revision, and the main effect could hardly be enhanced by completing some of the details. As the title indicates, it is the story of a gifted young man seeking an earthly immortality and disenchantment when his dream seems about to be fulfilled. It is Hawthorne's workmanship throughout, with his clear-cut transparent style, weird suggestions, and picturesque and sometimes grotesque descriptions. And not the least interesting, though subordinate, aspect of the story is in the hero's outside relation to the war of our Revolution. Could the author have intended here a hint of his own life-work in cloudland or dreamland going on aloof from his country's later strife?

MISCELLANEOUS.

THE LANDS OF SCOTT.*—Mr. Hunniwell, by the preparation of this book, has done a service which entitles him to a grateful acknowledgment from every admirer of the poems and novels of Sir Walter Scott. Having himself made a pilgrimage through most of the scenes which have become immortal though the allusions and descriptions of the great Wizard of the North, he has conceived the idea of illustrating each one of Scott's works in succession, by descriptions of the present condition of the places which he has in any way referred to. Very wisely, Mr. Hunniwell has not confined himself to his own impressions of these places; but, as the result of wide reading, has brought together everything he could find in the writings of others which could be worked into his plan. Those who have ever had the pleasure of riding from Stirling, through Callander, to "the Trosachs," and have traced the course of the "Knight of Snowdown," and his companions, which they took in the memorable stag hunt described in the "Lady of the Lake," past "the heaths of Uam-Var," through Cambus-more, over Bochastle Heath, by Lanrick Mead and Loch Achray, and over the "Brigg of Turk" to Loch Katrine, can appreciate in some measure the enthusiasm with which the author has explored the localities referred to in *Marmion*, in "the Lay," in *Waverley*, *Guy Mannering*, *Quentin Durward*, *Anne of Gierstein*, and the others of that remarkable series. It would not be difficult to criticise the author's execution of his work, from a literary point of view, but it would be a very thankless task. The faults, and in particular a certain obscurity of expression, are apparent enough; but the book furnishes so much interesting information, and bears marks of so much loving labor on the part of the author, and it is provided with such convenient maps and copious indexes, that we think it will be looked upon with favor even by the most fastidious, and will prove to be a very convenient book for reference as long as the works of Sir Walter are read.

LAMON'S LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN* is founded on the manuscripts of Mr. William H. Herndon, who was for twenty-five

* *The Lands of Scott*. By JAMES F. HUNNIWELL. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1871. 12mo, pp. 508.

† *The Life of Abraham Lincoln*; from his birth to his inauguration as President. By WARD H. LAMON. With illustrations. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1872.

years his intimate associate and partner, in the practice of the law. It is an oft repeated proverb that no man is a hero to his valet. It would seem from the character of this volume that no man is a hero to his law partner. He certainly would not be likely to appear a hero, however exalted might be his aspirations or his doings, in the eyes of such a man as Mr. Herndon. We do not question that the law partner of Mr. Lincoln possesses great strength and shrewdness, but we find abundant evidence in this narrative that he was deficient in the capacity and in the disposition which would qualify him to do justice to a character so peculiar, and in many respects so subtle, as was that of Mr. Lincoln. Mr. Lincoln was, doubtless, melancholy and moody, and capricious, sceptical, and even ambitious, as Mr. Herndon would understand these characteristics. He was unquestionably coarse and rude in many of his associations, his conceptions, and his language. But the moral heroism, the faith in duty and in goodness, the filial love of God, and the refined sympathy with the church, the lowliness of mind, the craving for sympathy, the openness and honesty of heart and speech, and the refined affections, the stern self-control, and the magnificent unselfishness of which he was capable, seem to have been beyond his partner's capacity to estimate or even to believe in. Mr. Lamon has evidently a spirit kindred to that of Mr. Herndon, and between them they have produced a portrait as like that of the original as those frightful images which are given by a mirror that in being itself cracked and defaced, and soiled and uneven, are untruthful, just in like proportion to the minuteness of detail with which it reflects the palid form of a fair face or a noble form.

TYERMAN'S LIFE OF JOHN WESLEY.*—The founder of Methodism has had many biographers. Watson, the Methodist theologian, wrote his life. Southey, from a literary point of view, and with no deep sympathy with the essential character of the Wesleyan movement, composed, nevertheless, a very engaging, if not a wholly satisfactory, memoir. Southey, with Coleridge's annotations, written in a more profound and appreciative tone, may still be read with profit by such as would see Methodism through the eyes of a scholar and a churchman, whose nature spontaneously recoiled from whatever seemed in his eyes of religious enthusiasm. Stevens in his History of Methodism has furnished a correct, fair,

* *The Life and Times of the Rev. John Wesley, M. A., founder of the Methodists.* By Rev. L. TYERMAN. In 3 vols. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1872.

and readable narrative of the career of its principal leader. These are some of the authors who have before dealt with the subject of the themes before us. Tyerman has had access to some new materials; he has explored the sources of knowledge with praiseworthy diligence; and his work will take its place at the head of the biographies of Wesley. It is not free, however, from literary crudities and infelicities, which are sometimes diverting, but which detract from the merit of the work.

TO AND FROM THE PASSION PLAY.*—The little village of Ober-Ammergau, in the Bavarian Highlands, has within a few years acquired a world-wide reputation, in consequence of the interest which has been awakened in the representation by a large portion of its inhabitants of a "Passion Play." As it is there enacted, it is no new thing. It dates back to a time when such performances were common everywhere throughout Christendom. It was instituted in consequence of a vow made by the village people in 1683, at a time when they were suffering from the ravages of "a plague." In their affliction, they turned to God, and promised if He would spare them they would perform every ten years, "for thankful remembrance and edifying contemplation, and by the help of the Almighty, the sufferings of Jesus the Saviour of the world." From that moment the plague ceased, and the vow has been religiously kept for more than two centuries. Every ten years there has been a representation of the sacred drama. Attention was first generally called to it some twenty years ago by Miss Howitt, in that charming book "*An Art-Student in Munich*;" and since then each succeeding exhibition has been attended by increasingly large assemblies. Several interesting accounts have been published of the last representation in 1871; but the most interesting and complete narrative is the one whose title we have here given. A full analysis of the different scenes of the Play is given; and, the author being a priest, there is a certain advantage in having the description from a Roman Catholic point of view.

DR. LOUIS BÜCHNER'S TREATISE ON MAN IN THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE† contains precisely the views which we

* *To and From the Passion Play*, in the Summer of 1871. By the Rev. G. H. DOANE, Pastor of St. Patrick's Cathedral, Newark, New Jersey. Boston: Patrick Donahoe. 1872. 16mo, pp. 311.

† *Man in the Past, Present, and Future*. A popular account of the results of recent scientific research as regards the origin, position, and prospects of the

should expect would be propounded by the author of "Force and Matter." "Man in the Past" was in his best form but one remove from the ape, and in his remoter types was anything in the lower forms of animal life, and anything lower still which your theory of development or education may require you to believe. The facts adduced in evidence for these conclusions are certain human bones and human implements of flint and bronze that prove men to have been coeval with certain animals now extinct, and supposed to have existed before the Diluvial and Glacial periods. This is Büchner's answer to the question "Whence are we?" "What are we?" or "Man in the present," is a material structure, the sameness of which with that of animals in the embryo and its subsequent developments prove that man has been developed from them by successive processes of advancement. Everything which exalts man, as marriage, social organization, the sense of shame, the belief in God, the art of numbering, the invention and use of tools, the use of fire and of clothes, the development of language, has been developed from the animal condition by a greater perfection in the bodily structure. "Where are we going?" or "Man in the future," is man as he is certain to become, when he is entirely delivered from the bondage of theological and spiritualistic prejudices, and reconstructed according to those practical views of progress which are inspired by materialism. The glorious results are comprehended by six words which contain all that can be theoretically or practically required for the future, namely, "Freedom, Culture, and Prosperity for all." This work is worth reading for several reasons, among which are conspicuous the boldness of the positions of the author, the baldness of his materialism, and the slenderness of the facts and arguments on which his conclusions rest. And yet he has the effrontery to appropriate to himself the words of another, written with another application: "There is no scepticism so offensive as that which doubts the facts of honest and careful observation; no infidelity so gross as that which disbelieves the deductions of competent and unbiassed judgments."

LIVES AND DEEDS WORTH KNOWING ABOUT.*—Of the same general character with his former well-known and useful volume,

human race. From the German of Dr. L. BÜCHNER, author of "Force and Matter," &c. By W. S. DALLAS, F.L.S. London: Asher & Co., 13 Bedford St., Covent Garden. 1872. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co.

* *Lives and Deeds worth knowing about.* With other Miscellanies. By the Rev. WM. F. STEVENSON. London: Strahan & Co., 56 Ludgate Hill. pp. 375.

"Praying and Working," this production gives charming pictures of men of very beautiful character, such as Pastor Harms, Hans Egede, Christian Spittler, Barth, Batsch, Neumark, Feneberg, Friedefeld, and Madame Zell, fit companions of those whom Dr. Stevenson portrayed before. A number of essays on Vagabonds, Hymns, Guesses at Truth, &c., of a lighter character, complete the volume. The setting is sometimes a little too large for the picture in the biographical papers; but we know too little of the devoted, simple-hearted philanthropists of Europe, and especially of those of Germany, and can easily forgive the fault. "Dr. Chalmers at Elberfeld," is really a practical homily for English Christians, or how to deal with pauperism, and "Matthew Claudius" is a hint to the literati on the nobleness of a *homme de lettres*, who makes truth and goodness a higher end than literary ambition, while he is thoroughly a man of letters still. The book is one of a class which needs to be multiplied, and to supplant in Sabbath school libraries the weak fictions which now inundate them.

BULLION'S LATIN-ENGLISH AND ENGLISH-LATIN DICTIONARY.*—This is a new imprint of a work that has been previously before the public. The author is a well-known and industrious compiler of school books. This Dictionary is an abridgment and re-arrangement of Riddle's *Lexicon*, which was founded on Freund's. A large collection of synonyms is incorporated by the compiler, and a Latin-English Dictionary adapted from that of Kaltschmidt. The aim was through great condensation, facilitated by system, to produce a dictionary of convenient size containing all that is necessary for ordinary use in schools and colleges. The result is certainly a very useful manual. It covers the range of Latin authors commonly read in schools and colleges; points out etymologies, usually with great care; indicates the composition; distinguishes some 7000 similar words, or "synonyms;" and classifies the definitions as "proper, metonymical, and figurative," and frequently also as "general and special," with the necessary subdivisions. Examples are given, with the author's name, but without specifying the place. The arrangement of the definitions is convenient for the eye. On the whole, the work seems well adapted to the end in view, and forms a good and convenient manual.

* *A Copious and Critical Latin-English and English-Latin Dictionary.* By Rev. P. BULLION, D.D. New York: Sheldon & Co. 8vo, pp. 1155.

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WITH THE COÖPERATION OF

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